Public service personnel in West Germany in the 1950s: controversial policy decisions and their effects on social composition, gender structure, and the role of former Nazis.

Although a half century has elapsed since the end of World War II, comparatively little research has been done on German social history in the period after 1945. Instead, social historians have concentrated on examining events and processes in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. One major reason for the continuing focus on this era is the understandable desire to identify social factors which help to explain the failure of Weimar democracy, the rise of National Socialism, and its widespread acceptance in the German population. As a consequence of this emphasis, however, the period after 1945 has been neglected. The extensive research by contemporary historians on the postwar era has provided little corrective, since it deals predominantly with developments in the political sphere. More than a decade has gone by since the prominent contemporary historian Hans-Peter Schwarz criticized this bias and challenged his colleagues "to discover the society of the Federal Republic in its beginning phases as a field of historical research."(1) But only few heeded his call. The author of a recent survey observes that there is still a notable lack of consensus as to which concepts, key terms, types of explanations, and theoretical models might be most helpful in analyzing the phenomena at hand. Moreover, there is a need for empirical studies dealing with the specific social constellations and groups that played an influential role in postwar developments.(2)

Within this context, this article deals with the development of a particularly large and important social group during the 1950s. The focus on this decade might seem surprising, since the 1950s are commonly seen as a socially static, even boring, period during which most West Germans were preoccupied with economic reconstruction. Only in the 1960s, according to popular conception, did social stagnation give way to upheaval and rapid transformation. However, recent scholarship has revealed the complex character and historical significance of West German social evolution in the 1950s. Continuity was indeed the dominant feature of some areas of society, but other sectors were marked by momentous changes, some of which occurred quite rapidly. It is still too early for a definitive reassessment of the 1950s, for our knowledge of social developments in many areas remains fragmentary. Nevertheless, more and more historians now regard this decade as a key period, during which numerous processes of far-reaching importance set in and others, whose roots can be traced back to earlier decades, now prevailed. The dynamic thrust of these developments would lead to a metamorphosis of the social structure, way of life, and value systems in the Federal Republic within a relatively short period of time. As a result, West German society left behind the world of the 1920s and 1930s, which had been the explicit or implicit prototype for its reconstruction. What emerged was a "modern industrial society" with all its contradictions, social costs, ecological hazards, and problems of political governability.(3)

Until now, research on the social history of the Federal Republic has virtually ignored those working in the public service.(4) This is surprising, given the Size of this group and its traditional importance within German society, politics, and economics. Both a longstanding bureaucratic tradition and the increasingly active role of the state in economic and social policy had contributed to a massive expansion of the public service since the mid-nineteenth century. It eventually reached proportions unique on an international scale, as comparative figures for the first part of the twentieth century show. In 1925, and thus even after a sharp reduction in the number of those working in the German public service as a consequence of territorial losses in World War I and severe economic problems, there were still over 2.72 million public employees - more than in any other country in central or western Europe and nearly as many as in the United States, although the U.S. population was almost twice as large as Germany's.(5) The percentage of the German work force employed in the public service was also singularly high (8.50%).(6) Remarkably, the Federal Republic emerged with a public service that was no smaller when viewed in relative terms - despite the turbulence and the upheavals of the Nazi era and the occupation period. Indeed, its dimensions had increased even further. The 2.1 million people employed in the West German public service in 1950 constituted almost one-tenth of the entire work force and more than one-seventh of all wage earners actually employed at the time.(7)

These public employees performed a wide variety of tasks. Many worked in administration at the city, county, state, or federal levels, others worked for the police, for fire departments, hospitals and other health-care institutions, the public schools, or the (exclusively state-run) university system. Still others were employed in a multitude of public utilities and enterprises, such as gasworks and water companies, sewage treatment plants, most electric companies, and virtually all urban transport systems. (In addition, more than a quarter of a million worked for the Federal Postal Service (Bundespost) in 1950, which not only was responsible for delivering letters and packages, but also ran the telephone and telegraph systems.) Furthermore, all local post offices provided banking facilities as well as a savings and loan service, both of which were widely used. Last but not least, the public service included the Federal Railway (Bundesbahn), which employed more than half a million persons in 1950. The national railway system handled the bulk of the country's commercial shipping and was the most important means of passenger travel and commuter transportation. Thus the public employees were not only a social factor of considerable significance, they also played a central role in the country's economy.(8)

The public service differs from other sectors of the economy in that political decision-makers can directly influence the social composition of the employees, their legal and economic status, and their working conditions. In Germany, government has traditionally determined the exact number and duties of those working in all areas of the public service, the prevailing recruitment policies, promotion rules, and basic salary regulations. Political decisions regarding such questions have had far-reaching consequences not only for the character of the public service, but for the structure of German society and the degree of social mobility in general. If, for example, recruitment policies allowed members of the middle and lower classes to enter the public service in increasing numbers, and if promotion regulations enabled them to work their way up from one level of administration to the next on the basis of merit, then they had better access to the higher levels of the public service - and upward social mobility increased overall. If, on the other hand, political decisions restricted access to the public service or limited the chances for advancement on the basis of individual achievement, then this reinforced existing social hierarchies and reduced chances for social mobility. The history of the German public service in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offers numerous examples of such restrictions. There were formal barriers to social mobility such as the requirement that applicants for higher administrative positions must have a university degree in law (Juristenmonopol, "lawyers' monopoly"). At the same time, many positions in the lower levels of the civil service were traditionally reserved for those who had served as non-commissioned army officers for a certain number of years (Militaranwartersystem). There were also informal barriers: discrimination against candidates on the basis of their political views, social origins, religion, and sex was widespread.(9)

This article deals with important aspects of this complex subject in the formative years of the Federal Republic. It examines four major decisions in personnel policy, each with far-reaching social consequences:

1. the decision on the part of the first Adenauer government and the first federal parliament, the Bundestag, to reject all proposals for a fundamental reform of the public service. Instead, the traditional personnel structure and the unique system of legal relationships on which it was founded were to be retained;

2. the decision taken by Dr. Konrad Adenauer and his political allies to avoid a decisive break with the past when recruiting personnel for the new federal ministries in Bonn. Priority was given to hiring former civil servants from the Prussian and Reich ministries in Berlin, even though it was well known that such persons had usually belonged to the Nazi Party and that some had been even more directly involved in the injustices and criminal acts perpetrated by the Nazi regime;

3. the decision of the first Bundestag to require all parts of the public administration and all public enterprises to recruit at least 20% of their personnel from among those who had lost their public service positions as a consequence of the war or in the process of denazification. This measure also mandated priority hiring of former professional soldiers and officers of the paramilitary Reich Labor Service. This controversial legislation was a major determinant of the recruitment policies of the federal government, the states (Lander), and the municipalities in the 1950s and early 1960s;

4. the decision taken at several different levels to drastically reduce the proportion of female employees, whose number had increased considerably during the war years. Particular attention was devoted to forcing married women out of the public service. In doing so, administrators did not hesitate to continue to apply pertinent regulations decreed by the National Socialists.

1.

In 1952/53, after years of contention, all proposals for a fundamental reform of the public service were finally rejected. The traditional personnel structure and the peculiar system of legal relationships on which it was founded had been defended against all onslaught.

The issue had been an object of conflict since 1945. After the war, both the British and the American military governments had declared their determination to "democratize" the German public service.(10) First of all, a fundamental reform of the personnel structure was viewed as being essential. Traditionally, public employees were divided into a strict hierarchy of three groups with widely differing social and legal status: manual workers (Arbeiter), salaried employees (Angestellte), and civil servants (Beamte). The sharp distinction between the first two groups, blue-collar workers and white-collar salaried employees, was characteristic for German society on the whole. Legislative measures passed around the turn of the century had reinforced and strengthened the dividing line between them. Motivated by the desire to create a social bulwark against the rise of the workers' movement, these laws had given salaried employees a privileged legal and economic status.(11)

Civil servants, in turn, enjoyed a special status that clearly distinguished them from the other two groups. The relationship between civil servant and employer was not founded by signing a mutually binding contract - that would have been considered tantamount to reducing civil servants to the status of salaried employees, who were alleged to be interested foremost in the pecuniary rewards of their work. Instead, the relationship between the civil servant and the state was supposed to be of a higher ethical quality. It also evidenced roots reaching back into the feudal past: the civil servant was appointed in an "act of state" (Hoheitsakt), received an official letter of commission and swore a formal oath of loyalty to the Dienstherr (literally: "master to whom service is owed"). The further conditions of service were regulated by a specific legal construct within the field of public law, the civil service status (Beamtenverhaltnis). Central tenets of this status were the understanding that those involved would spend their entire working careers in the civil service (Berufsbearatentum) and that they would in return receive lifelong tenure as well as emoluments, which were regarded not as earnings, but as a maintenance grant consistent with social status. The material provisions included not only a substantially higher salary than employees received, but also significantly better provisions for sick pay, a generous non-contributory pension, and, on death, dependents' allowances.(12)

The singular nature of the civil servants' status and their proximity to authority had traditionally encouraged their perception of belonging to a coherent and self-contained social estate or corporate group (Standesbewusstsein). This mentality was reinforced by the long-standing doctrine that service to the state was an especially valuable and morally superior way of life. Such notions had always been most pervasive in the higher ranks of bureaucracy, but they also played a considerable role in the lower levels of the civil service - in part as psychological compensation for the disquieting fact that, in reality, income levels in this part of the service were frequently lower than theory would have dictated. Lower grade civil servants who earned less than highly qualified manual workers could still experience a feeling of moral superiority, because only they had the privilege of serving the state and, indeed, of being regarded as a veritable "incarnation of the idea of the state."(13)

Representatives of the American and British military governments criticized the hierarchical personnel structure in the public service as undemocratic. For one thing, manual workers and salaried employees had virtually no chance of working their way up to a higher level on a merit basis. Moreover, the special status and traditional mentality of the civil servants were considered highly problematic. This "privileged official class" with its distinctive "caste consciousness" and disdain for elected representatives was deemed to be a major obstacle to Allied efforts to create a democratic state in Germany. Military government officials were especially critical of the higher ranks of the civil service, which were perceived as being full of persons with an upper-class background and a fundamentally militaristic or authoritarian cast of mind. Virtually all were regarded as politically compromised, not only due to their obvious involvement in the National Socialist regime, but also because it was well known that many higher civil servants had retained their preference for a monarchical system after 1918 and regarded the Weimar Republic with scorn.

In order to effect a fundamental change in the political and social composition of the public service, both military governments sought to restructure its legal underpinnings. They tried to convince the German state governments that Anglo-American notions of reform were in fact superior to the status quo and that it would thus be a good idea to draft new state civil service laws based on these concepts. On the whole, German representatives showed little interest. The American military government eventually abandoned its efforts to achieve reform through democratic persuasion and put the governments of the three states in its zone under pressure. As a result, they promulgated new civil service laws in October/November 1946. But even then, none of these laws was fully consistent with American policy goals.(14) British representatives proved unable to persuade even one state government in their zone to introduce a law corresponding to the reform model they had drawn up in 1945-46.(15) After the two zones were merged and the Economic Council, a type of legislature for the Anglo-American Bizone, was created in June of 1947, British and American representatives also tried to convince its members to pass a reform law for the jurisdiction of the bizonal administration. These efforts proved similarly unsuccessful.(16)

Finally, in early 1949, the military government authorities for the Bizone lost their patience and dictated a reform law. Such a step was unusual at this late date and sparked a heated public debate. "Military Law No. 15" officially pertained only to those employees working in the bizonal administration, but its authors intended to use it as an instrument to predetermine the future situation in the Federal Republic as a whole. Five aspects of the military law are of particular significance in our context:

a) Several provisions were designed to broaden the social base of the civil service. The decisive role which formal education had previously played in hiring practices was modified, and members of the middle and lower classes were given greater opportunities to work their way up into the higher ranks on the basis of merit. Traditionally, advancement from one level or career track (Laufbahn) to the next was an anomaly. It was virtually impossible within the administrative service and more common only in the lower reaches of the railway and postal service. Military Law No. 15 widened the existing avenues and opened up new ones. In addition, many positions at higher levels were no longer to be restricted to those with legal degrees; college graduates in other relevant fields were to have equal access. The law also guaranteed equal treatment regardless of gender, thus prohibiting the further application of a number of regulations explicitly discriminating against women.

b) "Outsiders" were to receive greater opportunities to enter the civil service. This disparaging, but time-hallowed term referred to those who had not become career civil servants after completing their formal education, but taken jobs in other fields. Military Law No. 15 allowed such persons to take an examination which would verify whether they were qualified to be admitted to the civil service. On the whole, experience in other fields of work was no longer to be regarded as objectionable, but as a potential enrichment.

c) The category of salaried employees was to be eliminated completely, and those holding this status were to be promoted to "civil servants subject to notice" (Beamte auf Kundigung). By reducing the rigid distinction between salaried employees and civil servants, this provision would help do away with the "caste system" which Allied officials considered so undemocratic. Other measures were aimed at improving the job security and economic situation of the salaried employees, since they could be dismissed easily and their earnings were comparatively low.

d) A civil servant could be dismissed if the employing agency was able to convince an impartial board that the individual lacked the necessary ability or motivation. This provision was condemned by advocates of the traditional system as contradicting the basic principle of lifelong tenure for career civil servants.

e) The law required the creation of an independent civil service commission to coordinate and monitor the processing of personnel matters throughout the entire administration. This measure was intended to ensure impartial recruitment and promotion decisions based on merit. The commission would be responsible for publicly advertising all available positions and conducting written examinations to determine the most qualified applicants. The civil service commission was also charged with protecting employees from arbitrary actions by administrators and government officials.(17)

In September 1949, parallel to the formation of the Federal Republic, the military governors of the three Western zones were formally relieved from duty and superseded by the Allied High Commission, which was based in Bonn. As one of its first measures, the Allied High Commission announced that Military Law No. 15 would also pertain to the employees of the new federal agencies and would remain in force until the Germans had worked out a civil service law of their own. This step was intended as a diplomatically indirect way of assuring that the Allied reform measures would be applied during the crucial formative phase of the Federal Republic. All experts agreed that drafting a comprehensive new civil service law would take many months, and that the subsequent deliberations in the cabinet and the Bundestag would take even longer. Yet the Adenauer government countered with an unexpected move: within a matter of weeks, the cabinet approved the bill for a brief preliminary measure, a Federal Personnel Law which essentially mandated the application of a "denazified" version of the German Civil Service Law of 1937. While this legislation was pending, federal agencies did not implement Military Government Law No. 15. The Bundestag worked quickly, approving the Federal Personnel Law in a final vote on March 2, 1950. But the Allied High Commission refused to sanction the measure. Chancellor Adenauer, a staunch advocate of the traditional German civil service system,(18) negotiated intensively with Allied representatives to achieve approval. He argued that the Federal Personnel Law was intended only as a short-term measure, necessary to provide an adequate basis in German law for hiring the civil servants so urgently needed to staff the federal ministries. Adenauer assured the Commissioners that a more comprehensive permanent law would soon be drafted, taking the main points of the Allied reform program into account. After the cabinet consented to minor modifications, the Allied High Commissioners permitted the Federal Personnel Law to be promulgated in June 1950. Parallel to this, they suspended Military Law No. 15, but only until December 31.

In the period following, the Allied High Commission repeatedly reminded the Chancellor of the assurances he had made and pressed for passage of a law conforming to its reform objectives. In order to win greater support for this goal among Germans, the Commission even dropped some particularly controversial aspects of the original conception.(19) Nonetheless, the opponents of reform in the Adenauer government and in the conservative majority parties - the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the German Party (DP) - postponed final legislation as long as possible. The longer the tug-of-war lasted, the less leeway Allied reform advocates had: with the intensification of the Cold War, issues of foreign and security policy were given higher priority. The governments of the Western powers asked the Federal Republic to make a substantial financial contribution to Western defense efforts, for example, and the Allied High Commission had to negotiate with Chancellor Adenauer over a treaty determining the amount his country would pay. Under such circumstances it must have appeared unwise to upset Adenauer and his cabinet by insisting on a program for civil service reform which they so adamantly opposed.(20) Finally, in early 1952, the Allied High Commission announced that it was giving the Germans full freedom to decide the issue for themselves. Military Law No. 15, which had repeatedly been suspended but had continued to hang over the heads of Adenauer and his ministers like a Damoclean sword, was officially annulled on March 27, 1952.

Nine months previously, in July 1951, the federal cabinet had approved the bill for a comprehensive Civil Service Law which took several of the Allied reform wishes into account. Most of these concessions were now deleted during the deliberations in the Bundestag, and the ones that remained were mainly cosmetic in nature. The Federal Civil Service Law, passed on July 14, 1953, has thus rightly been characterized as a measure which preserved the traditional civil service system while "warding off Allied reform efforts."(21)

This decision also spelled the end of all plans to open the civil service to a broad range of candidates from different social backgrounds. Conservative politicians, who had condemned proposals to promote upward social mobility as "an effort to reduce the educated to the same level as the uneducated,"(22) had successfully fended off what they perceived as an attack on traditional values. In broader terms, the legislative affirmation of the old hierarchy of career tracks also helped shore up the system of social stratification which had been destabilized by the twin shocks of total war and total defeat.

The degree of formal education which individuals acquired before entering the public service was now once again the main determinant of their later career chances. Only university graduates were admitted to the highest of the four levels of administrative service, the higher service (hoherer Dienst). Graduates of the most demanding type of secondary school, the Gymnasium, were considered only for positions in the second highest level, the superior service (gehobener Dienst). Those with a diploma from another type of high school were limited to jobs in the third level, the intermediate service (mittlerer Dienst), and all others were accepted only for positions in the lowest level, the elementary service (einfacher Dienst). Exceptions were rare, and advancement from one level to the next was highly unusual, if indeed possible at all. The traditional prescript that those entering the higher administrative service should have a legal degree, a rule which had been relaxed during the Nazi period and the immediate postwar years, now came to be more strictly enforced.(23) The admission of outsiders was also restricted.

