Private military companies: 'shadow soldiers' of neo-colonialism.

Niccolo Machiavelli, in his letter to a Florentine noble about his book The Art of War--considered a masterpiece by some--dwells on armed forces gaining an 'official', 'public' quality, and emphasises the necessity of this tendency for the formation of regular and permanent armies. He writes:

   Many are now of the opinion, my dear Lorenzo, that no two things
   are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and a military
   life. Hence we daily see that when a man goes into the army, he
   immediately changes not only his dress, but his behavior, his
   company, his air, his manner of speaking, and that he affects to
   throw off all appearances of anything that may look like
   ordinary life and conversation. For a man wanting to be
   ready-equipped for any sort of violence despises the formal dress
   of a civilian and thinks no dress fit for his purpose but a suit of
   armor ... But if we consider the institutions of the ancients, we
   shall find that there is a very close, intimate relation between
   these two conditions, and that they are not only compatible and
   consistent with each other, but necessarily connected and
   interrelated. (Machiavelli, 1990: 3)

In an era in which national states had recently begun to take shape, Machiavelli thinks of permanent, national armies as indispensable for the foundation of a powerful state. This development implies the separation of civilian and military, or private and public, and makes the society-wide 'right to use violence' public. This is an unavoidable part of the development of a modern state. Hobbes (1984) and Locke (1989), two of the founders of modern state theory, systematically present the basis of the need to delegate the right to use violence to the state, from the point of view of natural law.

However, more recent developments in the form of the presentation of new opportunities for colonialism have led to the right to use violence being increasingly handed into to private hands again. (1) Rather than focusing on theoretical discussions about the effects of the privatisation of security on coercive policies within neocolonialism, and on the future of the sovereign state, which has the monopoly of legitimate violence, the aim of this article is to draw attention to the crucial role of private military companies in the colonialist activities of powerful Western states, especially those of the USA. Within this framework, the paper will refer to the conditions that have prepared the ground for private military companies, discussing the problem of defining them, before going on to use empirical evidence in order to examine the roles they play in neocolonialist policy.

The march toward privatised security

The emergence of the privatised security industry is closely related to recent political transformations at global and national levels. Along with developments and changes in the fields of security and military technology in the post-Cold war period, increasing rapidity in the process of the privatisation and minimisation of the public sector is a leading factor that has both triggered and accelerated its emergence. Security--a function formerly existing solely under the state's responsibility--is coming to be performed by non-governmental or 'private' actors, as is already the case in the fields of trade and finance. And it is not only governments that use private military companies: individuals, companies and international organisations have increasingly begun to use military services provided by the free market, and not by public institutions.

Changes in military technologies and methods of waging war have prepared the ground for the birth of a private security industry. As on the one hand, wars between the 'super powers' came to an end and the boundary between internal and international conflicts disappeared, technological advancements on the other hand eliminated the need for large armies to fight on battlefields. In wars that rely on high technology, more experts are needed, and they are mostly gathered from the private sector (Hobsbawn, 2000: 7-15).

The other variable here is a considerable reduction in the size of armies, especially on the parts of the USA and the ex-USSR countries in the post-Cold-war era. Over 6 million personnel are said to have been discharged from armies in the 1990s; and it is discharged personnel who have provided and still provide labour for the newborn private military industry. Superior units from certain armies--e.g. the 32nd Reconnaissance Battalion of South Africa and the Soviet special-forces 'Alfa' unit--have preserved their structures and established their own companies. This phenomenon applies to people other than soldiers, too: 70 per cent of members of the former KGB are now said to be working within this new industry (Singer, 2001-2002: 194).

