Radiation, chemical and biological defense forces in information warfare.

Struggle in the information sphere under modem conditions has taken on an across-the-board character. Modem combat is not about only strikes, the delivery of fire for effect and maneuvers but also information, electronic and intellectual contest. Information warfare is increasingly used as one of the important tools of bringing pressure to bear upon the enemy.

The sphere of information warfare involves, in one way or another, all the forces and assets taking part in an operation. Units and elements of radiation, chemical and biological (RCB) defense are no exception. On the one hand, they can be targets, and on the other, they can be active components in the system of information warfare.

As many people know, RCB defense in operations is intended to minimize casualties from radioactive material, chemical and biological agents, and to create favorable conditions for the performance of combat missions by the troops. Evidently, the enemy's information efforts in some or other type of operational support will first of all consist in garbling information about the actual RCB situation in the areas of combat. There are grounds to claim that spreading false information (rumors) about an unfavorable radiation, chemical and biological situation will be widely used in information warfare to create panicky moods in areas of combat operations and destabilize the overall situation. Thus, information security becomes a key problem.

The existing system for gathering, analyzing and outputting RCB information generally meets modem requirements. Channels for transmitting such information in operational and higher command and control echelons are reliably protected against enemy electronic access and modification. At the same time, the tactical and operational-tactical echelons can be accessible to garbled RCB situation data through communication channels somewhere along the "RCB patrol-platoon-company" line and via mass media outlets.

Studies show that the enemy can target for bringing information pressure components of a unified system for the detection and appraisal of the scale and consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction (the destruction of facilities constituting radiation, chemical and biological hazards) as a composite part of the command and control system in peacetime and wartime. The enemy can, to some or other extent, prohibit the procurement (gathering) of reliable data on the RCB situation, deliberately garble them, hinder the exchange of necessary data and that would seriously hamper the taking by the military-political leadership of the country of appropriate countermeasures (especially faced with threatened use of weapons of mass destruction).

A regional disposition of forces combat operations model developed for the economically developed areas of the Russian Federation has been used to appraise the probability of the appearance of false information and terrorist actions, compile a list of sources of RCB situation data and determine the number of personnel and equipment to promptly and reliably examine the situation. Analysis has shown that, during an operation, information can come in from between 50 and 75 areas of possible radioactive, chemical and biological contamination. Since the enemy as a rule has information on potentially hazardous facilities, it will use them in information warfare operations and in combination with acts of subversion and terrorism that can achieve "instant dramatic effects." It is possible that there will be deliberate destruction of facilities that pose a radiation, chemical and biological hazard; furtive employment of radioactive materials, biological agents and potent chemical agents, as well as mere declarations of such intentions.

Information warfare missions should be tackled by mobile examination and analysis units to be tasked with collecting, summing up and communicating information about the RCB situation in areas of possible enemy terrorist actions and places where false information is distributed via mass media channels. It would make sense to include these units in the complement of RCB defense troops of regional commands and theater of military operations commands. It would be appropriate to include in them, in addition to RCB reconnaissance personnel, experts in specific types of biological reconnaissance who are equipped with instruments for express diagnosis of biological agents, television cameramen and military television correspondents with the purpose to promptly alert the troops and local people to the actual RCB situation using video footages from the areas of possible acts of subversion and the areas targeted for spreading false rumors.

In order to reliably deny the enemy access to channels carrying information about the RCB situation and to promptly communicate it to the troops and the population RCB, reconnaissance tactical-level bodies should be equipped with the most up-to-date radiation, chemical and biological reconnaissance assets, and the appropriate information should be carried through closed communications channels. This will also make it possible to form, on assignment from the command, a necessary data array dealing with the RCB situation on the enemy territory.

The employment of aerosols, radar-absorbent materials and foams by RCB defense forces considerably reduces the signature of troops, the possibility of their being engaged by precision and other weapons and deludes the enemy as to their true intentions. In preparing for operations, the main efforts should be concentrated on feigned areas of troop deployment, command and control centers, airfields, crossing sites, on attracting the enemy's attention to areas of decoy actions. In the areas of the actual stationing of troops, aerosols should be kept in readiness for immediate use. An important element of information warfare during the course of an operation is a reliable concealment of troops and facilities from enemy aerial, ground and naval reconnaissance. The concealment of troops from space-borne reconnaissance assets calls for the use of aerosols regardless of the distance between the objects to be concealed and the line of contact.

To use of aerosols reducing the signature of troops (forces) to the maximum effect, it is necessary to be guided by the following main principles: their wide-ranging use and constant readiness for concealing troops (forces) and industrial facilities (regardless of the distance from the line of contact); centralization of control over the setting up of aerosol screens; the use of aerosols along with engineering concealment devises and EW assets and in line with a unified operational concealment and deception concept.

Troops protection against technical means of reconnaissance (by minimizing information available to the enemy) can also be considerably increased by the use of radar-absorbent materials and foams in conjunction with aerosols, engineering and EW assets. The enemy can be misled in information warfare also through a set of measures aimed at giving it a false idea of the combat readiness of the opposing troops (forces), their intentions and nature of their activities, which makes the enemy take steps advantageous to us.

It should be noted in conclusion that the most important thing in developing organizational and technical measures to protect information about the RCB situation in preparing for and performing an operation is, as studies indicate, to timely detect the channels by which the enemy can access protected information and promptly suppress them. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid stereotyped methods in using information warfare assets.