The successful defense of the traditional system had fundamental consequences not only for the social structure of the civil service, but for civil servants' mentality and self-perception as well. During the Nazi era and the occupation period, the public image of this group had suffered seriously. As a result, the foundations of their proverbial corporatist mentality and the sense of moral superiority which often accompanied it had been severely shaken.(24) Now, however, federal legislation had acknowledged and confirmed their traditional legal and social standing. Civil servants were once again something special, on a different level than the rest of the work force. This affirmation of traditional positions encouraged the revival of a specific group mentality based on elements of the old corporatist outlook. Even the undemocratic concept of the civil servant as the incarnation of the "idea of the state," transcending party politics and the constitution, regained some of its former influence. This group mentality fostered persistent efforts to emphasize and bolster the financial and social line dividing civil servants from "ordinary" employees.(25)

2.

When setting up the new federal ministries, Konrad Adenauer and his political allies gave priority to hiring former civil servants from the higher levels of the Prussian and Reich ministries. This decision was prompted in part by the desire to take advantage of the years of experience which such persons had acquired in ministerial work, so that a well-functioning administration could be established as quickly as possible. But party-related motives and power politics also played an obvious role.

A closer look at Konrad Adenauer's methods of operation shows that these often conflicting goals were in practice pursued simultaneously. He repeatedly emphasized his determination to restore order in the public administration by rebuilding a career civil service comprised of well-trained experts who were politically neutral. Such assertions were often accompanied by the accusation that his political opponents - and most particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD) - were not advocating more flexible personnel guidelines because they were truly interested in democratization, but because they were eager to hoist their own supporters into administrative positions, regardless of qualification. Sources that have become available in the last few years reveal, however, that Adenauer often failed to heed the principles he espoused in public. In the years between 1946 and 1949, for example, when he was head of the CDU in the Rhineland, he consistently endeavored to have CDU members appointed to key posts in public administration. In such matters, Adenauer was much more purposeful than many of his political opponents, because he had a clear sense of the political significance of personnel decisions: he was convinced that bringing one's influence to bear early on, during the initial process of selecting administrative personnel, was the best way to affect the outcome of subsequent administrative decisions.(26)

Adenauer and his political allies showed similar resolve when setting up the federal administration. They rejected the widespread view that it would be most sensible to build on the bizonal administration already at work in Frankfurt, arguing that much of the civil service personnel employed there had no previous ministerial experience. This situation was, however, to a considerable extent the result of Allied denazification regulations designed to prevent the hiring of politically compromised civil servants. Another factor contributed to the scepticism and animosity with which Adenauer and other conservative leaders viewed the agencies in Frankfurt: they suspected that there were quite a few SPD supporters among the bizonal employees. An alternative presented itself in late 1948: a group of former high-level civil servants from the Reich Ministry of the Interior approached Adenauer and offered him their services. He encouraged them to contact as many former colleagues from the Berlin ministries as possible, and they began to compile personnel lists which could be used to fill future positions. These lists contained information on the age and the religious affiliation of those concerned, the positions they had held until 1945, and the classification they had received during denazification. Adenauer and his aides must have known that the systematic recruitment of such individuals would be controversial. To avoid a possible misunderstanding, a spokesman of the group of Reich civil servants had explicitly pointed out that those involved were "essentially" persons "who had at least had formal connections to the NSDAP [Nazi Party]," and he emphasized that some of them had held "prominent positions" in the Reich administration until 1945.(27)

The preparations made by these former Reich civil servants influenced personnel policy in Bonn all the more directly, once leading members of the group assumed important positions in the new federal administration. One of them was Hans Ritter von Lex, the first State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of the Interior.(28) Another was Dr. Hans Globke, who soon became Adenauer's "most important aide," acting as "virtual head" of the Federal Chancellery from 1949 on. Globke had a voice in all important personnel decisions in the federal ministries and has therefore been characterized as the "key person in setting up the apparatus of state in Bonn."(29)

This was one reason why many regarded Globke as the very personification of Adenauer's personnel policies. The other was that Globke's own career provided a controversial example of how representatives of the old administrative elite managed to retain their social position in spite of the twofold change in political regimes in 1933 and 1945. Globke had entered the Prussian civil service in 1921, after earning a doctorate in law, and had been transferred to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in Berlin in 1929. Such an assignment was considered a distinction, indicating good career chances in state administration. When the Prussian and Reich Ministries of the Interior were merged in 1934, Globke was taken into the Reich civil service and put in charge of the section of the ministry handling matters of personal and family legal status (Personenstandssachen). One year later he was given the responsibility of co-authoring all papers dealing with the "racial questions" involved in marital law - i.e., questions involving the segregation of those with "Jewish blood" from the "Aryan" majority. From 1936 to 1939 Globke also co-authored all papers on "general racial issues." In collaboration with Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Interior Ministry and an ardent Nazi, he wrote a semi-official commentary on the notorious "Nuremburg Laws." These measures, adopted in the fall of 1935, prescribed the systematic discrimination of the Jewish population in order to "protect German blood" and "German honor." (The very notion of their being "endangered" was grotesque; the Jews comprised less than one percent of the country's inhabitants.) The commentary told the authorities and the courts how this "German racial legislation" was to be applied.(30) Thus Globke was actively involved in organizing the implementation of Nazi racial policy - and the persecution of the Jews which it entailed.

Most accounts of Globke's conduct during the Third Reich fail to mention that, unlike most civil servants, he had not acted under economic pressure. He would not have lost all means of support had he refused to cooperate and possibly risked dismissal. On the contrary, he had good connections to private business circles and married the daughter of an industrialist in 1934.(31) Nonetheless, Globke chose to remain in the service of the Reich Interior Ministry. After the beginning of the Second World War, he applied his legal talents to solving problems in new areas: he assumed responsibility for the issues involved in organizing the administration of the annexed and occupied territories.(32)

Although Globke's controversial past was public knowledge in 1949, Konrad Adenauer had "no reservations whatsoever" about making him "his closest aide and adviser." In the years to follow, the Chancellor continued to defend him "against every attack."(33) There seem to be three main reasons for this. First, the two men shared a common background and outlook inasmuch as both had been shaped by the Catholic environment of the Rhineland. Second, Globke undoubtedly had a remarkable talent for organization. He showed considerable proficiency in managing the establishment of the federal ministries and in coordinating the operations of the new administration - quietly, effectively, and according to Adenauer's wishes. Third, Globke was not only capable and diligent, he was absolutely dedicated to serving the Chancellor. Indeed, Globke's controversial past left him virtually no leeway for independent political action or disloyalty. He "was only tenable" in his prominent position "as long as Adenauer acted to shield him."(34)

In addition to Globke and Ritter von Lex, numerous other former civil servants from the Prussian and Reich ministries had been hired by the federal administration since 1949. Many initially worked at subordinate posts, yet growing numbers were employed in the politically influential position of ministerial department head (Abteilungsleiter). As early as August 1950, 47.2% of all department heads were former Reich civil servants; an additional 22.9% had been civil servants in ministries at the state level or in other areas of administration prior to 1945. After 1950, the percentage of department heads who had once worked in Reich ministries rose even further. One factor contributing to this increase was the hiring of "a considerable number of civil servants who had held high-level positions at the end of the Third Reich."(35)

Administrative experience and professional qualifications were by no means the only criteria used in selecting ministerial personnel. Party politics also played an obvious role. Rudolf Morsey points out that the "flood of applicants for the federal service" offered "optimal recruitment possibilities."(36) But figures on the political affiliation of the department heads in the federal ministries reveal that supporters of the government parties predominated overwhelmingly. As of February 1953, 74% of the department heads can be identified as members or supporters of a particular political party. Of this group, less than 5% were affiliated with the SPD. Almost two-thirds are known to have been members or supporters of one of the governing parties: approximately 53% CDU/CSU, 6.5% FDP, and 4% DE Only the remaining 32% were regarded as neutral.(37)

Particular controversy was sparked by the manner in which the Adenauer government dealt with the political problems inherent in appointing former Nazi Party members as civil servants in the ministries. Everyone knew that only a portion of them had joined the NSDAP out of conviction; many had become members for opportunistic reasons or because they were pressured to do so. Therefore most experts considered it justifiable - and sensible - to rehire qualified civil servants who had only been nominal party members to fill less profiled positions (such as Referent).(38) In 1950, a speaker of the SPD opposition in the Bundestag stressed that his party explicitly supported such a policy.(39) It was commonly assumed, however, that particularly stringent standards would have to be applied when filling the higher positions in the ministries.

The Adenauer government showed little sensitivity in this respect. If it seemed obvious that a former party member would not be considered for a post as State Secretary, more generosity was displayed when filling positions on the level immediately below. As early as August 1950, more than a quarter of all department heads in the federal ministries were former NSDAP members; in addition, three officials in personnel departments had also belonged to the Nazi Party.(40) The Federal Minister of the Interior, Gustav Heinemann (CDU), tried to halt this development, but failed due to resistance from his fellow cabinet members. They were unwilling to agree to a clearly worded policy resolution which Heinemann had drafted, siding instead with the Chancellor, who preferred to decide "from case to case."(41) Under these circumstances, the number of former party members in politically influential positions increased steadily. "No less than 60%" of all department heads appointed between August 1950 and February 1953 had belonged to the NSDAP. In 1951, an ex-party member was appointed State Secretary; a second such appointment occurred in 1952.(42)

Adolf Arndt, a well-informed representative of the SPD, had already taken issue with the government's recruitment policies in July 1950. Speaking to the Bundestag, he criticized what he perceived to be an esprit de corps among the former ministerial civil servants from Berlin. It was all too often strengthened and reinforced by a feeling of solidarity among the politically compromised, he observed. In some areas, including the Foreign Service, Arndt saw a "tacit alliance of former members of the NSDAP." These employees did their best to hold open positions for former colleagues and to turn away other applicants. Furthermore, Amdt charged, "some key positions" in federal ministries were held by men "who were filled with resentment against those who were politically uncompromised or who had been persecuted" and who were therefore doing their best to thwart efforts to hire such persons now working in administrations at the state level.(43)

Arndt's criticism did not appear to make much of an impression on the government, but a series of articles in the Frankfurter Rundschau in 1951 finally triggered hectic activity. The newspaper examined the recruitment policy of the Foreign Office and made a number of disturbing accusations. The Bundestag appointed an investigating committee to look into the matter. The committee's report, which was adopted unanimously, declared that some of the information in the newspaper articles was exaggerated or false.(44) Beyond that, however, the report noted that there definitely were problems which would have to be addressed. First, the head of the personnel department of the Foreign Office was not only a former NSDAP member, but had also worked "in the personnel department of the Foreign Office under Ribbentrop." The committee considered this "highly questionable." Second, the committee was convinced that "a group of former National Socialists has been at work" trying "to reactivate" persons for the Foreign Service "who had by no means displayed irreproachable behavior during the National Socialist regime." "The immediate superiors" of this group knew about and tolerated its actions. Third, the Foreign Service had already hired some former career diplomats who had definitely been more than nominal members of the NSDAE They had once worked with obvious dedication to further Nazi foreign policy goals. One, for example, had served in the Political Department of the "Ribbentrop Ministry" and participated in the conception of Nazi foreign propaganda; another had not only helped formulate the country's "European policy" during the National Socialist era, but had even been involved in the organization of Jewish deportations abroad. Fourth: applicants not belonging to the ingroup of former career diplomats had been turned down summarily. The investigating committee had received "a large number of complaints" in this regard.

Since Konrad Adenauer was in charge of foreign policy, he bore the political responsibility for this situation. In 1949, he had directed that the Foreign Service be set up as a department within the Federal Chancellery; after an independent ministry of foreign affairs had been established in 1951, Adenauer had assumed the office of Foreign Minister while continuing to serve as Chancellor.(45) When responding to the report of the investigating committee, Adenauer obviously felt that a good offense was the best defense. Thus the Chancellor claimed in his speech to the Bundestag on October 22, 1952, that the reputation of the Federal Republic had not been damaged by the personnel policy of the Foreign Office, but rather by "the excessive attacks by the press." He further maintained that these "attacks" had served to disrupt the previously "gratifying development" of the Office and had "repeatedly ... hampered the effectiveness of this instrument of German foreign policy." Adenauer declared that if this were to occur again in the future, he would take legal action to have offenders prosecuted for "libel of the Foreign Service." Public "attacks on members of the civil service" would not be tolerated.(46)

Adenauer justified the policy of rehiring civil servants from the Ribbentrop Ministry, contending that it would have been impossible to proceed any other way. "One can not set up a Foreign Office without filling at least the leading positions with people who understand something about how things used to be done in the past." During the parliamentary debate, however, a well-informed FDP representative pointed out that the issue at hand was by no means a matter of a few individuals in leading positions: of the 82 section heads in the new Foreign Ministry, he declared, 64 had belonged to the Foreign Service prior to 1945 (78%). After repeated queries from the opposition, Adenauer finally revealed the percentage of former NSDAP members among the civil servants in the Foreign Office: "from the specialists in the sections (Referenten) on up, ... approximately 66% had formerly belonged to the Nazi Party." The proportion was thus even higher than during the Third Reich, since recent research has shown that 59% of such civil servants were NSDAP members as of 1940 (71 of 120).(47) Adenauer showed little interest in further debate on such questions. Instead, he demanded a stop to the practice of "sniffing around for Nazis."

It is still too early for a definitive statement about the extent and significance of the controversial lines of personnel continuity extending across the political rift of 1945. Our picture of the situation is incomplete, for many important aspects have yet to be investigated. We know little, for example, about personnel movements in the federal ministries after 1952/53 - and even less about the social and political backgrounds of the civil servants in positions below the level of department head. A broader focus seems all the more important, as some individuals who were clearly compromised were deliberately assigned to relatively low-ranking positions at first in order to avoid public censure. They were later promoted to higher and more influential positions. One case in point is former Major General Werner Kreipe, one-time Air Force Chief of Staff and recipient of the "Blood Medal," which Hitler commissioned to honor those early Nazi supporters who took part in his attempted Putsch in Munich in 1923. Kreipe was hired by the Federal Ministry of Transportation in 1951 and first given a position as a salaried employee. After the political controversy sparked by his appointment died down, he moved further and further up the career ladder. Finally, in 1961, he was named head of the ministry's department for air transportation affairs and assistant chairman of the board of directors of the government-owned Lufthansa Airlines.(48)

The investigation of such phenomena should not, however, distract attention from an equally significant form of social continuity - namely the line that bridged not only the political rift of 1945, but the cleft of 1933 as well. Militant National Socialists who first received positions in the Reich administration after January 30, 1933, or who were promoted to leading posts soon afterward on the strength of their political convictions played no significant role in the Bonn ministries. Instead, the former NSDAP members in the federal agencies were to a considerable extent members of an older administrative elite which had evolved prior to 1933 - and which, on the whole, continued to serve under the National Socialists. Most members of that older elite adapted quickly to the new political circumstances in 1933, whether out of nationalist conviction, opportunism, or fear. After 1945, they once again adjusted their behavior to suit the change in the political environment.(49)

Bonn's personnel policy was oriented to the past, in that priority was given to reinstating members of the old administrative elite. Yet it was very "modern" in one crucial point: the influence of the political parties, already reflected in the affiliations of higher-ranking civil servants in the early 1950s, was to increase perceptibly during the course of the decade. It gradually extended into the middle and lower levels of the ministerial bureaucracy as well. Although those involved took pains to transact such matters behind the scenes, considerations of party loyalty played such an obvious role in many hiring and promotion decisions that the issue had become a subject of public debate by the end of the 1950s.(50) The mounting criticism had little practical effect, however: in the years to follow, the party organizations would lose their remaining inhibitions and intervene actively in personnel decisions at all levels of the ministerial bureaucracy.(51)

Viewed from this perspective, the 1950s were a decade with a dual character. On the one hand, representatives of the old administrative elite gathered once again in Bonn and re-formed their ranks. On the other hand, the recruitment criteria which came to prevail gradually led to the formation of a new administrative elite subject to growing party domination and thus far less autonomous than the old civil service elite had once been.

3.

"The crassest error in a democratic sense was Article 131 of the Basic Law, along with the laws and ordinances regulating its implementation. The Federal Republic has been suffering under the consequences since its founding and will long continue to do so."(52) This pointed judgment by Karl-Hermann Flach, an influential journalist and politician on the left wing of the FDP, conveys an impression of the intensity with which contemporaries disputed the issue during and well beyond the 1950s. Even today the discussion of this topic is far from dispassionate, in part due to misconceptions and false information. For example, a well-respected and widely read introduction to postwar German history characterizes the legislation based on Article 131 as having applied to "members of the public service who had lost their positions due to denazification"; the provisions are said to have resulted in these persons regaining "their pension entitlements and the opportunity to work for the state." This account touches on an unquestionably important aspect of the topic, but mentions only one feature of a series of measures with several goals and complex social ramifications.(53)

What was really at issue? When the Parliamentary Council drew up the Basic Law, it stipulated in Article 131 that the Bundestag had to pass legislation regulating the legal status of those persons "who on May 8, 1945, were employed in the public service ... and who till now have not been employed or are not employed in a position corresponding to their former position." This provision affected a variety of groups: former employees of the Reich and of the state of Prussia whose employing agency no longer existed; former professional soldiers as well as civilians who had worked in the Wehrmacht administration; expellees and refugees (i.e., those who had been expelled from the former Eastern provinces and the Sudetenland or had fled from the Soviet zone) who had previously worked in the public service; and, finally, public employees who had once worked in the area now constituting the Western zones but lost their positions in the course of denazification.(54) In addition, Article 131 stipulated that federal lawmakers had to pass legislation regulating the legal status of those persons "who on May 8, 1945, were entitled to a pension or other assistance and who no longer receive any assistance or adequate assistance." This referred mainly to pensioners and surviving dependents who no longer received the customary support payments because the appropriate regional authorities had ceased to exist or, as was the case in the Soviet zone, because they now refused to honor such claims. This second part of Article 131 also pertained to a wide variety of groups with very different social and political backgrounds - all the way from widows of prominent Nazis to, say, the impoverished dependents of a mail carrier from East Prussia killed in wartime fighting.(55) In view of the complex nature of the subject and its political explosiveness, the Parliamentary Council deliberately refrained from making any decision as to how these various groups were to be treated. Instead, it left the matter entirely up to the future Bundestag.

