Proposed UN force for Lebanon rejected in Security Council.

The voting on the text (document S/16351/Reu.2), was 13 in favour (China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe) to 2 against (USSR, Ukrainian SSR), with no abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of a permanent member, the USSR.

Under the French draft, the Council would have decided, in agreement with the Government of Lebanon, to constitute immediately, under the authority of the Council, a United Nations Force composed of personnel furnished by Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council and selected, if appropriate, from contingents of the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. The said Force will take up a position in the Beirut area, in co-ordination with the Lebanese authorities concerned, as soon as all elements of the multinational force have withdrawn from Lebanese territory and territorial waters. The United Nations Force will have the mission of monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and helping to protect the civilian populations, including in the Palestinian refugee camps, and, without intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon for the benefit of any party whatever, will thereby assist in reestablishing the peace necessary for the restoration of the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.

The Council would also have requested the Secretary-General to make without delay all arrangements to enable the United Nations Observer Group Beirut (OGB) to monitor compliance with the cease-fire in the Beirut area. Member States would have been requested "to refrain from any intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and any action, in particular military action, that might jeopardize the re-establishment of peace and security in Lebanon, and to facilitate the task of the United Nations Force".

[UNIFIL, established by Security Council resolution 425 of 19 March 1978, is composed of units from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Senegal and Sweden, with a total of 5,688 personnel as of April 1984. It was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The OGB, consisting of some 50 United Nations observers, was set up under Security Council resolution 516 of 1 August 1982, which authorized the Secretary-General to deploy United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut.]

[The multinational force was formed by France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1982. The purpose, as stated by France in the Council debate, was to restore calm, to the extent possible, in Beirut and the surrounding area and also to protect the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.]

The Council held four meetings, beginning on 15 February, in response to a request for an urgent meeting "to consider the situation in the city of Beirut" contained in a letter of 14 February from France to the Council President (document S/16339). Council Members

France led off the debate by stating that the situation in the Beirut area had become particularly serious s a result of recent events "that have once again radically altered the elements of the Lebanese problem". Of even greater concern was the fate of civilians, who had been subjected to fighting and bombardment and constantly exposed to the threats and dangers of a resumption of violence and even military operations. That situation had further complicated the prospect for any political solution likely to restore stability and peace in Lebanon through national reconciliation, with respect for the independence and integrity of the entire country.

Council resolution 521 (1982) had suggested the creation of a United Nations force to assist the Lebanese Government to ensure full protection for civilians in and around Beirut, but it was clear that lengthy negotiations would have been required to reach agreement on the creation of such a force. Thus, aware of the extreme urgency of the situation, France had decided to respond positively to the Lebanese Government's request, in agreement with all the country's political elements, regarding the creation of a multinational force. However, France would have wished that a United Nations force "might be created", as proposed in that resolution. [Under resolution 521 (1982), the Security Council authorized an increase in the number of United Nations observers in Beirut from 10 to 50, requested the Secretary-General to initiate consultations on additional steps the Council might take, "including the possible deployment of United Nations forces to assist the Lebanese Government in ensuring full protection of the civilian population in and around Beirut".]

France said the multinational force had been sent in "more particularly to protect the sorely stricken camps of Sabra and Shatila and generally to contribute, in so far as it was able and in difficult circumstances, to the restoration of a precarious calm" in Beirut and the surrounding area. Circumstances had now changed. Recourse to an international force to replace the multinational force had become necessary to ease tension.

A United Nations force was needed, and the most suitable way to provide it was to send certain UNIFIL detachments to Beirut. France would not object to UNIFIL's French elements being among those detachments, but it was preferable that the international force in the Beirut area should contain no national of permanent Council members. The international force should take up position in the Beirut area, to which its mandate should be limited. It should take its position upon the departure of the multinational force, "which without any further reason to exist or intervene, either in Beirut or elsewhere in Lebanon, should withdraw, together with its accompanying ships". By authorizing the Secretary-General to use part of UNIFIL in Beirut, the United Nations would be contributing, as was its duty, to the protection of civilians and thus to the re-establishment of peace necessary for the restoration of Lebanon's territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence.

