Problems with Current U.S. Policy.

Key Problems

* Opposition to both the Vietnamese and Lao agreements has centered on human rights issues with no direct connection to trade.

* A small number of members of Congress have been able to hold trade agreements hostage to a partisan political agenda, with backing from right-wing Vietnamese-American and Lao/Hmong-American groups.

* Strongly worded criticisms of problems in Vietnam and Laos tend to backfire, closing channels of communication and strengthening hard-line policies, making repressive tactics more likely.

After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 to drive out Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, the U.S. sided with the Khmer Rouge and their Chinese allies in opposing Vietnamese occupation. The wartime trade embargo against North Vietnam was extended to include the unified Vietnam as well as Cambodia. There was no official embargo against Laos, but no aid was given. U.S. allies were pressured to go along with the sanctions, as with Cuba today. Meanwhile, certain veterans groups established and perpetuated the view that Americans were still being held alive in Vietnam after the war, symbolized by the black POW-MIA flag still flown at the U.S. Capitol and other government buildings. Despite acknowledged cooperation by Vietnam and Laos in the search for remains of the war dead, the POW-MIA myth helped postpone an end to the trade embargo until the mid-1990s.

With the support of the Clinton administration and members of Congress from both parties, substantial progress has been made since the lifting of the Vietnamese trade embargo in 1994. However, U.S. policy continues to be overly influenced by residual anticommunism and war-related emotions. Although veterans are divided regarding relations with Vietnam, one faction still promotes the POW-MIA line. Asian-Americans are also divided, and certain refugees from the former South Vietnam oppose any contact with the communist government and discount the economic and political changes that have transpired since the 1980s.

In Laos, members of the Hmong minority led by Gen. Vang Pao fought a CIA-backed war against the Pathet Lao in the 1960s and 1970s and have never given up hope of overthrowing the Lao government and returning to power. This group may be connected to several of the terrorist bombs in Laos in the past year and to a border raid from Thailand in July 2000. It was certainly behind the disappearance of two Hmong-Americans (one of them Vang Pao's nephew) who were apparently captured on the Thai-Lao border in April 1999 carrying large amounts of cash and other materials for the Hmong resistance.

Following this still-unresolved incident, supporters of Hmong-American groups formed the U.S. Congressional Forum on Laos, which has held a series of closed-door, secretive meetings on Capitol Hill beginning in 1999. This group has no formal link to the U.S. government but has gained support from members of Congress, including Reps. George Radanovich (R-CA), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), and Mark Green (R-WI). In the Senate, Bob Smith (R-NH) and Jesse Helms (R-NC) placed a hold on the appointment of a new ambassador to Laos and signaled their opposition to the trade agreement. As a result of this pressure, the State Department backed away from submitting the Lao BTA to Congress in 1999 and 2000.

Opponents of relations with Vietnam and Laos have also sought to use the issue of religious freedom as a means to defeat or postpone NTR. Both countries restrict operations of unofficial religious groups, just as they do independent labor unions or other local associations. In the absence of credible information, however, it is sometimes difficult to separate actual discrimination from politically motivated exaggerations. At hearings conducted by the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom in February, the majority of Vietnamese-American and academic witnesses spoke in favor of the BTA, yet the commission (headed by former Reagan administration official Elliott Abrams) went on record against the agreement in its May report. The report threatened the imposition of sanctions if Vietnam and Laos did not improve their religious freedom records, and it suggested that ratifying the BTAs might send a signal to continue religious discrimination. This opposition has not been echoed by mainstream human rights organizations, which have not taken a position on the agreements.

Strongly worded criticisms of problems in Vietnam and Laos tend to backfire, closing channels of communication and strengthening hard-line policies, making repressive tactics more, not less, likely. This unintended result generalizes to other areas of potential conflict, including trade. Both Vietnamese and Lao officials are open to engagement and negotiation, and quiet diplomacy can produce results where threats and bullying accomplish little. Given the history of U.S. meddling in the region, strong-arm tactics also have little moral foundation.

Closer U.S. cooperation with Vietnam and Laos has an important strategic value. Despite their communist or revolutionary labels, both countries' foreign policies attempt to steer a neutral course between large neighbors and trading partners. Laos balances its close historical ties with Vietnam with the increasing commercial and cultural impact of Thailand and the growing political-economic role of China. Most importantly, the Lao economy is highly dependent on foreign aid and is still reeling from the effects of the Asian economic crisis, which prompted its currency, the kip, to fall by 80% versus the dollar.

Similarly, Vietnam must balance its attraction to and fear of China with its membership in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Sino-Vietnamese relations seemed to be warming under Vietnam's General-Secretary Le Kha Phieu, but Phieu's replacement since the March party congress, Nong Duc Manh, promises to bring more balance to Vietnamese foreign policy with the U.S. and China. Under such a scenario, as in the Lao PDR's search for an economic way out, the U.S. could play a significant and positive role. If the opportunity for NTR passes, however, both countries could potentially tilt further away from the United States.

Andrew Wells-Dang <[e-mail]> currently works as the resident director of CET Academic Programs, Inc., in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), Vietnam. The views expressed in this brief are his own.