At the time, no one knew how many people were affected by Article 131, and there was no reliable information on the social and political structure of the group. In order to obtain dependable data, the federal government commissioned the Statistical Office of the Combined Economic Area (i.e., the three Western zones) to take a detailed survey of those involved. The final results were presented in a report dated June 10, 1950. It circulated in only a limited number of copies and, until now, has never been analyzed by historians.(56) The report stated, first of all, that 430,306 persons were affected by Article 131 as of February 1, 1950. These "131ers," as they soon came to be called, were divided into two groups: 344,927 former employees and 87,379 entitled to pensions or other forms of assistance (including surviving dependents). The Statistical Office emphasized, though, that the number of persons involved was actually even greater. Despite extensive efforts, it had "by no means" been possible to find and register all those affected; the figures in some categories were regarded as "much too low." Moreover, these statistics did not include the large number of former employees and pensioners who had once worked for the Reich Railway and the Reich Postal Service. These individuals had been registered separately by the federal railway and postal administrations, which had reported directly to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.(57) In addition, the Statistical Office had primarily confined its efforts to registering those who had belonged to the public service for ten years or more.

As shown in Table 1, the official statistics divided the former public employees into two groups: "former professional soldiers" and "displaced civil servants" [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 1 OMITTED] (verdrangte Beamte). Both terms were diffuse and misleading, as the further breakdown of these categories reveals. Particularly questionable was the decision to subsume those dismissed during denazification in the Western zones - the so-called "denazified 131ers" - under the category of "displaced civil servants." The latter expression was commonly understood as referring to civil servants from the Soviet zone and the former Eastern territories; thus the unusual manner in which the statisticians defined these terms served to remove the "denazified 131ers" from the public eye. There is reason to believe that this did not happen inadvertently. A similar predilection for misleading terminology can be observed in another presentation which the Statistical Office published in early 1950. In an article on the preliminary results of the survey, the percentage of "denazi-fled" civil servants had been computed in a way that made it seem considerably smaller than it actually was.(58)

Table 1 contains newly calculated figures on the relative size of this group, showing it to be larger than historians have previously assumed. But even these statistics offer only a partial answer to the controversial question as to the degree to which the 131ers were politically compromised. Further significant information can be found in the appendix to the report compiled by the Statistical Office: it contains detailed figures revealing how those registered had been classified during denazification.(59) Since 1946, denazification involved the investigation of an individual's past by a special prosecutor's office and, in many cases, a subsequent hearing before a tribunal or panel of jurors. This process resulted in classification based on a system of five categories: I. major offenders (war criminals); II. offenders (activists, militarists, and profiteers - i.e., active participants or supporters of National Socialism, or recipients of excessive or unjust profits); III. lesser offenders (a probationary group, mainly for activists who could be expected to fulfill their duties as citizens of a peaceful democratic state after proving themselves in a period of probation); IV. followers (those who had belonged to the NSDAP or had been official candidates for party membership but were never more than nominal Nazis); V. exonerated persons (those who, in spite of formal membership or candidacy, had been involved in active resistance against the National Socialist regime and therefore suffered disadvantages). Finally, persons whose answers to the obligatory written questionnaire provided no grounds for suspecting any National Socialist activity were normally subject to no further examination and referred to as "not affected" (by denazification legislation).(60)

An evaluation of these statistics reveals a complex mixture of politically compromised and uncompromised persons in all subgroups of the 131ers. First, even among the "denazified civil servants" - those 55,368 persons who had been dismissed in the course of denazification in the Western zones because they were considered serious political offenders - only 83.3% had been formally classified as politically compromised in subsequent investigations by denazification panels (46,135 in categories I-IV). 10.7% were now viewed as "exonerated" (5,930 persons in category V), and 6.0% had even been declared "not affected" (3,303 former civil servants). Second: the remaining 108,567 "displaced civil servants" (expellees from the Eastern territories, refugees, and civil servants whose employing agency no longer existed) were by no means all uncompromised. Only 54.3% of these individuals were classified as "not affected" or "exonerated," while 33.8% were considered politically compromised (36,654 in categories I-IV). This figure included several war criminals. The percentage of those who were politically compromised was probably even higher, since 254 civil servants submitted no information on the results of their denazification, and another 12,738 (11.7%) were listed as "not classified."

Among the "former professional soldiers," the proportion classified as compromised was distinctly lower. In evaluating these figures, however, two factors must be taken into consideration. First, professional soldiers had traditionally been urged to abstain from party politics, and this notion of propriety continued to influence the behavior of many officers after 1933. Thus many refrained from joining the NSDAP, even though they agreed with its goals and supported its policies in practice. This restraint worked to their advantage after 1945, since party membership was one of the main criteria used to determine political culpability in the denazification process.(61) Second, many denazification panels had no way of verifying the information which officers submitted about their activities during the war. Nevertheless, there was still sufficient evidence to classify 16,172 of the 147,595 professional soldiers and Wehrmacht civil servants as politically compromised (11.0%). That figure included several war criminals. Moreover, the number registered as "not classified" was quite high: 32,428 (22.0%). This means that even at this late date, over one-fifth of the "former professional soldiers" had not yet taken part in the denazification procedure. Thus no definite statement on the degree of their political incrimination can be made.

Two further considerations give reason to view all official figures on the proportion of politically compromised 131ers as minimum values. First, these statistics were compiled on the basis of questionnaires filled out by those falling under Article 131 and gathered with the assistance of their interest groups.(62) Second, research on the history of denazification has shown that the classification standards were relaxed considerably after a short opening phase in 1946.(63) For example, many denazification panels hesitated to assign civil servants to categories I or II, since these classifications automatically entailed the prohibition of any further employment in the public service. It was often decided to put compromised civil servants in category III, the "probationary group," so as not to deprive them of their previous means of livelihood.

One example may serve to demonstrate how imperfectly such categorizations reflected the complex political realities of the Nazi period. Dr. Werner von Bargen, born in 1898, belonged to the group of career diplomats scrutinized by the investigating committee of the Bundestag in 1951/52. He had entered the Foreign Service in 1925 and joined the Nazi Party as of May 1, 1933. While serving as representative of the Foreign Office in occupied Belgium, von Bargen was involved in the organization of Jewish deportations. In 1943 he advanced to head of the Section for Western Europe in the Political Department of the Foreign Office. Later, however, von Bargen could show that he had been in contact with nationally-minded officers connected with the plot to kill Hitler in 1944 (they had hoped to overthrow the Nazis, restore German honor, and - last but not least - salvage their country's standing as a major European power). As a result, the main denazification panel in von Bargen's home town of Stade decided in 1947 to classify him as category V ("exonerated"). Thus he was able to apply for a position in the Foreign Service of the Federal Republic and was reinstated in 1951. The investigating committee of the Bundestag took a sharply different view of his past, however: it considered him "unsuitable for further employment in the Foreign Service ... in any form." This decision was prompted by several factors, among them: "Only after being confronted with the documents did Dr. von Bargen cease asserting that he could not remember, etc., and give an approximately truthful statement about the role he played in the Belgian Jewish deportations. Even then, his testimony was characterized by many reservations."(64)

In summary, a critical appraisal of the denazification statistics shows that the number of politically compromised 131ers was considerably larger than is suggested by the official percentage figures. Persons with doubtful records were to be found not only among the "denazified civil servants," but in all other sub-groups as well. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that many 131ers were not compromised. Thousands had been summarily dismissed from the public service in the Soviet zone, others had been forced to flee from the former Eastern provinces and were unable to find employment in the Federal Republic. These individuals and their families posed a social problem and, since they soon flocked to the banner of interest groups clamoring for financial compensation, a political one as well.

How did federal legislators deal with this complicated and potentially explosive issue? The "Law Regulating the Legal Status of those Persons Falling under Article 131 of the Basic Law" was promulgated on May 11, 1951. It prescribed far-reaching measures to compel reintegration of the 131ers into the public service. In principle, every person with at least ten years of service was to receive a position "equivalent" to the one held until 1945. To this end, the law mandated that all government units and public enterprises had a "placement obligation" (Unterbringungspflicht - literally: "duty to provide accommodation or shelter"). At least 20% of all regular positions had to be reserved for the "participants in the placement program" (Unterbringungsteilnehmer); in addition, every unit of the public service was obliged to disburse at least 20% of its total pay expenditures for the salaries of such employees. Any government agency or enterprise failing to fulfill this twofold requirement had to pay a commensurate "compensation fee" to the federal government. Moreover, such units were penalized by the loss of their discretionary powers in personnel matters: until the 20% quotas had been reached, they were obligated to hire "placement program participants" for all positions that became vacant or were newly created. Those 131 ers still waiting for placement were to receive a monthly "transitional payment" from the federal government. Finally, the law also provided for pensioners and surviving dependents who were not covered up to that time: if no other government unit in Western Germany was responsible for meeting their claims, the federal government accepted the financial liability.(65)

The law included special regulations addressing the delicate problems posed by the politically compromised 131ers. Closer examination reveals, however, that these provisions were inconsistent and dubious:(66)

1) The law declared that punishments imposed in the course of denazification were "unaffected" and thus remained in force (sec. 8). But since most of these penalties consisted of temporary demotions or salary cuts for a five-year period, they ran out in 1951/52 anyway. As a result, this section of the law applied essentially to the limited number of individuals who had been permanently dismissed from the public service. An examination of the figures compiled by the Statistical Office shows that this group comprised a mere 0.4% of all cases registered in 1950 (1,227 of the 344,927 former public employees).(67) Dr. Georg Anders, an official in the Federal Ministry of the Interior who wrote an influential commentary on the law, emphasized that hope existed even for these persons. Because the occupying powers had transferred the responsibility for the conclusion of denazification to the state governments, it was now possible for earlier classification decisions to be revised "in accordance with the stipulations of state law." Proceedings completed before 1949 could be reopened or a pardon granted. Anders also pointed out that state legislatures were free to pass new regulations on denazification if they so wished.(68)

At the time Anders wrote his commentary, it was in fact obvious that denazification proceedings conducted under state law had in some cases already resulted in a perversion of the standards which had earlier applied. In 1950, for example, the denazification panel in Hanover had classified Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, the former State Secretary in the Reich Interior Ministry, as category IV - thus deeming him a mere "follower" with only nominal membership in the Nazi Party. Yet the facts testifying to the contrary were clear. Stuckart had been an ardent Nazi before 1933 and had subsequently taken part in translating his party's racial theories into practical policy. His role in the drafting of the Nuremburg Laws was well known, for example, and his participation in the Wannsee Conference on the "final solution" of the "Jewish question" was documented. Due to the denazification panel's mild ruling in 1950, Stuckart was able to apply for reinstatement in the civil service according to the provisions of the law implementing Article 131. He could not, however, lay claim to the salary of a State Secretary, since the panel had "punished" him by demoting him to the next lower rank, that of Ministerialdirektor - still one of the highest positions in German administration.(69)

2) The approximately 55,000 former public employees who had lost their positions during denazification in the Western zones were expressly excluded from participation in the placement program (sec. 63). This did not mean that such individuals could not be rehired, if public employers so desired; but there was no particular advantage to it, insofar as government units were not allowed to take these persons into account when computing the quota of 131ers among their employees. Furthermore, this group received no assistance from the Federal Compensation Agency (Bundesausgleichsstelle), which had been set up to aid 131ers who had not yet found an adequate position. In the light of such provisions, the "denazified 131ers" seemed to be at a significant disadvantage. This appearance was deceiving. Another clause of the same section 63 granted them the same claim to monthly transitional payments as the other 131ers. The responsibility for these payments did not, however, lie with the federal government, as in all other cases, but had to be assumed by the former employing agency. As a result, many state and municipal administrations decided to save money by filling as many empty positions as possible with such individuals. This consequence of section 63 was not accidental, nor did it come as a surprise to experts. The sources show that this roundabout solution to the problem of the "denazified civil servants" was in fact discussed and agreed upon behind the scenes during parliamentary deliberations. It was even referred to explicitly on the floor of the Bundestag - though only once, by a representative who apparently violated a tacit agreement that this aspect of the law was not to be debated in public.(70)

3) The law prohibited former members of the Gestapo and the Waffen-SS from participating in the placement measures (sec. 3 subs. 4, sec. 56 subs. 6). However, a provision in a later section of the law determined that this stipulation did not apply to persons who had been transferred to the Gestapo or the Waffen-SS "for official reasons" (von Amts wegen) during the Nazi era (sec. 67). This pertained, for example, to a substantial number of the more experienced Gestapo members, since they had worked for the Political Police until 1933 and then been integrated into the newly-created Gestapo. In his commentary, Anders stressed that members of the Criminal Police, which had worked closely with the Gestapo, were not affected by any of these provisions. The same was true, he stated, for members of the "Reich Security Service" (Reichssicherheitsdienst). This term was not commonly employed prior to 1945; Anders used it to allude to a particularly sensitive subject which he treated explicitly only in a footnote: the wording of section 67 even opened the door for the reinstatement of former staff members of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the headquarters of the Nazi "security" apparatus led by Heinrich Himmler.(71)

The law implementing Article 131 sparked heated public debate even before it was promulgated. The problematic way it dealt with politically compromised employees was only one aspect of the controversy, however. Even more criticism focused on the federal lawmakers' financial generosity. When Interior Minister Heinemann introduced the bill in the Bundestag in 1950, he reminded the representatives that, in addition to the 131ers, "many other groups" were also awaiting federal assistance. He pointed to "the disabled war veterans and victims of bombing, those who lost the savings they held prior to 1945, the victims of Nazi persecution, the persons who were abducted by foreign troops during the war, victims of Allied dismantling of factories, bond creditors, suppliers of the Reich, and, finally, the large number of expellees from the former Eastern territories."(72) But none of the parties in the Bundestag agreed with the moderate financial settlement for the 131ers which the bill contained, even though the Finance Minister spoke strongly in its favor. Instead, they competed with each other to advance proposals for increased benefits. This was true not only of the conservative parties, but of the SPD as well: well-known Social Democrats did their best to distinguish themselves as advocates for the cause of the expellees and professional non-commissioned officers suffering under social degradation. Even the Communist Party (KPD), whose speakers had ritually castigated the civil service as a "haven for reactionaries," now demanded more money for the 131ers. The cost of the initial proposal, which the Finance Minister had endorsed, was to have been 350 million marks a year. After the Bundestag had completed its voting on proposals for increased benefits, the annual cost was projected to be 750 million marks.(73)

When the bill came up for the final vote in the Bundestag on April 10, 1951, the speaker for the SPD, Fritz Erler, voiced his disapproval of the embittered public criticism. He granted that "a rather generous settlement" had indeed been reached, and accepted that "some who are themselves in dire straits may be filled with envy when looking at those favored by this law." But envy, asserted Erler, is "always an evil emotion." In the future, priority would have to be given to bringing the other "victims ... up to the same level that we have granted this particular group."(74) This statement and the results of the following vote belie the common assumption that the 131er legislation was a "reactionary" measure put through by a rightist coalition. On the contrary, the bill received virtually unanimous approval. Not one member of the Bundestag voted against it, and only two abstained.

What was the rationale behind the stance of the SPD and the KPD? After all, both parties had always had a strained relationship to the conservative civil service apparatus, and the active role which state authorities played in the persecution of the Left between 1933 and 1945 had created even further animosity. A closer look at the policy of the SPD, the major opposition party, shows that it appears to have been prompted by several motives, some of which were extremely pragmatic:(75)

- The sheer size of the electoral constituency which the law affected must have been a major consideration. The 131ers and their families numbered well over a million persons, and most were of voting age. Clearly, SPD leadership could not want the conservative coalition to be seen as the sole force endowing this group with long-term financial benefits.

- Influential Social Democrats were concerned that the party would acquire a negative image if it opposed virtually everything the government proposed. Kurt Schumacher, the SPD's forceful and headstrong leader, took every opportunity to emphasize that he disagreed with Konrad Adenauer on nearly all key foreign policy issues. As a counterbalance, SPD representatives in the Bundestag strove to play a constructive role in the resolution of major domestic problems. From the very beginning, Social Democratic leaders left no doubt that they were willing to cooperate with the government on legislation to implement Article 131. During the committee deliberations on the government's draft law, SPD representatives worked resolutely (if often unsuccessfully) to amend it and change its focus.

