Problems with Current U.S. Policy.

Until the recent escalation of the conflict, Sri Lanka's war has played mostly off to the side of the world stage, with little interest from the international community, including the United States. It has appeared to hold no strategic value for the U.S., other than as a potential gateway to trade on the subcontinent, despite occasional claims of U.S. military interest in the eastern port of Trincomalee.

Successive Colombo governments have succeeded in portraying a country mainly unaffected by the war, except for a terrorist problem in the north and east. It is a democratic republic with a multiparty system. From the late 1970s, the socialist-oriented policies of earlier governments were left behind to embrace a market economy and to fall in line with IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies. All of these factors have earned the government U.S. support, and however flawed its democracy might be in practice, the Sri Lankan government enjoys a kind of automatic benefit of the doubt both when it comes to the conduct of the war and regarding a range of human rights abuses.

The Clinton administration has traditionally restricted its role regarding the conflict to expressing support for a negotiated political settlement that protects the rights of minorities and guarantees equal rights for all of Sri Lanka's citizens. It has strongly supported the current government's proposed constitutional changes--known as the devolution, or peace package--even after their usefulness was called into question due to process concerns and a progressive weakening of the document. In 1999 the State Department expressed its willingness to serve as a facilitator for talks if requested by the Sri Lankan government, an indication of increasing potential U.S. involvement, though the same offer has been made by a number of other governments.

A Sri Lanka caucus was formed in the House of Representatives in 1998. The caucus seems to be a cheerleader for the Sri Lankan government, and it periodically issues statements praising the government and condemning the LTTE. These statements, which often bear little resemblance to reality in the country, appear in the headlines of Colombo's newspapers the next day.

Washington has been willing to be critical of the Sri Lankan government on certain human rights issues, but it usually stops short of voicing its displeasure publicly, as illustrated by the U.S. unwillingness to sponsor a resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. U.S. officials have attempted to make use of the recent Leahy Law (which prohibits training of any foreign military personnel known to have committed human rights abuses), however, to screen Sri Lankan military officers for U.S. training.

Previously, the U.S. was fairly receptive to both the concerns expressed by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, but this changed in 1997 when the LTTE was formally designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization. This label has had the unfortunate consequence of removing channels of communication between the U.S. and the LTTE and has reduced Washington's potential influence with the rebels. The U.S. has admitted that the terrorist designation has had no effect on the behavior of the LTTE, and there is no evidence that alternative initiatives have been tried.

In a visit to Colombo in June, Under Secretary of State Thomas Picketing--while urging the parties to the conflict to begin talks immediately, if possible--emphasized U.S. support for the territorial integrity of the country, and said that Washington would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by the LTTE. Such statements are unlikely to encourage the LTTE to come to the negotiating table, though one day it must, if there is ever to be a resolution of the conflict.

U.S. military cooperation with Sri Lanka includes the training of Sri Lankan security forces by the Green Berets and Navy SEALS in such areas as long-range patrolling, tactical reconnaissance, and rapid-reaction air and sea attacks. The U.S. must also approve the sale of U.S.-made military equipment used in foreign-built weaponry. Sri Lankan purchases of Kfir jets from Israel--secured after Sri Lanka and Israel reestablished severed diplomatic ties in the space of 24 hours--required U.S. approval because of the U.S.-made engines in the jets. Early this year, U.S. officials in Sri Lanka downplayed media reports that some major U.S. weapons purchases by the Sri Lankan government indicated an increase in U.S. military assistance.

The crisis in Jaffna has brought India back onto the scene for the first time since the late 1980s, when it unsuccessfully attempted to make peace in Sri Lanka through the Indo/Lanka Accords. Events in Sri Lanka, particularly the outcome of the conflict, will have an impact on India's complex domestic scene. Although the LTTE has the sympathy of many of India's Tamils in the state of Tamil Nadu, the LTTE's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, stands accused of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. India faces a number of its own separatist movements and would view a newly formed Tamil state to its south as a threat to its territorial integrity.

Given the growing U.S. relationship with India and its secondary interest in Sri Lanka, Washington has had no problem deferring to India as the regional power. The escalation on the battlefield and Sri Lanka's turn to India for help has tended to shift the attention away from Norway's peace initiative to power politics and has set up a Norway-India-U.S. triangle.

Key Problems

* The U.S. has not given Sri Lanka's conflict the attention it deserves.

* The designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization has contributed to marginalizing the group and has not resulted in changes in behavior.

* U.S. military assistance may undermine efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Miriam Young <[e-mail]> is the executive director of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace and the coordinator of the U.S. ArGO Forum on Sri Lanka.