Progress.

EVENTS in the Middle East have prompted a wave of "Was Bush Right?" soul-searching among liberals and gloating among conservatives. While recent headlines have been gratifying and even at times astounding, we should put a hold on the victory parade. Just as the steady diet of bad news in Iraq in 2004 didn't mean that Democrats, and even some former supporters of the war, were right to conclude that all was lost, the positive news lately doesn't mean we are assured of victory. Events will still bring nasty surprises, as they do in any war. And the forces resisting progress and reform in the Middle East--from Iran and Syria to the radicals in Iraq and the Palestinian territories--still have fearsome bite.

But the Bush administration can take considerable satisfaction in progress since the January 30 Iraqi elections. Most significant, street protests in Beirut have swept a Syrian-backed government from power in Lebanon, showing that the Middle East is not immune to the kind of "people power" rebellions that have toppled corrupt governments in other regions of the world.

Recent weeks have proved false several lines of argument against Bush policy. First, that Iraq is an irrecoverable mess and using it as a showcase to spread reform in the region a pipedream. In truth, the January 30 elections changed the political dynamic in Iraq and inspired the protesters in Lebanon, as many of them have attested. Second, that the "Arab street"--that hoariest of cliches of Middle East commentary--is always anti-American and on the side of radicalism. Crowds recently have protested terrorism in Iraq, and the Palestinian public has demanded the exit of Arafat cronies from the Palestinian Authority. Amajority of people in these places, and in Lebanon, may not have a deep commitment to republican government. But neither are they delighted to be tyrannized. Third, that the absolute first step to peace and reform in the Middle East is forcing an agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis. In fact, recent months have shown that it is the other way around--reforming Israel's Arab interlocutors holds the key to any eventual peace deal. It is the shift from thug Arafat to (tentative) reformer Abbas that has infused Israeli-Palestinian relations with a new whiff of hope.

While Bush's critics should feel chastened, the president cannot take credit for everything that has taken place in recent weeks. Events outside his control have conspired in his favor. Arafat's death made possible the fresh start for the Palestinians. The Syrian overreaching in the spectacular assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri sparked the outrage that fueled the budding Cedar Revolution. But Bush's emphasis on freedom and insistence on reform has provided the context for these changes, and in the case of Egypt--where permanent president Hosni Mubarak now feels compelled to approve multiparty elections in some form--administration prodding led directly to the change. This raises an important point: As the Iraq invasion has demonstrated, military force is a blunt instrument and nation-building by the U.S. military a trying and costly business. It is preferable that local actors undertake change on their own, which is where all the other instruments of U.S. power come into play: the power of example, behind-the-scenes persuasion, financial pressure, and diplomacy, in concert with as many of our allies as possible (both France and Saudi Arabia have usefully called on Syria to quit Lebanon).

The weeks ahead are crucial. The administration must continue to insist on a total Syrian pullout from Lebanon. Syrian troops are almost beside the point. It is Syrian intelligence that runs Lebanon and milks it of resources to prop up the Assad regime back home. Assad will try to appease the administration with half-steps: a redeployment of troops here, a handover of an Iraqi insurgent leader there. When that doesn't work, Hezbollah--a tool of Syria and Iran--will likely turn to terrorist mayhem against the Lebanese population on the model of the Iraqi insurgency. The chaos will seek to make Lebanon ungovernable and support the notion--already bandied about by some liberals newly entranced with what they imagine to be realpolitik--that Syrian hegemony is necessary to maintain order there. But it is Syria that is ultimately the problem in Lebanon, and no instrument readily available to the administration should be spared in forcing an evacuation that could also bring the welcome demise of Assad's regime.

Meanwhile, it is crucial, of course, that the Iraqi project succeed, so that it continues as a positive model for the region. Attacks against U.S. forces have ebbed lately, although the insurgency still massacres Iraqi forces and civilians with disturbing ease. It is the political process that holds the most promise for marginalizing the insurgency, which is why the failure of negotiations so far to produce a prime minister has been so dismaying, even if it has been typical of the brinksmanship that has characterized post-Saddam Iraqi politics.

The last two months have been an Arab Spring. Whether it will bloom into something more enduring is impossible to know. The possibility itself is amazing. But that shouldn't be cause for giddiness. Optimism and principle will need, as always, the steadying influence of realism, prudence, and staying power. If they don't seem necessary right now, just wait--they will again soon.