- Concern over growing support for groups on the radical Right was another important factor. The success of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party was particularly alarming. Although it had just been founded in October 1949, its members soon included two Bundestag representatives and several state legislators.(76) Lobbyists for the 131ers tried to capitalize on nationalist sentiment in a manner quite similar to the radical Right, attacking the new republic for ignoring the plight of those former civil servants and professional soldiers who had served the Reich so faithfully.(77) Viewed against this backdrop, a generous settlement of the 131ers' claims appeared to be an expedient way of thinning the ranks of the economically discontent, thus reducing the number of potential protest voters. Rapid social integration of this large and articulate group would bolster the political stability of the Bonn Republic and help preclude a backslide into the unsettled conditions of the Weimar era. Nevertheless, even if such action seemed prudent, it was still distasteful to many SPD activists. Some leading Social Democrats looked at the situation from a positive angle, however, perceiving it as an opportunity to sow the seeds for future electoral victories. Kurt Schumacher argued that it would be irresponsible to shun the millions who had once belonged to the Hitler Youth, the Nazi Party, and the Wehrmacht officers' corps as though they were all equally guilty. That would drive them into the arms of radical groups on the right and the left, sounding the death knell for democracy in Germany. In his effort to expedite the political integration of these uprooted elements - and broaden the electoral base of the SPD - Schumacher interspersed his socialist rhetoric with recurrent appeals to nationalist sentiment. He condemned the Communists as agents of a foreign power and castigated Konrad Adenauer for allegedly being too cooperative toward the Western powers, even calling him "Chancellor of the Allies" and insinuating that Adenauer had betrayed German interests.(78) SPD leadership complemented this strategy by establishing behind-the-scenes contacts to groups lobbying for the 131ers. Talks with representatives of the nascent confederation of former professional soldiers began as early as 1949 and intensified during parliamentary deliberation on the bill. Subsequently, Schumacher even met secretly with members of the controversial Mutual Aid Society, the veterans' organization of the Waffen-SS.(79)

- The debate over German rearmament, fanned by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the resultant heightening of East-West tensions, led Social Democratic leaders to recognize that armed forces would soon be a factor in domestic and foreign policy once again. Although many in the party's socialist rank and file were solidly pacifist, Schumacher and other top SPD officials met secretly with former Wehrmacht generals to discuss the conditions under which both sides could work together to establish a new, democratic army. One major obstacle was obvious: prominent military figures had repeatedly declared that they and their former colleagues deeply resented the way they had been "defamed" and "discriminated against" since 1945. They vehemently rejected the notion that Wehrmacht officers shared a "collective guilt" for German war crimes. Numerous former officers refused to entertain any thought of participating in future defense efforts until the Bundestag settled their claims under Article 131. They asserted that such action was needed to restore their "dignity" and the "equal rights" of which they had been deprived.(80)

- Even among the large majority of civil servants not affected by Article 131, there was a widespread feeling that the issue was of great symbolic importance. Official recognition that former civil servants were still entitled to privileges guaranteed to them by the Reich was deemed necessary to reestablish the "honor" of the professional civil service. Even if they did not share this view, Social Democrats serving in elected office on the local and state levels were dependent on a good working relationship with the bureaucracy. In addition, party representatives in Bonn profited from informal links to civil servants in some of the federal ministries, repeatedly surprising political adversaries with confidential information during parliamentary deliberations. Had the SPD opposed legislation to implement Article 131, the pragmatic efforts to establish a cooperative relationship with the higher ranks of bureaucracy could well have suffered a considerable setback. Members of the party leadership must have perceived this as a serious risk to take. Representatives of the rank and file took a different view, however, censuring what they perceived as privileged treatment of civil servants - who had been restored to their old positions as if they were the only group "who did not lose the war, whereas the other groups have to shoulder the entire burden alone."(81)

- More than a few SPD representatives in the Bundestag felt that it was now time to return to "normality" and, after two decades of political turbulence, let bygones be bygones. This tendency was a response to a widespread mood in West German society. Efforts to come to terms with the past were increasingly unpopular, most wanted to look to the future and forget National Socialism - and denazification as well.(82)

Finally, the law implementing Article 131 was rendered more palatable to many on the Left by coupling it with a restitution act for all former public employees who had been victims of Nazi persecution. Many of the beneficiaries had belonged to the SPD or KPD, or were of Jewish ancestry. The Bundestag approved the restitution act on April 5, 1951, five days before the legislation on Article 131, and the two laws were promulgated simultaneously. When subsequently attacked by representatives of the rank and file for approving the 131er law, SPD leaders defended their position by pointing to the restitution act. The Bundestag would never have passed it, they asserted, had the Social Democrats refused to vote for the 131er bill.(83)

This claim may well have been a conscious misrepresentation of the facts in order to mollify party critics. Recent scholarship has shown that the conservative coalition did not have to be coerced by the Left at all. Indeed, the government began preparing the restitution act back in 1949, parallel to the 131er bill, and conservative leaders were equally interested in passing both measures simultaneously - because, as one historian concludes, the restitution act was "basically an alibi for the settlement of the 131ers' claims, which ... actually had priority." The government fully realized that, without the accompanying restitution act, its proposals for the 131ers would have met with moral and political censure at home and abroad, since they would have awarded this group more generous compensation than public employees persecuted by the Nazis. Since a general restitution law for all Nazi victims was not on the immediate agenda for financial reasons, it was said - the government drew up this special measure applying solely to former public employees. It awarded them a considerably higher rate of compensation than that planned for the remaining victims who would be dealt with later - because without such privileged treatment, the beneficiaries of the restitution act of 1951 would still have received less than their former colleagues, the 131ers. Even so, the results of the two laws were not really comparable: the restitution act applied to less than one thousand persons, whereas the number of 131ers was more than four hundred times as large.(84)

What precisely were the effects of the 131er legislation on the social structure of the public service in the 1950s? This important question has never previously been investigated by historians. The following remarks can not provide an exhaustive answer, but highlight key aspects of the complex process which ensued.

Let us begin by examining the situation in two particularly large and important government enterprises, the federal railway and the postal service. A closer look reveals that the number of 131ers was comparatively high even before the law was passed. This was the result of management efforts to accomodate former employees from the Eastern provinces and the Soviet zone as well as the colleagues who had once worked in the corresponding Reich ministries. In addition, both enterprises had already reinstated tens of thousands who had been dismissed during denazification.(85) These policies were motivated by several factors. Social concern played a role, as did conservative group mentality. Economic considerations were an additional component: such one-time employees were already familiar with technical procedures and did not require extensive training. As a result, the railway and the postal service had already rehired most of their "own" 131ers before the law even went into effect.

Nevertheless, the relatively high number of 131ers in these enterprises was by no means sufficient to fulfill the 20% quotas. At the end of 1951, only 14.2% of all regular positions in the postal service were held by 131ers. At the railway, the percentage was even lower, and did not reach a similar level until nine months later (14.1% as of September 30, 1952). By this point in time, the federal railway had reinstated approximately 60,000 former civil servants from the ranks of the 131ers "in regular positions at the level to which they were entitled (or higher)," as the personnel department emphasized.(86)

Such figures already reflected the first results of the law based on Article 131. Starting in 1951, the railway and the postal service had to pay substantial compensation fees and were obligated to fill empty positions with additional 131ers. Most of the persons now hired had no previous work experience in these enterprises; the majority were former non-commissioned officers and Reich Labor Service officers. Other candidates were older, for example those who had once worked in the Wehrmacht administration, and could only be put to use in a narrow range of jobs, for which they had to be specially trained. This hiring policy was not only costly, but left little leeway for recruiting younger employees. Thus the age structure of the staff grew even more unbalanced than it already had been as a result of the war. At the beginning of 1955, only 20.6% of all railway civil servants were under 40 years of age; the proportion of those between 50 and 65 was twice as high (40.6%).(87) The prominent role which 131ers played in parts of the higher service can be illustrated with data from the federal railway in 1955: 85% of all civil servants employed in that career track were 131ers (1,785 of approximately 2,100); 975 were "civil servants who had been relieved from their positions due to the denazification laws," the other 810 were "expellees or displaced civil servants."(88)

Information about the implementation of the law in the other parts of the public service is provided by statistics compiled by the Federal Compensation Agency. At the time the law took effect, only the federal administration was in a favorable position with regard to the 20% quotas. Indeed, as of July 1, 1951, the proportion of 131ers in regular civil service positions was already 23.7% (excluding the railway, the postal service, and the Federal Social Insurance Agency for Salaried Employees). In state government, where a considerably larger number of civil servants was employed, the figure comprised only 13.6%, and at the local level a mere 8.3%.(89) The changes which the law brought about in less than four years can be seen by comparing the data for March 31, 1955: at the state and local levels, the quotas had now leaped to 19.0% and 15.1% respectively, and even at the federal level the percentage had risen further, to 24.3%. The particularly large increase in local administration, where the proportion of 131ers had almost doubled, came as a direct result of the pressure exerted by high compensation fees. Municipalities that refused to hire politically compromised civil servants could literally not afford to maintain such a policy for very long. Initially, five major cities had to pay over one million marks per year; in one case, the annual sum amounted to 2.7 million marks. In the period up until March 31, 1955, state and local units had incurred a total of 190 million marks in compensation fees. City and county governments bore approximately 70% of this burden.(90)

The pressure on the public service subsided only gradually in the later 1950s. The reestablishment of armed forces in 1955 eased the situation considerably, since it provided new jobs for former professional soldiers. But many disabled veterans in this group were no longer suited for active military service and continued to crowd into other branches of the public service.(91) In addition, the federal government amended the 131er law and the regulations on its implementation several times in order to increase the number of those entitled to benefits. Moreover, refugees and displaced persons continued to stream in from East Berlin, East Germany, and the former Eastern provinces, putting in claims for positions in the public service.(92) Finally, on August 21,1961, the placement obligation which had weighed on government units for more than a decade was lifted. This step was taken in the context of the third supplement to the law, which included generous provisions designed to facilitate the settlement of all cases still open.(93)

Both the increase in the number of persons eligible to make claims and the repeated extension of the range of benefits were results of the political parties' continuing competition for the votes of the 131ers and their families - and of civil servants in general. Each of the supplements to the law was passed immediately prior to a Bundestag election: in July 1953, September 1957, August 1961, and, for the fourth and last time, in July 1965. Each led to a substantial rise in costs. On July 1, 1965, just before the Bundestag cast its final vote on the fourth supplement, a speaker for the CDU/CSU proudly quoted statistics on the financial consequences of the 131er legislation: expenditures up to the end of 1964 had amounted to approximately 19.5 billion marks - not including the substantial expenses incurred by the federal railway and the postal service. Following the approval of the fourth supplement to the law, he stated, the annual costs would "exceed 3 billion marks by far."(94) Two decades later, there were still more than 200,000 persons receiving monthly benefits. The cost to the public was approximately 4 billion marks a year.(95)

4.

After the end of the Second World War, administrators at all levels of government strove to reduce the number of female employees drastically. These efforts continued into the 1950s and were a major determinant of personnel policy. Nonetheless, the literature on the history of the public service in Germany usually fails to make any mention of this essential aspect of postwar development. Nowhere has this important topic been investigated systematically.(96)

In part, the widespread dismissal of female employees was a reaction to developments during the war. Since 1939, many government agencies had hired women as "temporary helpers" (Aushilfskrafte) to replace male employees who had volunteered or been inducted for military service. Often such women did not have the formal education normally required for the position. Thus once the war was over, employers not only discharged women whose male predecessors actually returned, but also tried to find better qualified replacements for many others as well. Frequently social considerations also played a role: most public administrations and enterprises tried to give less qualified and less demanding positions to disabled veterans and crippled fathers, because such individuals had little chance of finding a job in private industry.

In many cases, however, administrators simply wanted to return to "normal" conditions as far as gender was concerned. Women working in "men's positions" (Mannerarbeitsplatze) were to be "exchanged" for members of the opposite sex (austauschen). City councils, district administrations, state employment offices, and regional authorities reviewed the lists of public service positions in their jurisdictions, deciding which were "typically male" and therefore to be officially designated as "exchange positions" (Austauschplatze) if women were holding them at the time.(97) The standards applied were based on the personnel structure of the prewar period, in which women had played only a subordinate role: traditionally, the percentage of female employees in the German public service had been low; women rarely attained higher-level positions and were predominantly hired for a limited range of "typically female" jobs, above all in nursing and health care, in secretarial and switchboard services, and in elementary schools. The administrative efforts to enforce a large-scale gender rollback after 1945 were viewed by many as a matter of course. Indeed, there was a historical precedent which many still remembered well: after the First World War, employers had dismissed hundreds of thousands of women who had been newly hired between 1914 and 1918 to work in the public service and in private industry.(98)

Well into the 1950s, officials in many government agencies were particularly determined to force married women out of the service. This policy was often justified by pointing to another historical precedent, the Reich Law on the Legal Status of Female Civil Servants of May 30, 1932. It permitted the dismissal of married female civil servants working in the Reich administration, even though they had previously been awarded lifelong tenure. Only two conditions had to be met: the agency for which the woman worked had to file a formal request for her discharge, and an examination of her family's total income had to show that her "economic maintenance ... seems to be permanently ensured." This measure clearly violated the Weimar constitution, which not only stipulated that men and women were basically equal before the law (Article 109), but also expressly prohibited discriminatory measures against female civil servants (Article 128). The 1932 law could only take effect because the Reichstag approved it with the two-thirds majority necessary to pass measures contravening the constitution.(99)

One factor prompting this legislation was obviously the unprecedented economic crisis of the early 1930s. Public criticism of working wives mounted, and they were castigated as "double earners" (Doppelverdiener) because their jobs enabled their families to enjoy a double income, whereas millions had none at all. Nevertheless, mass unemployment was by no means the only reason why the Reich law of 1932 came to be passed. It must also be viewed in the context of a long tradition of discriminatory measures against married women in the German public service. In fact, the law was a somewhat milder version of regulations which had been adopted in 1923 and abolished only in 1929. Another important factor was growing pressure exerted by religious forces. The Pope had condemned the increasing number of working mothers in his encyclical Casti Connubii on December 30, 1930. He maintained that the chief purpose of marriage was to bring forth children, who were to be raised as good Catholics, so that their number "may daily increase." The concept of women's economic and social emancipation was "a crime," propagated by "false teachers who ... do not scruple to do away with the honorable and trusting obedience which the woman owes to the man." The married woman should not "be able to follow her own bent and devote herself to business and even public affairs," but give her full attention to "children, husband, and family." This was "the essential order of the domestic society"; it corresponded with "the natural disposition and temperament of the female sex" and was founded "on the authority and wisdom of God, and so not changeable by public laws or at the pleasure of private individuals."(100) In the months following this papal pronouncement, the influential Catholic Center Party drafted a law permitting the dismissal of married female civil servants and brought it into the Reichstag. Catholic politicians also played a key role in ensuring passage of the bill, negotiating persistently with representatives of other parties until the broad coalition necessary to assure approval with a two-thirds majority had been forged.

Although the provisions of 1932 were cited again and again after 1945 as a historical precedent, they were not actually followed to the letter in the postwar period. Instead, a more drastic version decreed during the Nazi era was applied. As of June 30, 1933, the new Hitler government had prescribed important changes in the wording of the 1932 law: the regulations no longer applied solely to the Reich administration, but to married female civil servants at all levels. Furthermore, government agencies lost their discretionary right to retain female civil servants considered difficult to replace: dismissal upon marriage was now mandatory.(101) These revisions were not only aimed at battling mass unemployment, they were also part of an ideologically motivated effort to reinforce traditional gender roles by compelling married women to leave the work force. Thus it was only consistent that this measure was later incorporated into the German Civil Service Law of 1937 (Deutsches Beamtengesetz, DBG), as section 63. Similarly, the wage regulations decreed in 1938 for salaried employees in the public service also mandated that women who married were to be dismissed automatically.(102) During the war, these rules were relaxed or suspended as part of emergency provisions decreed by the Nazi authorities. But after the occupying powers annulled all such emergency provisions in 1945, the regulations dating from 1937/38 came back into force.

Efforts to alter this situation were made only in some states. In the American zone, the impetus came from the military government: when it demanded that the state governments of Hesse, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg-Baden prepare new civil service laws in 1946, there were explicit instructions to include a clause prohibiting discrimination of employees on the basis of sex. These state laws went into effect in October/November 1946, as shown in part one of this article. However, they did not apply for the many employees of the railway and the postal service in these states. These two enterprises continued to operate on the basis of Reich civil service law, and they made further use of the corresponding option to dismiss married female civil servants.(103)

In the British zone, the military government did not play such an active role. In August 1946 it issued a contradictory declaration stating that men and women should be treated equally, but at the same time permitting government units to decide for themselves whether to continue to dismiss married women. The British statement was all the more confusing, in that it also referred to a section of the military government's plan for reforming German civil service law with an even more restrictive slant: "Generally speaking, provision should be made for women to resign from the Public Service on marriage...."(104) This perplexing amalgam of conflicting positions reflected basic differences of opinion in Britain itself, where married women were traditionally barred from the public service. That rule had only been relaxed due to the exigencies of the world war, and there were strong forces in favor of restoring it after the conflict was over. It was only in September 1946 that the cabinet agreed to abolish the marriage bar in Britain once and for all - and not because there was an overwhelming desire to provide equal opportunity for married women, but mainly due to the critical manpower shortage in the immediate postwar years.(105)

Eventually, German politicians in the British zone took the initiative on their own. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the one's largest and most important state by far, Interior Minister Walter Menzel (SPD) persuaded his colleagues to pass a cabinet resolution on February 9, 1948, declaring that the relevant part of the German Civil Service Law was "no longer to be applied." In an announcement issued on February 26, Menzel explained that section 63 was incompatible "with the legal principles now in effect and the basic ideas of a modern democracy." In addition, he declared, it "indisputably" represented a "pure manifestation of National Socialist thought."(106) This policy was often ignored by local government units, however, and even agencies directly subordinate to the state government proved reluctant to implement it. Finally, on November 18, 1949, the state administrative court refused to acknowledge the cabinet resolution as legally binding. As a result, government units in North Rhine-Westphalia were free to continue dismissing married women.(107) Such formal difficulties did not arise in Lower Saxony, the second largest state in the British zone. There the state legislature passed a special law suspending section 63 DBG. But those responsible had waited long before taking action: the new law was dated June 17, 1949.

As a consequence of these developments on the state level, the regulations decreed by the Nazi regime retained their validity in important areas of the public service in the Western zones. These provisions continued to apply after the founding of the Federal Republic as well.(108)

But why did the Basic Law have no influence on this situation when it went into effect in 1949? After all, Article 3 contained a clear guarantee in paragraph 2: "Men and women have equal rights." This so-called "equality principle" (Gleichheitsgrundsatz) was even more explicitly restated in paragraph 3: "No one may be prejudiced or privileged because of sex...." When the Parliamentary Council voted to incorporate these passages into the Basic Law, there were many older legal provisions contravening them, for example in the areas of family law, marriage law, property law - and civil service law. In order to give federal legislators time to revise these regulations to comply with the new consitutional norm, the Basic Law provided for a transitional period: all necessary changes had to be made by March 31, 1953, at the latest (Art. 117, par. 1). Thus section 63 DBG remained in force even after the Basic Law was promulgated. The same was true for the corresponding section of the 1938 wage regulations for salaried employees in the public service.

