Red Team goes maneuver: 1st Cav Div Arty as a maneuver BCT.

On 1 November 2003, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Div Arty), Red Team, at Fort Hood, Texas, received a mission that initiated its historic transformation from a force FA headquarters (FFA HQ) into the 1st Cav's 5th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. The 5th BCT did not perform the traditional roles and missions associated with its prior life as the 1st Cav Div Arty. From the BCT's activation in January 2004 until its redeployment from Iraq to Fort Hood in March, it operated as a maneuver BCT that owned ground in the Al Rashid District of the southeastern portion of Baghdad.

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To fulfill the FFA HQ mission, the Div Arty cut the division joint fires and effects cell (JFEC) and C Battery, 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery (C/1-21 FA), the target acquisition battery (TAB), to the division for the deployment. The JFEC was the coordinator of the 1st Cav's joint fires and effects and all the Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radars and lightweight countermortar radars (LCMRs) in the 1st Cav footprint.

The transformation and simultaneous preparation for combat operations in Iraq presented unprecedented challenges for the Red Team Soldiers. To our knowledge, no Div Arty has transformed into a combined arms brigade while maintaining FA combat readiness. The prevalence of Army missions requiring combat operations in complex urban environments means that units may face similar transitions in the future.

The goal of this article is to provide insights into this transformation and to show that it is a viable option for units in the future. We focus on the changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership and materiel required to transform a FFA HQ into a combined arms brigade charged with conducting full-spectrum operations in Iraq.

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Doctrine. This transformation presented unique opportunities for innovation. Before deploying, the staff took doctrine as the foundation and modified it to suit full-spectrum operations in Baghdad. In addition to mastering maneuver doctrine, the Div Arty staff applied FA doctrine in innovative ways to meet the requirements of maneuver and fire support in an urban fight.

Most importantly, the 5th BCT implemented an information operations (IO) framework that constituted the BCT's deep fight in combat. Throughout the OIF II deployment, the 5th BCT emphasized a holistic strategy of engagement with the local populace. This was at all levels, squad to brigade.

The BCT quickly discovered that IO truly is a decisive form of engagement, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. "Marginalize," "co-opt" and "leverage" became doctrinal tasks in their own right and were as vital to full-spectrum operations as "destroy," "neutralize" and "suppress."

Selected staff took part in two pre-deployment site surveys in Baghdad and brought back valuable information to use in developing the 5th Brigade's part of the 1st Cavalry Division's campaign plan. The plan centered on the simultaneous execution of five lines of operation (LOOs) with the desired end state of a secure Baghdad. (See Figure 1.)

The staff understood that security is a prerequisite for stability, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for prosperity. The ultimate goal of a free and prosperous Iraq has to be built upon a secure Baghdad, even if that end state takes years to achieve. The 5th Brigade's Al Rashid District took a tremendous step toward helping to achieve a free and prosperous Iraq when it had a 72-percent voter turnout in the January national elections.

Our BCT staff displayed the adaptability and creativity typical of fire supporters. Incidentally, fire support doctrine is ideally suited for full-spectrum combat operations in an urban environment. As shown in Figure 2, the 5th BCT modified the targeting model of Decide, Detect, Deliver (Track) and Assess ([D.sup.3]A) to synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects, including civil-military operations (CMO). By adapting proven targeting tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) normally applied to lethal fires and adding a fifth element--track--the BCT brought fires expertise to bear on lethal and nonlethal targets in Al Rashid.

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In Al Rashid, actions in LOOs 3 through 5 (Figure 1) support setting the conditions for generating human intelligence (HUMINT) that leads to effects to execute LOOs 1 and 2. The effects generated in LOOs 3 through 5 influenced the populace's perception of Coalition Forces positively and the populace's perception of the extremist anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) conversely. We then exploited these positive IO effects in HUMINT, leading to precision lethal targeting information.

This concept is simple yet powerful. The 5th BCT routinely achieved 80 percent lethal targeting effectiveness on its HUMINT-generated precision targets.

The Al Rashid battlespace is complex, requiring the BCT to execute synchronized activities across all five LOOs nearly simultaneously on any given day during the deployment. Figure 3 gives an example of the application of activities in support of all five LOOs during Operation Falcon Freedom in December 2004.

