Protection of tactical units in a combat operation (battle).

Analysis of armed conflicts over the past decade, as well as the main provisions of modern military doctrines adopted in the world's leading countries, points to the growing role that so called basic tactical military units (BTMU)* play in dealing with these conflicts. It is the view of the present authors that the scale of current and future armed conflicts and new methods of warfare are important factors in this role.

The U.S. concept of joint operational units provides for the creation and employment in future armed conflicts of mixed arms forces and assets based on combined arms divisions performing combat missions mainly in the tactical and operational-tactical zones. Judging from past armed conflicts, the main distinguishing features of such combat action are: the absence of a continuous line of engagement; penetration into the opposing sides' battle units; the point-of-action character of warfare, especially in critical areas, nodes and strongholds; abrupt changes in the situation, caused mainly by the delivery of massive strikes with a broad use of precision guided weapons, and the increasing impact of scout, commando and raiding groups on the course of combat operations. (1)

The specifics of modern and future armed conflicts led to the development of a basically new concept of warfare that came to be known as network warfare. (2) With regard to the operational and tactical scale of combat operations, this concept, taking into account the increasing dynamics of combat action and the mobility of units and sub-units, provides for the maximum possible use of battle units with dispersed independent elements, built on a "network" basis. BTMU are the main elements here, above all reinforced combined arms battalions and companies. It needs to be noted that these elements perform their missions based on the principle of centralized command and control.

This trend toward changes in methods of combat action in modern armed conflicts is also reflected in the tactics of combat action by our military units that were developed by taking into account the war experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya (3) and presented in current official enforceable legal documents.

It is obvious that the changes that have occurred in the place and role of military units also set higher demands on their protection in the new conditions in which combat action is conducted. This is especially important since in the active phase of an armed conflict, a possible adversary will attempt to deliver strikes (as a general rule, massive, multiple strikes) against BTMU in staging areas, on the march, and in combat. Air assault assets, tube and rocket artillery, and commando and raiding groups, using hit and run tactics, can be used to achieve this.

The present authors consider it important to stress that the intensive use of cluster ammunition and their delivery means allowed for this type of weapons to be used not only by aviation but also by artillery in massive and multiple strikes on BTMU. In this case, the following delivery means can be used: tactical and cruise missiles, guided and unguided cluster bombs, guided air bombs and rockets, guided active rockets, unguided rockets, and artillery cluster shells. They are armed with compact warheads (charges) using optical-electronic and combined aiming and guidance systems. Massive strikes by offensive air weapons can be delivered in salvos from one carrier or with a simultaneous attack by a subunit with several carriers using conventional or unitary precision guided weapons.

Local armed conflicts show that hit and run attacks on motor and armor convoys on the march will be delivered with the use of portable AT missile complexes as well as unguided weapons with optical aiming systems. Such strikes can be massive and fast moving. The adversary, as a general rule, has an opportunity to prepare covert escape routes once the combat mission has been accomplished, thus complicating effective retaliatory action.

Today, the main volume of BTMU protection tasks is assigned to antiaircraft complexes of the Air Defense Forces that can engage both offensive air weapons and smaller systems. Experience in local wars, however, shows that the existing air defense assets are not effective enough against offensive air weapons. (4) Even taking into account that antiaircraft complexes currently in service with the RF Armed Forces are more modern than those that were used in recent armed conflicts, they cannot completely fulfill the task of protecting ground subunits against massive strikes. This is mainly due to the clustered, point-of-action character of warfare with deep penetrations on both sides, which rules out the use of long-range antiaircraft complexes to provide direct protection of subunits that come under enemy attack. As for tactical antiaircraft complexes, which provide immediate protection of these subunits, they are exposed to damage effects and EW strikes, which will considerably diminish their capability to detect offensive air weapons and their operational effectiveness as a whole. Furthermore, these complexes are not designed to engage small delivery means (e.g., cluster artillery shells). There is also a high probability of offensive air weapons being effectively used outside the effective range of tactical antiaircraft systems. So they will not be able to ensure complete protection of subunits of branches of service in the event of massive strikes so, in the view of the present authors, it is necessary to look for additional ways and methods of BTMU protection.

As is known, the effectiveness of the combat employment of weapons is contingent on the degree to which such basic functions of their command and control systems as detection, target designation, aiming, and guidance are fulfilled. Failure to perform some of these functions can diminish the combat effectiveness of weapon systems or even result in non-performance of a combat mission as a whole.

Today, the operation of detection, aiming and guidance systems using the optical, IR or microwave range can be disrupted with optic-electronic EW assets. This, however, will require additional information about the direction of the attack, the type of weapons used. etc. Taking into account the specifics of modern warfare, this information cannot always be available. So jamming cannot reliably counter precision guided weapons or the optical-visual aiming systems, especially if they are used on a massive scale.

Direct protection of armor and motor equipment and facilities can be provided by individual protective systems. An individual tank protection system is now in service. Yet, in the view of the present authors, the provision of individual protective systems to all armor, light armor and unarmored facilities is problematic due to the diversity of types of weapons, requiring the installation of a large number of reconnaissance and jamming devices on each unit, which is not always possible. Furthermore, the autonomous use of individual protective systems on each unit (tanks, IFV, etc.) diminishes the level of interoperability and concealment in joint operations. Finally, the weight and mass characteristics of individual protective systems prevent them from being mounted on unarmored facilities.

It is therefore proposed that the task of BTMU protection be assigned to collective protection systems (CPS) that will:

  --detect (identify) enemy raiding groups and their means of delivery
    and effectively engage them or provide target designation to the
    weapon systems of a protected subunit for the subsequent destruction
    of enemy forces; and
  --suppress the enemy's command and control optical-electronic systems
    in order to prevent (hinder) the detection, aiming and guidance of
    enemy weapon systems.