Egypt called for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, foremost among them the Israeli forces, and for national reconciliation in Lebanon. The situation had deteriorated, with Beirut once more becoming a divided city. The immediate task before the Council was to take the initiative to halt bloodshed in Lebanon and achieve a cease-fire--a major step and a new necessary attempt towards creating an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of action at the political level in Lebanon.

Egypt supported the French proposal and was ready to contribute to any joint effort in support of it. The proposal was intended to create the atmosphere necessary once again to break the cycle of violence and thus to promote a political settlement, Lebanese national reconciliation and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The United Nations had an important role to play in achieving Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence within its internationally recognized boundaries.

The United Kingdom said there was an immediate need to put an end to the fighting in Lebanon, to promote the process of national reconciliation and to make possible the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

The United Kingdom had urged for a long time that the Organization be given an enhanced role in Lebanon and had strongly supported the efforts the Council President was making, at France's request, to see if the Council could agree on a new mandate for such a role. It shared the objective of getting an effective United Nations presence in and around Beirut and hoped the Council would consider carefully how best to reach agreement on that, including the eventual replacement of the multinational force, of which Britain was a member, by an enhanced United Nations presence. Much political will and flexibility would be required, not least on the part of the various parties involved in the fighting within Lebanon. "But all of us know something of the national positions of the countries concerned; we know, therefore, that this process will take time."

The United Kingdom stated that it would like to see the maximum possible use made of the small United Nations observer force now present in Beirut, because it could have an important effect in reassuring the local population and in contributing to a lowering of tension. With that in mind, the United Kingdom had proposed to the Secretary-General a number of limited steps which the United Nations could take now without a new Council resolution. That did not cut across in any way the major work of reaching agreement on a new mandate for an enhanced United Nations role. Nor were those steps in any way a substitute for the more far-reaching proposals which the Council must consider in due course.

The United Kingdom hoped that first, the United Nations observers and other United Nations representatives already in Beirut could undertake small confidence-building measures. The United Nations personnel themselves were in a better position than the United Kingdom to identify the particular functions they might perform, especially in the humanitarian role. To undertake such tasks, a modest increase in the number of the observers might be necessary. The Council should not stand in the way of such an increase if the Secretary-General considered that that would be helpful. Second, the Secretary-General should make active use of his good offices role. The particular way in which the Secretary-General could use that role was for him to judge. Third, further consideration should be given to the expansion of UNIFIL's role to facilitate Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Those practical and humanitarian steps could be taken now and could provide some reassurance to the Lebanese that the United Nations was able and willing to play a humanitarian and politically neutral role in working for the restoration of peace and stability in their country.

The United States said it continued to support the legitimate Government and people of Lebanon in the restoration and preservation of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity throughout Lebanon "to their internationally recognized borders". The international community should assume greater responsibility for assisting the Lebanese. The United States welcomed the suggestions of the United Kingdom. The efforts of some Council members to utilize to the fullest existing facilities and authority for United Nations participation in peace-keeping in Lebanon had been hampered by the pursuit of short-range political goals on the part of some parties. No 'Short-Range' Goals

The pursuit of short-range national political goals in Lebanon was not the purpose of the United States' participation in the multinational force, the United States stated. The United Nations had available actual or potential instruments in Lebanon which might be useful: a 50-man observer group, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), which could be raised on short notice, and UNIFIL, a nearly 6,000-man peace-keeping force, deployed in some cases in areas where violence no longer threatened the Lebanese. The United States was ready to enter into serious discussions with "our colleagues on the Council and in the Secretariat" concerning the composition and deployment of United Nations forces, preferably throughout Lebanon. It imposed no preconditions.