To accomplish the mission, the IO effects coordination cell (ECC) developed TTPs to synchronize events and assess targeting effects. The ECC treated each project or leader engagement as a conventional target with desired effects. The BCT leveraged these effects to increase HUMINT or change behavior toward Coalition Forces. The following steps outline the [D.sup.3]A targeting process that the BCT rehearsed at home station and put into practice in Iraq.

Decide. Rather than achieving the traditional kinetic lethal effects on an enemy military force, the brigade had to achieve more subtle effects on the civilian population while maintaining the ability to execute lethal effects on the insurgents. The priority was always force protection while the brigade contributed in Al Rashid to the overall movement of Iraq toward security.

Achieving effects, such as gaining the trust of the local nationals, ultimately led to HUMINT for the brigade's Soldiers who then contributed to the precision targeting process. The 5th BCT also sought to build Iraqi responsibility for political and business affairs, critical infrastructure and security, developing local institutional responsibility to help achieve security and then stability in Al Rashid.

Detect. To achieve the effects identified in Decide, the staff prioritized the needs of the local population, the impediments to meeting those needs and the "power brokers" capable of influencing public perception: imams, sheikhs, tribal leaders, technocrats and former military leaders. The decision of where to focus CMO had to include input from the Iraqi people and their leaders.

The people's expressed needs were "key terrain" in the urban fight and were depicted in the integrated area of operations (AO) intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that supported lethal and nonlethal targeting.

Coalition understanding of the community's needs followed by quick actions to empower the people to help meet those needs leads to local ownership of security and reconstruction.

Resources were limited, so selecting the highest payoff projects was critical. The 5th BCT sought low-dollar, high-impact projects that produced high local employment and had an immediate visible impact in Al Rashid. Most importantly, these types of projects generated local national goodwill, which set the conditions for effective HUMINT collection and, subsequently, for precision lethal targeting--hence, full-spectrum operations.

To illustrate the effectiveness of this approach, the 5th BCT increased organic HUMINT generation from less than 30 reports per month in April 2004 to 120 reports per month by September 2004.

Track. Unlike traditional artillery targets, these targets were complex and achieved effects over a long period and through multiple, sequential and simultaneous applications of the five LOOs. For example, a single CMO project might involve two or three sections of the brigade staff, a local contractor, non-governmental organizations, ministries of the Interim Iraqi Government and higher echelon staffs.

It was not enough to propose or even begin CMO projects. The brigade had to develop tracking systems to ensure its projects were planned, approved, resourced, contracted, executed, inspected and advertised.

It was not enough to track only the number of projects ongoing or the dollars spent to date. Instead the doctrinal idea of effects is more appropriate when measuring the impact of a particular project.

The BCT commander reviewed this process weekly at the nonlethal projects back brief. Projects were categorized by sewer, water, agriculture, etc., to facilitate discussion. See the tracking spreadsheet for sewage and solid waste CMO projects in Figure 4 on Page 13.

Deliver. Employing people from the local community was essential. As important was selecting a supervisor who had as vested an interest in the project as the people working for him. Local hires led to local ownership, force protection and HUMINT.

It was critical to clearly demonstrate what Coalition Forces were doing for the community through the local newspapers and TV and radio broadcasts. The citizens needed to know about the projects and how they would benefit from them. Patrols (squad leaders and Soldiers), tactical psychological teams (TPTs) and civil affairs teams (CATs) also delivered the IO messages.

With Al Rashid's low literacy rate, pictures were essential for effective IO. The 5th BCT developed battle damage assessment (BDA) books of before-during-and-after photographs of the projects to show the population that coalition-enabled projects were having a positive impact on their neighborhoods. By continuously showing the local Iraqi leadership what we were doing, we ensured they couldn't refute our good intentions, which increased our ability to hold them accountable for the security of their respective areas.

Assess. Good assessment requires asking the right questions. What was the effect on the population (was there a change in behavior)? Do "you" know that Coalition Forces did "this" for you and that Coalition Forces are concerned about "your" needs? Was there an increase in HUMINT as a result of a specific project? Did Coalition Forces achieve neutrality in an area that used to support or give tacit approval to insurgents?

The 5th BCT used a comprehensive assessment system that had measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP). A key point is that the subjective assessment of the leader who "owned" the ground was a critical part of the overall assessment of nonlethal effects.

Organization. The Div Arty had to change at all levels, from the separate company to the headquarters element. Three of the four organic FA battalions were attached to other brigades.

