Problems with current U.S. policy.

Having a new quasi-ideological theme to justify most security assistance is extremely convenient for the Bush administration. Policy objectives that could not have been pursued in the pre-September 11 security environment can now be repackaged and sold as part of the counterterrorism effort. In addition, wrapping new security assistance programs in a counterterrorism cloak allows the administration to provide support for repressive regimes and aid to states verging on, or currently involved in, armed conflict.

Although its emphasis on military aid is problematic, it is at least clear why the U.S. government felt the need to renew ties to Pakistan immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, given the role that Islamabad was to play in the Afghanistan operation. The same might be said about Washington's desire to reward Central Asian states for allowing U.S. forces to use their land and airspace.

But the connection with counterterrorism is less clear regarding many of the other new recipients of security assistance. For instance, the administration first tried to justify military aid to Azerbaijan by citing that country's offer of overflight rights, air bases, and intelligence. The Pentagon later admitted that the security assistance is largely designed to help Azerbaijan protect its maritime borders--that is, to protect U.S. access to oil in the Caspian Sea from possible Iranian threats.

Oil interests may also explain why the U.S. is sending Georgia hundreds of soldiers and millions of dollars worth of arms to chase out a couple dozen Arab fighters. The U.S. government wants a new oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to go through Georgia and Turkey, and propping up the Shevardnadze regime with military aid and training is an effort to boost security around the planned pipeline. This aid, along with U.S. bases springing up around Central Asia, may also help Washington gain an advantage in the U.S.-Russian-Chinese-Iranian competition for regional influence. Likewise, sending U.S. soldiers to the Philippines could help establish a U.S. presence in the strategically vital and resource-rich South China Sea.

Closer to home, both oil and old-fashioned anti-Marxism are playing their roles in the U.S. relationship with Colombia. The State Department's foreign aid request for FY2003 includes $98 million to train local troops to protect the Carlo Limon oil pipeline, which has been regularly attacked by rebels, especially the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN). As noted above, the administration also wants permission from Congress to provide U.S. training and arms in military action against the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The official rationale is that the aid supports counterterrorism, since the FARC is on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. But if this were truly its principal concern, Washington would focus its efforts on the right-wing paramilitaries, which are closely tied to the Colombian military but are responsible for the vast majority of political assassinations in Colombia.

These new policies show the Bush administration's intention to pursue wide-ranging goals during a time of relatively weak foreign policy oversight. Using U.S. soldiers and tax dollars to protect access to oil is not likely to have the same popular support as fighting terrorism. Many Americans would also balk at helping foreign militaries fight insurgencies, given the Pentagon's poor record with such interventions in the past. But by blurring foreign policy goals before a largely unquestioning American public still shaken by 9/11, the administration may win easy victories.

In the meantime, traditional American foreign policy goals such as promoting human rights, democracy, and nonproliferation are being cast aside in the haste to fight terrorism. President Bush dropped sanctions against India and Pakistan--triggered by their nuclear weapons testing--without receiving any pledge that these adversaries would refrain from future testing or weapons development. In effect, the president told the world that nuclear nonproliferation is not necessarily a top U.S. priority. The military coup that installed "President" (General) Musharraf in power in Pakistan should by law have led to a cutoff of U.S. aid. But in the post-9/11 world, aid flows again, and a popular referendum in May 2002 gave Musharraf five more years in office.

Since September 11, the U.S. government has also initiated or strengthened ties to many regimes with horrendous human rights records. The State Department's annual human rights report documents severe abuses committed by many of Washington's top military aid recipients. For example, the report notes that Uzbekistan "is an authoritarian state" that permits no political opposition, imprisoning, torturing, and even killing suspected activists. According to the State Department the Philippine military apparently engaged in "extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention," which worsened "as the Government sought to intensify its campaign against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group."

In addition, U.S. military support to allies in the fight against terrorism risks triggering or intensifying conflict in several tense regions. Real risk of military confrontation exists in South Asia, as India and Pakistan simultaneously mass soldiers at their border and seek weapons from the United States. U.S. transfers to India of weapons with offensive capabilities (like the weapons-seeking radars, recently approved by Congress, that could help India find and destroy Pakistani forces or missiles) could trigger a preemptive strike by Pakistan. Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia's military stalemate over the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan could be upset by an influx of arms to either party, while in Georgia, the government is already talking about using U.S. arms and training to recommence war against the breakaway province of Abkhazia. Moreover, arms and training for Colombia and the Philippines are designed to intensify, not allay, the fighting in those countries.

Key Problems

* Other geostrategic policies that would have faced harsh criticism in the pre-9/11 world--such as counterinsurgency aid or protecting U.S. access to oil sources--are now being approved in the name of counterterrorism.

* Antiterrorism is trumping all other foreign policy concerns, opening the way for new relations with repressive regimes.

* U.S. aid, arms, and training related to counterterrorism may destabilize tense regions.