RF Armed Forces Rear Services: history and modernity.

The experience of past wars is among the factors with an active impact on progress in military affairs. A source of various aspects of military science and its most important component, military art, it is embodied in a better organization of the Armed Forces and their Rear Services, as well as in better manuals, regulations, statutes, instructions, orders and other official documents issuing from the Ministry of Defense.

"Without history's lampion, tactics is darkness" is a well-known saying belonging to the great Russian general A.V. Suvorov, which is as relevant today as it was in his day and age. It sounds like a behest to the posterity and keeps its topicality in all spheres of present-day military activities, meaning that regardless of the aims, character, scale and methods of military operations, one should not only take into account the modern conditions but also skillfully use the experience accumulated by our predecessors.

Let us turn to the experience of rear services support in military events that took place both in the past and in modern Russia.

Chief supply officer for armies of a front was in charge of catering to the armies comprising a front in the Russian army during World War I (1914-1918). Apart from controlling the supply services, he supervised military transportation, the transport, sanitary and veterinary services, the treasury, as well as the military districts and civilian directorates present in the territory of the front's rear area. In effect, the chief supply officer was the chief of rear services. At that time the functioning of this complex machine was to be coordinated with the operation of the General Quartermaster's service, to wit, the front's operational department.

For some reason, however, this arrangement did not apply to the army and tactical echelons. In armies, the rear services, transportation, and supply work were controlled by an army staff's transportation and supply section, which comprised artillery supply, quartermaster, transportation, sanitary and veterinary services. In turn, these controlled relevant units and subunits. At the tactical echelon (in corps, divisions and brigades), chiefs of all services were directly subordinated to commanders. They were not under a unified control element nor were they within staffs, but each had to coordinate his work with the latter. Regimental unit administrative & support services were headed by a director, who had under his command: the regimental treasurer, who handled pay and clothing supply; the regimental quartermaster, who was responsible for food, forage and quarters support; the weapons chief; the noncombatant company commander, who was in charge of the regimental train and workshops; the chief regimental doctor, and the clerk. Interestingly, no rear services or supply elements were envisaged at that time under the Supreme Commander in Chief; nor was there any procedure for relations between chief front supply officers, the General Staff and the central supply elements. (1) Thus, the Russian army during the First World War lacked a unified system for controlling its rear and supply services that would run through all tactical structures from the top down, but it did have the front-level centralization of control.

During the Civil War (1918-1920), the leadership of the young Republic of the Soviets, who attached an immense importance to the regular supply of the Red Army, not only used the experience of the Russian army, but also considerably improved it in the new sociopolitical and military conditions. On June 1, 1918, the Soviet Government formed Central Supply Directorate (CSD) of the Red Army, which took under its control all the main central supply directorates of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (artillery, administrative-and-support, military engineer, air fleet, quarters support, military sanitary, military veterinary, horse replenishment, etc.). It was due to supply the forces with weapons, ammunition, and other materiel. The decision was of fundamental importance, for the Red Army's supply was from then on managed by a unified responsible element. Within fronts and armies it set up supply directorates; in the tactical echelon (division, brigade) the supply work was in the hands of respective supply chiefs; in the regiments it was the responsibility of the unit administrative and support director. This supply system functioned well throughout the Civil War and was instrumental in its successful accomplishment.

In the military reform years (1924-1925) the CSD was transformed into Red Army Supply Directorate, retaining the functions of its predecessor.

It could be expected that the supply system, which had been tested during the First World War and improved in the course of the Civil War and in the postwar years, would be not only preserved in future but also developed in line with the new conditions in the process of combat and operational training. But this was not to happen. On November 20, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council abolished the Red Army Supply Directorate and rendered independent its constituent directorates, placing the administrative-and-support directorate and the military construction directorate under First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and the rest under the Red Army weapons chief. Formally that enhanced the status of the corresponding directorates, but actually destroyed the supply system that had acquitted itself well in the not so distant past. Thus, the centralized Red Army supply system that had existed prior to 1929 was destroyed for some unknown reason. The historical lesson was left unheeded.

In the mid- and late 1930s, the national leadership took certain steps in order to improve planning and to merge separate supply elements of the Red Army. For example, from September 1935, it entrusted rear support planning to combined arms staffs, for which purpose it created within the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army General Staff a rear services organization and supply directorate; and within the staffs of military districts (fronts), armies and corps, rear services sections; at the regimental level it established the position of assistant chief of staff for rear services. (2) On October 11, 1939, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense formed by his order Red Army Military-Technical Supply Directorate to supervise the following directorates: motor and armor, signals, chemical, engineer, and fuel supply. The same order created Directorate of the Red Army Supply Chief, which took control of the supply train and clothing service, food supply service, and quarters operational service as well as the Main Military Retail Directorate. (3) In August 1940 the Directorate was reformed as Main Quarter. master Directorate of the Red Army, with Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulyov promoted as its chief. By that virtue were created two powerful, if independent, structures serving as the umbrellas for the main supply services of the Red Army.