It quickly became apparent that the Adenauer goverment saw no need to set an example by complying with the constitutional principle of equality before it became compulsory. On the contrary, the bill for the provisional Federal Personnel Law which the cabinet passed on to the Bundestag on November 11, 1949, specifically retained the exact wording of the old section 63 DBG. However, the members of the appropriate committee of the Bundestag refused to go along: they voted to change the provision so that dismissals would no longer be possible.(109) Now Federal Postal Minister Hans Schuberth entered the fray, demanding that the original wording be retained. He cited economic arguments to support his case. For decades, the postal service had employed a substantial number of women; at that particular point in time the figure was approximately 70,000. If they married, they were usually dismissed forthwith. This policy had always been justified by claims that married women were not physically capable of shouldering the double burden of family and career. Schuberth cited statistics alleging that married women who had been permitted to remain in the postal service evidenced a considerably higher number of sick days and therefore a lower level of productivity than unmarried employees. He warned that any change in the present regulations would inevitably lead to an uncontrollable rise in the number of married female civil servants. The results of this development would make it impossible to run operations efficiently and economically, he maintained, and could very well lead to complete disruption of mail and telephone service. The conservative majority in the Bundestag soon agreed to a proposal more to Schuberth's liking. It was somewhat weaker than the 1937 statute, but still gave government units the opportunity to dismiss women upon marriage.(110)

The Postal Minister's campaign to defend the status quo was all the more successful due to a supporting consideration: continued discrimination of married women guaranteed additional jobs for the 131ers. The interconnection of these two questions has never before been noted in the historical literature, perhaps because those in power at the time did their best to distract public attention from the issue. This linkage was, however, explicitly stressed by the State Secretary of the Interior Ministry, Ritter von Lex, as he negotiated with representatives of the Allied High Commission to gain approval of the Federal Personnel Law in 1950. They criticized the measure because it violated the Allied requirement that men and women be treated equally. Ritter von Lex responded by pointing out that hundreds of thousands of former civil servants were looking for new positions in the public service. In view of this "very difficult situation" he saw no possibility of retaining any married woman whose husband's income afforded adequate support. Any other policy would cause "great embitterment" among the 131ers.(111) It went without saying that the dismissal of married women in order to accomodate more 131ers would lead to a shift in the gender structure of the public service. Everyone involved knew that the vast majority of the 131ers were men (according to the final results of the official survey presented seven weeks later, the exact figure was 96.4%).(112)

The representatives of the All led High Commission proved reluctant to accept this part of the law. In order to allay their reservations, the emissaries of the federal government asserted that the provision was actually only intended as a "very temporary measure." In fact, they stated, it was the section of the law which was "the most provisional in nature," quite "definitely a transitional regulation."(113) But such assurances did not mean that the federal authorities would refrain from dismissing married women once the law received Allied approval. The postal service alone discharged several hundred female civil servants and salaried employees in 1951 and 1952.(114)

Furthermore, it soon became evident that many CDU/CSU representatives in the Bundestag were definitely not of the opinion that the regulation should be temporary. The deliberations on the bill for a permanent Federal Civil Service Law, which lasted from 1951 until mid-1953, were marked by persistent attempts to insert a section providing for the dismissal of married women. Surprisingly enough, a closer look at the forces behind these efforts reveals that Catholic women's organizations played a key role. These groups - among them professional societies for female public service employees such as the Association of Catholic German Women Teachers and the Professional Association of Catholic Women Social Workers - maintained that female and male civil servants should receive equal treatment in general, but women should still be dismissed in case of marriage. In a joint statement, these organizations declared that their demand was motivated by "impassioned concern for the child, which is endangered by the mother's employment, and by concern for the family in general, whose protection is viewed by the state as a particularly urgent task." Proposals to leave it up to the woman herself to decide whether to remain in the public service after marriage were specifically rejected: the issue raised questions "that deeply affect the basic character of our people" and had to be regulated by the state. Moreover, these Catholic women's associations argued that the state was obligated to protect its legitimate interests as an employer and thus had to dismiss married women because they were less productive and took more sick leave than unmarried women. It was also contended that this policy would be in the best interest of the population as a whole, since civil servants' salaries were paid for with taxpayers' money, which had to be spent responsibly and economically.(115)

Leading representatives of Catholic women's organizations continued to press for such measures even after a growing number of male CDU/CSU politicians had begun to waver. Many of the latter argued that the traditional dismissal practice was indeed desirable from a Christian point of view, but they had growing doubts about whether it would be sanctioned by the newly-established Federal Constitutional Court. Article 3 of the Basic Law was so clearly worded that it seemed to leave little room for interpretation. Helene Weber, an outspoken CDU representative in the Bundestag, showed little sympathy for such vacillators and demanded a firm stand. Weber was the speaker of the women's committees of the CDU/CSU and a prominent Catholic women's leader (president of the Professional Association of Catholic Women Social Workers and vice president of the Catholic German Women's Federation). She had also worked for decades as a civil servant - which was only possible because she had adhered to the traditional ideal of chaste service for the common good and remained unmarried. During the deliberations of the appropriate CDU committee in May 1952, Weber insisted that the party must ensure that the new civil service law included a section allowing for the dismissal of married women. The equality principle in the Basic Law should not be given a "stiff legalistic literal interpretation;" that would have "devastating consequences." Indeed, she pointed out, the Weimar constitution had also contained a similar provision but that had never proved to be an insurmountable barrier. Weber's position was supported by the other woman on this committee, Josephine Doerner, who had been a civil servant in the postal service for decades and was thus also unmarried. Doerner now headed the newly-created department for women's affairs in the postal ministry.(116)

Weber finally seized the initiative herself and introduced a proposal in the Bundestag which would allow continued dismissal of female civil servants at marriage. On May 13, 1953, she took to the floor to urge her fellow representatives to vote for the measure. She asserted that only unmarried women were able to fulfill the demands posed by a position in the civil service. It was unrealistic to expect that married women could meet the challenge of holding two occupations simultaneously, that of public servant and that of housewife and mother. They should therefore remain at home and devote "their entire energy" to building healthy families. Weber declared that this task was the key to repairing Germany's torn social fabric and thus a matter of national importance anyway. She concluded with the contention that employing married women in the civil service would also be unjust toward younger unmarried women, because they would then have no hope of finding jobs as "social workers, teachers, or postal employees."(117)

Clearly, the efforts to discriminate against married female civil servants were not only the product of conservative male politics, but also the result of a determined initiative on the part of influential unmarried professional women. Once this constellation is recognized, the historical precedent cited again and again in the early 1950s, the Reich law of 1932, also appears in a new light. A re-examination of the sources reveals that the cleavage between single and married women was an important factor leading to the very inception of that measure - an aspect which has gone unnoticed in previous scholarly accounts. Indeed, it was Helene Weber who played a key role then, too, as the records of the Center Party show. At that time she was a senior civil servant in the Prussian Ministry of Welfare, she chaired the Center Party's national women's committee (Reichsfrauenbeirat), belonged to the Reichstag, and was also a member of the steering committee of her party's parliamentary group. During a meeting of this committee on February 3, 1931, Weber broached the subject, "demand[ing] a draft law which would require married women to quit the civil service." On October 15,1931, Weber presented the bill to the other members of the Center Party's parliamentary group, urging them to vote to submit it to the Reichstag. When the bill came out of the budget committee of the Reichstag on December 9, 1931, it was Weber who reported on it to the full house. Finally, on May 12, 1932, she took the floor to press for passage - in order to give "married women ... back to their families." Weber's one regret, she stated, was that the final committee version of the bill restricted its application to the Reich administration and thus no longer pertained to women working at the state and local levels.(118) This concession, exacted by the SPD in exchange for its approval, meant that the controversial measure did not affect the great majority of married female civil servants.(119)

Two decades later, the parliamentary debate took an altogether different turn. Helene Weber introduced her proposal with the support of 25 other representatives of the CDU, among them three women. But in the heated exchange following her speech on May 13, 1953, another female representative of the CDU - a married woman - took to the floor and argued for rejection. Dr. Else Brokelschen was a professional teacher and mother. After marriage, she declared, she had voluntarily tendered her resignation, because she had felt "unequal to the double burden" of "a double occupation as housewife and teacher." But her school superintendent and the regional school authority had urged her to stay on, she asserted, because they believed a married female teacher "would have to have a completely different view on social questions than an unmarried woman." After this jibe at Weber and other women's leaders who were single, Brokelschen demanded proof for the recurrent contention that the families of professional women were "not in good order," whereas the families of women who remained at home were. She had to admit that she spoke for no more than "a small number" of CDU representatives. Nevertheless, they were determined to vote against the proposal.(120)

Even a relatively small number of dissenting votes was enough to dash the hopes of those supporting the proposal, because the conservative coalition had a majority of only seven seats in the Bundestag. Yet Weber's motion was defeated by a much larger margin. Many conservative politicians were now convinced that the Federal Constitutional Court would eventually declare the measure null and void, so that voting for it would be an exercise in futility, serving only to expose its supporters to public ridicule. A second factor probably also played a considerable role: the next Bundestag elections were only a few months away. Since the SPD demanded a roll call vote, anyone casting a ballot in favor of the proposal risked criticism during the election campaign. The possible consequences were difficult to assess, but everyone knew that, as a consequence of the Second World War, women constituted a clear majority of the voters? This might well be the reason why an exceptionally large number of CDU/CSU representatives refrained from committing themselves publicly. More than 40% abstained or did not participate in the vote at all.(122)

Only after this vote on May 13, 1953, was it finally clear that the new Federal Civil Service Law would not include a section permitting the dismissal of married women.

In view of the attitudes and policies prevailing at the federal level, many state and local administrators also made no effort to conform to the constitutional principle of equality before it became mandatory. They continued to apply the old regulations after 1949 as if nothing had changed, and indeed sought to cut back on female personnel even further. Conditions were particularly favorable, inasmuch as the currency reform of June 1948 had led to a sharp rise in the unemployment rate. As a result, even those branches of the public service which had complained about an insufficient number of male job applicants in the immediate postwar years now had better chances of realizing their goals of "personnel exchange." In the public transportation sector, for example, the female streetcar conductors who had been sustaining operations in most cities since 1939/40 became the targets of such programs. Until the war, this occupation had been a male domain. Klaus-Jorg Ruhl has shown that the systematic efforts to replace female conductors with men were challenged by the influential Union of Public Service and Transport Employees. In the important Rhine-Ruhr area, the union managed to reach an agreement with public transport authorities guaranteeing further employment of women in this occupation. But even this apparent victory proved hollow; it was practically impossible to stem the tide of gender rollback.(123) A closer look at these developments reveals that the situation was more complex, however; union initiatives in support of female conductors not only met with resistance from public employers, but were also undermined by opposition from within the union ranks. Influential men in the local union councils showed little sympathy for the leadership's efforts to guarantee women the right to work at "men's jobs." The union's secretary for women's affairs at the federal level made no effort to conceal her indignation over this development. In a public statement, she termed it "extremely bitter."(124)

The steps taken against women regarded as "double earners" were particularly rigorous. Government authorities investigated the financial circumstances and family status of their female employees to determine whether dismissal could be justified. If such evaluations did not produce the desired results, they could be repeated periodically. Some administrators interpreted the term "double earner" so broadly that it even applied to young unmarried women living in a common household with their parents. If the father's income seemed adequate, the working daughter could be dismissed.(125)

But even under the particularly favorable conditions prevailing in the early 1950s, it was not always possible to replace women with men to the extent desired. The new demographic constellation sometimes prevented full implementation of such policies. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the war-related drop in the relative size of the male population necessarily entailed a lasting shift in the gender structure of the workforce. But in the postwar era, many Germans only gradually came to comprehend the full implications of the new situation. As long as the economy was in a state of transition, unemployment remained high, and refugees continued pouring in from the East, many hopes of rehiring men [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 2 OMITTED] to fill positions which they had "normally" occupied before the war still seemed realistic. It was only later, as a result of the first powerful economic upswing, that the consequences of demographic constraints for hiring policies would become fully evident. This process set in somewhat earlier in the public sector, however, because salaries there were distinctly lower than in most areas of private industry. Thus many men considered a job in the public service less desirable, and they transferred to the private sector as the opportunity arose. Those willing to take their places were frequently women. As a result, many public employers proved unable to reduce the number of female employees as far as they would have liked.

What, then, was the net effect of these conflicting forces on the gender structure of the public service? The earliest detailed statistics available are from the year 1952. According to these data published by the Federal Statistical Office, 22.6% of the employees at the federal, state, and local levels were women (293,410 of 1,300,245). This official figure suggests an overly favorable picture of the situation, however, since it does not include the 845,872 persons working for the postal service, the railway, and the public law institutions. The percentage drops to 18.1% if they are taken into account.(126)

Table 2 presents detailed information on the female employees according to employment status and sector. The breakdown according to employment status (columns one and two) reveals that most women held positions as salaried employees. Of the rest, the majority were manual workers. Less than one-quarter of all women in the public service enjoyed civil service status and thus life tenure - as long as they refrained from marrying. The percentage of male employees with civil service status was almost twice as high (45.4%). Conversely, the percentage of men working as salaried employees was only 16.6% - 1ess than one-third of the corresponding figure for women (51.0%).

The view from another angle is even more revealing. The data on female employees as a percentage of total public service personnel (column four) show that 40.4% of all salaried employees, but only 10.5% of all civil servants were female. This difference was even more significant when one considers that the number of civil servants was almost twice as large as the number of salaried employees. The figures indicating a somewhat higher percentage of female civil servants at the state and local levels should not be misinterpreted as proof of more liberal recruitment policies in the administrative units there. They chiefly reflect the large number of female teachers working in the public schools. Most school teachers in West Germany were employees of state governments, a smaller number worked for municipalities. Women comprised 38% of all teaching staff at these levels.(127) As the statistics show, the highest proportion of female civil servants was to be found in the postal service. This was the result of a unique personnel policy with a long historical tradition. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the postal service had employed a considerably larger number of women than other parts of the public service; most worked as telephone operators, as sorters and bookkeepers in the financial divisions, or in counter and secretarial services. Because personnel fluctuation posed a problem, efforts had been made to increase the incentive for long-term service: female salaried employees who had worked for the postal service for a number of years received the opportunity to take an examination enabling them to enter the civil service at the intermediate level. The traditional prerequisite for receiving such a civil service position was, however, the understanding that the woman would have to abstain from marriage ("celibacy clause").(128)

Finally, most women with positions as civil servants or salaried employees worked in subordinate positions. The degree to which they were concentrated in the lowest levels of service can be seen in Table 3. First of all, it contains statistics on gender structure in the non-technical areas of the public service in 1950 (excluding the railway and the postal service).(129) The percentage of male employees in the two lowest levels was conspicuously smaller. Conversely, the [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 3 OMITTED] proportion of men working in the two highest levels was almost three times as large as that of women. The gender gap was even greater in the postal service, as can be seen from the figures for 1952. There were almost no female employees in the highest level of service, and very few in the second highest. Indeed, women were to be found almost exclusively in the two lowest levels: 97.9% of all female civil servants and 99.8% of all female salaried employees held positions in the intermediate or elementary service.(130)

5.

The consequences of the controversial policy decisions discussed in this article were far-reaching:

- The successful defense of traditional civil service law reaffirmed the old hierarchy of career tracks based on formal education, reduced opportunities for upward mobility, and helped shore up the system of social stratification which had been destabilized by the twin shocks of total war and total defeat. The confirmation of civil servants' privileged legal status also encouraged the revival of a specific group mentality characterized by a sense of moral and social superiority.

- In Bonn, priority hiring of former civil servants from the Prussian and Reich ministries reestablished clear lines of continuity with the period before 1945. Many members of the old administrative elite now served in the upper echelons of the new federal ministries. Among them were numerous civil servants who were compromised by the role they had played during the Third Reich. The repercussions of these developments were by no means confined to the capital city; they had a manifest influence on the political climate in the country as a whole.

- Similarly, the legislation implementing Article 131 of the Basic Law also had a broader, symbolic significance. These measures did not merely address the social problems of many uprooted public employees, but compelled government units to rehire large numbers of them, thus intensifying personnel continuity with regard to the period before 1945. Moreover, this legislation provided the basis on which almost all of the civil servants discharged during denazification could be reinstated. At the same time, the 131er legislation left little opportunity for the recruitment and training of younger employees in many parts of the public service. The skewed age structure of the staff gave rise to longs term personnel problems - and thus to further costs not included in the official statistics on the billions awarded to the 131ers and their families.

- A gender rollback was the result of persistent efforts to discharge women holding "men's jobs," all married women, and as many other female "double earners" as possible. Women were once again relegated to the position which traditional role concepts accorded them: to sectors outside of the core areas of the civil service, to subordinate posts with little employment security, to jobs for which men could not be found - or, as far as married women were concerned, to home, hearth, and family.

Nevertheless, an interpretation of the social history of the public service from this perspective alone would be incomplete. A closer look at developments in the latter part of the 1950s shows that this was also a decade in which signs of long-term social change became increasingly apparent in this sector as well. Some processes took place against the will of many administrators and government officials, or as a result of decisions which proved to have unintended consequences. Above all, important elements of social change can be discerned in two areas:

1. The overall percentage of women in the public service began to increase once again - slowly, but perceptibly. The driving force behind this development was the "economic miracle" (Wirtschaftswunder), the unprecedented economic upsurge characterized by years of rapid and continuous growth lasting well into the 1960s. The situation on the labor market changed drastically, eventually forcing modification of traditional policies toward women in the public service. The boom led to a dramatic drop in the unemployment rate: it fell from 11.0% in 1950 to 5.6% in 1955, finally shrinking to only 1.3%, in 1960.(131) As a consequence, government authorities had an increasingly difficult time finding men who were willing to accept positions in the lower echelons of the public service. Administrators admitted openly that they had no other alternative but to hire more women once again.(132) The total percentage of female employees in the public service increased, from 18.1% in 1952 to 22.8% in 1960. The proportion of women working in administrative units at the federal, state, and local levels rose even higher, climbing from 22.6% in 1952 to 28.1% in 1960.(133) Some officials hoped that this development was only temporary and that it could later be reversed under more favorable conditions. In reality, it marked the beginning of a long-term shift in the gender structure of the public service. This trend, alternatively sustained by economic factors and political forces, has continued up to the present day.