To accomplish the aforementioned tasks, CPS should include appropriate weapon, jamming, reconnaissance and command and control systems. This brings up the need to substantiate the expedient composition of the CPS mobile complex for subunits of branches and arms of service, as well as determine its status and methods of combat employment in the force disposition of the subunit that it protects. This can be done by developing a functional CPS model, possible variations in its composition, performance assessment characteristics and performance assessment procedure, composition selection procedure, and proposals on the organization and operational employment of mobile CPS in subunits of branches and arms of service.

In developing a functional CPS model, it is essential to take into account that the CPS is an aggregate of information and physical processes. As is known, information processes involve the reception of information from reconnaissance assets, processing and transforming it into command and control instructions. As far as physical processes are concerned, they involve the creation of jamming and other types of impact on the adversary in conformity with specific commands.

Information processing and the issue of commands in the course of engagement could be conveniently described on two hierarchic decision making levels.

In determining the method of impact (the upper level), it is planned to analyze data coming external sources, individual protective complexes, and reconnaissance assets as part of CPS. These data serve as an information base for identifying threats to BTMU, including signs and identification features of offensive systems (weapon emplacements of raiding parties, fixed and rotary winged aircraft, etc.), their status (detection, preparation for launch, aiming, etc.), and the weapons used (small arms and light weapons, AT guided rockets, compact ammunition, etc.), and the state of the environment (the speed and direction of wind, illumination, etc.).

Based on the information about the threats and the status of reconnaissance, jamming and weapon systems, the character of an expedient impact on the enemy (delivery of fire or optical-electronic suppression) is determined and methods of impact are specified to achieve the maximum effectiveness of CPS performance in the specific conditions.

In selecting impact parameters and characteristics (lower decision making level), the following is evaluated and ascertained: the space and time parameters of transport means, weapon systems, and weapon emplacements of the enemy's raiding parties; their status; the current parameters of optical electronic reconnaissance and command and control assets (space and time characteristics, frequencies, etc.); the parameters of fire delivery and jamming characteristics; and the status of the environment.

Possible variations of CPS composition are substantiated in three stages. At Stage 1, specific procedures and methods of counteraction are determined and appropriate assets are selected. At Stage 2, their needs for information are determined, and at Stage 3, optimal reconnaissance assets are selected from among the available types.

Decisions concerning the selection of counteraction or reconnaissance systems are to be based on the preference rating of a particular system, which is determined by taking into account its effectiveness in impacting on a particular type of a target, as well as its cost, electromagnetic interoperability with other systems, etc.

Those reconnaissance assets are selected from same type systems whose preference ratings are higher. Under this procedure, several CPS composition options are identified. The final selection of each option should be based on the evaluation of the effectiveness of each CPS composition option.

Appraisal of the effectiveness of CPS performance (countering offensive air weapons, cluster bombs, and raiding parties) requires the development of mathematical imitation models of combat with the participation of different BTMU. In so far as the CPS is designed above all to minimize damage caused to a (protected) BTMU in combat, it would be expedient to use as one effectiveness indicator the level of losses prevented. At the same time, CPS weapon systems are designed to effectively engage enemy targets. To assess their effectiveness, the level of loss augmentation in the offensive (enemy) force is used. Furthermore, CPS survival probability could be used as another essential parameter.

The average number of effectively engaged and non-engaged targets with or without CPS could be determined through an aggregate of combat imitation models built on the same principles. This will make it possible, in various combat situations, to take into account the specifics not only of opposing forces as a whole, but also of each element in particular, namely, the employment of different types of weapons, EW and other systems, and their expenditure; the impact of jamming at different stages of combat employment (detection, aiming, etc.); the impact of space maneuver in combat; and changes in the numerical strength of opposing forces.

Since the proposed approach requires the fulfillment of tasks of a different hierarchy (from monitoring the status of physical processes in CPS subsystems to observing the evolution of an armed conflict), the present authors propose using a three level structure of models. The upper level model should imitate the course of confrontation. The middle level model should be used to reflect different stages in the functioning of objects. The lower level model should imitate physical processes within their subsystems (detection, jamming, etc.).

It is the view of the present authors that the aforementioned structure of methods and procedures will help assess the effectiveness of the employment of mobile CPS in combat operations by BTMU and choose the optimal CPS composition and employment procedure.

NOTES:

1. I.N. Vorobyov, "Prognoz kharaktera i soderzhaniya operatsii (boyevykh deystviy v voynakh budushchego," Voennaia mysl', No. 3, 2005.

2. A.A. Nogovitsyn, V.V. Barvinenko, "Razvitiye sposobov i form voyennykh deystviy: informatsionnyy aspekt," Voennaia mysl', No. 2, 2004; A.V. Raskin, V.S, Pelyak, "K voprosu o setevoy voyne," Voennaia mysl', No. 3, 2005.

3. A.I. Baranov, "Upravleniye gruppirovkami voysk vo vnutrennikh vooruzhennykh konflik-takh," Voennaia mysl', No. 10, 2003.

4. A.A. Nogovitsyn, "Opyt voyn i sposoby boyevogo primeneniya VVS i voysk PVO v sovre-mennykh operatsiyakh," Voennaia mysl', No. 6, 2005.

Col. Yu.Ye. DONSKOV (Res.)

Doctor of Military Sciences

Col. V.A. TATARCHUKOV

Candidate of Military Sciences

Lt. Con. A.V. ZAGORUDKO

* BTMU include battalions, regiments, airborne tactical groups (assault groups), raiding detachments, etc.