In March 1941, however, the People's Commissar of Defense, while sharing duties between his deputies, imposed a subordination arrangement that largely disrupted this lineup. Red Army supply services were subordinated to different deputy people's commissars of defense: First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny got the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the sanitary and veterinary departments, as well as the material assets section; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Chief of General Staff Army General G.K Zhukov was charged to supervise fuel supplies; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik got, in addition to the Main Artillery Directorate, the Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army; Deputy People's Commissar for Defense for the Air Force Lieutenant General of Aviation P.V. Rychagov was put in charge of links with the aviation industry for air weapons and ammunition; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, apart from supervising the construction of fortified areas, got the Main Military Engineer Directorate of the Red Army. In addition to other directorates, the People's Commissar of Defense left directly subordinated to himself the Main Motor and Armor Directorate. (4)

Thus it turned out that the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the sanitary directorate and the veterinary directorate were subordinated to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, whereas the military-technical supply structures were subordinated to other deputy people's commissars of defense, something that disrupted the unity of control of the materiel supply. As is obvious, these reforms failed to lead to a level of centralization of the supply effort, which had been tested in the two past wars and persisted till 1929. In the meantime the military conflicts that happened in 1939 and 1940 (Khalkin-Gol, the war against Finland) showed that disunity and lack of coordination in the organization of the rear services control often led to disruptions of supply.

So what was the rear services and material support control system like at the start of the Great Patriotic War?

It was the duty of combined arms staffs to control the rear services. The guiding consideration in this respect was that they would be able to organize the rear services operation in the most effective fashion. Accordingly, the General Staff, as before, had the Rear Services and Supply Organization Directorate; front, army and corps staffs had rear services departments; divisional staffs had rear services sections; and regimental staffs had assistant chiefs of staff for rear services. (5) However, while organizing the rear services and planning material support, the combined arms staffs bore no responsibility for the materiel supply, which was entrusted to chiefs of combat arms and services. Military transportation elements (MTE), which made part of the General Staff and front and army staffs, planned delivery of materiel by rail and engaged in its practical implementation. Motor transport was also used for the same purpose and its importance grew increasingly by the start of the war with Germany. Considering all that, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense issued an order, on July 16, 1941, when the war was already in progress, which set up an independent motor and road directorate on the basis of the General Staff's motor transport and road service, a division of the Red Army Rear Services Organization and Supply Directorate. The directorate was instructed to form, by July 25, 35 automotive battalions to be used to deliver materiel, as well as 8 road and transport regiments, and 11 military road and bridge battalions subordinated to the Center. (6)

The very first days of the war revealed defects of the peacetime supply system. Engaged in organizing and controlling intense and highly dynamic combat operations, the combined arms staffs were unable to control the rear services. Chiefs of combat arms and services, who did not possess the necessary operational and tactical information, often had no idea how much materiel, to whom and where they should send. The military transportation elements often dispatched consignments of materiel to enemy-occupied areas or to areas whence the same ranges of materiel had been withdrawn to the rear. Sanitary and veterinary services, which were subordinated directly to commanders-in-chief (commanders), operated in isolation from other rear services structures, this in spite of the need for close coordination. Therefore, despite the huge effort to supply the army in the field with materiel, as performed by the rear services at all levels in the first war weeks, the need became obvious to create a maximally centralized system of rear support of forces as a whole. In this connection, chief of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulyov, along with a group of top and senior commanders, drew up proposals envisaging formation of a centralized supply control system. As they went about creating it, they had to fall back on the "lampion of history," the undeservedly forgotten experience of World War I, the Civil War and even the Russo-Japanese War. In so doing they borrowed everything that could be used with a benefit if under totally new conditions of the war then in progress.

The proposals were reported to J.V. Stalin, who, based on the decree of the State Defense Committee (SDC) of July 31, 1941, "On Control of the Red Army Rear Services," signed, on August 1, an order to institute the position of Chief of Red Army Rear Services with the rank of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and to form Main Directorate of Red Army Rear Services made up of a staff, the military transportation directorate, the motor and road directorate, and an inspectorate. Under the order, the Rear Services chief controlled the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the fuel supply directorate, and the sanitary and veterinary directorates. The same arrangement applied to the rear services of fronts and armies, whose chiefs simultaneously became deputy commanders for rear services.

