Recovery operations: a lifesaver in OIF.

You are the battalion S4 in Iraq. You've just been told to conduct a logistical resupply convoy to a location 50 kilometers away from your base in the middle of the Sunni Triangle. The tactical operations center (TOC) tells you that the batteries have been tasked to provide a heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun trucks, and a five-ton truck with water trailer for the convoy and you are to bring your HMMWV for command and control ([C.sup.2]).

During your pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs), you discover that the five-ton has a slow leak on the right rear dual so you inform the TOC, which directs the unit to replace the truck. Now you are running behind and need to leave as soon as possible to maximize daylight hours as it is already past 1400. As soon as the replacement truck arrives, you conduct a quick PCC/PCI on the truck, give the convoy brief and move out.

At around 1500 about 15 kilometers short of your destination and in the middle of an ideal ambush site, your trail gun truck calls to inform you that the five-ton has a flat right front tire. Your mind races and you begin checking off all the items that need to be done to get back on the road. As you secure the area and begin assessing the problem, you discover that the spare tire for the five-ton is flat. Angry at yourself for not checking that before moving out, you call your destination to see if they have a tire you can use--they do. You take one gun truck and move out to get the spare tire and leave orders to have the flat tire removed so the truck will be ready to have the new tire mounted when you get back.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

It is almost 1700 when you return to your convoy after obtaining the replacement tire, and you discover the five-ton is not jacked up and the tire is still not off. None of the vehicles had a working jack or lug wrench. You give them your lug wrench and have the HEMTT come forward to pick up the front end of the five-ton with the crane. In the middle of elevating the HEMTT, the crane jams at a 90-degree angle and will not move. As a last ditch effort, you use the outriggers to elevate the back of the HEMTT. This method used in conjunction with the winch elevates the front of the five-ton, and you change the tire.

It is 1930 and starting to get dark before you are back on the road. You review all that went wrong and how to prevent future similar events. Fortunately for you, the enemy did not become aware of you and your troops as you stretched a 30-minute recovery operation into more than four hours. It is obvious that if you want your Soldiers to survive this tour, you must reduce their exposure to enemy attack during recovery operations.

Could this really happen to you? You better believe it! Here is how you avoid exposing your Soldiers so unnecessarily.

We had not been in Iraq long when we discovered the paramount importance of key recovery equipment, good recovery training and rehearsals and effective PCCs/PCIs. See the figure with the list of essential recovery equipment and their national stock numbers (NSNs) on Page 34.

If you are deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and are not sure what your mission will be, prepare your Soldiers for good vehicle recovery--it is applicable to everything. By ensuring quick, efficient recovery operations, you will not be forced to react to unfolding challenges as in the introductory scenario and will safeguard the lives your Soldiers.

Robo Impact Tools. This is an electric impact type wrench that plugs into the standard slave receptacle of all military vehicles. It radically reduced our recovery time. This tool will not always break the lug nuts loose, but once they are broken, it reduces the time it takes to torque the nuts off and on.

Key to the Robo Tool's use is training and rehearsals. We had recovery teams identified and trained to work as "pit crews" for flat tires. Once we knew we needed to change a tire, the leader with the tool moved to that vehicle and was helped by at least two other Soldiers: one to jack up the truck and another to break the lug nuts loose with a lug wrench. We minimized the time required to change the tires.

To speed this process use a wrecker crane instead of a jack to raise the vehicle.

PCC/PCI: Ensure the tool is present and your pit crew is identified, has trained on the equipment and is rehearsed.

Basic Issue Items (BII). It is very important to inspect your BII and ensure they are complete and will work for your mission. For example, BII for the HMMWV includes a scissor jack. This piece of equipment might work on an empty vehicle, but once it is combat loaded and has force protection measures on it, the scissor jack is inadequate to elevate the HMMWV. We made sure all HMMWVs had hydraulic bottle jacks, which would lift them no matter what their load configuration.

PCC/PCI: Ensure all BII is present and serviceable.

Additional Load List (ALL). There are additional items you could have. For example, HMMWVs usually do not carry spare tires. We never left the perimeter without at least one spare tire for every three HMMWVs in a convoy, and one per HMMWV was preferred.

Also, HMMWVs should carry tow chains as ALL. They can be very helpful when you don't have much time and need to move a short distance to a more secure area.

PCC/PCI: Spare tires should be present and serviceable, tow chains should be present and operators trained in hook-up and tow procedures.

