Procuring and sustaining the joint strike fighter.

The JSF program abandoned its original procurement strategy based on evolutionary acquisition principles in favor of a front-loaded schedule which committed to delivering full capability during the system development phase.

"Procuring and Sustaining the Joint Strike Fighter," written by Major Stacy Hawkins, is the featured article in this edition's Contemporary Issues. Major Hawkins makes the case that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the linchpin to the nation's next generation of tactical aircraft. Initial JSF procurement is expected to close the impending fighter force structure deficit, as current aging aircraft systems retire. Based on the historical lessons of procurement efforts, such as the F-16, the Department of Defense recently formulated a new sustainment methodology which focuses on evolutionary, knowledge-based principles. This change provides a framework to incorporate technological innovations, which occur after the system development decision, into a weapon system's production cycle. The current JSF procurement strategy has, however, abandoned this evolutionary concept in favor of an approach which schedules larger aircraft delivery increments early in the weapon system's life cycle. This approach, however, could create late life-cycle modification requirements for a significant portion of the JSF fleet. Further, inadequate sustainment provisions could increase the probability of aircraft structural deterioration.

Hawkins and Chiabotti argue that in order to avoid the exorbitant costs associated with late life-cycle deterioration, procurement planners need to conduct early analyses to forecast aircraft sustainability throughout the JSF's projected service life. The sheer size and varied operational demands of the JSF will require new life-cycle management approaches based on variable performance metrics standards and fiscal year programming flexibility.

Aircraft maintenance metrics are important. Don't let anyone tell you differently! They are critical tools to be used by maintenance managers to gauge an organization's effectiveness and efficiency. In fact, they are roadmaps that let you determine where you've been, where you're going, and how (or if) you're going to get there. Use of metrics allows you to flick off your organizational pilot and actually guide your unit. But they must be used correctly to be effective. Chasing metrics for metrics' sake is a bad thing and really proves nothing. A good maintenance manager will not strive to improve a metric but will use it to improve the performance of the organization.

--Lieutenant General Terry L. Gabreski Maintenance Metrics US Air Force, Air Force Journal of Logistics, 2001

Because of increased program costs, schedule delays, and a reduced production schedule, the size of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is currently under congressional scrutiny. As the Department of Defense's (DoD) most expensive acquisition program, the JSF is the linchpin to the nation's next generation tactical strategy. Furthermore, initial JSF procurement is expected to close the impending fighter force structure deficit, as current aging aircraft systems retire. Based on the historical lessons of procurement efforts, such as the F-16, DoD recently formulated a new sustainment methodology which focuses on evolutionary, knowledge-based principles. This change provides a framework to incorporate technological innovations, which occur after the system development decision, into a weapon system's production cycle. The current JSF procurement strategy has, however, abandoned this evolutionary concept in favor of an approach which schedules larger aircraft delivery increments early in the weapon system's life cycle. A faster JSF low-rate initial production (LRIP) rate risks outpacing the full development of critical aircraft design technologies and could potentially create late life-cycle modification requirements for a significant portion of the fleet. Moreover, inadequate sustainment provisions could increase the probability of aircraft structural deterioration. In order to avoid the exorbitant costs associated with late life-cycle deterioration, procurement planners need to conduct early analyses to forecast aircraft sustainability throughout the JSF's projected service life. The sheer size and varied operational demands of the F-35 acquisition will require new life-cycle management approaches based on variable performance metrics standards and fiscal year programming flexibility.

