Reconnaissance in anti-amphibious operations.

Organization and maintenance of continuous coordination is an essential component of the overall effort to prepare and conduct operations. It is also one of the main functional duties of commanding generals (commanders) and staffs at different command and control echelons. It must be said that the effective manuals, regulations and other directive documents provide a sufficiently comprehensive rundown on what all officials should do while organizing coordination in the main types of combat operations conducted by troops (forces). Yet, as is evident from the record of local wars and armed conflicts that happened in the last few decades of the 20th century, the endeavor to translate manual rules into actual combat practice runs into a number of difficult problems, which considerably complicate mission performance.

As the present writer sees it, the most difficult affair in terms of organizing coordination, of all the variety of forms of combat operations conducted by operational (operational-strategic) formations of the armed forces, is the anti-amphibious operation (AAO) mounted by the joint effort of the Land Forces, the Navy and the Air Force in the border area between the three physical mediums (land, water and air), which is the type of operation that in the present period takes on an increased importance.

Suffice it to mention the fact that after World War II the United States and its allies landed 94 amphibious and airborne assault forces of various size. One of the biggest amphibious assaults was the Inch' on operation involving 40,000 U.S., British and South Korean officers and men, who landed on the Korean Peninsula coast in September 1950. In 1982, British armed forces staged a successful amphibious assault on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The 1991 Gulf war against Iraq saw a full-scale coalition amphibious landing on the islands of Failaka and Bubiyan.

As is common knowledge, the anti-amphibious operation is a joint operation by the Armed Forces services and represents a totality of combat operations, ones coordinated in terms of aim, missions, space and time, as pursued by troops of a front and by naval forces, which are conducted in accordance with a unified concept and plan jointly with Air Force and Air Defense large strategic formations in order to interdict the adversary's invasion from the sea, to disrupt (rebuff) the landing of his amphibious and airborne assault forces, and to hold the defended coast with its important facilities. The present writer is convinced that the main meaning of coordination is in coordinating efforts of force groupings belonging to different services, and that it is this part of work done by commanding general (commander) and staff that is crucial to successful amphibious landing defense.

Bearing witness to the above is the record of past wars and armed conflicts. For example, the September 1944 German amphibious landing on the island of Sursari (Gogland) in the central part of the Gulf of Finland was disrupted owing to the well-organized teamwork between the aviation and the Baltic Fleet forces, which ended in the defeat of the enemy. Proceeding from naval reconnaissance information, the 9th and 11th air assault divisions blocked the air cover of the German assault force on airfields at Rakvere and delivered six powerful strikes at the enemy's movement group. The result was the sinking of nine troop landing vessels, one transport ship, and several landing barges; two ships were crippled and 22 fighter planes were shot down. (1)

An example of the opposite kind was the Japanese anti-amphibious operation in the Philippines in October 1944. There being no coordination between the land force, separate groups of ships and the aviation, primarily reconnaissance aviation, the Japanese AAO, though powered by major forces, was a total failure. (2)

Characteristically, both above examples are directly linked not only with specifics of coordination between combined units of different armed forces services, but also with so important a component thereof as the teamwork between reconnaissance forces and assets.

In the modern conditions, an anti-amphibious operation will involve, apart from the Land Forces, the Navy and the Air Force, some other troops, military units and bodies designed to provide for the state's military security by the military methods, as well as their command and control elements: the Internal Troops and other forces of the Interior Ministry, the Border Troops of the Federal Border Service, units of the Ministry for the Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Calamities, the Federal Security Service, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communications and Information under the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Service of Railway Troops of the Russian Federation, and the Foreign Intelligence Service (hereinafter, for brevity, other troops). Besides, the armed forces of Russia's allies may take a direct and active part in the organization and conduct of AAO in separate operational sectors. It must be said that so far the structure, we apons and basics of operational employment in the majority of them are identical to the Russian ones. Seemingly there should not be any particular problems with organization and maintenance of continuous coordination between military units of our states. Yet, the experience of recent operational training involving army representatives of CIS states, the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation points to the existence of numerous problems, both objective and subjective, in the organization of coordination between them.

The subjective ones are due to personal traits characterizing commanding generals (commanders), chiefs of staff and other leaders as well as staff officers. I believe the most characteristic and general shortcoming in their work is their underestimation of the role and importance of reconnaissance as a most important type of operational support, their inability to grasp the direct relation between its efficiency on the one hand and its timely organization and continuous conduct by different forces and assets on the other.

The objective problems in the organization of teamwork between reconnaissance forces and assets can in turn be divided into two big groups: organizational and technical. Number one organizational problem is the lack of a unified approach to the drafting of guideline documents regulating the procedure for and sequence of coordination between reconnaissance forces and assets belonging to different power structures. The main hitch in this sense is the existence of inter-agency barriers, which hinder ample and effective reconnaissance information exchanges in the interests of preparing AAO.