Speaking in favour of the draft resolution, the United States said it had participated in the multinational force, created because of the unavailability at the time of a United Nations force to assist the Lebanese Government to reinforce its peace and consolidate its authority. It had paid a high price for its efforts on behalf of Lebanon. Many Americans had been killed in the bombing of its embassy and nearly 300 marines had been murdered as they slept. More had been heard in the Council about the presence of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon than about the presence of more than 50,000 Syrian troops and Palestinian and Iranian and other associates in Lebanon. The USSR was "refusing to co-operate and attacking others precisely for refusing co-operation."

The Netherlands called on all parties concerned in and around Beirut to agree promptly to a cease-fire, to which they should then adhere scrupulously. It also called on all involved to facilitate the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon and of all other United Nations agencies concerned in humanitarian activities ceasefire in the Beirut area would be conducive to an early renewal of the process of internal conciliation in Lebanon.

The Netherlands stated that it fully supported Lebanon's territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence, and "these require the withdrawal of all unauthorized foreign forces" from Lebanon. The most pressing problem which the Council should address now was how to avoid a further deterioration by helping to bring about an effective cease-fire in that city. The United Nations was in a position to provide Lebanon with the necessary assistance to monitor such a cease-fire and to preserve peace in the area. United Nations peace-keeping forces were perhaps the best way of preserving peace in Lebanon.

The experience of the multinational force "also serves as an example that we should not embark too hastily on a United Nations peace-keeping mission in that area", the Netherlands observed. According to the Secretary-General, the conditions under which United Nations peace-keeping forces could carry out their mission effectively were: such forces should be deployed with the permission of the host country and with the consent of all other parties involved; any United Nations peace-keeping mission should be given a clearly defined mandate; and such a force would need the Council's approval and full backing. It was with those important general conditions in mind that the Netherlands remained prepared to support any constructive proposal that would lead to a stable and effective cease-fire in Beirut.

The Netherlands stressed the overriding importance of an early resumption of the process of internal conciliation between all Lebanese factions, without which the prospects of peace in that war-torn country would remain slim. 'Massive Aggression'

The USSR said that from the very first hours of the massive Israeli aggression against Lebanon in 1982, the Council had demanded that Israel end its aggression. Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), which had laid the substantial basis for a subsequent settlement in Lebanon through the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from that country of Israeli forces and the ending of military actions on Lebanese territory, had not been implemented. Tel Aviv brazenly ignored the Council's demands. Israel and the United States affirmed that those resolutions had become obsolete and inapporpriate. The situation in Lebanon continued to be extremely complicated and tense. The Israeli occupiers continued to dominate southern Lebanon. Israeli aircraft were again bombing Lebanese cities and towns.

Some people in Washington, the USSR continued, found it propitious to set up operations in Lebanon and to include it within the "sphere of vital interest" of the United States. That precisely was the long-term calculation that dictated the decision to deploy the so-called multinational force, whose backbone was the United States Marines supported by the United States Sixth Fleet. The United States and Israel imposed upon the Lebanese a servile agreement that essentially would have turned Lebanon into an American-Israeli protectorate. The presence of a "Multinational force" further worsened the danger facing the Lebanese people and Government. Having dropped the pretense of being peace-makers, the Marines and the ships of the Sixth Fleet dropped on Lebanon hundreds of tons of bombs and shells in an attempt to dictate to the Lebanese how they should arrange their own internal affairs.

The USSR said that in July 1982, at the peak of Israeli aggression against Lebanon, it had put forward a proposal that the use of UNIFIL contingents in the Beirut region be considered. The United States had not responded. In September 1982, after a barbaric massacre against defenceless Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps, almost all Council members, including the USSR, were prepared to take a decision on the immediate sending of United Nations forces to Beirut. However, such a decision was frustrated by the United States. In subsequent months, highly placed representatives of the United States Administrative states repeatedly that they saw no possible role for the United Nations in Lebanon.