Front-Loaded Procurement Approach

The JSF program abandoned its original procurement strategy based on evolutionary acquisition principles in favor of a front-loaded schedule which committed to delivering full capability during the system development phase. The debate regarding the merits and shortfalls of both strategies was central to near-term budgetary requirements for the JSF acquisition program. Furthermore, the total life-cycle sustainability of the program became dependent on initial decisions regarding procurement schedules. Critics of the front-loaded strategy asserted that the JSF would not acquire adequate knowledge with respect to technologies, design, and manufacturing processes within its system development and demonstration phase, and have scaled back production to accommodate future system evolutions. Conversely, advocates pointed to the urgency of achieving full system capability as early as possible in order to leverage a larger share of the DoD modernization budget for fleet production. Figure 1 depicts the proposed production scenario for the JSF program, and depicts the scheduling overlap between JSF development and its planned LRIP schedule.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Due to the overlap between system development and initial production projections, acquisition officials in 2005 faced the choice of further delaying JSF procurement to allow for full development of technological capabilities or proceeding with 2007 LRIP activities. Despite the DoD's preference for the evolutionary procurement approach, the JSF program office has committed to the delivery of full system capability at the end of its development phase by scheduling production for 20 percent of its total buys during the same period. (1) This decision fits well within the context of constrained defense budgets, particularly considering Congressional reluctance to fund long-term aircraft development and production efforts that yield little evidence of measurable real world operational potential. While political realities force the JSF to jockey for scarce modernization dollars, the long-term impact of the front-loaded acquisition strategy would surface as the JSF required sustainment support to assure service-life viability. As discovered with its predecessor, the F-16, the absence of a sustainment strategy can pose significant challenges to an aging aircraft fleet. Quantitative modeling provides a means to address mid to late life-cycle JSF sortie capacity shortfalls and identifies necessary fleet requirements.

State of the F-35 World--From a Modeling Perspective

A May 2005 draft of the Air Force edition of the LRIP performance-based agreement (PBA) unveiled the maintenance metrics formulated to support readiness requirements for JSF operations. This draft PBA established a contractual relationship between the JSF Program Executive Office (PEO) and the Air Force as well as stipulated performance metrics that justify sustainment funding for the initial JSF production increment. (3) Of particular note, the proposed metrics served as the baseline performance measures for a range of operational and support activities occurring during the early phases of the F-35 life cycle:

   This PBA supports all contracts and memorandum of agreements
   [sic] that contribute to the readiness, availability, and
   reliability of the F-35 CTOL [conventional takeoff and landing]
   logistics and engineering support systems. It includes all post
   LRIP I delivery sustainment services such as material support,
   publications, aircraft introduction, systems engineering, site
   activation, support equipment, training, supply chain management,
   Autonomic Logistics Information System [ALS], sustaining
   engineering, fleet management ... and software support. (4)

As the analysis in Figure 2 depicts, the forecast 85 percent mission capable (MC) rate for the JSF in 2013 represented the baseline objective for sustainment funding to meet the projected flying-hour program (FHP) when the aircraft began full rate production. (5) Figure 2 assumes similar maintenance variables as the F-16 in lieu of undemonstrated F-35 performance and projects an average 2.1/100,000 hour service-life attrition rate. As such, the results of the notional modeling drill validate the 85 percent MC rate as evidenced by the 28.52 hourly utilization rate which meets the FHP program with a considerable surplus. Of particular note is the absence of a JSF programmed depot maintenance requirement eliminated by the predictive maintenance capabilities of ALS and prognostics and health-management technologies. Figure 2 highlights the projected reliability of a fully developed and tested JSF weapon system as it enters full-rate production.

The utilization rate sensitivity caused by the MC rate adjustment in Figure 3 provides a notional look at the relative sortie capacity sensitivity to MC rate fluctuations. (6) As contrasted with Figure 2, the JSF fleet sortie capacity in Figure 3 is also well above the flying-hour requirement despite the 10 percent MC rate reduction. This highlights an obvious reality regarding early life-cycle weapon system sustainment--a new highly reliable aircraft can operate at a lower MC and higher total not mission capable supply (TNMCS) rates and still meet FHP requirements. While this discovery may amount to a blinding flash of the obvious for most aircraft logisticians, it questions the decades-long organizational practice of using MC rate standards as performance metrics for wing-level maintenance organizations. In addition to the benefits of high aircraft reliability, the underutilized backup aircraft inventory (BAI) aircraft availability can also offset the effects of high not mission capable rates for an early life-cycle weapon system. BAI aircraft are fielded for the express purpose of supplementing primary aircraft inventory strength depletions because of unscheduled depot maintenance and fleet-wide modifications. For an early life-cycle weapon system with high reliability, however, BAI capacity is typically suboptimized but could provide additional capacity to mitigate the long-term effects of low MC rates.