The basis for organizing coordination between the Armed Forces and other troops, including between their reconnaissance forces and assets, is a decision by the Supreme High Command, as well as orders, directives and instructions by the Defense Minister and heads of other ministries and agencies.

In a period of threat, it is planned to reassign to military districts that part of other troops, which is deployed in their territory. That will considerably facilitate solution of many coordination problems, because the attracted troops (forces) will be entirely under the control of the commanders of military districts authorized to act as operational-strategic commands. Yet, this kind of reassignment is hopelessly late. To make an efficient use of reconnaissance forces and assets, coordination between the reconnaissance services of the Armed Forces and other troops is better organized at an earlier stage, that is, in peacetime. What is due to become the basis regulating organization of coordination both during a war and in peacetime are interagency regulations and instructions approved by the heads of the relevant power structures.

As of today, this kind of guideline documents is available only for the Armed Forces and the Federal Border Service, but these too, as I see it, fail to reflect in detail all matters related to organization and maintenance of coordination between reconnaissance forces and assets of the Armed Forces and the Federal Border Service.

The specifics of tasks pursued by different agencies imply confidentiality of the information received. Therefore, full-scale information exchanges between non-subordinated structures are not only impossible but also frequently harmful. It is precisely the mechanism for cooperation between reconnaissance services of forces and assets belonging to different services and different agencies that should be drawn up as early as the peacetime period. It may include a set of different measures, but its main goal is to give unequivocal replies to these questions: Who organizes coordination in the interests of reconnaissance support for some or other missions? How (in what way and by what method) is coordination organized and maintained? When (in what period and within what timeframe) is organization of coordination carried out?

As is evident from combat practice, organization and maintenance of teamwork between reconnaissance forces and assets is on the basis of personal contacts between officials of relevant power structures and has no clear-cut legal base. The efficiency of those measures, therefore, is directly dependent on the subjective human factor and cannot fully meet the demands placed on the organization and conduct of a modern joint operation.

It would not be out of place in this situation to bring back to memory and use in practice the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War, when the stem reality pushed forward the acute need to urgently draw up directive documents organizing coordination. For example, the Armed Forces got, as early as 1943, when they started a strategic offensive, Regulations on Joint Actions of the Land Forces with the Navy and Military River Flotillas, which played a significant role of its own in subsequent front and fleet operations.

As I see it, to save time and ensure quality drafting of the legal foundations of coordination, it is necessary to form working groups manned not only by General Staff officers but also representatives of all federal executive authorities.

Another no less important organizational problem, which is directly linked with the foregoing one and practically follows from it, is the lack of a joint body controlling reconnaissance forces and assets of different federal executive bodies in the interests of preparing and running an operation in strategic sectors. The necessity of its creation is dictated by the growing role and importance of an early warning system that gives notice of a possible enemy aggression. It is of particular importance to create, in due time, a joint reconnaissance command and control element in isolated strategic sectors, where all forms of employment of the Armed Forces are possible, including anti-amphibious operations.

In my view, it is most expedient to form joint reconnaissance command and control centers on the basis of reconnaissance directorates of the military districts. Their main peacetime task will be organizing coordination between reconnaissance forces and assets of different federal executive authorities. In a period of threat and in wartime they will control all reconnaissance bodies and maintain continuous coordination in the interests of front defense operations. Consequently, the overall command of the troops of all federal executive authorities will be directly exercised, in that period, by the military district (front) commander.

Some military specialists believe, however, that the overall control of troops and forces during an AAO should be the duty of the navy commander, because it is precisely this structure that will bear the brunt of opposition to the adversary at all stages of an amphibious landing operation (save for the last one, the direct repulsion of an amphibious landing and beach combat operations). The problem of command and control in coastal sectors became particularly aggravated in the last decade of the 20th century in connection with the reform of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, in whose course some part of the land forces in some military districts was reassigned to the Navy. Accordingly, command and control of reconnaissance forces and assets as well as organization of coordination between them should be made the duty of the Navy's reconnaissance directorate.

World War II history knows many examples of different solutions to this problem. The Supreme High Command Headquarters issued a directive, on November 22, 1941, creating a unified command of the Crimea forces, which was authorized to exercise control over the 51st Independent Army and the Maritime Army, all units in the Crimean Peninsula and operationally the Black Sea Fleet. The joint command outfit was headed by Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, with Lieutenant General P.I. Batov, commander of the 51st Independent Army, appointed as his deputy for the land forces, although the Crimea's staff and Military Council were created on the army basis. The fact that the staff of the 51st IA had no naval reconnaissance specialists complicated concrete planning of the use of reconnaissance forces and assets. (3)

In April 1942, the Supreme High Command Headquarters formed the Chief Command of the North Caucasian Sector under Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny. He was given control over the forces of the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol Defense Area, the North Caucasian Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. The sector staff had a 26-strong naval team, which included (apart from radar officers) signals personnel, rear services personnel, intelligence officers as well as specialists from among petty officers and the ranks, something that considerably enhanced efficiency of reconnaissance. (4)

The experience of joint combat operations showed that, given the decisive role of the Land Forces in the coastal sectors, the fleet could be operationally subordinated to the front, whose staff, having a naval sector, provided for the competent use of the naval forces and for coordination with the naval reconnaissance forces and assets. To capture ports and enemy bases, the Black Sea Fleet was given, on terms of operational subordination, a land force grouping.

