Prove it, Mr. President: George W. Bush's claim that the hijackers of September 11, 2001, were directly dispatched from Afghanistan may well not be false.

But the time has come to prove that it's true.

Last September 27, the Los Angeles Times produced a lengthy examination of the biographical journeys that led nineteen hijackers to their fatal choices on September 11. It provided extensive background on flying lessons in Florida, alleged ringleader Mohammed Atta's time as a student in Germany, and how the perpetrators lived what seemed to their neighbors to be quiet and ordinary lives in the United States. But one thing that narrative didn't contain was a single word about Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, or Osama bin Laden. Since then, no other media outlet or any government source has made a direct connection between the crimes of September 11 and the terror operations in Afghanistan.... Until the State of the Union address on January 29.

President Bush dropped the information seemingly in passing, as if it had long been common knowledge. Most of the subsequent media attention was devoted to the speech's "axis of evil" saber-rattling. (There appears to be no truth to the Internet rumor that China, Libya, and Syria--feeling a bit left out--are on the verge of announcing the formation of a new "axis of just as evil.") So the new factoid passed virtually without notice.

"Most of the nineteen men who hijacked planes on September the 11," said Bush, "were trained in Afghanistan's camps." This was the most damning accusation the administration--or anyone else--had yet delivered directly linking the September 11 hijackers to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The closest any Western leader had previously come was last October, when British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that three of the nineteen had been identified as bin Laden associates "with a track record in his camps and organization." Now, suddenly, it was "most." There is little, if true, that could more thoroughly justify (even if retrospectively) the righteousness of the military action against Afghanistan that commenced on October 7.

But Bush didn't offer any evidence of his new claim during the address itself. Nor has he since. The administration apparently expects people to simply take the president's word for it. And apparently most people have.

Bush's new suggestion that the hijackers were owned, operated, and directly dispatched from Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden may well not be false. But the time has come to prove that it's true. When President Bill Clinton bombed the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in 1998, he claimed that it was engaged in the production of nerve gas. But he never produced the evidence. This is precisely the kind of arrogant transgression that generated the hatred and rage that undoubtedly motivated the perpetrators of September 11. Now, in response to September 11, the Bush administration seems to be making the same mistake.

In the first weeks following the attack, leading officials from the three major coalition partners in the "War on Terrorism"--the United States, Britain, and Pakistan--couldn't seem to get their story straight regarding the sufficiency of the evidence against Osama bin Laden. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said on September 23 that he would soon provide tangible proof that bin Laden was indeed the evil genius behind September 11. "In the near future," Powell told Sunday morning talk aficionados, "we'll be able to put out on paper a document that will describe quite clearly the evidence that we have linking [bin Laden] to this attack." But that document was never forthcoming, and that promise quietly forgotten. Powell himself admitted on October 2 that the evidence in U.S. possession wasn't good enough to present to a judge.

But Pakistan drew precisely the opposite conclusion. "We have seen the material that was provided by the American side," said Foreign Minister Riaz Khan. "This material provides sufficient basis for indictment in a court of law."

On October 4, British Prime Minister Tony Blair posted what he called "incontrovertible" proof of al-Qaeda's guilt on the British government's website. But most of the "evidence" presented there consisted simply of factual claims rather than proof for those claims:

   Shortly before 11 September bin Laden told associates that he had a major
   operation against America under preparation.... In August and early
   September close associates of bin Laden were warned to return to
   Afghanistan ... by 10 September.... One of bin Laden's closest lieutenants
   has said clearly that he helped with the planning of the 11 September
   attacks.

All quite damning--if demonstrably proven instead of simply asserted.

Other British government evidence was clearly circumstantial in nature:

   The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous
   attacks.... Al Qaida operatives . have described how the group spends years
   preparing for an attack.... The operatives involved in the 11 September
   attrocities attended flight schools ... and placed potential airports and
   routes under surveillance....

Her Majesty's government itself acknowledges that its own evidentiary document "does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama bin Laden in a court of law."

Finally, on December 14, U.S. officials released the Osama house tape, which appears to capture bin Laden telling his cohorts that he had indeed planned the crime, that he had "calculated in advance the number of casualties," that he didn't foresee the cataclysmic effect of the flaming jet fuel, and that the collapse of the two towers was "more than we had hoped for."