TLCS--A New Approach

The Air Force has traditionally used fleet-specific MC rate standards to justify operating and support costs for fiscal year defense budgets as well as for performance measurements for wing-level maintenance organizations. The latter purpose, however, neglects to account for the unpredictability of long-term defense spending and ignores the potential early life-cycle reliability benefits afforded by fully developed and operationally tested weapon systems. Whereas the fleet-wide MC rate standard is useful toward operations and support (O&S) costs for annual budget justifications, it lacks relevance as an optimization tool for unit-level maintenance performance. Conversely, over the long term. the legislation of a performance motivated MC rate standard can deplete a weapon system's support infrastructure and risk late life-cycle sustainability. A variable MC rate standard tailored to FHP requirements, however, could leverage early life-cycle aircraft reliability to mitigate costs of future sustainment demands. In addition to the excess flying-hour capacity caused by the higher MC rate standard depicted in Figure 2, the level of sustainment necessary to attain the 85 percent MC standard is significantly higher than the minimum required to meet the FHP objective as shown in Figure 3 (76 percent).

This phenomenon demonstrates the reliability benefit and subsequent savings gained from a growing fleet size, underutilized BAI assets, and lower O&S costs of early production aircraft. Therefore, the savings accrued through the establishment of tailorable maintenance metrics standards designed to adequately meet FHP performance levels, particularly during early phases of an aircraft's service life, can potentially defray future costs accompanying late-cycle aircraft deterioration.

In Figure 4, a JSF Total Life-Cycle Sustainment (TLCS) model is proposed consisting of three weapon system life-cycle forecast curves for aircraft reliability, sustainment funding, and maintenance performance. The purpose of this model is to depict the effects of tailorable MC rate standards on aircraft reliability (blue line) given a constant rate of sustainment funding throughout a weapon system's life cycle. Whereas, current sustainment funds programming fluctuates annually based on weapon system performance, price indexes, and near-term operations tempo projections, the TLCS recommends a sustainment funding stream (green line) based on forecasted cost per flying hour and specified O&S expenses. Furthermore, the TLCS model leverages opportunities to invest underutilized early life-cycle funding toward future life-cycle sustainment requirements by setting maintenance performance standards to meet FHP demands as opposed to performance goals (red line). The savings generated from this tailored approach are then managed in a financial instrument similar to existing DoD working capital funds (WCF) which provide for weapon system sustainment based on a revolving revenue concept. The TLCS approach ultimately offers the following benefits.

* A just-in-time sustainment approach that provides the necessary infrastructure when needed.

* Early investment to maximize future buying power.

* Protection against unexpected defense budget cuts and a shift in the organizational focus away from maintenance optimization to FHP requirements.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Although the JSF TLCS is notional, it assumes two conditions based on historical evidence from previous tactical aircraft acquisition programs.

* Aircraft reliability is higher during early life-cycle years and subsequently decreases over time.

* Aircraft sustainment costs increase over time because of aging and pricing factors.

Figure 4 highlights these ebbs and flows which occur over a weapon system's life cycle and offers a methodology to take advantage of early life-cycle performance to protect against late life-cycle deterioration and rising costs. While this approach proposes a methodology to overcome future aircraft life-cycle sustainment challenges, the TLCS model must also account for the existing organizational programming and budgeting culture which employs an execution year versus total life-cycle mindset. In order for the TLCS approach to work in practice, the DoD must shift its current organizational paradigm to accommodate a total life-cycle investment approach based on weapon system performance forecasts. The following discussion provides recommendations on how to meld the TLCS model into existing DoD standard operating procedures.

TLCS--From Rhetoric to Reality

Currently, the DoD forecasts O&S expenses which include purchases for fuel, lubricants, repair parts, depot maintenance and contract services, and modification kit procurement and installation based on price indexes, demand rates, and historical weapon system performance. (8) As shown in Figure 5, these collective factors represent approximately 70 percent of total life-cycle costs for a given weapon system. (9) Of this 70 percent, the cost volatility associated with depot-level reparable and consumable parts accounts for a significant portion of O&S expenses. (10) Additionally, the unpredictability of repairable and consumable parts costs present challenges to budgetary forecasting causing unpredictable fluctuations in fleet-wide cost per flying hour (CPFH) rates. These conditions result in increased O&S costs, additional supplemental budget requests, and delayed maintenance when funding shortfalls fail to provide for sustainment requirements. Program managers collectively identify the need to develop internal cost reduction efficiencies in order to control O&S expenses and thwart the effects of external cost fluctuations:

   ... repair parts are the top candidates for cost reductions because
   new and more reliable parts and processes can be designed and
   manufactured to replace parts that fail often or are difficult to
   obtain. More reliable parts fail less often and require less
   maintenance. For example, replacing the [existing] F-16 battery
   with a maintenance-free battery [costs] $3.4M fleet wide and
   [will] save $3.8M over the next 9 years and $6.9 million over the
   next 25 years. (11)

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

Cost reduction strategies for repair parts, consumable items, and depot maintenance activities are essential to ensuring the projected service life of a weapon system. The JSF, due to its Joint development and employment, will likely present significant sustainment challenges stemming from the sheer size of the program. Despite efforts to build commonality into the different aircraft variants, the viability of the advanced systems employed by the JSF will demand constant vigilance to ensure that costs for repair parts and maintenance activities remain under control. Because the JSF TLCS methodology is an investment-based approach to funding late life-cycle sustainment requirements, it depends on cost reduction initiatives gained through increased parts reliability and inexpensive repair processes that ultimately reduce CPFH rate fluctuations. Furthermore, greater savings protect sustainment forecasts against unforeseen events such as aircraft modifications, contingency operations, and design anomalies which incur additional life-cycle costs.

Just where do the savings produced via the TLCS methodology go? The DoD currently manages an intricate web of WCFs designed to "provide a financial structure that is intended to promote total cost visibility and full cost recovery of support services." (13) Whether the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office decides to utilize an organic sustainment infrastructure or one provided through contractor logistics support, an adaptable WCF construct is applicable as a viable mechanism to manage appropriated resources for weapon system life-cycle sustainment. According to DoD costing officials:

   The funds are structured around functions that provide goods and
   services to customers throughout DoD. Managers of these functions
   prepare their proposed budgets based on anticipated workload and
   expenses. At the same time, fund customers include in their budgets
   their planned requirements for goods and services from the various
   functions. These budgets are submitted ... and the budget process
   sets rates for each function. Rates are keyed to a unit of output
   that is unique to each function. The rates are stabilized for the
   budget year and are intended to ensure that customers pay for the
   full cost of goods and services they receive from the
   functions. (14)

Two WCF funds that currently support aviation sustainment requirements are the Depot Management Activity Group fund and the Supply Management Activity Group fund. These financial instruments operate under a revolving fund concept "of breaking even over time by charging customers the full costs of goods and services provided to them." (15) Customers such as wing organizations use appropriated operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to purchase the goods and services provided by the WCFs. The activity groups then use revenues to replenish inventory and pay labor costs for rendered services. (16)

To enable the TLCS framework, a WCF-type instrument would continue to manage financial activities associated with providing sustainment support to operational units; however, TLCS revolving funds would institute a predictive, versus reactive, sustainment approach for managing specified categories. For example, current WCFs are initially funded by Congress to build an inventory of parts or sustain a workforce organization. Once the initial infrastructure is established, customers use unit-level annual O&M funds to pay for inventory items and labor costs for stated requirements. These O&M payments serve as revenue for the WCFs and are subsequently used to replenish inventory stockage levels, pay salaries, and recoup administrative costs associated with providing goods and services. Conversely, a TLCS WCF would receive a projected total life-cycle sustainment appropriation, phased in lump sums over several multiple Future Years Defense Program periods, from Congress to manage fleet requirements throughout an aircraft's entire service life. This sizable investment would sit in an interest bearing financial instrument attached to US Government securities, such as T-Bills, with authorization to reinvest gains. In the case of the jointly employed JSF, a DoD PEO would manage this fund and authorize all expenditures to support operational requirements for each of its military service customers.