It was necessary to ensure implementation of Council resolutions 508 and 509 and to bring about an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory, the USSR observed. The United States must end its crude military blackmail of Lebanon and its barbaric firing from the ships of the Sixth Fleet. Its ships and the other foreign military fleets should be removed from the Lebanese coast. Even after the so-called redeployment of the Marines to their ships, the United States continued its strikes against Lebanon. The United States President had stated that it was enough for one shell to fall against any American institution in Beirut for the artillery of the battleship New Jersey to again be brought into action. If the logic of that "doctrine" were to be followed, then the United States Administration should have acknowledged that the Soviet Union had a right to bombard New York following the explosions on the grounds of the residence of the Soviet Mission. No 'Arm-Twisting'

The USSR said the real settlement for the situation in Lebanon should be achieved not by separate deals and arm-twisting but on the basis of a strict and unswerving implementation of the relevant Council decisions. Among the important and necessary conditions for sending United Nations forces to Beirut, over and above the withdrawal from Beirut of the "multinational force", were the need to withdraw foreign warships from the Lebanese coast and to have guarantees that there would be no resumption of artillery fire, air strikes or any other interference in Lebanon's internal affairs by the multinational forces. During consultations on the draft resolution, it became quite clear that some Council members did not wish to assume the responsibility not to resume interference in Lebanon.

The draft resolution contained other unacceptable or ambiguous wording--for example, relating to the mandate of the United Nations forces in Beirut. And although the USSR favoured continuing consultations on that, the draft was introduced in the Council without any further consideration of the USSR's position in order to force a vote. Thus the work in the Council on the draft resolution was broken off owing to the unseemly manoeuvres of Western delegations. There was an opportunity to achieve a positive outcome. In its present form, the draft was unacceptable, and the USSR would vote against it.

Upper Volta said the situation in Beirut was one component in the broader problem in the Middle East, whose centrepiece remained the Palestinian problem. The present difficulties in Lebanon stemmed also directly from outside interference. The Lebanese must be the sole judge of their own destiny. The presence of Israeli occupation tropps in southern Lebanon, as well as of the so-called multinational forces in Beirut and Lebanese territorial waters, was inadmissible. All foreign troops must withdraw from Lebanon. Only the immediate withdrawal of those forces and strict respect for Lebanon's territorial integrity, unity, national sovereignty and independence could create conditions favourable to the reconciliation of all Lebanese.

It was the Council's duty to hasten the restoration of peace in Lebanon and to help alleviate the suffering of civilians, including the Palestinian refugees. That was why Upper Volta viewed the French proposal favourably. It was ready to accept the text in order to act quickly for the benefit of the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees.

India said any solution of the problem of Lebanon could not be divorced from a search for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East that must be based on the exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable natioanl and human rights. The position of the multinational force was untenable and its continued presence could only further aggravate tension and conflict. India had welcomed the French initiative. While concentrating on the current crisis, the Council Should bear in mind the larger perspective of the problem of Lebanon as a whole, as well as the continuing impasse in the Middle East. The objective of the United Nations force should be clear and its mandate should be precisely defined before it was deployed. It was also essential to see some evidence of a genuine process of national reconciliation in Lebanon.

The Lebanese should have the opportunity to find harmony, peace and stability free from all foreign interference. India was aware of the urgency of the situation and the necessity for early Council action. The draft resolution was sufficiently balanced to meet most, though not all, of the concerns expressed during consultations. It represented a sufficiently broad and acceptable frame-work of essential elements and provided a reasonable basis for the Council to take the initial step towards the constitution of a United Nations force. National Reconciliation

Malta said adoption of the draft resolution would constitute a necessary step towards restoring in Lebanon the peace and stability necessary to augment the prospects for a positive outcome to the current dialogue of national reconciliation. The draft took into account most of Malta's concerns. Malta appealed to all concerned to respond positively and to extend full respect and support to the task being contemplated for United Nations personnel, so that when they undertook their assignment full safeguards would be given to those persons dedicated to the preservation of peace and to ensuring the re-emergence of Lebanon as a free, independent nation, at peace within itself and with all its neighbours.

Nicaragua said it welcomed the French initiative. Lebanon continued to be under fire and bombardment and part of its territory remained under the occupation of Israeli forces. With some additional effort, it might have been possible to obtain a better outcome for the draft resolution, which could contribute to an improvement of the situation in Lebanon.