1-21 FA (-), First Strike, the divisional multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), was in the 5th BCT and demonstrated its flexibility. It trained and deployed as a motorized infantry battalion and was prepared to provide a Hot Platoon of M270A1 MLRS, as the Multinational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I) required.

The 68th Chemical Company and C/2-82 FA were attached to Task Force (TF) 1-21 FA. C/2-82 FA deployed the brigade's battery of M109A6 Paladins.

The 1st Cav's cavalry squadrons, 1-7 Cav (-) and 1-8 Cav (Motorized), rounded out the 5th Brigade's combat power.

In preparation for the Iraqi's national elections in January, the brigade leveraged additional assets from the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), to include 1-5 Cav, the 411th and 458th Combat Engineers and organic units, such as the 304th Iraqi Army Battalion, 2d Iraqi Intervention Force Battalion and the 1-1 and 3-1 Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) Commando Battalions. After the elections, the BCT became joint as well as combined when it received operational control of (OPCON) 2/24 Marines, a battalion that operated in the southern Baghdad AO.

Combat Service Support (CSS). The brigade required a forward support battalion (FSB) to support the newly attached combat units. The 1st Cav created the 515th FSB as a capabilities-based unit rather than a modified table of organization and equipment-(MTOE)-based unit. The unit's personnel and equipment were designed to provide the capabilities required for CSS to the 5th BCT, given that the 1st Cav's 27th Main Support Battalion (MSB), III Corps assets and civilian contractors were pushing all classes of supplies to the BCT.

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The 515th FSB required 450 additional personnel. The division resourced all personnel and equipment internally, forming three companies from five battalion-sized units. The brigade also added C Forward Support Company (FSC) to the 515th FSB for maintenance support for 1-8 Cav. The strength of the 515th FSB was about half the assigned strength of other support battalions, but given the supply push concept in place, the 515th was set to execute CSS for the brigade.

After we occupied the brigade's Forward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon in Baghdad, we realized the push concept had to be tailored to accommodate the environment in the 5th BCT's AO. The FSB staff provided excellent leadership and implemented a plan to account for the battalion's lack of personnel. The FSB staff prioritized the work and executed the duties efficiently and effectively by stressing to the FSB Soldiers the importance and relevance of the mission at hand. The line battalions helped by providing tremendous support from their own crews--by not leaving all the maintenance work up to the FSB mechanics.

Local Iraqis were hired to augment the maintenance teams, working on tires, changing tracks and doing other less complex maintenance tasks. This freed the mechanics to focus on high-skill tasks.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 5th BCT. To accomplish the mission of a maneuver brigade headquarters, the Div Arty underwent a drastic transformation of its own to become HHC, 5th BCT. Almost every staff section had to adjust to fulfill the requirements of a maneuver mission as the MTOE for a Div Arty staff is about half that of a legacy maneuver BCT. Every leader and Soldier had to be optimized for the deployment.

* Intelligence -- A traditional Div Arty S2 section supports counterstrike missions and requires five Soldiers. The wider scope of BCT intelligence operations necessitated 15 additional personnel. The S2 created the subsections of HUMINT (S2x), detainee operations (brigade interrogation facility, or BIF), analysis and control team (ACT), joint coordination cell (JCC), weapons intelligence and forensics team (WIT), plans and current operations to meet the demands of intelligence-driven operations in Iraq. Analysts already working in the brigade S2 shop adjusted the IPB to gain counterinsurgency intelligence.

The formation of a robust S2x/targeting cell was essential in a full-spectrum fight. The S2x cell was the liaison with US and MultiNational Force (MNF) Special Operations Forces (SOF) and "other" government agencies. The integration of the JFEC targeting officer into the S2x cell ensured that actionable intelligence entered the [D.sup.3]A targeting cycle quickly.

Detainee operations also were part of the S2x cell and provided the S2 with a thorough exploitation of evidence, interrogations and witness statements, providing closure or requiring follow-on targeting.

The brigade acquired additional intelligence assets that were essential in fighting a counterinsurgency. B Company of the 101st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, part of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), provided our ACT for intelligence analysis, signals intelligence section (Prophet) and HUMINT section with three tactical HUMINT teams (THTs).

The ACT had to have a strong analytical leader for accurate and timely interpretation of information. Initially the amount of information entering the brigade daily exceeded the capacity to assimilate it. Over time, the analysts in the ACT developed methods of processing the large volumes of disparate information into a coherent threat assessment.