Under this centralized sustainment construct, TLCS WCF representatives from each Service would coordinate maintenance performance standards with respective operational command organizations and tailor sustainment support to fulfill FHP requirements. During contingency operations, the TLCS WCF officials would coordinate with the operational commands to request appropriate supplemental funding to replenish inventory and workforce capabilities exhausted by unforeseen operational requirements. The advantage in this approach is that accountability for providing weapon system life-cycle sustainment rests with a centralized organization charged with monitoring fleet health and distributing responsive logistics support, as outlined by agile logistics initiatives. (17)

While this approach transfers control for life-cycle sustainment from unit-level wing organizations to a centralized PEO, it utilizes the benefits derived from the evolutionary JSF Autonomic Logistics Information System/ prognostics and health-management technologies to leverage predictive maintenance capabilities to preemptively, versus reactively, address aircraft deterioration. Additionally, the TLCS methodology leverages the advantages of financial discounting to increase the buying power of sustainment dollars over a 2030 year aircraft service-life period. The TLCS WCF construct provides an adaptable programming and budgeting vehicle to accommodate the necessary shift from execution year to total life-cycle sustainment without sacrificing operational performance.

The F-16 program sustainment crisis during the late 1990s provides ample proof that a failure to address total life-cycle sustainment requirements can cause significant challenges as aircraft age due to operational demands and unpredictable funding. Due to the sheer size of the F-35 acquisition, current approaches to life-cycle sustainment will not accommodate the myriad challenges associated with the disparate aircraft variants and the corresponding range of operational requirements. TLCS is a step toward instilling the culture of accurate weapon system forecasting within the DoD and Air Force while shifting the focus toward tailorable performance standards designed to meet appropriated flying-hour program requirements. By advocating that weapon system programs pay for themselves over time through establishing efficiency-based performance standards and stringent reliability controls, the JSF TLCS offers promise to meet projected service life goals while minimizing costs.

Article Acronyms

ALS--Autonomic Logistics Information System

BAI--Backup Aircraft Inventory

CPFH--Cost per Flying Hour

CTOL--Conventional Take Off and Landing

DoD--Department of Defense

FHP--Flying-Hour Program

JSF--Joint Strike Fighter

LRIP--Low-Rate Initial Production

MC--Mission Capable

NMCB--Not Mission Capable Both

O&M--Operations and Maintenance

O&S--Operations and Support

PBA--Performance-Based Agreement

PFT--Programmed Flying Training

PEO--Program Executive Office

TLCS--Total Life-Cycle Sustainment

TNMCS--Total Not Mission Capable Supply

WCF--Working Capital Fund

Notes

(1.) United States Senate, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services--Tactical Aircraft F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues, Government Accounting Office. 109th Congress, 1st session, 2005, [Online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d05519t.pdf, 6 May 2005.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) Draft F-35 LRIP I Performance-Based Agreement (PBA) Between the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JSFPO) and the United States Air Force (USAF), 20 May 2005.

(4.) Draft F-35 LRIP I Performance-Based Agreement (PBA), 2.

(5.) ACC/JSF office, "MC Rate Objective for JSF Full-rate production" email from 25 May 2005.

(6.) Figures 2 and 3 derived from sensitivity model produced by SMSgt (Ret) Mike Wasson, AETC Studies and Analysis. Data obtained from ACC DRA/JSF CTOL Beddown plan for the FY06 POM.

(7.) Data obtained from ACC DRA/JSF and JSFPO. Data depicted is an estimate of F-35 CPFH costs based on a stated JSFPO goal of achieving an F-35 flying-hour cost below that of the average F-16 rate over its life-cycle.

(8.) United States Senate, "Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services--Defense Acquisitions--Air Force Operating and Support Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority," [Online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00165.pdf, August 2000, 3-6.

(9.) Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services--Defense Acquisitions--Air Force Operating and Support Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority, 6.

(10.) Ibid.

(11.) "Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services--Defense Acquisitions--Air Force Operating and Support Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority," 9.

(12.) "Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services Defense Acquisitions--Air Force Operating and Support Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority," 6.

(13.) United States Air Force Annual Financial Statement 2003, [Online] Available: http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/FY04/ USAF2003finstmts.pdf, 20 May 2005, 21.

(14.) Ibid.

(15.) United States House of Representatives, "Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives--Air Force Supply--Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational Problems," [Online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/n199077.pdf, May 2005, 14.

(16.) Ibid.

