RUSSIAN POLITICS IN EXILE: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924-1931.

RUSSIAN POLITICS IN EXILE: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924-1931. By Felix Patrikeeff. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford). 2002. xiv, 230 pp. (Maps.) US$68.00, cloth. ISBN 0-333-73018-6.

This work is a welcome addition to the recent work on Harbin and the Russian experience in northern Manchuria. Felix Patrikeeff's perspective is wide, taking into consideration not only some of the dynamics of local society, but also some of the strategic impulses that tended to either encourage or undermine the Russian presence. The result is a study that elevates this presence from one of peripheral interest to central significance. Indeed, Patrikeeff contends that the Japanese seizure of Manchuria occurred not only because of growing Chinese nationalism, but also due to resurgent Soviet influence.

Patrikeeff begins this history with an examination of the origins of Russian interest in Manchuria, noting that even before Peter the Great there were Russians trying to expand the empire into the Amur basin. Of course, independent initiatives could not be expected to succeed, but continued encroachment demonstrates that there was institutional support for expansion. This support, however, proved to be tenuous, as official policy appears to have alternated between encouragement and inattention. That said, the potential for economic gain seems consistently to have refocused Russian eyes on Manchuria whenever that attention strayed. The shifting nature of this focus lies at the heart of Patrikeeff's analysis, leading him to characterize Russian imperalism as bezalaberynyi--"slovenly" or "disorderly." (pp. xiii, 15)

The key tension behind Patrikeeff's main focus is also the product of such fluctuations, as Russian and later Soviet policy in the twentieth century varied similarly. While Sergei Witte sought to cement economic linkages with Manchuria, later tsarist policy relied more upon military dominance. Then, in the wake of the Russian Civil War, Soviet attention returned to Manchuria, initially for military but eventually for economic reasons as well. (Neither of these reasons, Patrikeeff suggests, has received their due in English language studies of Manchuria.) The initial Soviet thrust into Mongolia and Manchuria was defensive, based upon the need to secure Siberia's flanks from marauding White Russian forces and to intimidate anti-Soviet Russian populations. However, in order to make that occupation fiscally responsible, Soviet policy in Manchuria was compelled to differ from that implemented in the rest of China through the Comintern. While a revolutionary line was pursued south of the Great Wall, in Manchuria the Soviet Union ultimately acted as any other imperialist power would. This resulted in a massive military intervention in 1929, something Patrikeeff believes helped inflame Japanese desires to secure Manchuria for themselves. Yet Patrikeeff's analysis also helps explain the Soviet willingness to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway. As the 1929 intervention had paralyzed the local economy, the Soviet Union was able to unload a debt-ridden institution at a premium to eager buyers as well as remove a potential source of conflict.

In compiling this study, the author has amassed a large body of oral interviews and an extensive bibliography of Russian and English language materials. However, for Japanese and Chinese sources he has relied solely upon those available in English translation. While understandable, this is lamentable because his argument would be enhanced if he included Japanese perceptions of Soviet activities and the regional economy.

Despite the many intriguing aspects of this study, there is a minor irritant that cannot be left unsaid. Sixty-nine pages of endnotes follow the 131 pages of text; even printed in a smaller font the notes amount to more than half the length of the main text. As this constitutes a relatively large body of information, much of it pertinent, it would have been far better to incorporate some of the longer notes into the text itself, or at the very least turn them into more easily accessible footnotes.

BILL SEWELL Saint Mary's University, Halifax, NS, Canada