The contemporary operating environment (COE) was the framework within which we templated the threat groups. For example, the threats in the battalions' AOs were templated on a matrix by insurgent leaders, known organizations, exact locations, etc., and then the activities for each were annotated. These activities included, but were not limited to, providing insurgent financing, suicide bombers, mortar/missile crews, other attackers, kidnappers, safe houses, anti-Coalition Force intelligence, and caches of weapons and munitions as well as manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). The 5th BCT updated the activities of threats on a map of its AO every 72 hours to assess the changes in the threat locations and levels of activity.

Using a COE template ensured doctrinal consistency and portability to other units. This became especially important when we dealt with adjacent units from different services or established links between threat groups that were common to several AOs.

* Other Staff Sections -- Other sections faced similar challenges. The S5 section began with one officer. Lessons learned from the pre-deployment site surveys showed the BCT S5 needed additional personnel to support CMO purchasing and paying agents for projects. Shortly after arriving in Iraq, the scope of CMO expanded significantly. The S5 shop added five additional troops: one officer, one NCO, and three Soldiers, for a total of eight personnel.

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The engineer section needed a substantial overhaul as well. The 8th Engineer Battalion provided B Company, combat engineers, to the 5th BCT. The company had to be augmented to execute traditional combat engineer tasks with the amount of construction and construction management ongoing in AI Rashid as well as address the district's sewer, water, electrical and solid waste problems. With no direct support (DS) engineer battalion, the brigade had to optimize B/8 EN's combat power.

An engineer's headquarters element and assault and obstacle platoons became brigade assets. The assault and obstacle platoons were dedicated to improving force protection on FOB Falcon. The 1st and 2d platoons were OPCON to 1-7 and 1-8 Cav, respectively. This task organization mitigated the lack of a doctrinal engineer battalion per BCT.

In addition, the 5th BCT aggressively pursued and acquired additional engineer assets from the 411th and 458th Engineer Battalions to be OPCON to the BCT when it executed operations with massive mobility (Operation Hardball) and countermobility (Operation Thunderstruck) in Al Rashid. These operations were designed to provide force protection for the Coalition Forces and deny freedom of movement to the insurgents. These assets came from the 36th Engineer Group supporting the 1st Cav.

Training. The train-up for OIF II included everything from FA readiness training to BCT lethal combat operations to stability tasks. The Div Arty's mission-essential task list (METL) changed to a maneuver brigade's METL. The 5th Brigade focused on training the units and staff to fight a counterinsurgency across the spectrum of operations.

Pre-Deployment Training. The brigade headquarters executed a comprehensive training plan consisting of individual readiness training (IRT), small arms on ranges, convoy live-fire exercises (LFXs), reflexive fire tables, rotations in the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) shoot house and platoon/company/battalion situational training exercises (STXs). In addition, the brigade deployed to both the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, for training.

The 5th BCT also was responsible for training 1-21 FA, 68th Chemical Company and HHC, 1-7 and 1-8 Cav executed training with their former brigades.

* Five Phases of Training -- Phase I began with division leader training for platoon sergeants and above in September 2003.

Phase II consisted of individual training from 15 October to 14 November 2003. Train-the-trainers gave briefings on country orientation, anti-terrorism/force protection, rules of engagement (ROE), unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs. The Div Arty conducted IRT in nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC); first aid; land navigation; combat lifesaving; and weapons qualification.

In many cases, Soldiers would fill roles unrelated to their military occupational specialties (MOS), which increased the requirement for thorough training. One example of this is training cooks in detainee operations so they could run the 5th BCT interrogation facility.

Phase III focused on unit collective competencies. The Div Arty staff trained as a maneuver brigade staff in the NTC's leader training program (LTP) in November 2003, and all units conducted collective LFXs in early January 2004. Units trained on troop-leading procedures (TLP), convoy live fires, tactical road marches, evaluation and treatment of casualties, and calls for medical evacuations (MEDEVACs).

Phase IV consisted of unit collective competencies in warfighting tasks, counterinsurgency operations and stability operations, 1-21 FA trained from the squad to the battalion levels, and HHB Div Arty trained from the squad to brigade levels.

Training included the integration of disparate unit types. Both 1-21 FA and the 68th Chemical Company transitioned to motorized infantry units while retaining their unique specialties. 1-21 FA retained the readiness to fire Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) missions by fielding the M270A1 MLRS launcher, and the 68th Chemical Company maintained proficiency in hazardous response team (HRT) operations in support of MNC-I.