2. The 1950s witnessed the emergence of a personnel structure clearly different from that prevailing in the Weimar Republic. By the end of the decade, the proportion of civil servants had dropped to a level previously unknown. Conversely, the percentage of salaried employees and manual workers rose substantially. A significant, though apparently unintentional, consequence of this process was a gradual broadening of the social base of the public service.

This momentous shift was not the result of central directives, but of a multitude of individual decisions at various levels. One obviously important factor contributing to the destabilization of traditional personnel structures was the war: the percentage of civil servants dropped dramatically due to military inductions and casualties. Yet even after the war was over, the proportion of civil servants remained unusually low.(134) To some extent, this was a consequence of denazification. The percentage of NSDAP members among civil servants had been considerably higher than among salaried employees or manual workers. Thus a particularly large number of civil servants lost their jobs after 1945. A second factor was the cautious hiring policy of many authorities due to the uncertain prospects of political and economic development. Since the future financial situation and personnel needs could not be clearly assessed, employers often refrained from making long-term commitments. Administrators now often hired salaried employees or manual workers for jobs previously performed by civil servants. Persons without civil service status were less expensive and could later be dismissed if so desired.

As conditions stabilized in the 1950s, the percentage of civil servants gradually settled at a level higher than during the turbulent war years and the occupation period, but conspicuously lower than the level considered "normal" during the Weimar Republic. For example, the proportion of civil servants in local government was 18.1% in 1960, as compared to 59.5% in 1927. During the same period, the percentage of civil servants in state government dropped from 83.5% to 60.4%. The corresponding figure for the federal government was 30.5% in 1960, as compared to 56.9% for the Reich government in 1927.(135)

Within each of these government levels, however, the situation differed greatly from sector to sector. There had been little change within the ministries and other traditional core areas of the public service such as police, justice, finance, and defense (the so-called Hoheitsverwaltung). In these sectors, most employees continued to enjoy civil service status. But the situation was quite different in the more newly established service administrations (Leistungsverwaltung), for example in health care and public welfare, in the compensation agencies, in public construction and housing authorities, and in the social insurance agencies. Here the percentage of civil servants was markedly lower than it had been previously. Moreover, political decisions led to a considerable expansion of the service administrations in the 1950s. This shift in the character of the public service contributed to an even faster decrease in the overall proportion of civil servants.(136)

Thus the 1950s were a period in which lawmakers unmistakably confirmed the special legal and social status of career civil servants, but at the same time the point at which this group lost its dominant position in the public service, at least in numerical terms, once and for all. Only the traditional core areas remained largely untouched by change. There, civil servants - and often the old conservative esprit de corps - still dominated. But these areas were increasingly surrounded by others in which civil servants constituted just a small portion of total personnel, occupying only the highest positions. The great majority of the staff consisted of salaried employees and manual workers. Their understanding of their role as public employees differed radically from the old corporate mentality once common among civil servants, and they often came from other social backgrounds.

The question of the extent to which contemporaries perceived this momentous structural shift and, if so, how they interpreted it, is a subject for future research. At present, most evidence suggests that popular conceptions of the public service were predominantly influenced by traditional images and ideologies. This perception was encouraged by the policy of the Adenauer governments and the conservative parties, which deliberately propagated the old ideals and values. This policy proved to be so effective that many who criticized the Adenauer era as a period of veritable "restoration" cited the public service as a prime example - though some important developments in this sector might better be viewed as an example of how futile political intentions can be in the face of long-term social change. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, well-known historians and political scientists continued to depict the development of the public service during the Adenauer era solely in terms of "restoration." Thus the significance of the controversial political decisions of the early 1950s lies not only in the fact that they represented a major contribution to the social consolidation of the public service under conservative auspices. In addition, these measures apparently had such a strong influence on people's perception of the public service that signs of long-term social change were either overlooked or underestimated by many for years to come.

Institut fur Geschichtswissenschaft Ernst-Reuter-Platz 7 10587 Berlin, Germany

ENDNOTES

1. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Modernisierung oder Restauration? Einige Vorfragen zur kunftigen Sozialgeschichtsforschung uber die Ara Adenauer," in Rheinland-Westfalen im Industriezeitalter, vol. 3, eds. Kurt Duwell and Wolfgang Kollmann (Wuppertal, 1984), 278.

2. Paul Erker, "Zeitgeschichte als Sozialgeschichte. Forschungsstand und Forschungsdefizite," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 19 (1993). Four other theoretical articles written by contemporary historians also appeared in 1993; the publication of five such pieces within one year's time reflects recognition of the need for a fundamental change of perspective in German contemporary history. See Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Deutsche Zeitgeschichte nach 1945. Entwicklung und Problemlagen der historischen Forschung zur Nachkriegszeit," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 41 (1993); Hans Gunter Hockerts, "Zeitgeschichte in Deutschland. Begriff, Methoden, Themenfelder," Historisches Jahrbuch 113 (1993); Michael Prinz, "Demokratische Stabilisierung, Problemlagen von Modemisierung im Selbstbezug und historische Kontinuitat - Leitbegriffe einer Zeitsozialgeschichte," Westfalische Forschungen 43 (1993); Axel Schildt, "Nachkriegszeit. Moglichkeiten und Probleme einer Periodisierung der westdeutschen Geschichte nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und ihrer Einordnung in die deutsche Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 44 (1993).

3. For a particularly important contribution to the discussion about the re-evaluation of the 1950s see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn, 1993). The volume contains articles on aspects of the political system, the economy, society, and culture of the Federal Republic. It includes an earlier version of this article, which has been utilized with kind permission of the publisher, J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger. For publication in English, the study has been further developed at many points, and new primary sources have been consulted.

4. The term "modern industrial society," now used by many historians to characterize the social formation which has evolved since the founding of the Federal Republic, doubtlessly contributes to the tendency to overlook the public employees. The term points specifically to the area of industrial production and distracts attention from the tertiary sector, although the growing significance of public and private services is said to be a prime characteristic of "modern" societies.

5. In the United States, 3.11 million persons worked for government units at all levels in 1929. The population of Germany numbered 62.4 million in 1925; in the same year, the figure for the U.S. was estimated to be 115.8 million. For these and the following statistics see Peter Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975. A Data Handbook in two Volumes, vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M./London/Chicago, 1983), 193-243; Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 8, 126-8, 1100-4 (all figures exclude military personnel). The number of public employees in Germany was actually even larger; Flora's statistics do not include personnel employed by the public utility companies, the social insurance agencies, the public hospitals, and state-run welfare institutions (such as public assistance agencies and homes for the elderly).

6. Not until after World War II did some other western European countries evidence similar percentages. In the following decades, though, many would overtake Germany permanently - as the result of a secular trend to accelerated growth in the public sector on an international scale. For a general discussion of the causes and varying pace of this development see Richard Rose et al., Public Employment in Western Nations (Cambridge, GB, et al., 1985). The statistics for the United States reflect a similar pattern of growth: whereas 6.48% of the work force were employed in the public service in 1929, the proportion had risen to 7.56% by 1940. It reached 8.96% in 1948 and then swelled to 15.28% by 1970 (computed on the basis of the figures in Historical Statistics, 126-7, 1102-4).

7. In 1950, there were 2,104,103 full-time employees in the public service; the entire work force numbered 23,489,000 persons (Erwerbspersonen), and 14,163,100 wage earners were actually employed (beschaftigte Arbeitnehmer). See Bevolkerung und Wirtschaft 1872-1972, hg. vom Statistischen Bundesamt (Stuttgart/Cologne, 1972), 140, 236-7; Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952, 87.

8. In 1950, the Federal Statistical Office listed the number of those working for the Federal Postal Service as 279,508; they constituted 13.3% of all public service employees. 525,429 persons worked for the Federal Railway; they represented 25.0% of all public service employees. See Bevolkerung und Wirtschaft, 236, 241.

9. For a discussion in long-term perspective see Hartmut Kaelble, Soziale Mobilitat und Chancengleichheit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich (Gottingen, 1983), 73-102. In his discussion of social mobility in the public service after 1945, Kaelble had to confine himself mainly to formulating cautious hypotheses, because the empirical data available to him were of limited value. This detracts in no way from the theoretical importance of his pioneering work.

10. The policies of the other two occupying powers had no direct consequences for developments in the Federal Republic. The Soviets favored sweeping reforms, and by 1949 the traditional German civil service system had actually been abolished in their zone. The French were the sole occupying power which considered only limited reform necessary. The measures enacted in their zone met nonetheless with stubborn German resistance and had no lasting effects. See Curt Garner, "Schlussfolgerungen aus der Vergangenheit? Die Auseinandersetzungen um die Zukunft des deutschen Berufsbeamtentums nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges," in Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Ende des Dritten Reiches. Eine perspektivische Ruckschau (Munich/Zurich, 1995), 607-9, 615-6, 633-40, 652-62. For American policy see ibid., 612-5,627-9; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie. Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-1952 (Opladen, 1993), 173-83; Wolfgang Benz, "Versuche zur Reform des offentlichen Dienstes in Deutschland 1945-1952," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 29 (1981); for a detailed study of British policy see Ulrich Reusch, Deutsches Berufsbeamtentum und britische Besatzung. Planung und Politik 1943-1947 (Stuttgart, 1985). Reusch's interpretation requires modification in fundamental points, however; see Curt Gamer, "'Zerschlagung des Berufsbeamtentums'? Der deutsche Konflikt um die Neuordnung des offentlichen Dienstes 1946-1948 am Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 39 (1991).

11. See Jurgen Kocka, "Class formation, interest articulation, and public policy: the origins of the German white-collar class in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries," in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing interests in Western Europe. Pluralism, corporatism, and the transformation of politics (Cambridge, GB, et al., 1981).

12. The historical origins and basic features of the Berufsbeamtentum are discussed in the introductory survey by Bernd Wunder, Geschichte der Burokratie in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M., 1986); it not only makes reference to the older literature, but also contains much new and important information. The general treatments available in English are less satisfying; see Fritz Morstein Marx, "Civil Service in Germany," in Leonard D. White et al., Civil Service Abroad. Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany. The Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, Monographs 2-5 (New York/London, 1935), pp. 161-275; Erich Angermann, "Germany's 'Peculiar Institution': The Beamtentum," in Angermann and Marie-Luise Frings, eds., Oceans Apart? Comparing Germany and the United States (Stuttgart, 1981). The best English-language discussion by far has appeared in the context of research on the history of German professionalization in international perspective: Jane Caplan, "Profession as Vocation: The German Civil Service," in Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds., German Professions, 1800-1950 (New York/Oxford, 1990). Two important monographs dealing with developments in the decades before 1945 have also appeared in English: Andreas Kunz, Civil Servants and the Politics of Inflation in Germany, 1914-1924 (Berlin/New York, 1986); Jane Caplan, Government Without Administration. State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Oxford, 1988).

13. Verkorperung der Staatsidee. The relevant body of academic teachings, Staatsrecht, dealt with the nature and authority of the (German) state. By no means did these doctrines and their proponents disappear along with the German state itself in 1945. After the first shock of defeat had worn off, well-known representatives of this field (who were themselves civil servants) moved quickly to re-assert the continued validity of their earlier teachings; see, for example, the influential work by Carl Heyland, Das Berufsbeamtentum im neuen demokratischen Staat. Eine staatsrechtliche Studie (Nach dem Stande vom 1. Oktober 1948) (Berlin, 1949). Heyland was professor at the University of Giessen, where he had been teaching without interruption since 1923.

14. These state laws were published in Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 1946, 349-68; Regierungsblatt fur die Regierung Wurttemberg-Baden 1946, 249-62; Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fur Gross-Hessen 1946, 205-15. For an evaluation written by an avid proponent of the traditional civil service system see Heyland, 140-56.

15. Bark and Gress, the authors of the largest and most recent English-language history of West Germany, have - for reasons known only to them - come to a diametrically opposite view of these developments, for example: "In 1946 the Allied military governments ... introduced laws ... [which] abolished the bureaucracy's historical status as a special group under public law and transformed the Beamter's relationship with his employing institution into a simple contract like that between any employee and his employer." This stunning misjudgment could have been avoided, had the authors more carefully read the German work which they cite. See Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, vol. 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963, 2nd ed. (Oxford, GB/Cambridge, MA, 1993), 81-5 (the quotation is on p. 83). In addition to studies in German, there are also a number of helpful contemporary accounts available in English, written by scholars who had worked for the military government, among them: Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 1944-1955 (Princeton, NJ, et al., 1957), 332-4; Arnold Brecht, "Personnel Management," in Edward H. Litchfield and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY, 1953); J.F.J. Gillen, State and Local Government in West Germany, 1945-1953, With Special Reference to the U.S. Zone and Bremen, Historical Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (1953), 69-91.

16. The author is presently engaged in a detailed investigation of the reasons why the American and British military governments did not find ways to implement their reform objectives in the critical first years of occupation. For first results of this project see Garner, "Schlussfolgerungen."

17. For the text of Military Government Law No. 15 see Gesetzblatt der Verwaltung des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes, 1949, Beilage 2. On this and the following see Udo Wengst, Beamtentum zwischen Reform und Tradition. Beamtengesetzgebung in der Grundungsphase der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1948-1953 (Dusseldorf, 1988), 32 ff., 108 ff.; Garner, "Schlussfolgerungen," 640-51; Rupieper, 183-99; Benz, 239-45.

18. Adenauer's commitment was not only motivated by political considerations, but also influenced by biographical factors. The Chancellor could well identify with the interests of the higher civil servants, since he himself had once studied law and then set off on a career in the higher administrative service. Only later did he enter into politics. Adenauer's father had also been a civil servant.

19. Above all, the plan to abolish salaried employees was abandoned. This proposal had been criticized even by those Germans in favor of reform.

20. The course of the negotiations between Chancellor Adenauer and the Allied High Commission on December 14, 1951, illustrates the dilemma resulting from this conflict of interest on the Allied side. The German record is published in: Hans-Peter Schwarz in connection with Reiner Pommerin, ed., Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare 1949-1951 (Munich, 1989), 428 ff. For a good introduction to the main foreign policy issues of the period see Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany. John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA/London, 1991).

21. Wengst, Beamtentum, 108, 253. For details of the changes effected by the law and an evaluation of their actual significance see Reusch, 20-1. The contrasting interpretation provided by Bark and Gress (p. 296) is completely and utterly wrong; they also predate the passage of the Federal Civil Service Law by two years (p. 84).

22. Thus Hans Schuberth (CSU), who castigated the "angestrebte Nivellierung der Gebildeten schlechthin" during a conference of leading representatives of the CDU and the CSU on January 8-9, 1949. Schuberth, born in 1897, was a university graduate and Director of the Postal Service for the Bizone since 1947; in the autumn of 1949 he became the first Postal Minister of the Federal Republic. For the record of the conference see Die Unionsparteien 1946-1950. Protokolle der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands und der Konferenzen der Landesvorsitzenden (Dusseldorf, 1991), 252 ff. (the quotation is on p. 333).

23. See Rudolf Morsey, ed., Verwaltungsgeschichte. Aufgaben, Zielsetzungen, Beispiele (Berlin, 1977), 241-2. The remarks there relate to the situation in the federal administration; a similar development occurred in most state administrations. The central role of the Juristenmonopol in administrative practice in the 1950s is also stressed by Reusch, 21.

24. See Gamer, "Zerschlagung," 63 ff., 91 ff.

25. Inversely, substantial portions of the population harbored considerable animosity toward the civil servants. See, for example, the results of the polls conducted by the Institut fur Demoskopie in Allensbach: Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung 1947-1955 (Allensbach, 1956), 211-2; Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung 1958-1964 (Allensbach/Bonn, 1965), 348.

26. For some important examples see Garner, "Zerschlagung," 68-9, 98-9.

27. Kessler to Blankenhom, 25 Jan. 1949: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter: BAK), B 106/45737. Blankenhorn was Adenauer's personal secretary (personlicher Referent). See Rudolf Morsey, "Personal-und Beamtenpolitik im Ubergang von der Bizonen- zur Bundesverwaltung (1947-1950). Kontinuitat oder Neubeginn?," in Morsey, ed., Verwaltungsgeschichte; Udo Wengst, Staatsaufbau und Regierungspraxis 1948-1953. Zur Geschichte der Verfassungsorgane der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dusseldorf, 1984), 89 ff., 135 ff.

28. The State Secretary was the highest-ranking civil servant in a ministry and its administrative head. He was also the official representative of the minister.

29. Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 143; Klaus Gotto, "Hans Globke (1898-1973)," in Kurt G.A. Jeserich and Helmut Neuhaus, eds., Personlichkeiten der Verwaltung. Biographien zur deutschen Verwaltungsgeschichte 1648-1945 (Stuttgart et al., 1991), 467; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ara Adenauer. Grunderjahre der Republik, 1949-1957 (Stuttgart/Wiesbaden, 1981), 38. See also Arnulf Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer. Die Entstehung der Kanzlerdemokratie, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1982), 15 ff. For the following see: Gotto.

30. Stuckart-Globke, Kommentare zur deutschen Rassengesetzgebung, Bd. I: Reichsburgergesetz vom 15. September 1935. Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre vom 15. September 1935. Gesetz zum Schutze der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes (Erbgesundheitsgesetz) vom 18. Oktober 1935. Nebst allen Ausfuhrungsvorschriften und den einschlagigen Gesetzen und Verordnungen erlautert von Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, Staatssekretar, und Dr. Hans Globke, Oberregierungsrat, beide im Reichs- und Preussischen Ministerium des Innern (Munich/Berlin, 1936).