Privatisation has started a process that is going to shake or transform the bases upon which the modern state is built. In the last twenty years we have witnessed an expansion in the field of private forces thanks to neoliberal policies applied at national level and the growth of the global market at an international level. 'For the first time since the emergence of the nation-state, more military weapons are in the hands of private citizens than in the hands of national governments' (Mandel, 2000: 2). In order to better understand the expansion of the privatisation of the security sector, it would be useful to review some indicators. In the UK, for example, the private security industry employs 162,000 people--many more than the police force, which employs 142,000. (2) In Germany, the number of private security companies more than doubled between 1984 and 1996, going from 620 to 1400, and the employment rate in this field has increased by 300 per cent. In the USA, the private security industry is thought to be worth around $100m, which is twice the total budget of local, government and federal police (Creveld, 2000). In Turkey, the sector was developed under President Ozal, when banks created their own security teams: today, 200,000 private security personnel are employed, while the police force numbers 180,000 (Safak, 2005)

Private military companies, which are my point of focus here, form a part of this sector. In political events such as coups d'etat, occupations or wars, in which politics and militarism merge, these companies are employed via contracts with powerful states and multinational corporations. Their services include logistical support, tactical assault operations, strategic planning, secret intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, attack and defence in battlefields, and the provision of military skills like military training and technical aid. According to data gathered by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists during two years of research, there are nearly 90 private military companies operating in 110 countries, in an industry said to have an annual value of us$100bn. Private military companies are mainly based in the USA, the UK and South Africa, and mainly operate in Africa, South America and Asia (Centre for Public Integrity, 2002: 2).

The role they have played in the Iraq war has directed increasing international public attention towards them: 'The recent conflict in Iraq has drawn the attention of the media to the emergence of private military and security firms, with an estimated 20,000 staff members in the war-torn country' (Carbonnier, 2006: 402). According to the Guardian's research, these private companies constitute the second biggest power in Iraq after the Pentagon. As stated in the official coalition records, compared to the UK's 9,900 troops in Iraq, private military forces total 10,000, or one private personnel member for every ten us soldiers. Compared to the first Gulf war, the number of private military personnel in the line of fire has increased by a factor of ten (Traynor, 2003).

The privatisation of war has become such a general tendency and has reached such a level in the Iraq war, that a war or conflict without any interference of private military industry is considered to be out of question for the USA, and for a growing number of other countries.

This industry is growing and enlarging thanks to the money it receives from states. For example, the USA has an estimated $87bn budget this year for the war in Iraq, with the private military industry's share estimated at $30bn (Traynor, 2003): in other words, a third of us military expenses in Iraq are paid to private military companies. As well as this, 25 per cent of the $18.6bn allocated by the us government for Iraq's reconstruction is thought to be being paid to private military companies (Conachy, 2004). The situation indicates the growth of a sizeable 'grey area' occupied by money and violence.

Distinctive characteristics of private military companies

The hiring of soldiers is a common practice in the history of war. But the private military companies under discussion here differ from armies of mercenaries. Representing the transformation of private actors in the military industry, their most important characteristic is that they operate in the form of modern companies and provide military services of various types, which also serves to differentiate them from mercenaries. Their corporate identity allows them to develop financial relationships with companies in same sector or from other industries; and many of the most active companies today (e.g. MPRI, Armorgroup and Vinnell) are subsidiary companies of major corporations (Singer, 2001-2002: 192).

Unlike mercenaries, private military companies have a legal structure, establish contractual bonds, and compete with each other in the global market. In many cases, they are committed to a particular state--in name, at least--and subject to laws that censure adherence to foreign contracts. In contrast with mercenaries, they provide a variety of services such as training, intelligence, consulting, logistic support, operational support and post-conflict solutions. Companies like Vinnell, Armor Holdings, Levdan, DynCorp, TSI and MPRI constitute examples of private military companies of this type.

In general, such companies do not get involved in conflicts directly or provide combat forces: they deliver the services mentioned above. Moreover, these companies are contracted to provide security for unarmed negotiators and technicians in certain regions, and to protect specific installations (e.g. oil pipelines) (Taulbee, 2002: 4).