Pakistan said the United Nations had an important role to play towards redressing the fast-deteriorating situation in Lebanon, which would supplement the efforts in that direction by responsible Governments in the region. The presence of a United Nations force in the Beirut area could prove critical in mitigating violence and ensuring a cease-fire, which would provide Lebanon a breathing space in which efforts for national reconciliation could be sustained to produce tangible results.

Pakistan felt particularly concerned over the safety of the Palestinian refugee camps and demanded that every step be taken against the repetition of the barbarous crimes against the Palestinian refugees, such as those perpetrated in Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Admittedly, the stipulated Council action was not a remedy for all the problems besetting Lebanon, the foremost of which was the continuing presence of Israeli forces on its territory. Yet there was the possibility that the presence of such a force could become a prelude to a process which could eventually restore the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Only the United Nations had the capacity to meet the need for an impartial presence which could bring tranquillity in Beirut and provide a respite for the Lebanese leaders to intensify their efforts for national reconciliation.

China said the situation in Lebanon had deteriorated continuously. There had been a chain of armed conflicts in the Beirut area resulting in heavy loss of Lebanese life and property. The Council should play a positive role in the question of Lebanon and implement in earnest its previous relevant resolutions. It should also give consideration to other steps that were practical in the light of the present situation. Any Council action regarding Lebanon should be genuinely conductive to the safeguarding of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to the elimination of foreign aggression and interference and to the promotion of natioanal reconciliation. Clear Mandate

The United Nations force called for in the draft resolution had a clearly defined mandate. The crisis in the Beirut area was only part of the Lebanese crisis. The root cause of the grave situation in Lebanon lay in Israel's invasion and occupation of that country. The key to the solution of the Lebanese question was the withdrawal of Israeli troope from Lebanon. In the meantime, foreign warships in the vicinity of Lebanese waters should not carry out any armed intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs under any pretext.

The Ukrainian SSR said urgent effective measures should be taken which would lead to peace and stability in Lebanon. To that end, what was most necessary was the elimination of everything which hindered normalization of the situation in that country. The draft resolution did not contain provisions which would achieve the goals that the Council was pursuing. The main cause of the Lebanese tragedy was the uninterrupted imperialist intervention in Lebanon's affairs. The culmination of the interference was the massive armed invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces in 1982. In spite of Council resolution 509, the Israeli aggressor continued to occupy one third of Lebanon and was carrying out devastating bomb strikes in other regions of the country. Israel and the United States had imposed upon Lebanon a servile agreement transforming that country into an American-Israeli protectorate. New woes and suffering for the Lebanese resulted from the arrival in Lebanon of the so-called multinational force. The redeployment of the marines to the ships of the Sixth Fleet had not in the slightest removed the threat to Lebanon.

The Ukrainian SSR said there should be a complete cessation of interference in Lebanon's affair; the interventionist forces of Israel and the so-called multinational force should withdraw from Lebanon unconditionally and completely; the warships of the countries participating in the multinational force should be removed from the Lebanese shores; and an immediate end should be put to air and artillery bombardments, which should not be renewed in the future. Without the implementation of those conditions, the question of giving assistance to Lebanon on behalf of the United Nations lost any real basis.

The refusal to include in the draft resolution the relevant provisions and guarantees, including indications that the agreement of all directly involved parties was necessary, as well as the absence of a number of other important provisions, would make the mission of a United Nations force for all practical purposes unrealizable. The draft resolution was an attempt, on the one hand, to justify interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and, on the other, to do so in the name of the United Nations. Mission Unrealizable

Peru said it fully agreed with the need for vigorous, effective and just action by the United Nations to help overcome the grievous situation in Lebanon. The French initiative was designed to achieve peace for that part of the world. France had accepted all the suggestions made to it by "a group of countries with varying degrees of development and common positions". Peru understood the reasons for putting the draft resolution to the vote at the present time. The outcome was not the end of the Council members' responsibilities. Peru would continue to contribute all its efforts and capabilities to any initiative aimed at achieving the unity of views which had not been attained but which Peru was confident would be attained in the near future. Views of Lebanon

Lebanon, which spoke on the third day of the debate, said it approved in principle the dispatching of United Nations forces or observers to assist in restoring security and stability in Lebanon and in making it possible for the legitimate authorities to exercise control over all Lebanese territory. The proposal to send international forces to the Beirut region represented "a positive move".