In Phase V, the 5th BCT participated in a division-wide mission readiness exercise (MRX) at Fort Hood from 11 through 17 December 2003. This exercise was the capstone training event--the first time the brigade simulated operations with 1-7 and 1-8 Cav. The MRX trained the brigade staff in planning, operations and the dissemination of information.

The exercise simulated demonstrations and protests, IED detections, mortar attacks, VBIEDs, the transition to offensive operations and local national assassinations. The battle staff developed battle-tracking techniques that proved essential in Iraq.

The brigade staff worked with the newly attached civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP) and Ml units for the first time during the MRX. Working with these critical elements before deploying helped build the staff into a capable maneuver headquarters. The ECC coordinated the actions of PSYOP and CA under the brigade's IO plan.

Future MRX training should include additional tasks. Troop management at the brigade level became increasingly important in Iraq because many brigades had units at several different FOBs. Troop-to-task issues were a constant challenge. Units needed to manage tasks that ranged from regular combat patrols to CMO. Troop management training should be stressed during pre-deployment training.

At the MRX, the brigade staff learned how to setup and operate many of the digital battle-tracking systems not previously part of the Div Arty headquarters. The staff had to learn how to use the maneuver control system-light (MCS-L) and the experimental command post of the future (CPOF). Digital battle tracking became extremely important, and the MRX was a good opportunity to gain proficiency.

The S6 had to remote most digital systems from vehicles into a hardened building. He consolidated the equipment from four expando-vans into one shelter that served as the nexus for telephone, radio and networks. It was important to replicate the conditions at the FOB in Baghdad as closely as possible. The staff overcame many of the limitations of the MCS and all-source analysis system-light (ASAS-L) and developed solutions to address the need for battlefield information where these systems failed to provide the functionality promised.

* Training FA Readiness -- During its transition to a maneuver brigade headquarters, the Div Arty also had to train FA combat readiness. The training schedule for Div Arty units was rigorous. The Div Arty executed Paladin and MLRS tables in support of the brigades' rotations to NTC in the months before deploying. 1-21 FA completed M270A1 new equipment training (NET) and certified 12 crews.

The Div Arty staff continued to resource and equip the artillery battalions for gunnery, firing range, IO and radar training--all of the tasks from the Div Arty METL. During this time, the adaptability of the Red Team Field Artillerymen truly was tested, and they rose to the challenge.

* Joint Operations and Operational Fires and Effects Training -- In retrospect, the brigade would have benefited from training in conducting joint operations and providing fires and effects for targets that had operational- and strategic-level consequences, both of which became central aspects of full-spectrum operations in Al Rashid.

The brigade assumed control of 2/24 Marines immediately after the national elections. This was a capstone change in our task organization, making us joint, and came on the heels of a near-year-long working relationship with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) operating in the north part of the Babil Province that is just south of Baghdad. It helped that we had worked so closely together.

Likewise, training to execute operational fires and effects at the brigade level should be part of future training exercises. The 5th BCT routinely executed operational fires in support of the International Zone (IZ) by denying insurgent groups the ability to fire long-range rockets--typically the 122-mm rocket with a range out to 27 kilometers--at operational and strategic targets, such as the US Embassy and the Center of Iraqi Government.

At any given time, the BCT commanded or controlled joint assets for operational level fires and effects to support the counterrocket mission. These included the Shadow, Armed Predator, or Hunter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); MNC-I long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD) teams; EA-6B Prowler electronic attack support; Scathe View (C-130 with a thermal intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform); national measurements and signals intelligence (MASINT); a joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) with its moving target identification (MTI); AC-130 Spectre Gunships; sea/air/land (SEAL) sniper teams; Army attack aviation; and organic artillery.

Leadership. In November 2003, the Div Arty staff participated in the LTP at the NTC. The two-week program was central to the transformation of the Div Arty staff into a maneuver brigade staff.

The program focused on the military decision-making process (MDMP) in maneuver brigade planning for full-spectrum operations. The staff trained on planning tactical operations using the abbreviated MDMP and battle drills adopted from its maneuver brethren.

The LTP observers helped the staff members change their thought processes from creating FA support plans (FASPs) to creating full maneuver operations orders (OPORDs). The observers also honed the staff's understanding of TLP.

