Problems With Current U.S. Policy.

Key Problems

* Nuclear Weapons: The U.S. has limited its post-test punishment
of India and Pakistan, seeking instead to manage the threat to
U.S. interests posed by these nuclear powers.

* Terrorism: Press reports suggest that army-terrorist links have
grown stronger since the coup.

* Kashmir: Pakistani aggressiveness has brought the U.S. closer
to the Indian position, but this has furthered neither U.S.
interests nor regional peace.

An amendment to the 1995 U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act automatically triggers severe sanctions against any non-nuclear state that engages in nuclear testing. The 1998 South Asian nuclear tests demonstrated the limited deterrent effect of this amendment: India was not deterred and Pakistan, for regional and domestic political reasons, had no real choice but to respond to India's tests. The Clinton administration's waffling "sanctions policy" has generated precious little for the U.S. in South Asia.

India's decision to test nuclear weapons was shaped both by domestic politics and by its desire to make a significant political statement and to take a step toward nuclear weaponization before agreeing to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At present, especially after the U.S. Senate decision not to ratify the CTBT, neither India nor Pakistan feels much pressure (much less obligation) to sign this treaty. Both countries have expressed a willingness to consider entering the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but only as recognized nuclear powers. The U.S., given its longstanding opposition to enlarging the "nuclear club," considers this position a nonstarter.

The U.S. softened its post-test sanctions against India, because they seemed to be having no effect on Indian policy. U.S. officials were also responding to increasingly vocal U.S. business interests. In short, the U.S. tried and failed to change India's nuclear policy. The Clinton administration weakened the sanctions against Pakistan because, ironically, the sanctions were "working." Pakistan's already weak economy, far more intimately linked to the U.S. than India's economy, was placed under additional strain. However, the U.S. was concerned that the sanctions would exacerbate an already tenuous domestic political landscape without necessarily effecting the desired changes in Pakistan's nuclear policy. By 1999, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had, by constitutional and less-than-constitutional means, severely weakened the influence of the Pakistani presidency and judiciary. He then established special courts that quickly convicted many opposition leaders. Yet, even as he was gaining unprecedented civilian control over the Pakistani government, his regime was losing control of Pakistan's rapidly dwindling economy and its increasingly polarized society.

Following terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration made the eradication of terrorism a top priority. Militant Islamic groups in Pakistan were developing closer relations with terrorist groups around the world, including Saudi businessman Osama bin Ladin, who is accused by the U.S. of masterminding the bombings of American embassies in East Africa (among other terrorist plots) and who resides just across the border in Afghanistan. These relationships have had the support of some provincial political leaders and military commanders. Pakistan's sanctions-induced economic decline was perceived to be strengthening the hand of these provincial actors. So Washington insisted that Pakistan's prime minister take a strong antiterrorist stand to thank the U.S. for softening economic sanctions.

To be sure, Prime Minister Sharif did attempt to weaken the links between his army officers and terrorist organizations by hindering arms flows and transferring officers. The resulting resistance of these military commanders was one of many factors that triggered the October 12, 1999, military coup in Pakistan. Since the coup, the U.S. has weighed in with mixed criticism of the new "undemocratic" regime and has continued to demand that Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf break the links between his government and terrorist organizations in the region. In particular, the U.S. has repeatedly urged Musharraf to use his close relationship with the fundamentalist Taliban government in Afghanistan to force the extradition of Osama bin Laden. To date, Musharraf has shown neither the interest nor the ability to hamper the activities of organizations that are supported by important segments of his fellow officer corps. Both Indian and Pakistani press reports suggest that army-terrorist links have grown stronger since the coup.

In reality, Osama bin Laden is not the primary terrorist challenge in the region. That dubious honor belongs to terrorist groups in Kashmir, many of which receive support from Pakistan. These organizations gained world attention in December 1999, when an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked in Nepal, refueled in India, and flown to Afghanistan. On New Year's Eve, India released three Kashmiri prisoners in exchange for the 156 hostages aboard the aircraft. All three prisoners have since found their way to Pakistan. Despite the Pakistani government's professed attempts to stifle them, all three have held rallies and have made anti-India and Kashmir-separatist statements.

India has sought to link the hijack incident, terrorist camps in Afghanistan, and alleged Pakistani involvement in terrorism to the security issue on the top of the Indian agenda: Kashmir. During the summer of 1999, a variety of insurgent organizations closely coordinated and supported by the Pakistani Army crossed over Kashmir's Line of Control. India suffered some 3,000 casualties before it regained control. For the first time, U.S. leaders of all political orientations shifted from an "even-handed" approach to laying the blame for the conflict firmly at the feet of the Pakistani Army. Since then, and especially since the new year, Kashmiri violence between "independent" military groups (many with Pakistani Army support), the Indian Army, and the Pakistani Army has been reported on a weekly basis.

Although many in these groups are truly thugs, India's repressive military policy is not matched by any attempt at meaningful engagement with nonterrorist opposition groups in Kashmir. Only 31% of the Kashmiri electorate participated in the 1999 parliamentary elections (compared to India's national average of 60%), illustrating broad-based dissatisfaction. India's repression has fueled terrorism in the absence of broader political spaces for the expression of dissent.

Sumit Ganguly ([e-mail]) is a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University. David Stuligross ([e-mail]) is the South Asia editor at Asian Survey and coordinates the South Asia Nuclear Dialogue at the Nautilus Institute.