The British government's report (UK Government Green Paper, 2002) on private military companies addresses the problem of binding these companies under legal regulations at an international level. The report includes detailed and extensive information about private military companies, and deals with the problem of defining them.

The private military industry contains many different groups: mercenaries, private armies, private security, private intelligence, and private military companies. According to the Green Paper, private military companies are groups that differ from other security companies in that they operate contractually within a large military and security field, and are equipped to take part in combat operations.

Deborah Avant (2002), an international-relations expert on the private military industry, states that private military companies differ from a country's hired soldiers, are not 'dogs of war' or 'freelancers', and aim at a long life and productive status in the global market; and as such, they endeavour to be persuasive in their performance of a legitimate function such as military service. These companies have already formed a commercial group: the International Peace Operations Association.

As a matter of fact, the involvement of many security companies in conflicts makes their qualitative difference from private military companies disappear; and at the same time, many companies that are called 'private military companies' do not partake in combat operations at all. Thus the debate on the definition of groups related to the industry is an ongoing one. But probably a more important question is that of what these formations represent. In this respect, the words of the 'special reporter' assigned by the United Nations to monitor the activities of mercenaries are relevant: 'Mercenary activities are a form of violence which has been used in the past 40 years to hamper the exercise of the right to self determination of peoples and to violate human rights' (Jackson, 2002: 39; Taulbee, 2002: 7). The reporter evaluates private military companies and defines them as 'incorporated mercenaries'.

These companies play key roles in operations in the name of international intervention, or are used by the USA and other powerful states in regions in which they have economic interests. These companies offer many benefits to powerful states: they limit the costs and risks of military intervention, impede adverse public reaction of the sort seen over the Iraq war, and the governments concerned are shielded from having to account for violations of human rights.

In fact, the determination of how and to what extent private military companies are different from other private security units is merely a methodical problem. These companies have quite flexible structures and are capable of configuring themselves in order to provide a series of services, ranging from security and intelligence to partaking in conflicts and logistical support. These flexible features make them a sector to which powerful states and multinational companies can easily apply in order to achieve their colonialist purposes.

Private armies and their role in colonialist activities

The process of the privatisation of security services, which were once the exclusive realm of the state, has not yet been studied in depth in terms of its effects on colonialist, coercive policies. In this paper, a number of themes are examined in order to shed light on the reasons behind the expansion in private military organisations in the course of colonialist activities.

First, private military companies intervene in regions in which the states of powerful capitalist countries have economic or geostrategic interests, but to which they are not allowed to send their troops or are unwilling to do so. A typical example was the existence of private us military companies in the civil war in Yugoslavia, closely related and connected to the us government. MPRI and DynCorp are the most important among such companies. MPRI signed a contract with the Croatian government in 1994--the first to be signed between a state and a military company for military training--to increase the capacity of Croatian military forces. Within a year of signing the contract, MPRI had enabled the Croatian army to form an assault force against the Serbs, and to retrieve regions under Serbian occupation (Green Paper, 2002: 13; Centre for Public Integrity, 2002: 6; Jackson, 2002: 35-36).

This success prompted the Clinton administration to use a similar strategy in the training of the Bosnian army. This time, MPRI trained the Bosnian army to develop combat skills. Another example can be found in the termination of hostilities between Kosovo and Serbia, in which another private company, DynCorp, played a key role: the International Peace Force in Kosovo came later. 'Founded in 1946, DynCorp (now owned by Computer Sciences Corporation) is one of the largest private military contractors in the world. The company has provided police officers for operations in the Balkans and pilots for the u.s.-led war on drugs in South America' (Center for Public Integrity, 2006). DynCorp is one of the most controversial of the private military companies, being 'involved in a series of recent high profile scandals', including participation in the illegal arms trade and in the trafficking of women (Beaumont, 2002).