Tow Bars (Light and Heavy). These need to be present and serviceable, and your crews must know how to attach them. An unserviceable or improperly attached tow bar can result in a catastrophic accident. Check them often, and replace them if damaged.

Additionally, heavy tow bars use different feet to attach to different equipment (a five-ton requires a different foot attachment for a tow bar than a HEMTT). It is not unusual for tow bars to be missing or to show up through the supply system missing the foot attachments.

The middle of a recovery operation is the wrong time and place to find the tow bar feet are missing or wrong.

PCC/PCI: Be sure tow bars are present and serviceable plus have the proper foot attachments and the crews responsible for their employment are identified, trained and rehearsed.

Crane Operations (HEMTT and HEMTT Wreckers). In the hands of a trained crew, this equipment is invaluable. In OIF, it was not unusual to run out of spare tires.

If you have a deadlined HMMWV and towing assets are committed or the vehicle cannot be towed, you can place that HMMWV in the back of a HEMTT or heavy expanded-mobility ammunition trailer (HEMAT) using two HEMTT cranes. If you are out of HEMAT spare tires, you can stack a HEMAT on another HEMAT. A well-trained crew can load and tie down a HMMWV into a HEMAT or HEMTT in five to seven minutes and stack a HEMAT on a HEMAT in 20 minutes.

Recovery using cranes and carrying everything from HMMWVs to water trailers to HEMATs always gave the convoy commanders options.

PCC/PCI: Ensure that the "Snatch Cranes" are identified along with the carrying HEMTT or HEMTT/HEMAT combination and Soldiers are trained, rehearsed and equipped with enough ratchet straps for tie downs (six ratchets per piece preferable due to road conditions in Iraq).

Obtaining these key pieces of equipment is important, but training and rehearsals are essential. The battalion trained key leaders from each battery on the recovery methods and gave them time to train their batteries on the tasks and display proficiency in a recovery validation. Time standards were established and units were held to them, such as crane operations complete with tie down in 20 minutes or less. Most units were much less.

During our 12-month tour in OIF, we placed a combined mileage of two million miles on our fleet. There were many recovery operations during our year, and our recovery times consistently improved while in country. Before deployment, we trained recovery operations as a part of most training exercises, but these tasks were usually pulling a vehicle out of a ditch, versus loading a HMMWV on a HEMAT, because it was not mission capable (NMC) or disabled due to an improvised explosive devise (IED). Additionally, these training events only included maintenance and not crane operations and the pit-crew concept.

As many operators as possible should be included in recovery training, incorporating it into all training and expanding the number of recovery tasks trained. Additionally, deploying units should conduct a recovery validation, certifying all maintenance teams and operators on key recovery tasks.

One thing is certain: we will continue to train on these recovery tasks to ensure we never will have a convoy like the one described at the beginning of this article.

Medium and Light Tow Bars
Medium Tow Bar with    NSN 2540-01-267-2912 (1ea)      $1,034.00
  Standard Foot
Medium Tow Bar Foot    NSN 2540-00-545-2337 (2ea)        $268.26
Light Tow Bar          NSN 4710-01-371-7292/7293/7294    $282.00
Light Tow Bar Foot     NSN 5340-01-022-4686 (2ea)        $126.00
Light Tow Bar Pin      NSN 5315-00-624-0543 (4ea)         $22.03
  Assembly

M113 Family Tow Bars
Tow Bar with           NSN 2540-00-936-7801 (1ea)        $997.00
  Standard Foot
Tow Bar Foot (Light)   NSN 5340-01-046-4770 (2ea)        $163.53
Tow Bar Pin (Light)    NSN 5315-01-031-6207 (5ea)          $9.64
Tow Bar Foot           NSN 5340-01-051-3609 (1ea)        $128.49
  (Medium)
Tow Bar Pin (Medium)   NSN 5315-01-035-5307 (1ea)         $17.44

Tools
Robo Impact Tool       NSN 5130-01-299-1675 (1ea)      $2,513.00
12-Ton Hydraulic Jack  NSN 5120-01-146-8096 (1ea)        $142.00

Key Recovery Equipment with National Stock Numbers (NSNs)

By Major Richard A. McConnell

Major Richard A. McConnell returned in April 2004 from 12 months in Iraq as the S3 and then Executive Officer of 1st Battalion, 12th Field Artillery (1-12FA), 17th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Previously, he was the Operations Officer for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST)-West at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He commanded Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps Artillery in Germany. He was a battery Fire Direction Officer in 1-320 FA, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm.