Problems with current U.S. policy.

Key Problems

* Diversified global concerns, glaring regional conflicts, and heightened cultural awareness filter and distort the best message that Washington can devise.

* U.S. messages disseminated via mass media channels are particularly vulnerable to distortions and can even be turned against the United States.

* The strategic goal of public diplomacy is not to control or dominate the new communication terrain but rather to effectively navigate it.

Undersecretary Hughes will be tasked with reforming U.S. public diplomacy at the State Department, and the first challenge she will face is transforming Washington's mindset. Fighting information battles by disseminating messages over mass media channels has become the communication equivalent of conventional warfare: it lacks the agility and persuasive power to outmaneuver non-state actors and to navigate the highly charged political and cultural dynamics that define today's global communication era.

During the Cold War it was possible to speak of information battles, and that approach ideally matched the geopolitical landscape and technology at that time. The international arena was defined by the bipolar rivalry between two identifiable government powers with comparable capabilities and constraints. Fighting an information battle readily complemented the political, military, and economic struggle between the two superpowers.

Public diplomacy during the Cold War was about bipolar interests, information volume, control, and separate audiences. Crafters of U.S. public diplomacy adroitly defined its strategic goals as promoting U.S. interests, increasing

volume, segmenting audiences, and controlling information. Public diplomacy was a product; creating the best and distributing the most information to foreign audiences was the goal.

Mass communication technology deftly served Washington's strategy. Broadcasts were targeted, controlled, and monitored. Information dissemination was vital; the one with the most information could dominate and frame the political debate. Controlling the airwaves through saturation or jamming created a "spiral of silence" that effectively isolated and discredited the opponent. A government's persuasive power rested on quantity rather than quality of information; volume was more important than credibility.

Foreign and domestic audiences were separated both geographically and by news source. Technological and political restrictions limited the flow of information between the two audiences making it possible to speak to one without confusing or alienating the other. The prevalence of government-controlled media made the free flow of information" a rare and cherished commodity.

But the Cold War information strategy is not working today in the war on terrorism because the political/cultural terrain and advances in communication technology have transformed how nations communicate simultaneously with diverse publics on a global level. The bipolar context that once neatly defined and sorted all information messages has given way to a multipolar context of diversified global concerns, glaring regional conflicts, and heightened cultural awareness. Each dimension adds another layer of filters capable of distorting even the most skillfully crafted message that Washington can devise.

The first dimension of this new multipolar context is multiplicity of global concerns such as disease, poverty, environmental degradation--and terrorism--that transcend the physical borders of individual nations. To address these shared problems, nations have turned to a more collaborative approach. In a setting that favors cooperation, Washington's efforts to singularly pursue national interests magnify foreign perceptions of U.S. exceptionalism, unilateralism, and isolationism.

Second, disputes once overshadowed by the superpower rivalry have resurfaced with a vengeance. U.S. actions relative to regional conflicts and politics now carry greater weight than they did before. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for example, has become a prism for viewing U.S. policy and serves as a litmus test for Washington's credibility in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy is the local reality for the people absorbed by these clashes. The glaring intensity of these controversies has made U.S. policy the message of U.S. public diplomacy.

Third, culture has emerged as the new dynamic in international relations, replacing the surge of nationalism that defined the Cold War era. The more globalization spreads, the more culture becomes the new frontier for defining identities and allegiances. Although culture knows no national boundaries, it creates its own cognitive boundaries. For those within its confines, culture informs communication. For all others, culture distorts the message. U.S. reliance on mass media channels worked effectively with foreign publics during the Cold War, but that dependency has now become a disadvantage. Messages disseminated via mass media channels are particularly vulnerable to unseen cultural filters and distortions. Crossing the cultural barrier has become U.S. public diplomacy's greatest hurdle.

Advanced communication technology has also changed the very practice of public diplomacy. Previously, the most significant feature of the Internet was the amount of information--the "paradox of plentitude," as Professor Joseph Nye called it. Today, the Internet's defining characteristic is the exchange of information. The immense popularity of emails, blogs, chat rooms, and online discussions reflects the current communication dynamic. Instant messaging, mobile phones, and satellite television are about being connected.

Before, U.S. public diplomacy was an information product, made in America and disseminated overseas. Today's communication interactivity has transformed it into a process. Public diplomacy has become more about "participation" rather than simply "presentation," noted British scholar Rhiannon Vickers in her comparative analysis of British and Canadian public diplomacy. "Dialogue" keeps surfacing in public diplomacy discussions because people expect a more interactive and participatory role.

To win hearts and minds in today's politically charged landscape and global communication era, U.S. public diplomacy needs to be able to navigate the new terrain. Instead of trying to control or dominate the playing field, which tends to spawn resentment and magnify U.S. isolation and anti-American sentiment, Washington's public diplomacy needs to bridge the gap that separates the United States from foreign publics. Fighting information battles over the airwaves cannot do that; building communication bridges and forging a network can.

Jamie Metzl of the Council on Foreign Relations proposed the idea of "network diplomacy," suggesting that public diplomacy was "ideally suited for a network orientation." Other countries are beginning to explore the idea. The United States as a communication leader and innovator needs to aggressively do so as well, or it will remain stuck in the Cold War era, vulnerable to mass media distortions and the agile non-state actors forever ready to use and exploit those distortions.