LTP dramatically improved the operations of the BCT tactical operations center (TOC) through training vignettes in planning traffic control points (TCPs), cordons and searches, and cordons and attacks/raids; integrating air-ground operations; and transitioning to offensive operations. In addition, selected staff members attended cultural training in Jordan and city-management/essential services training with the City of Austin in Texas.

This leadership and other specialized training contributed significantly to the brigade's ability to command and control up to nine subordinate units that were the equivalents of battalion task forces, ranging from Iraqi Commandos to US Marines.

Additional leadership requirements were manning and operating Army support teams (ASTs). These 5th BCT ASTs were imbedded in Iraqi units for the duration of the deployment. The AST provided the Iraqi forces leadership training and support. In all, more than 50 5th BCT personnel served on ASTs.

Materiel. The brigade S4 shop had to develop a support plan for the newly formed brigade. In order to evaluate the logistical needs of the brigade, the S4 shop had to rebuild the Div Arty's logistical database from scratch. Inventories of the new battalions' equipment were compiled, to include the number of on-hand items, such as weapons and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Until early January 2004, the Div Arty had to track logistics for all of the FA battalions as well.

Once this database was compiled, the S4 could evaluate the logistical needs of each unit and work to correct deficiencies. At the height of the inventory load, the S4 tracked one armor, one MLRS and three cannon battalions; one cavalry squadron; one each chemical, signal, MI and engineer company; the provisional FSB and HHC 5th BCT.

The S4 and S3 sections relied on flexibility, innovative thinking and cooperation to overcome challenges resulting from the unit's unusual task organization. Because the 515th FSB did not have an official unit identification code (UIC), it was difficult to acquire ammunition to support weapons zeroing, qualification and training. Many Soldiers received new weapons and needed to zero and qualify them before deploying.

The brigade headquarters worked around the lack of a UIC by consolidating ammunition from all the subordinate units under one brigade allocation and tasking one unit to run a range attended by all units in the brigade. This system required careful resource management to ensure there was plenty of ammunition available.

The Div Arty's transformation to a BCT was a tremendous challenge and a valuable learning experience. The requirement to train for full-spectrum maneuver operations in a rapidly changing environment and embrace new methods of operations, all while retaining the ability to support the division with artillery fires, truly tested the adaptability and agility of Red Team Field Artilleryman.

Although the road to success as maneuver was a tough one, the Red Team proved the Army can count on Field Artillerymen to thrive in that role.

Operation Falcon Freedom -- Ministry of Interior (MOI) Commandos, Iraqi
Police Service (IPS), the 40th Iraqi Armored Brigade (-), US 1-8 Cav and
US 1-7 Cav conducted a combined cordon and search of suspected anti-
Iraqi forces (AIF) in several Al Rashid zones. As the operation neared
completion, the committees in LOOs 3, 4 and 5 began meeting.

The 5th BCT's Five LOOs:
1. Outer cordon is set in combat operations.
2. Actions on the objective employed ISF; the tactical command post was
   run by combined forces.
3. Essential Services Committee began meeting.
4. Women's Governance Committee began meeting.
5. Blue Ribbon Committee for economic pluralism began meeting.

Figure 3: Operation Falcon Freedom, conducted in December 2004, is an
example of simultaneous full-spectrum operations in AI Rashid executing
the five LOOs listed in Figure 1.

By Colonel Stephen R. Lanza, Major Robert L. Menti, Captain Luis M. Alvarez and First Lieutenant Michael R. Dalton

Colonel Stephen R. Lanza commands the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Div Arty) at Fort Hood, Texas; he trained the Div Arty as the division's 5th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and deployed it to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II from January 2004 to March 2005. In his previous assignment, he was the Team Chief for the Strategic Concepts Group of the Army Staff at the Pentagon.

Major Robert L. Menti is the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery S3. Also in 1st Cav Div Arty, he was the S3 for the 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) and Aviation Brigade Fire Support Officer. He deployed to OIF II as the 1-21 FA S3 and later served as the 5th BCT S3.

Captain Luis M. Alvarez is the S2 of the 1st Cav Div Arty and deployed to OIF as the S2 of the 5th BCT. Also in the 1st Cav, he was the G2 Targeting Officer and the S2 for 4-7 Cav. He is a graduate of the US Army Counterintelligence Course, Fort Huachuca, New Mexico.

First Lieutenant Michael R. Dalton is a Firing Platoon Leader in 2-82 FA, Steel Dragons, in the 1st Cavalry Division. During OIF II, he was the 5th BCT S1. He is a 2003 graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point.