"How can there be any doubt now," said Secretary of State Colin Powell after the house tape's release, "that he is the mastermind?"

But the tape hardly closes the case against bin Laden. Virtually all the debate about the undeniably loathsome conversation with a visiting Saudi shaykh centered on whether that tape was authentic or fabricated. But there is a third possibility: the tape may be both genuine and accurately translated--but bin Laden may not have been telling the truth. Just because he says he did it doesn't mean he did.

There is no question that the house tape depicts bin Laden taking glee in the devastation that was wrought on September 11. His moral stature after the statements he made could not be more odious. He views those who don't share his warped views of modernity as subhuman. As George Kennan has observed about the Nazis' use of the word untermenschen, some terms are applicable only to those who employ them.

But don't police officials regularly receive false claims of responsibility for heinous crimes and terrorist acts? Virtually all of bin Laden's comments on the tape could have been derived from things we all heard in the days immediately following the attacks. Many structural engineers observed that the collapse of the towers was "more than we would have expected" and that the full effect of a full tank of jet fuel was the one thing they never anticipated. Therefore, all that has been "proved" is that bin Laden read the newspapers on September 12.

It is difficult to conceive that U.S. officials would have fabricated the house tape--not because of any ethical restraints but because of the enormous dangers if caught. The whole faux antiterrorism coalition would unravel in a stroke if such a calculated deception were to emerge. The risks of such an undertaking would far exceed the benefits.

But has anyone asked what possible motive bin Laden himself might possess for saying such things on tape? We still know nothing of the circumstances of how the tape came into American possession, other than that it was found in "a house in Jalalabad." Are we really supposed to believe that Osama bin Laden allowed himself to be videotaped saying these things and then absent-mindedly left such an incriminating item behind? "Oh fiddlesticks, we left the iron on and we forgot to pack the tape where I reveal all!"

It seems much more likely to suppose that the house tape was meant to be made and meant to be found. Osama bin Laden may well have been trying to take credit for actions that were perpetrated by someone else. Might not he simply have been bragging falsely to the fawning Saudi shaykh? "What he said on the tape will gain him more support among the Muslim masses," claimed the Iran News. That surely must be the primary audience for all these tapes--and the primary motivation for making them. Osama bin Laden wants his potential constituents in the Muslim world to hold him responsible for the September 11 attacks--whether or not he was in fact actually responsible.

In any case, even if this videotape is considered the nail in the evidentiary coffin, it should be recalled that the U.S. government drew its conclusions about bin Laden's culpability long before the tape was discovered.

Few U.S. commentators have bothered to question whether we possess real evidence that al-Qaeda was behind September 11. But foreign voices--especially in the Muslim world--have repeatedly asked for such proof. "Why hasn't [the United States] shown us the real evidence that gave them the right in the first place to start bombing?" asked Nabel Saeed in Bahrain's Gulf Daily News in December. "Show us your proof, and we will defend America indeed."

"The interest of the U.S. in airing this tape worldwide to incriminate bin Laden," said Fahed El-Fanek in Jordan's Al'rai after the videotape of bin Laden's conversation was released, "is proof that the U.S. went to war lacking any evidence against bin Laden."

"We have nothing to show from the United States," Sheik Mohammed bin Jubeir, the chair of the appointed Saudi Arabian legislature, said in January. "All we hear from the U.S. are accusations. No proof."

The Bush administration's refusal to provide such proof may well be why the same calls are now being heard about the "axis of evil" claim during the State of the Union address. "We condemn the American accusations," said Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi the day after the speech. "We think Mr. Bush would do better by providing proof of his allegations.... The repetition of such accusations is not going to help him." "We should ... provide evidence to each other," said Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in a February Oval Office meeting, "and assure all others that those threats really exist."

U.S. interests would have been much better served if the government had not only declared that it believed that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the attacks but presented tangible evidence to establish "probable cause" against him. That's what President Ronald Reagan did after the Soviet downing of Korean Airline Flight 007 in 1983--and it immediately rallied the entire non-communist world to our side. That's what President John F. Kennedy did before that in 1962--in one of the most dramatic moments of the twentieth century--when his United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson interrogated Soviet UN Ambassador Valerian Zorin in the Security Council chamber, couldn't get a straight answer, and then presented unmistakable photographic proof to a riveted worldwide television audience that Soviet missiles were on the ground in Cuba. In a stroke, the whole non-communist world converged behind the United States.