31. Although Ulrich von Hehl pointed this out in 1979, this important fact has gone unmentioned in later accounts. See Ulrich von Hehl, "Hans Globke (1898-1973)," in Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern. Aus dem deutschen Katholizismus des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3, eds. Jurgen Aretz, Rudolf Morsey, Anton Rauscher (Mainz, 1979), 251. Von Hehl does not, however, specify the year of marriage; it can be found in Wer ist wer?, vol. I (Berlin, 1962), 431.

32. Globke's defenders argue that the preface of the commentary, which contains a blatant celebration of Nazi race ideology, was penned solely by State Secretary Stuckart; that Globke never belonged to the Nazi Party (he had, however, tried to join in 1940, with Stuckart's support, but his membership application was rejected by Martin Bormann); that Globke later declared that he had only agreed to co-author the commentary because he wanted to use the chance to prevent a more stringent interpretation of the Race Laws by anti-Semitic ideologues; and that he maintained regular contact with the Catholic bishop of Berlin, providing him with confidential political information from within the Reich administration. These arguments are advanced in particularly detailed fashion in Klaus Gotto, ed., Der Staatssekretar Adenauers. Personlichkeit und politisches Wirken Hans Globkes (Stuttgart, 1980). Bark and Gress also devote considerable attention to these aspects of the case (pp. 85, 247-8); their assertion that Globke worked in the Reich Ministry of Justice is erroneous.

33. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ara Adenauer. Epochenwechsel, 1957-1963 (Stuttgart/Wiesbaden, 1983), 214. See also Henning Kohler, Adenauer. Eine politische Biographie (Berlin/Frankfurt a.M., 1994), 725-31. In 1953, Globke was officially named State Secretary of the Federal Chancellery (it is notable that this decision was not announced until after the parliamentary elections held that year). He retained this position until Adenauer resigned in October 1963.

34. Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 143. In the last several years, the conflict that once raged over the problem of an adequate historical evaluation of Globke's activities during the Third Reich gradually subsided, and it seemed as though elements of a general consensus were emerging. However, the most recent account to be published should provoke further debate. Manfred Kittel tries to put Globke's commentary on the German Race Laws of 1935 in a more favorable light by calling the work "a scholary commentary" ("einen wissenschaftlichen Kommentar") - as though it were somehow possible to reconcile the concept of scholarship with the authoring of a manual on the practical application of Nazi race ideology. In addition, Kittel does not mention that Globke wrote and published the commentary in collaboration with a prominent National Socialist. Other aspects of Kittel's monograph have already sparked considerable controversy, in particular his thesis that West German society did a much more adequate job of coming to terms with the Nazi legacy during the Adenauer years than previously believed. See Manfred Kittel, Die Legende von der "Zweiten Schuld." Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in der Ara Adenauer (Berlin/Frankfurt a.M. 1993), 80-6 (the quotation is on p. 80).

35. Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 177-8; see Gerold Ambrosius, "Funktionswandel und Strukturveranderung der Burokratie 1945-1949: Das Beispiel der Wirtschaftsverwaltung," in Heinrich August Winkler, ed., Politische Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1953 (Gottingen, 1979), 193.

36. Morsey, "Personal- und Beamtenpolitik," 224.

37. See Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 175-6. Unfortunately, he does not state the absolute numbers involved.

38. A Referent was a subject-matter specialist employed in one of the sections of a ministry (Referate) and subordinate to the section head (Referatsleiter). Several sections constituted a branch (Unterabteilung), and the branches were in turn grouped into departments (Abteilungen).

39. See Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte (hereafter cited as: DBT, StBer), 12 July 1950, 2631. The SPD representative went on to declare that if this stance should lead to "attacks" on the party from forces domestic or foreign, he and his colleagues were prepared to "take this in their stride."

40. See Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 179.

41. Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol. 2, 1950 (Boppard am Rhein, 1984), 667-8.

42. Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 179-80.

43. DBT, StBer, 12 July 1950, 2631-2.

44. The report was dated June 18, 1952, and published as DBT, Drucksache (Ds.) 3465. The following quotations are on pp. 9, 12, 36, 40.

45. One of Adenauer's closest aides, Herbert Blankenhom, had been a career diplomat from 1929 to 1945. From 1949 on he played an important role in determining who was hired for the new Foreign Service. See Wengst, Staatsaufbau, 184-9; Baring, 34 ff.

46. DBT, StBer, 22 Oct. 1952, 10724-5. For the following, including the Adenauer quotes, see pp. 10735-6, 10742.

47. See Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Zur Rolle der Diplomatie im 3. Reich," in Klaus Schwabe, ed., Dos Diplomatische Korps 1871-1945 (Boppard am Rhein, 1985), 187. See now also the recent English-language treatment by Gordon A. Craig, "Konrad Adenauer and His Diplomats," in Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds., The Diplomats, 1939-1979, (Princeton, 1994). That account makes no mention of the developments discussed here, however, and in fact concludes that, during the first formative years, "former diplomats ... were exceptions to the rule" (p. 205).

48. See the file in the "Sammlung Personalia" of the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn (hereafter: AsD); Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol. 4, 1951 (Boppard am Rhein, 1988), 259.

49. Further research on these topics should also include comparisons with developments in state and local administration, about which we know very little as yet. One important study now underway investigates the social composition of portions of the administrative elite in the states of Baden and Wurttemberg from 1930 to 1952. For first results see Michael Ruck, "Administrative Eliten in Demokratie und Diktatur. Beamtenkarrieren in Baden und Wurttemberg von den zwanziger Jahren bis in die Nachkriegszeit," in Cornelia Rauh-Kuhne and Michael Ruck, eds., Regionale Eliten zwischen Diktatur und Dermokratie. Baden und Wurttemberg 1930-1952 (Munich, 1993).

50. See, for example, the influential critique of party patronage practices since 1949 written by Theodor Eschenburg, Amterpatronage (Stuttgart, 1961).

51. For the extent and consequences of such practices in the 1960s and 1970s see Kenneth H.E Dyson, Party, State, and Bureaucracy in Western Germany (Beverly Hills/London, 1977); Dyson, "Die westdeutsche 'Parteibuch'-Verwaltung. Eine Auswertung," Die Verwaltung 12 (1979); Klaus Seemann, "Die Politisierung der Ministerialburokratie in der Parteiendemokratie als Problem der Regierbarkeit," Die Verwaltung 13 (1980); Renate Mayntz and Hans-Ulrich Derlien, "Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987: Towards Hybridization?" Governance 2 (1989).

52. Karl-Hermann Flach, Erhards schwerer Weg (Stuttgart, 1963), 23. The Basic Law was the provisional constitutional document worked out in 1948/49 by the Parliamentary Council, which was made up of 65 representatives of the states in the three Western zones. Leading West German politicians had decided to reserve the term "constitution" for a later document which would apply to Germany as a whole.

53. Christoph Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgrundung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955. 5th, revised and expanded ed. (Gottingen, 1991), 254. So far there has been no detailed research on the social consequences of this legislation. For a first brief discussion see Wunder, 164-7. Unfortunately, Wunder's account is of limited usefulness, because important details - including statistics - are presented without any reference to the sources from which they have been drawn. The English-language literature contains at most very short accounts of this legislation, which is probably why its significance for West German politics and society tends to be overlooked. The most reliable and detailed presentation is still the summary published in 1953 by Brecht, "Personnel Management," 269-71.

54. See Parlamentarischer Rat. Verhandlungen des Hauptausschusses (Bonn, 1948/49), 493 if. For more on the genesis of Article 131 see Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts, N.F.1 (1951), 858 ff.; Werner Sorgel, Konsensus und Interessen. Eine Studie zur Entstehung des Grundgesetzes fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Opladen, 1985), 120 ff.; Wengst, Beamtentum, 60 ff.

55. Although the legislative treatment of this delicate subject is not without interest, the following remarks will concentrate on those measures designed to reintegrate former employees into the public service.

56. See Verdrangte Beamte und ehemalige Wehrmachtsangehorige. Statische Erhebung uber den unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personenkreis. Endgultige Gesamtergebnisse fur das Bundesgebiet. Herausgeber: Statistisches Amt des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes, mit der Fuhrung der Statistik fur Bundeszwecke beauftragt, June 10, 1950 (Statistische Berichte. VII/7/2), in: Archives of the Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden (hereafter cited as: Verdrangte Beamte).

57. Ibid., 4. The railway and postal services registered approximately 81,000 persons: circa 12,800 had been dismissed during denazification; 9000 were being paid a monthly allowance and were to be given a new position as soon as one became available (Wartegeldempfanger); and 60,000 were retired employees, widows, or orphans. See "Bundesfinanzminister an Kabinettsmitglieder, 19 May 1950, Anlage": BAK, B 136/507.

58. See Wirtschaft und Statistik, N.F.2 (1950): 10. The percentage had been calculated after augmenting the total number of "displaced civil servants" by including groups which most would not have considered to belong to this category. The members of some of these groups were not even civil servants (for example: "salaried employees and manual workers," "relatives of deceased or missing civil servants," or "recipients of pensions or dependents' allowances"). As a result, the percentage of "denazified civil servants" was stated to be 23.1%. It increases to 32.6% if these additional groups are subtracted. The lower, "official" figure has been accepted at face value in the historical literature so far; see, for example, Wunder, 166-7.

59. See Verdrangte Beamte, Tables 1c, 11c, and 21c. The following statistics have been computed on the basis of the data in these tables.

60. For a good introductory survey of the course of denazification see Clemens Vollnhals, ed., Entnazifizierung. Politische Sauberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945-1949 (Munich, 1991), 7-64. The work includes a detailed bibliography.

61. The comparative advantage enjoyed by former professional soldiers in this respect generated strong resentment among other Germans. See Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern. Sauberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt a.M., 1972), 387, note 192. (This seminal work was reissued in 1982 as: Die Mitlauferfabrik. Die Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayerns.)

62. See Verdrangte Beamte, 2-3.

63. The most detailed account of this development is still the one provided by Niethammer, 335 ff.

64. DBT, Ds. 3465, 18 June 1952, 6. In spite of this vote, von Bargen was not dismissed. His career in the Foreign Service ended with a tour of duty as ambassador to Iraq 1960-63. For more on the controversial role which German diplomats played in the organization of the murder of the European Jews see Hans-Jurgen Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt im Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im Schatten der "Endlosung" (Berlin, 1987); Christopher R. Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office. A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland 1940-43 (New York/London, 1978).

65. For a useful introduction to this complex piece of legislation see the semi-official commentary: Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhaltnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen. Fur den praktischen Gebrauch erlautert von Dr. Georg Anders, Ministerialdirigent im Bundesministerium des Innern, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart/Cologne, 1952) (hereafter cited as: Commentary Anders). See also the commentaries written by Ambrosius and by von Werder/Ortmann/Otto. For a detailed account of the drafting of the bill and the protracted deliberations in the cabinet and in parliament see Wengst, Beamtentum, 152 ff. For new insights into the previously neglected, but important role of veterans' lobbyists, among them several former generals and admirals, see the perceptive study by James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill/London, 1993), 141 ff.

66. The following in contrast to the assessment by Hans-Peter Schwarz, Epochenwechsel, 214. He argues that large numbers of politically compromised civil servants were able to gain reinstatement in the 1950s due to the questionable manner in which the courts interpreted the law. We will show, however, that the law itself contained provisions enabling the readmittance of many such individuals from the very start. Nevertheless, the fact remains that many courts did their best to facilitate the return of even more.

67. See Verdrangte Beamte, Tables lc, 11c, 21c.

68. Commentary Anders, 44. Anders, who devoted detailed attention to this question, was himself a 131er. He had joined the NSDAP as of May 1, 1933, and worked as Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Justice until 1945; after the end of the war, he was without work for some years. In 1949 he was hired by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and served as Referent in the Department for Civil Service Law; during this period he played a major role in drafting the law implementing Article 131. Anders was subsequently promoted to head of this department and, in 1957, appointed State Secretary in the Interior Ministry.

69. Due to an unexpected twist of fate, the case ended on a different note: before Stuckart's claim could be decided, he died as the result of a traffic accident. Contemporary newspapers contain numerous reports on his controversial denazification proceedings. For assistance in confirming details of the case as well as for additional information I would like to thank Dr. S. Brudermann of the Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover, Dr. S.-H. Schmidt of the Landesarchiv Berlin, and Dr. A. Castrup-Steidle of the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.

70. Dr. Miessner (FDP) criticized section 63 because - in his opinion - it did not do enough to rehabilitate the "denazified 13 lers." See DBT, StBer, 6 Apr. 1951, 5036.

71. See Commentary Anders, 33. On the notable degree of personnel continuity between the Political Police and the Gestapo, as well as on the close working relationship between the Gestapo and the ostensibly "unpolitical" Criminal Police, see Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society. Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945 (Oxford, 1990), 50 ff., 69 ff.

72. DBT, StBer, 10 Apr. 1950, 3143.

73. Ibid., 3144; DBT, StBer, 6 Apr. 1951, 5026.

74. DBT, StBer, 10 Apr. 1951, 5091. For the following see ibid., 5110.

75. There is no previous scholarly analysis of the motives of the SPD and the KPD. Most authors even fail to mention that the Left supported the 131er legislation. Remarkably, this is true even of the major work on the SPD in this period: Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965 (Berlin/Bonn, 1982). See for the following the - unfortunately brief - records of the SPD executive committee's meetings on 21-22 Jan., 12 March, and 17 Nov. 1949; 24 June and 16 Sep. 1950; and 20-21 Jan., 10 March, and 25 May 1951: AsD, Parteivorstandsprotokolle; the very informative "Rede Dr. Schumacher vor Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss auf der Tagung vom 14.3.1950 in Bonn": AsD, PV, Schumacher, Q 11; Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1957, 1. Halbband, bearbeitet von Petra Weber (Dusseldorf, 1993), pp. LXXXVI, 43-4, 166-7, 179, 208-11,218, 220, 224-5,255,259-60; DBT, StBer, 13 Sep. 1950, 3142-61; 14 Dec. 1950, 3988-4000; 5 Apr. 1951, 4984-5017; 6 Apr. 1951, 5020-47; 10 Apr. 1951, 5099-110; Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 20. bis 24. Juli 1954 in Berlin (Bonn, [1954]), 306-8.

76. They had been elected on other tickets and subsequently joined the Socialist Reich Party. In May 1951, the party received 11% of the vote in state elections in Lower Saxony. After lengthy hearings, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the party unconstitutional on October 23, 1952, and decreed its immediate dissolution. See Horst W. Schmollinger, "Die Sozialistische Reichspartei," in Richard W. Stoss, ed., Parteien-Handbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980, vol. 2 (Opladen, 1984), 2274-336.

77. For several examples see Wengst, Beamtentum, chapter 4.

78. See Klotzbach, 188-236; Schwartz, 55-6, 78-83, 145-6; Dietrich Orlow, "Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945-1966," German Studies Review 16 (1993): 84-7; Willy Albrecht, ed., Kurt Schumacher. Reden - Schriften - Korrespondenzen 1945-1952 (Berlin/Bonn, 1985), 153-80, 714-894,994-8 (for the quotation see p. 732).

79. The press eventually gained knowledge of some of these activities. The ensuing reports led to considerable unrest within the SPD. See Georg Meyer, "Zur Situation der deutschen militarischen Fuhrungsschicht im Vorfeld des westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages 1945-1950/51," in Anfange westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, ed. Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, vol. 1, Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven-Plan (Munich/Vienna, 1982), 639-46; Diehl, 154-6; Albrecht, 178-9, 895-8; David Clay Large, "Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of the Waffen-SS and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950-1961," Journal of Modem History 59 (1987): 97-102.

80. See DBT, StBer, 13 Sep. 1950, 3142, 3145-6, 3149; 5 Apr. 1951, 4983-4; Hartmut Soell, Fritz Erler - Eine politische Biographie, vol. 1 (Berlin/Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1976), 143-7,570-1; Albrecht, 171, 177-8, 899-901; Diehi, 143-54; Klotzbach, 210-9; Meyer, 652-4, 692-707.

81. This remark was part of a severely critical speech by a delegate at the SPD national convention in 1954 (it was the first national convention after passage of the 131er legislation). Fellow delegates responded enthusiastically, the speaker was interrupted several times by "strong applause" and "lively calls of approval," as the official record notes. He demanded that the SPD members of the Bundestag cease cooperating with the government in efforts to increase benefits for 131ers even further, closing with the impassioned assertion that this legislation was nothing of which German democracy could be proud. The other delegates demonstrated their concurrence by applauding "for minutes." See Protokoll der Verhandlungen, 302-3.

82. This is one important topic addressed by Dr. Norbert Frei (Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich) in a major study, now nearing completion, on the way West German politics dealt with the legacy of the Nazi past in the 1950s. Frei examines a series of legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions, as well as the public debate which they sparked.

83. Thus Walter Menzel, speaking for the SPD leadership at the party's national convention in 1954. See Protokoll der Verhandlungen, 307.

84. See Constantin Goschler, Wiedergutmachung. Westdeutschland und die Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus (1945-1954) (Munich, 1992), 234-41 (the quotation is on p. 238); Wengst, Beamtentum, 222-35.

85. See, also for the following, Kurt Wiesemeyer, "Die wichtigsten Aufgaben im Personalwesen der Post seit 1945," Jahrbuch des Postwesens 6 (1955/56); Kurt Wiesemeyer, "Die Personalverhaltnisse der Deutschen Bundespost," Jahrbuch des Postwesens 10 (1960); "Unterbringungsverfahren der Deutschen Bundesbahn," Hinweisblatt der Bundesausgleichsstelle (hereafter cited as: Hinweisblatt) 1 (No. 9, 5 Dec. 1952): 1; Josef Fries, "Wiederaufbauprobleme im Personalwesen und ihre Losung," in Zehn Jahre Wiederaufbau bei der Deutschen Bundesbahn, 1945-1955 (Darmstadt, 1955); Theodor Molter, "Personalfragen des hoheren Dienstes seit 1945," in ibid.

