Problems with Current U.S. Policy.

Key Problems

* Four obstacles have blocked the
integration of gender into U.S.
development assistance--no zeal
within USAID leadership to make
gender a priority, the absence of
accountability mechanisms, shortages
of resources to integrate gender into
projects, and a lack of staff training
for conducting gender analysis.

* USAID has only recently started using
effective agency-wide mechanisms,
e.g., requiring attention to gender in
contracts.

* USAID's economic portfolio has
shifted from building domestic
enterprises to assisting developing
nations in joining and adhering to
international trade pacts and
collaborating with the WTO.

Why, despite congressional action, a law mandating gender integration, committed practitioners within USAID, and years of advocacy, has gender integration not penetrated U.S. development assistance as it has in other nations' bilateral aid agencies, e.g., Canada and the Nordic countries?

Foreign policy decisionmakers often cite a reluctance to "impose our culture" when it comes to women's issues, not recognizing that most women's issues are matters of human rights. It is also ironic that policymakers do not voice the same concern in other foreign policy matters that may be equally cultural.

Secondly, most decisionmakers and the majority of development practitioners view women (and, by association, gender integration) as just another sector. They do not consider women as a constituency that must be part of every program, nor do they view gender integration as an analytical tool to help programs support women and get better results.

In addition, the attention gender integration receives within individual USAID missions, bureaus, or projects depends heavily on the beliefs and commitment of their leadership. The 2000 ACVFA report states that for true integration of gender to take place, "senior leadership, particularly the chief executive, must `walk the talk'--with vision, commitment built on consensus, requisite resources and training, and clear accountability."

The one bureau that received high marks in the ACVFA report was Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Its recipe for success: an assistant administrator and deputy assistant administrator who valued and promoted gender integration; a highly skilled and diplomatic gender expert, who assisted missions and projects in integrating gender; and adequate resources to promote gender integration.

Directly related to the lack of leadership is the paucity of communications from Washington to USAID missions, bureaus, and partners about the existence of past women-in-development policies and, in particular, about the 1996 Gender Plan of Action. Though the administrator announced the GPA, he did so just once and only on the electronic bulletin board, which few personnel read. As one senior USAID official said during the interviews that the ACVFA conducted, "The GPA has been invisible and irrelevant."

Another internal obstacle has been the lack of real incentives for integrating gender. The Gender Plan of Action's best tools--evaluating performance on gender integration as part of personnel promotions, and scoring bids for contracts based on the bidder's treatment of gender--were weakened or delayed in their implementation. The gender criteria were only included in evaluating and promoting junior and mid-level employees, not in choosing and monitoring senior management. The procurement regulations were adopted at the very end of the Clinton administration (four years after they were proposed in the GPA), and only because of sustained advocacy by the ACVFA. Because contractors, consultants, and grantees play such a large and growing role in implementing USAID programs, this procurement requirement has the potential to integrate gender like never before, but that remains to be seen. The challenge now is to ensure that contracting officers know how to evaluate the quality of gender integration in proposals and that field staff know how to implement gender requirements in their projects and planning processes.

To compound matters, if mission directors, bureau chiefs, or project directors proactively seek to analyze gender and/or target women as part of their work, the Office of Women in Development (WID) lacks the technical staff and resources to adequately assist them. With a budget of $10 million and only 5-7 direct-hire staff, it is essentially impossible for WID to give attention to more than a small fraction of USAID'S 200-plus projects with a total budget of $2.7 billion.

Furthermore, foreign direct investment and trade now grossly overshadow USAID's development assistance, and trade and investment are increasingly touted as the alternative to aid. USAID's economic growth portfolio over the last five years has shifted from building nationally based enterprises to assisting developing nations in joining and adhering to international trade pacts and collaborating with the World Trade Organization. In other words, it provides aid for trade.

Ritu Sharma <[e-mail]> is cofounder and executive director of Women's EDGE.