However, at present and under present conditions, that positive move remained partial and limited for the following reasons: first, "the creation of favourable political conditions to ensure stability is the basis for the consolidation of security"; second, large parts of Lebanon continued to languish under the yoke of occupation; third, any international force which might be dispatched to Lebanon must have the means and effectiveness to undertake its tasks in all Lebanese regions; and, fourth that effectiveness alone was capable of enabling the United Nations forces successfully to undertake their tasks, particularly in helping achieve security and stability and participating in efforts to bring about Lebanese sovereignty over all Lebanese territory inside its internationally recognized borders.

If the Council took the relevant decision, the question of setting up and dispatching those international forces, as well as the timing of their deployment and the determination of their tasks, must be decided in consultation and co-ordination with the Lebanese Government, Lebanon said. Lebanon's keenness to see the international forces succeed stemmed from the current situation. If the Council was willing and if the international community represented by the Council wished to assist Lebanon, that assistance should be proportionate to the tragedy. Lebanon was ready to co-operate fully with the Council and the Secretariat in drawing up and in implementing any draft resolution that might be adopted if its aim was to make a real and effective contribution to half a crisis that was now more than nine years old.

Speaking after the Council had voted on the draft on 29 February, Lebanon said it regretted that, for the second time in a few months, the Council had been unable to take a decision that could play a partial and a limited part in ending a serious and tragic situation. It was a bitter disappointment "for all those peoples who, at the most dire moments of their history", looked towards effective assistance and help from the Council in overcoming the crises confronting them. Lebanon appealed to the Council to reconsider its position and respond positively and as soon as possible to any new initiative which was in keeping with the seriousness of the situation throughout Lebanon. Other Speakers

Italy said that when it decided to send military contingents to Lebanon in response to the Lebanese Government's urgent appeal and with the full agreement of all the parties concerned, it made it clear that the initiative was being taken "because of its realization of the impossibility of stationing a United Nations force there."

"Better than any other, a United Nations force could have carried out the tasks we deemed to be essential." However, in the absence of a United Nations initiative, Italy--based on a careful evaluation of its responsibilities and on the solidarity that united it, as a Mediterranean country, with the Near East--could not fail to assume the role "it has played as part of the multinational force ... to solve political and humanitarian problems we considered to be essential and pressing". The Italian contingent had in particular performed the invaluable task of protecting the Palestinian camps, of making impartial contact with all the parties and of providing impartial assistance in the form of hospital facilities and basic relief to meet the vital requirements of the neediest sectors of the Beirut population.

The Lebanese political situations, Italy observed, had deteriorated further, to the extent that the urgent intervention of the United Nations was required. The modalities for sending a United Nations force to Beirut and putting it in position there, its role and the tasks that it should accomplish, must be subject to the most careful evaluation--above all in connection with replacing the multinational force in such a way as to ensure, in the interests of the population and the Lebanese situation as a whole, that a dangerous vacuum was avoided.

Senegal said it welcomed the French initiative. Senegal, whose commitment to Lebanon's peace and sovereignty accounted for its participation in the UNIFIL contingent, reaffirmed that commitment. The matter now before the Council had humanitarian and political aspects. The most urgent aspect was the humanitarian one, concerning the cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians, including Palestinian refugees. But the Council must also safeguard the Lebanese State in all its component parts. Its unity and territorial integrity were threatened as never before.

The Council must consider, in the light of Assembly resolution 38/58, the Palestinian question as a whole, and in particular the measures for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East. That Conference could be of benefit to Lebanon and to the entire region. Everything should be done to avoid creating a vacuum, which could be dangerous, in the wake of the withdrawal of the multinational force.