86. "Unterbringungsverfahren"; see Wiesemeyer, "Aufgaben," 97; Hinweisblatt 2 (1953): 98, 105.

87. Computed on the basis of the data in Fries, 156.

88. Molter, 162-3. These categories illustrate how self-evidently the personnel department of the postal service distinguished between "denazified 131ers" and "displaced civil servants" - in clear contrast to the misleading terminology of the Federal Statistical Office discussed above.

89. The situation varied considerably from region to region. The proportion of 131ers in state government units in Lower Saxony was 27.2%, for example, but only 6.7% in Hamburg and 5.8% in Rhineland-Palatinate. See Hinweisblatt 2 (1953): 105-6.

90. Calculated on the basis of the data in Hinweisblatt 4 (1955): 86, 149. All further figures have been taken from these sources.

91. 26% of the former professional soldiers and Reich Labor Service officers registered in 1950 were partially disabled veterans. The same is true for 19% of the former civil servants of the Wehrmacht administration. Computed on the basis of the data in Verdrangte Beamte, Tables 11c, 21c.

92. See, for example, the yearly accounts written by the personnel department of the postal service: Deutsche Bundespost, Geschaftsbericht, 1955: 74; 1956: 85; 1957: 77; 1958: 75.

93. See Hinweisblatt 10 (1961): 70-1.

94. DBT, StBer, 1 July 1965, 9938. The second figure included the expenditures expected to be incurred by the railway and the postal service.

95. See Werner Breidenstein, "Versorgungsempfanger des offentlichen Dienstes am 1. Februar 1983," Wirtschaft und Statistik, N.F. 35 (1983).

96. The recently published, voluminous manual on administrative history since 1945 is a typical result of the traditional tendency to ignore this dimension of public service development: Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte, Bd. 5: Die Bunclesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1987). Some aspects of the topic are referred to in: Wunder, 163; Jutta Beyer and Everhard Holtmann," 'Auch die Frau soil politisch denken' - oder: 'Die Bildung des Herzens'. Frauen und Frauenbild in der Kommunalpolitik der fruhen Nachkriegszeit 1945-1950," Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 25 (1985): 414-8; Doris Schubert, Frauen in der deutschen Nachkriegszeit, Bd. 1: Frauenarbeit 1945-1949, Quellen und Materialien (Dusseldorf, 1984), 101-3, 325-31; Maria Hohn, "Frau im Haus und Girl im Spiegel: Discourse on Women in the Interregnum Period of 1945-1949 and the Question of German Identity," Central European History 26, 1993: 65-6; Klaus-Jorg Ruhl, Verordnete Unterordnung. Berufstatige Frauen zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und konservativer Ideologie in der Nachkriegszeit (1945-1963) (Munich, 1994), 117-21. Ruhl's book is one of two recent monographs offering a wealth of information on women's history of the period in general. The second is the impressive study by Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley et al., 1993). See also the useful document collection assembled by Klaus-Jorg Ruhl, ed., Frauen in der Nachkriegszeit 1945-1963 (Munich, 1988), here: 72 ff.

97. For examples of such policies in the cities of Kamen and Unna see Beyer and Holtmann, 414-7; for Duisburg: Schubert, 102,330; for Wuppertal: DBT, StBer, 2 Mar. 1950, 1490. A more detailed study of such activities based on a wider selection of sources would be a valuable contribution to further research.

98. See especially Susanne Rouette, Sozialpolitik als Geschlechterpolitik. Die Regulierung der Frauenarbeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt a.M./New York, 1993). Further details, embedded in a broader panorama of German social history in the postwar years, can be found in: Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1993).

99. The law was published in Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1932, 245-6. In the past two decades, it has been examined by a number of historians under differing perspectives. See, also for the following, Helen Boak, "The State as an Employer of Women in the Weimar Republic," in W. R. Lee and Eve Rosenhaft, eds., The State and Social Change in Germany, 1880-1980 (New York et al., 1990); Karen Hagemann, Frauenalltag und Mannerpolitik. Alltagsleben und gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1990), 458-64; Ursula Nienhaus, "'Unter dem Reichsadler'. Postbeamtinnen und ihre Organisation 1908-1933," 1999. Zeitschrift fur Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts 5 (1990): 72-6; Caplan, Government, 97-100; Barbara Greven-Aschoff, Die burgerliche Frauenbewegung in Deutschland 1894-1933 (Gottingen, 1981), 172-9; Claudia Hahn, "Der offentliche Dienst und die Frauen. Beamtinnen in der Weimarer Republik," in Mutterkreuz und Arbeitsbuch. Zur Geschichte der Frauen in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a.M., 1981), 71-6; Stefan Bajohr, Die Halfte der Fabrik. Geschichte der Frauenarbeit in Deutschland 1914 bis 1945 (Marburg, 1979), 180-8; Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society (London, 1975), 81-9, 147-58. See also the semi-official, yet very helpful survey of the history of women's employment in the German postal service by Josephine Doerner, "Neun Jahrzehnte Frauenbeschaftigung bei der Postverwaltung," Jahrbuch des Postwesens 7 (1956/57).

100. For a reprint of the original translation published by the Catholic church see Claudia Carlen, ed., The Papal Encyclicals 1903-1939 (Raleigh, NC, 1981), 391-413 (the quotations on pp. 393, 402-3). The Pope re-emphasized this position six months later in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, see pp. 415-444.

101. See Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1933, 433 ff.; here: sec. 7.

102. The wage regulations decreed at the same time for manual workers in the public service contained no comparable stipulation - presumably because the prescribed term for giving notice was already so short that a special provision seemed unnecessary. See "Tarifordnung B fur Gefolgschaftsmitglieder im offentlichen Dienst," Reichsarbeitsblatt 1938: VI 489 ff.; for salaried employees: "Tarifordnung A," ibid.: VI 475 ff., here: sec. 17 ("Departure from the Service Due to Marriage"). For the German Civil Service Law see Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1937, 39 ff.

103. For the continued application of sec. 63 DBG by the railway in the Western zones see "Rundschreiben," 13 June 1949, Die Reichsbahn 23 (1949): 299.

104. Military Government Directive on Administration, Local and Regional Government and Public Services, Part II [June 1946], Appendix E, para. 11: Public Record Office, Great Britain, FO 371/55617. For the British declarat ion of August 1946 see Grundsatze. Bestimmungen fur die Bearbeitung der Beamten-und Personalangelegenheiten. Landesregierung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Innenministerium, Abt. II, 3rd ed. (Dusseldorf, 1948), 56.

105. See Harold L. Smith, "The Womanpower Problem in Britain during the Second World War," The Historical Journal 27 (1984): 941-4. The marriage bar remained in effect for members of the British foreign service even after 1946, see Penny Summerfield, "Women, War and Social Change: Women in Britain in World War II," in Arthur Marwick, ed., Total War and Social Change (Houndsmills/London, 1988), 113. In her pioneering work Women in Nazi Society, Jill Stephenson warned against historians' implicit tendency to assume that policies in other countries were necessarily more enlightened than those in Germany in the 1930s. Explicit international comparisons, for which she then called, are still sadly lacking.

106. The cabinet had approved a proposal first put forward by the Interior Minister on January 15, 1948; it was published in Grundsatze, 56-8, and has been reprinted in Ruhl, Frauen, 74-7. In this document, Menzel openly criticized the equivocal policy of the British military government. For the announcement of February 26, see Ministerialblatt fur dos Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 1 (1948): 78. In May 1949, Menzel issued a similar notice pertaining to female salaried employees, see ibid. 2 (1949): 649-50.

107. A married woman teacher dismissed by a regional government unit had sued for reinstatement, citing the text of the cabinet resolution and Menzel's public announcement. In its decision, the court declared that the minister's characterization of sec. 63 DBG as a "pure manifestation of National Socialist thought" seemed "incomprehensible" - since the provision differed little from the regulations passed by democratically elected governments in 1923 and 1932. For the text of the court's decision see Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf, NW 110-849, BI. 93-103 (the quotation is from p. 8). This document has been published in abridged form in Ruhl, Frauen, 89-92; that version omits the passage cited here. For an evaluation of these developments from a different viewpoint see Ruhl, Verordnete Unterordnung, 118-20.

108. For a useful survey of the legal situation in the various states see Ernst Wichert, Deutsches Beamtengesetz mit Erganzungsgesetzen, Durchfuhrungsvorschriften und Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen. Allgemeine Fassung mir den Abweichungen im Bund und in den Landern Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Schleswig-Holstein und Baden und den Vorschriften des Beamtengesetzes des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz (Bonn, 1952), 201 ff.

109. The committee's spokesman, a member of the CDU, declared that he and his colleagues had taken this decision in view of "the importance of enforcing the equality principle": DBT, StBer, 15 Feb. 1950, 1269. For the wording approved by the committee see DBT, Ds. 497, p. 10.

110. Schuberth identified all the more strongly with the traditional personnel policies of the postal service, inasmuch as he had worked there for decades in high-ranking positions. After World War II he headed the Oberpostdirektion in Munich; in 1947 he was named director of the newly-established postal service for the Bizone (see note 22). For a particularly detailed presentation of Schuberth's arguments see "Bundespostminister to Bundesinnenminister, 18 July 1951": BAK, B 136/492. The parallels between the situation in 1949/50 and the constellation in the years before 1933 are striking. The Reich Postal Ministry had advocated a virtually identical policy, and it had played an important role in the efforts to put through the legislation required. Furthermore, in both instances Catholic politicians were instrumental in persuading their fellow lawmakers to approve measures restraining married women from working. For a general account of the parliamentary deliberations leading to the Federal Personnel Law of 1950 see Wengst, Beamtentum, 117 ff.

111. "Niederschrift uber die Besprechung auf dem Petersberg am 18. April 1950 betr. das vorlaufige Personalgesetz," 15: BAK, B 136/489.

112. There were 332,351 men and 12,576 women among the 344,927 former employees (computed on the basis of the data in: Verdrangte Beamte, Tables 1b, 11b, 21b). The preliminary results of the survey, available since February 1950, must have offered the authorities similar information; see Wirtschaft und Statistik, N.F. 2 (1950): 10.

113. "Niederschrift ... 18 Apr. 1950," 14-15.

114. See DBT, Ds. 4086, 13 Feb. 1953.

115. "Zur Gleichberechtigung der Beamtin. Stellungnahme des Vereins katholischer deutscher Lehrerinnen, des Berufsverbandes katholischer Fursorgerinnen, des Katholischen Deutschen Frauenverbandes und des Katholischen Fursorgevereins fur Madchen, Frauen und Kinder," undated: Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Archive, Munich (IfZ), Helene Weber Papers, vol. 37. For the quotations see pp. 11-12.

116. See "Niederschrift uber die Sitzung des Bundesausschusses [der CDU] fur 'offentliche Dienste', 19.-20.5.1952," 7-9: IfZ, H. Weber Papers, vol. 32. In 1957, Doerner still asserted that the postal service's traditional dismissal policy had not contradicted the Basic Law, obviously regretting that it had not been maintained. See Doerner, 378, 399. For biographical data on Weber see Die Volksvertretung. Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages (Stuttgart, 1949), 254; Rudolf Morsey, "Helene Weber (1881-1962)," in Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern.

117. DBT, StBer, 13 May 1953, 13051; see "Anderungsantrag der Abgeordneten Frau Dr. Weber (Essen) und Genossen, Umdruck Nr. 914," 12 May 1953: Parlamentsarchiv of the Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn. An analysis of the broader public discussion of this issue would exceed the scope of this article, but remains an important topic for further research. The aforementioned works by Moeller and Ruhl offer an excellent overview of the larger context - the general debate on the status of women in West German society. For details of Helene Weber's role in other controversies over government policy toward women and the family in the 1950s see Moeller, 63 ff., 84-5, 89-90, 94, 198-9, 218, 221; Ruhl, Verordnete Unterordnung, 256, 269.

118. Die Protokolle der Reichstagsfraktion und des Fraktionsvorstands der Deutschen Zentrumspartei 1926-1933, compiled by Rudolf Morsey (Mainz, 1969), 508; see ibid., 514, 518, 550-1; Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Ds. 1207, 15 Oct. 1931; Ds. 1269, 9 Dec. 1931; Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Stenographische Berichte, 12 May 1932, 2677-85 (the quotation is on p. 2684).

119. It was left to the Nazis to extend the coverage of the Reich law to state and local government - one year later, as seen above. The strong element of continuity in that step, often overlooked, is persuasive evidence in support of Jill Stephenson's argument that the truly unique features of Nazi policy toward women can only be discerned if viewed within the broader context of the policies pursued in the decades after the turn of the century. See Jill Stephenson, "Women and the Professions in Germany, 1900-1945," in German Professions, 277, 283-5.

120. DBT, StBer, 13 May 1953, 13055.

121. According to the official census returns for the resident population in 1950, women constituted 17.8 million of the 32.3 million persons aged 21 years and older (55.1%). Only 14.5 million were male (44.9%). Computed on the basis of the figures in: Die Bevolkerung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach der Zahlung vom 13.9.1950, Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 35 (Stuttgart/Cologne, 1952), 8-11.

122. This was true of 59 of the 146 CDU/CSU representatives (among them Konrad Adenauer). Of those who did vote, 63 supported the proposal and 24 were opposed. For the official record of how the individual representatives voted see: DBT, StBer, 13 May 1953, 13106-9.

123. See Ruhl, Verordnete Unterordnung, 121; Ruhl, Frauen, 72-3, 100-101.

124. Gewerkschaft Offentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (OTV), Geschaftsbericht 1949-1951 (Stuttgart, [1952]), Part I, 173. See Gewerkschaft OTV, Geschaftsbericht 1952-1954 (Stuttgart, [1955]), 323; Gleichheit 14 (1951): 59.

125. For the case of a female employee in Bremen who went to court to fight her dismissal on these grounds and lost, see Gleichheit 14 (1951): 171.

126. See Personal der offentlichen Verwaltung am 2.10.1952, Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 84 (Stuttgart/Cologne, 1954), 7, 14, 23, 30, 33. A comparison with the situation in preceding decades is difficult, since most earlier surveys contain no data on gender structure. It is, however, possible to find some partial figures which illustrate the magnitude of the decrease after the war in certain areas: in 1945, 35.8% of all local government employees in Bavaria were women; by 1949 the figure had dropped to 30.1%, by 1952 to 23.3%. During these seven years, the absolute number of local government employees had risen from 82,793 to 102,401, but the number of women decreased from 29,640 to 23,865. In the Reich Postal Service, women constituted 50.1% of the three main personnel groups (full-time civil servants, salaried employees, skilled workers) as of September 30, 1944. On March 30, 1949, the corresponding figure for the Western zones was 28.3%. This was still clearly higher than the percentage of women working for the Federal Postal Service in 1952 (23.6%). The author is preparing a study on the social history of the German public service 1945-1949, in which these and other developments in the turbulent postwar years will be analyzed.

127. See ibid., 14.

128. Statistics from the year 1950 show that the postal service had been largely successful in maintaining this policy in spite of the extraordinary conditions prevailing during and after the war: approximately 19,000 of 21,000 female civil servants were unmarried (90.5%). See "Bundespostminister to Bundesinnenminister," 18 Jan. 1951, p. 1: BAK, B 136/492. For more information on specific policy developments see Doerner, 385 ff., 394-5.

129. In official statistics, public employees were traditionally divided into two categories: (a) personnel in the non-technical areas of the public service (Hoheits- und Kammereiverwaltungen) and (b) personnel in economic enterprises (gas, water, and electrical companies; local public transportation; agriculture and forestry enterprises). In 1950, 15.6% of all federal, state, and local government employees worked in economic enterprises (199,837 of 1,282,530). A breakdown of this group into the four service levels is not available. Had the official statistics taken them into account, the results would have shown female employees to be at even more of a disadvantage.

130. The postal administration did not allow women to take on jobs in the elementary level of the civil service. It was primarily reserved for mail carriers, who were hired after leaving school at age 14 to 15; officials feared "that the working conditions and demands ... could be dangerous for girls in their developing years ... and detrimental for their future duties in marriage and motherhood" (Doerner, 394).

131. See Bevolkerung und Wirtschaft, 148. For background information see the useful survey by Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 1945-1955 (New York/Oxford, 1991), 177-221.

132. So, for example, Kurt Wiesemeyer, a senior official in the federal postal administration. In an article on the personnel situation in the latter part of the 1950s, he noted that the postal service had experienced growing difficulties in its search for "suitable personnel"; thus it proved necessary "to resort to accepting a greater number of female employees" - "even for positions normally reserved for men." See Wiesemeyer, "Personalverhaltnisse," 78-9.

133. Computed on the basis of: Personal von Bund, Landern und Gemeinden, 2. Oktober 1960, Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 4 (Stuttgart/Mainz, 1961), 4, 43.

134. Here just one example: among local government employees in Bavaria, the proportion of civil servants sank from 53.2% in 1933 to 29.5% in 1945; it finally reached 19.3% in 1949. This and other developments referred to in the following will be discussed in the author's above-mentioned study on the social history of the public service 1945-1949.

135. A similar shift occurred in the postal service: in 1927, 74.2% of the employees were civil servants, but only 61.2% in 1960. All percentages have been computed on the basis of the data in: Bevolkerung und Wirtschaft, 236-7.

136. The periodic reports on the number of public service employees published by the Federal Statistical Office also contain important information on sectoral differences in development in the 1950s. For detailed statistical material with comparative figures for 1930 and 1966 see Jorg Jung, Die Zweispurigkeit des offentlichen Dienstes. Eine Untersuchung uber die Veranderungen der Personalstruktur im offentlichen Dienst und die Verankerung des Berufsbeamtentums im Grundgesetz (Berlin, 1971).