With the Main Rear Services Directorate in place, the Rear Services chief could handle all supply elements and services, assets for their deployment and delivery, roads, servicing forces and assets, medical and veterinary support outfits, and medical transportation assets. This helped to create as good a materiel supply and evacuation system as enabled the fighting forces to successfully conduct operations of different nature and scale. (7)

Subsequently the system was specified and improved in accordance with the new conditions of the situation on the Soviet-German front. For example, May 1942 saw introduction, at the front echelon, of the position of deputy rear services chief, which at the corps and divisional level had its equivalent in deputy commander for rear services--rear services chief In fronts and armies, rear services staffs replaced the organizing and planning departments. Rear services department was the tool handled by the deputy divisional commander for rear services; the same officer handed down orders to the divisional doctor and the divisional veterinarian.

These provisions were further developed in the SDC decree of May 19, 1942, which placed all supply services concerned with general rear services organization, delivery planning and evacuation under front and army rear services chiefs. Yet the responsibility for supplying forces with all types of materiel was left to combat arms and services chiefs of fronts and armies.

This structure functioned well in the course of the war, although occasionally it was subjected to ungrounded modifications. For example, in early 1943 the Military Transportation Directorate was renamed Central Military Transportation Directorate (CMTD) of the Red Army and simultaneously (on the General Staff's proposal) was handed over, by a HQ SHC order of January 31, 1943, from the Rear Services Chief to the General Staff. Accordingly, front and district (army) military transportation directorates (departments) were to go to relevant staffs. This was motivated by the necessity of ensuring regular planning, organization and execution of all types of military transport movements.

Nevertheless, this mechanism proved unviable and existed only 36 days. The entire preceding experience showed that organization of military transport movements required joint efforts on the part of many services as directed by the Rear Services Chief. Apart from that, the new structure disrupted the system of responsibility for deliveries, which had acquitted itself well during the war. In connection with this, the HQ SHC order was repealed on March 7, 1943, with the Red Army military transportation elements handed over to the Rear Services Chief (CMTD).

June 9, 1943 SDC decree and June 12, 1943 order issued by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense abolished the Main Rear Services Directorate. The Red Army Rear Services Chief had his staff and personnel department and controlled the Central Military Transportation Directorate, the Main Motor Directorate, the Main Food Supply Directorate, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate, the fuel supply directorate, the veterinary directorate, the financial directorate, the directorate for personal registration of losses of junior command personnel of the army in the field and for pension security of their families, the administrative and household directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and the editorial board of the journal Red Army Rear Services and Supply. He also had under his jurisdiction the Military Academy of Rear Services and Supply and the Military Transportation Academy. In February 1945, the People's Commissar of Defense also subordinated to him the Main Directorate for Captured Property. Similar structures were envisaged within rear services directorates of fronts and armies. A September 14 SDC decree introduced the position of deputy district commander for materiel support.

This control arrangement existed till the end of the war and acquitted itself quite well as is evident from the successful operations the Red Army pursued in late 1942 and between 1943 and 1945.

In the first postwar period (1945-1953), the previous experience of rear services support was by and large studied and generalized. Logistic and technical support facilities of the rear services were expanded. The organizational structure of the combined arms and specialized rear services were specified in accordance with changes in the force composition of troops, their rearmament and disposition, as well as with advances in military art.

In future it could be expected that under peacetime conditions the war experience the combatants had sweated and bled for on the battlefield would be improved and developed on a new basis and that the rear services control system, which had confirmed its viability and expediency, would be preserved. But this did not happen. The Main Road Directorate was disbanded in 1946; the motor service was excluded from the rear services control elements in 1949; the Rear Services Staff was replaced by a small Armed Forces Rear Services Directorate in 1950; military transportation elements were dropped from the Rear Services; Armed Forces Rear Services Chief was stripped of his status and rights as a deputy minister, and rear services chiefs of military districts, armies and combined units were stripped of their rank as deputy commanders, something that seriously complicated and disorganized their work. For fairness sake it should be said that the Rear Services Staff was restored in 1953, but only as a Defense Ministry staff rather than an Armed Forces staff. The greater part of the far from well-grounded "reorganizations" was rescinded in the same year in connection with the merger of the Army Ministry and the Navy Ministry in the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1958 was instituted the position of Deputy Defense Minister--Chief of Defense Ministry Rear Services, which in 1962 was transformed to Deputy Defense Minister--Chief of USSR Armed Forces Rear Services. All of that enabled a comeback to the last war's experience of rear services control, if on a totally new basis connected with the adoption of nuclear weapons and other powerful means of destruction.

