Problems With Current U.S. Policy.

In an August 1999 news conference held in Kosovo, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DL) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke reiterated the U.S. policy of promoting a multiethnic society in Kosovo for all of Kosovo's citizens, no matter what their ethnic origin or religion. Biden warned that failure on the part of the KLA and the Albanian population to guarantee the rights of the Serb minority would result in immediate action by the U.S. Congress to cut off financial assistance for rebuilding Kosovo. Such pronouncements have had little effect on the behavior of either the KLA or Albanians seeking revenge. Three months after the ending of the bombing campaign, there were still daily attacks against the Serb minority; over 160,000 Kosovo Serbs have fled the province, i.e., more than 85% of the prewar Serbian population.

During the bombing campaign, the KLA was used as NATO's ground force and was given open U.S. support for its military actions. This policy was implied in President Clinton's May 23rd New York Times opinion piece, in which he declared that although Milosevic "has driven hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians from their homes, [he] ... has not eliminated the Kosovo Liberation Army. Indeed, its ranks are swelling, and it has begun to go on the offensive against Serb forces hunkered down to hide from air strikes." When the Serbs withdrew from Kosovo, the KLA rushed into the province and took over key towns and villages. NATO has been reluctant to challenge the KLA, as such a move could jeopardize relations with Kosovo's Albanian population.

The KLA's leadership, emboldened by NATO support during the bombing campaign, is determined to establish an independent Kosovo. Such an agenda contradicts the stated U.S., UN, and NATO policy of preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. However, the current arrangement has stripped Yugoslavia of its authority over Kosovo and constitutes a de facto detachment of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. The Kosovar Albanians and the KLA are closer than ever to achieving their goal of an independent Kosovo. As Steven Burg of the Woodrow Wilson Center has suggested, a KLA-controlled Kosovo would have a destabilizing effect on the entire region. It may attempt to create an expanded Albanian state or to foment unrest among Albanians in neighboring Macedonia, where relations between an Albanian minority (estimated at 30-35%) and a Slavic majority have been strained. The U.S. and the Western alliance have been slow in responding to this new crisis.

Since the end of the bombing campaign, U.S. policymakers have offered no concrete framework for achieving a lasting peace in the Balkan region. The cease-fire agreement that resulted in the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo has not been followed by a diplomatic initiative to provide for long-term resolution of outstanding problems in the Balkans. The major questions remain unsolved, especially the future status of Kosovo, the tension among Macedonia's ethnic groups, the prospect of Montenegrin independence, and the potential for recurrence of ethnic conflicts in Bosnia.

The Clinton administration, wanting to encourage cooperation among Balkan states, convened a meeting of Balkan leaders in Sarajevo in July 1999 with the aim of activating the newly established Balkan Stability Pact, signed on June 10, 1999, by foreign ministers of the European Union, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, and all Balkan states except the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This pact was initiated in order to promote long-term stability and prosperity in southeastern Europe through the encouragement of foreign investment and economic aid to the Balkan region. However, such a pact needs to be accompanied by a comprehensive peace arrangement that can address the complex issues of borders and security concerns for the Balkan states.

Foreign investment will not begin to flow into the region without the necessary stable, political arrangements to ensure the permanent cessation of violence. Moreover, the Balkan Stability Pact is premature, since it does not include the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Western leaders have considered including Montenegro in the pact, but such a move would only encourage Montenegrin separatism, sparking potential hostilities between Serbia and Montenegro. Direct or indirect support of Montenegrin secessionism is risky, as it could result in an overthrow of the Montenegrin government or an ethnic conflict in Montenegro that could embroil NATO and neighboring countries.

The U.S. has ostracized Milosevic and his government and has explicitly advocated for Milosevic's ouster and his trial for war crimes. Some experts have predicted that, given such a policy, Milosevic will be out of power within a year. However, little consideration has been given to the alternate scenario whereby Milosevic clings to power for the foreseeable future. Without Serbia's participation, an overall peace arrangement is unlikely in the region.