Problems with Current U.S. Policy.

The issue of military burden sharing has gotten more complicated recently. Late in 1999, the European Union (EU) announced plans to launch a European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) creating its own security force. This is not the mode of burden sharing the U.S. had in mind. The U.S. envisions European NATO members increasing their spending in strategic coordination with NATO objectives, including the defense of Europe, the Persian Gulf, and beyond. The ESDI is predicated on European coordination to address European problems, and it relies on restructured, rather than substantially expanded, military spending to achieve this coordination.

In March 2000, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson termed U.S. objections to the ESDI "a sort of schizophrenia. On one hand, the Americans say, `You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden.' And then when Europeans say `Okay, we will carry more of the burden,' the Americans say, `Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?'"

Robertson is right: Washington sees the ESDI as a plan that threatens America's ability to call the shots in Europe. It also threatens U.S. control of the arms market. U.S. defense contractors continue trying to dominate sales of U.S. systems to NATO partners; European contractors want to keep their military dollars at home. The $1.5 billion worth of new U.S. grant and loan programs, appropriated since 1997 to support NATO interoperability, has as much to do with underwriting U.S. arms sales as with cohesion for the alliance. The fight is, of course, extremely costly for all parties involved, as this competition with allies--and not, remarkably, with any external adversary--starves other priorities, such as peace support operations, nonmilitary foreign aid, diplomacy, and domestic needs.

The debate over burden sharing has recently acquired another twist. The U.S. proposal to build a national missile defense system has allowed Europeans to turn the tables on U.S. complaints about Europe's insufficient commitment to NATO coordination and military spending. The EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, said in May 2000 that such a system runs the risk of "decoupling" Europe and the U.S. by creating a separate U.S. security zone. And a May 2000 Washington Post article quoted a senior NATO diplomat as wondering, "How will you convince European voters to approve larger defense budgets when they see billions of dollars being frittered away on a threat that probably doesn't exist and a system that probably won't work?"

The evidence is plentiful that such increases in European defense budgets are not in the cards. Agreements underlying the adoption of the European Monetary Unit require EU countries to reduce their budget deficits to 3% of GDP. Germany is intent on increasing spending for education and youth unemployment programs, Britain for education and health, and Italy for social and regional development.

And the three new NATO members face even more severe problems balancing domestic needs with military commitments. These countries sharply increased their defense spending while they were trying to get into the NATO club, but they are now presenting more nuanced portraits of their budgetary intentions. Polish officials told the GAO that "they planned to spend more on defense in 1999 but could not, in part, due to numerous domestic reforms requiring increased funding." Hungarian officials similarly cited the need to balance funding for defense "with social spending priorities to avoid creating social tensions and political instability." In addition, each is currently trying to qualify for EU membership by meeting requirements for enhanced environmental standards and transportation infrastructure. Doing so will be costly.

Europe does face considerable challenges organizing and equipping itself to keep its own peace. Yet major defense reviews undertaken within the past three years by France and the U.K. have concluded that "modern, high-quality defense forces can be created without requiring large increases in defense spending by rigorously setting spending priorities and making difficult choices," including cutting troops and getting rid of unnecessary procurement programs and bases. Within the alliance, only the U.S. is currently committed to a course of increased military spending, for itself and everybody else. The U.S. would be better off learning from its allies in this respect rather than lecturing them.

Key Problems

* U.S. policy regarding increased NATO spending for interoperability with U.S. weapons systems is motivated by a desire to dominate both NATO strategic doctrine and arms market share.

* U.S. pressure on allies to increase military spending ignores both their pressing domestic needs and their search for sensible alternative security mechanisms.

* Europe views U.S. plans for national missile defense as creating a separate U.S. security zone and undermining the cohesion of the U.S.-European alliance.