Progress report.

Gen. David Petraeus gave his September progress report on the surge to Congress. For months, Democrats had hoped that political support for the war would collapse after his report. Instead, he and Amb. Ryan Crocker gave a sober account of clear military progress and the realistic possibility of eventual political improvements to help make it stick. Their testimony bought more time for President Bush.

Bush instantly endorsed Petraeus's recommendation for a drawdown of roughly 5,700 troops by December, toward a goal of withdrawing all the additional troops who were part of the surge by July. That drawdown would bring us from the current 160,000 to 130,000. Starting the withdrawals by December is not ideal and increases our risks on the ground, but Petraeus likely was placating the Joint Chiefs, who are protective of the institutional interests of the services and blanch at the strain the Iraq War has put on the military. Bush emphasized that the troop withdrawals would be based on conditions in Iraq, and Petraeus wisely counseled that any plan for withdrawal beneath 130,000 be put off until next March, since we are involved in a dynamic, unpredictable war.

The indicators of progress on the security front in Iraq are undeniable, although Petraeus was accused of using "cooked statistics." Awar zone isn't exactly an MIT statistics class, so reliable numbers are hard to come by. But figures from American, Iraqi, and private sources all show a decline in violence. Petraeus was said to ignore Sunni-on-Sunni and Shiite-on-Shiite violence in his figures, but he included them in the category of total civilian deaths, which have declined (he excluded them from the count of sectarian killings, which is obviously correct). He was also bizarrely (and falsely) accused of counting as sectarian murders only bodies found shot in the front of the head, not in the back.

Critics of the war tend to dismiss the military progress as inevitable--we always knew, they say, that adding troops would increase security. When Bush announced the surge at the beginning of the year, of course, the tenor of their comments suggested otherwise. They also say that the military progress won't be sustainable without political progress, a commonplace endorsed by both Petraeus and Crocker.

What the critics ignore is that the tribal revolt that has so improved our situation in Anbar and elsewhere is political progress. Sunnis in those places are siding with us rather than the insurgency. This shift in allegiances has made it possible to achieve some of the intended effects of the key political "benchmarks" without their being legislated by the Iraqi parliament. An amnesty law was supposed to ease Sunni fighters out of the insurgency; the tribal shift has led them from the insurgency in droves even in the absence of a law. A de-Baathification law was supposed to reintegrate Sunnis into Iraqi institutions; many of the Sunnis leaving the insurgency have been joining the Iraqi Security Forces. An oil law was supposed to spread revenue to Sunni areas; the central government has passed no such law but has just sent $107 million in aid to Anbar.

Iraq has just begun to step back from a horrific civil war. Expecting action within months on complex legislation with constitutional implications--as contemplated in our benchmarks--was obviously unrealistic. But a rough accommodation among Iraq's groups that will stabilize the Iraqi state is still possible over time.

How fast we can bring troops home depends on when Iraqi security forces can take on more of the fight. Democrats brandished a commission report on the Iraqi Security Forces prepared under the direction of retired general Jim Jones. They cited its assessment that "the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months." This comment is true, and not surprising. The Iraqi military was designed as a light infantry capable of quickly getting into the fight and dependent on our logistics. But the report also said, "There is evidence to show that the emerging Iraqi soldier is willing to fight against the declared enemies of the state," and "that substantial progress can be achieved" within the next 18 months.

President Bush's goal is to get to January 2009 with Iraq in decent enough shape that the next president, too, will be able to maintain troops there. This is portrayed by his critics as handing the whole problem off to his successor so that he doesn't have to make hard choices himself. But it's not as though the course he is on--pushing back against the Democratic majority in Congress, wobbly Republicans, and a hostile press corps as he sees the war through--were easy. We have several strategic objectives in Iraq--to rout al-Qaeda, to prevent the country's takeover by Iran, and to establish an Iraqi government that is an ally and can defend itself. Petraeus and Crocker made a compelling case that these objectives still can be achieved. The attempt is the only responsible course.