Subsequent years continued the revival of centralization of the rear services control elements. Specifically, 1988 saw the merger of the motor and tractor service and the road service, which together formed a motor and road service, which had unified elements in the center, the military districts, armies and corps. But in 1992, the Rear Services of the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost the military transportation service and the medical service. At the same time, the authorities set up a Federal Directorate of Railway Troops subordinated to the Railways Ministry and handed over road construction units to the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the RF Ministry of Defense.

In the meantime, the local wars and armed conflicts of the last few decades confirm that success in military operations is achieved only if there is a strictly centralized rear services support system that was created long before their start.

It should also be mentioned that in many foreign armies, specifically U.S. and German ones, even technical support is one of the types of rear services support, something that enables a high degree of centralization of supply and catering measures. As is evident from experience, this system is not only highly efficient but also quite economic. (8)

The foregoing warrants the following conclusions.

First. The past wars are an invaluable source of experience in various spheres of military affairs. It is necessary to thoroughly study and analyze this country's military past, using all things positive and useful in modern conditions. We should not let the "lampion of history" go out. We must always remember that the dogmatic perception of the past war experience, as for that matter being forgetful of that experience or neglecting it, is equally harmful for progress in military affairs.

Second. One of the topical tasks connected with the use of military experience is overcoming disintegration of historical consciousness, and giving up invariant interpretations of the past. Studying history of wars and military art is a process of accumulation of experience and each of its stages brings something new that merits attention as prospects are mapped out for progress in military affairs. In order to know what the present is all about, one should always turn to history. The present often makes us take a new look at some or other pages of the past.

Third. The study of the experience of wars and military conflicts should be a powerful means improving the military affairs and assuring the progressive organizational development of the Armed Forces, their high combat readiness and combat capability. In the interests of this, all systems and structures of the Armed Forces, including rear services, should be created in good time, while their verification, specification and expediency tests should take place in the process of peacetime combat and operational training of troops.

Fourth. It is necessary to ensure a close link between military historical knowledge and the operational-tactical rear training of students and officer candidates enrolled in military educational establishments; to skillfully use the existing rich experience in order to master the art of organization and execution of rear support in combat operations differing in their aim, nature and scale. The system of military historical training of students and officer candidates ought to be reformed: their scientific and intellectual level should be improved; they should be taught how to analyze past military experience and to use it at present; well-trained teachers should be invited to teach the history of wars, military art and rear services.

Fifth. The experience of the counter-terrorist operation in the territory of the Chechen Republic opens much scope and prospects for progress in military affairs. Participation in the operation of Armed Forces structures, their involvement in special actions of different nature and scale along with other agencies will prospectively dictate the necessity of strict centralization not only of command and control of all forces and assets but also of their rear support. For this purpose it is necessary to speed up the creation and practical testing of a unified, standardized and conjugated system of rear support under the aegis of the Armed Forces Rear Services, which has the most important and well-developed infrastructure as well as numerous and efficient combined units, units and organizations. It makes sense to shortly realize the available work experience in these matters in the educational process at the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation and its branches.

Sixth. It is necessary to revive close cooperation of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation with the Combined Arms Academy and the General Staff Academy. The modern and prospective scientific research done by these higher military educational establishments ought to be used as a basis for both a perusal of a broad range of problems of rear support in combat and operations pursuing different aims and use in the educational process.

NOTES:

(1.) See: Istoriya tyla Rossiyskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (XVIII-XX vv.), Book 1, St. Petersburg, 2000, pp. 365-366.

(2.) See: V.M. Moskovchenko, Upravleniye tylom okruga (istoricheskiy ocherk), Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport, St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 92.

(3.) See: Russkiy arkhiv, Vol. 14 (25), Terra, Moscow, 1998, pp. 16-17.

(4.) See: Ibid., pp. 46-47.

(5.) See: I.M. Golushko, Shtab tyla Krasnoi Armii v gody voyny 1941-1945, Ekonomika i informatika, Moscow, 1998, p. 22.

(6.) See: Russkiy arkhiv, Vol. 14 (25), pp. 86, 97.

(7.) See: I.M. Golushko, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

(8.) See: Voyna v Persidskom zalive, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1993, pp. 76-81, 240-264.

Maj. Gen. V.M. MOSKOVCHENKO

Doctor of Economic Sciences

Maj. Gen. G.E. NOSKOV

Candidate of Military Sciences