(17.) Agile Logistics is an initiative developed to streamline the US Air Force parts repair process by eliminating warehousing of depot-level repairable items among operational units and depot repair facilities.

Lieutenant Colonel Stacey T. Hawkins is the Commander, 305th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. He is currently deployed as the Deputy Commander, 386th Expeditionary Maintenance Group, Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. At the time of the writing of this article, he was a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Stephen D. Chiabotti is the Vice Commandant, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Figure 2. Notional JSF Fleet Modeling Forecast Analysis--2013

USAF PA Programmatic Factors:

Annual Flying Hours                   21,636      (PFT)
Accident Attrition Rate                  2.1   /100,000 Hrs
Aircraft in Depot-Level Repair            5%       BAA

AETC Maint & Ops Variable Factors:

Mission Capable Rate                     85%
Scheduled Maintenance                    25%
Phase                                     5%
Depot                                     0%
Preflighted Spare Aircraft               15%
Sorties per Aircraft per Day               2
Flying Days per Month                   20.4
Night and Cross-Country Sorties           0%
  Weather Losses
  Operations Losses
Total Losses                              3%
Aircraft Availability Target             93%
TNMCS                                     7%
NMCM 3-Year Historical Average            8%
NMCB Historical Average                   2%
Sortie Length (Hrs)                      1.4

Computed Operational Capability:

Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI)          71
Daily Flyable Aircraft                    57

Daily Scheduled CAP                       37
Daily Scheduled CAP + Spares              43
Sorties/Day                               73
Day Sorties/Month                      1,491
Day + Night Sorties/Month              1,491
Effective Sorties/Month                1,446
Flying Hours/Month                     2,025
Utilzation Rate (Sorties)                 20
Utilization Rate (Hours)               28.52

Capability Versus Requirement
  Computation (PAI Driven):

Annual Flying Hour Capability                        24,301
Annual Flying Hour Requirement                       21,636
                                      Delta           2,665

Aircraft Calculation:

Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA):     71
Backup Aircraft Authorization (BAA):       4
BAI Attrition Reserve (BAI-AR):            9
Total Aircraft Authorization (TAA):       84
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI):           84

Remarks:

  29 Hours/Month per PAA Aircraft
  5% Aircraft in Depot Maintenance
0.45 Class A Accidents per Year
     Authorized Aircraft
     Aircraft Procured

Figure 3. Notional JSF Fleet Modeling Forecast Analysis--2019

USAF PA Programmatic Factors:

Annual Flying Hours                   21,636      (PFT)
Accident Attrition Rate                  2.1   /100,000 Hrs
Aircraft in Depot-Level Repair            5%      (BAA)

AETC Maint & Ops Variable Factors:

Mission Capable Rate                     76%
Scheduled Maintenance                    25%
Phase                                     5%
Depot                                     0%
Preflighted Spare Aircraft               15%
Sorties per Aircraft per Day              2
Flying Days per Month                  20.4
Night and Cross-Country Sorties         0.0%
  Weather Losses
  Operations Losses
Total Losses                              3%
Aircraft Availability Target             84%
TNMCS                                    16%
NMCM 3-Year Historical Average            8%
NMCB Historical Average                   2%
Sortie Length (Hrs)                      1.4

Computed Operational Capability:

Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI)         629
Daily Flyable Aircraft                   454
Daily Scheduled CAP                      290
Daily Scheduled CAP + Spares             341
Sorties/Day                              579
Day Sorties/Month                     11,812
Day + Night Sorties/Month             11,812
Effective Sorties/Month               11,458
Flying Hours/Month                    16,041
Utilization Rate (Sorties)                18
Utilization Rate (Hours)              25.50

Capability Versus Requirement
  Computation (PAI Driven):

Annual Flying Hour Capability                       192,490
Annual Flying Hour Requirement                      191,016
                                      Delta           1,474

Aircraft Calculation:

Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA):    629
Backup Aircraft Authorization (BAA):      31
BAI Attrition Reserve (BAI-AR):           80
Total Aircraft Authorization (TAA):      741
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI):          741

Remarks:

  26 Hours/Month per PAA Aircraft
  5% Aircraft in Depot Maintenance
4.01 Class A Accidents per Year
     Authorized Aircraft
     Aircraft Procured