In my view, this principle of control over joint force groupings is expedient in modern conditions as well. It is necessary to stress once again that the greatest efficiency of troop control in coastal sectors was achieved after the creation of joint staffs, which included representatives of all military units of all Armed Forces services operating in the given region. The attempts to serve the purpose with reliance on the existing staffs usually gave no desired effect. The reasons for this state of affairs are due primarily to the fact that there are no specialists representing different Armed Forces services on combined-arms staffs, who are ready to start on mission performance immediately.

The same is evident from the modern practical experience of operational training in military districts. It shows that temporary joint command and control elements created for the period of command-and-staff exercises and drills on the principle of detachment of tactical command and control teams from all forces supported by the federal executive authorities can cope with their tasks only by dint of huge efforts, there being no smoothness of teamwork and coordination. The said problem is particularly acute where the reconnaissance control system is concerned.

Directly linked with the latter is yet another problem which is essentially about the following. The majority of staff officers in military districts, including intelligence officers, have an inadequate idea of the designation, structure and capabilities of the reconnaissance elements of the Navy, the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as other troops and bodies of federal executive authority, which are in direct cooperation with them. An analysis of results of command-and-staff exercises shows that members of the tactical command and control teams spend most of their time attempting to communicate to staff officers precisely this kind of information, rather than concentrating on organization and maintenance of coordination. The themes of officers' commander training programs currently in force in the Armed Forces are about things other than the TOE structure, assignments and capabilities of other troops. For this reason, one sees a solution to this problem in familiarizing the officers with collaborating re connaissance forces and assets in the course of individual training under the supervision of their immediate superiors. It is also necessary to invite representatives of the reconnaissance elements of relevant federal executive agencies immediately prior to command-and-staff exercises and drills and in a period preceding intelligence planning for each next calendar year.

Technical problems, in the first place ones related to signals equipment and automated command and control system, are of substance where organization and maintenance of continuous coordination in AAO is concerned.

The accepted signals equipment falls short of assuring reliable and concealed control of force groupings belonging to different services and different agencies even in peacetime conditions. Moreover, wartime allocation of additional channels is envisaged only for the top command and control echelon. In my view, it is urgently necessary to draw up and implement a target program aimed at ensuring teamwork communications in both peacetime and wartime. It should include a detailed calculation of the required number of radio networks and radio bearings, as well as communications equipment, to serve not only the main, but also alternate and reserve variants of the coordination effort. Before this program is finally put into practice, it is necessary to revise the pattern of distribution of the available communications equipment so that it fully ensure coordination between reconnaissance forces and assets.

Another technical problem involved in the organization of teamwork between reconnaissance forces and assets is the lack of coupled automated intelligence collecting and processing centers. Such centers, if created, will make it possible to receive information about the adversary from all reconnaissance elements and use it for preparing operations. They will carry out primary data processing and provide on-line information to direct users rather than on request.

The importance and efficiency of these automated centers (particularly in coastal sectors) was long ago appreciated by the reconnaissance structures of the armed forces of many foreign states. Specifically, in its Pacific zone alone the U.S. has deployed three centers, which receive, process, and classify data in accordance with their importance and reception time, and automatically supply them to users on request. Creating similar centers (automated systems) would considerably enhance capabilities of commanders and staffs, enabling timely decision-making concerning engagement of important enemy objects and troop (force) groupings.

The persisting scattered state of reconnaissance infrastructure poses a serious obstacle to organization of teamwork between reconnaissance forces and assets in AAO. In some regions of Russia, subjects of coordination are hundreds or even thousands of kilometers apart. The problem can be partially solved through allocation of additional scrambled communications links of guaranteed stability to reconnaissance structures organizing coordination.

It s pertinent to say in conclusion that this article reflects only some aspects of coordination between reconnaissance forces and assets in an anti-amphibious operation. As I see it, further discussions on the pages of this journal will help to reveal the entire spectrum and depth of the problem under consideration.

NOTES:

(1.) Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945, Vol. 4, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1962, p. 459.

(2.) Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny, Vol. 9, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 352.

(3.) CAMD RF, rec. gr. 132, inv. 2642, f. 29, sheet 91.

(4.) CANA, rec. gr. 83, f. 6104, sheet 4.