Such a presentation in this case would have generated more robust support for the United States' anti-terror campaign from governments around the world--especially Arab and Muslim governments. It would have provided them with powerful ammunition to. withstand domestic opposition in their own countries. It would have reduced the danger that our campaign will motivate future acts of terror. And it may well have meant that Osama bin Laden would be in custody today.

By the end of September 2001, the Taliban was clearly feeling the heat. Its members were frightened, they pleaded for negotiations, and they showed an increasing willingness to surrender bin Laden. All they asked for was a rudimentary display of evidence. Taliban officials stated for the first time that bin Laden was under their control on September 30--clearly suggesting that it was indeed within their power to turn him over. A few days later, Taliban representative Abdul Salam Zaeef practically begged the United States to offer some proof: "We are willing to try him [ourselves] if America provides solid evidence of his involvement in the attacks." Then, going further, he stated: "We are willing to talk about [trying him] in another country . but we must be given the evidence." Instead of providing it, the United States began bombing Afghanistan on October 7. And now, more than six months later, Osama bin Laden is still at large.

Numerous U.S. government officials have claimed they themselves have seen conclusive proof of bin Laden's complicity but that the evidence can't be revealed publicly because it would "compromise intelligence sources." Meanwhile, the Bush administration insists it has provided its proof "in secret" to its allies. This is all beyond patronizing. Do we ever say this in domestic criminal cases--that we have plenty of evidence but that most of it is simply "too sensitive" to ever be revealed?

Of course, there are some evidentiary details that would have to be heavily cloaked or withheld altogether for precisely that purpose. But all? It simply defies credulity to believe that the U.S. government is incapable of putting together a persuasive evidentiary case while also safeguarding its intelligence establishment.

In fact, some U.S. officials do provide evidence of their claims. Two days after the State of the Union speech, FBI Director Robert Mueller said that al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia had helped to plan the September 11 crimes and had directly aided the perpetrators; But Mueller didn't expect the world to just take his word for it. FBI officials provided the media with a detailed account of financial transactions, forged identifications, weapons purchases, and the particular dates in January 2000 when Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi--who allegedly helped to commandeer the flight that crashed into the Pentagon --slept in an al-Qaeda-owned condo in Kuala Lumpur.

If we can offer this level of detail regarding the al-Qaeda operation in Malaysia, why can't we do the same regarding the al-Qaeda operation in Afghanistan?

The answer may be that we haven't disclosed much evidence because we don't have much evidence. The heavy public attention the Bush administration itself directed toward the house tape strongly suggests that it possesses little else in the way of tangible proof. In reality, the immediate U.S. government response to the crimes of September 11 seems to have been to decisively go after those known conclusively to be responsible for the crimes of 1998 (the embassy bombings in Africa), and the crimes of 2000 (the assault on the U.S.S Cole). Osama bin Laden had already been indicted in both of these cases before September 11. When .one recalls that President Bush called President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan only hours after the September 11 attacks to request his help in apprehending bin Laden, it makes this conclusion hard to resist. And it seems likely that, if most Americans came face to face with this cold, hard truth, they would find it a less than fully satisfying response to the events of that terrifying day.

Osama bin Laden may indeed have been the evil genius who plotted and conceptualized and funded the foul attacks of September 11--and who dispatched minions directly from his camps in Afghanistan to carry them out. But whether or not that is the case, it shouldn't divert us from recognizing that neither the United States nor any other government has yet put forth conclusive evidence that this was so.

On the same day that Mueller provided the proof for his allegations, Bush continued to ratchet up his rhetoric against possible future targets of U.S. military action. "[If] you don't hold the values we hold dear true to your heart, then you, too, are on our watch list," he warned potential adversaries. "People say, `What does that mean?' It means they better get their house in order is what it means. It means they better respect the rule of law."

It wouldn't hurt for the United States to set an example.

Tad Daley is a visiting scholar at the Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles. He served as chief deputy to the late U.S. Senator Alan Cranston and ran for U.S. Congress himself on a progressive platform emphasizing global challenges to U.S. security. His articles have appeared in numerous publications including the Christian Science Monitor, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the United Nations Chronicle, and the Los Angeles Times.