The situation in Colombia is a good illustration of these companies' ability to infiltrate into regions that are prohibited or restricted for national armies. Congress has restricted both the number of us troops allowed in Colombia--to around 400 soldiers-and the actions they are permitted to perform there. Colombia, therefore, has become a country in which seven different private military companies play roles in the civil war and carry out various operations. The majority of these companies have previously worked with the us government, and have undertaken many roles beyond the government's official remit. While us soldiers were taking part solely in the fight against drug trafficking, private military companies were acting alongside Colombian troops.

A second area in which private military companies are used is the protection of foreign investments and multinational companies. Mining and energy-extraction companies sign contracts with private military companies to protect their investments and interests in critical regions such as Sierra Leone--an ex-British colony in which there are rich diamond deposits. Sandline, established in the UK, and Executive Outcomes, formed of South African ex-soldiers, have worked together in this country. These two military companies have played a key role in the success of government forces against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). They have trained the government forces and also organised a militia force to fight against the RUF. It should be mentioned that Sandline has close connections with a British firm working with diamonds in the country (Green Paper, 2002: 12; Shawcross, 2000).

Executive Outcomes has also been hired by oil companies wishing to safeguard their investments in Angola; but companies may also try to find other ways of doing this--even, in some cases, establishing their own private military companies not only to secure the protection of their investments and companies, but also in order to take their share of the private security sector, which is increasingly becoming a profitable market. The Brown and Root Company is a well known example. This company (known as Kellogg Brown and Root today) is a subsidiary and private military company of the Halliburton Corporation, whose CEO was Dick Cheney from 1995 to 1999 (Centre for Public Integrity, 2002: 2-3).

Brown and Root's work can be found in many regions: the Bagram base in Afghanistan, the Khanabad base in Uzbekistan and the Guantanamo base in Cuba were all built by this company. Since 1987, the maintenance and operation of us bases in Turkey has been undertaken by this company together with Vinnell Corp (Dundar, 2003). Halliburton Energy Services is a multinational company in the energy and oil industry, with many subsidiaries operating in other fields.

Third, private military companies can act as auxiliary forces--as the extension of an army--both during and after military occupation. A typical example of this can be found in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which has become a gold mine for private military companies. At least thirty-five of them are reported to be contracted there, employing a minimum of 5,000 heavily armed foreign soldiers. In the more dangerous regions of the country, 20,000 Iraqis are being employed for military purposes by these companies, with a further 10,000 to 15,000 employees from different parts of the world in place to provide military logistical support (such as training, communication and intelligence gathering). One of the reasons for the widespread use of private military companies in Iraq is the USA'S intention to keep its military expenses low. Other reasons may be political cost: 'A Pentagon official who opposes their use nonetheless detects an obvious if unsentimental virtue: "the American public doesn't get quite as concerned when contractors are killed"' (Duffy, 2004). Many services traditionally provided by the army are now being left to private military companies, such as ensuring the security of reconstruction projects, accompanying military convoys in danger zones, acting as bodyguards to Coalition Provisional Authority forces, and defending critical locations, including fifteen regional headquarters and the centre of American forces in Baghdad, the 'Green Zone'.

Of course, all these 'services' generate large profits for their providers. The Bush administration has set aside $18.6bn for Iraq's reconstruction, and at least 25 per cent of that will be paid out to private military companies. According to the estimate of a security company manager in London, the annual income of British private military companies reaches some $1.7bn.

Some of the private military companies operating in Iraq are:

* The Control Risk Group: A British private security company established many years ago, it has five-hundred employees in Iraq consisting of British ex-military personnel. It has contracts with the British government and many private companies to provide security services.

* Global Risk Strategies: A 'private army' with its headquarters in the UK, it hires mostly Fijian and Nepali soldiers. It protects possible terrorist targets, oil zones and the structures of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

* Custer Battles: An American company that ensures the security of Baghdad International Airport.

* DynCorp: The Pentagon's preferred company for the job of training the Iraqi police force, awarded a contract worth tens of thousands of dollars. The same company was contracted to train the Bosnian police.

* Vinnell: In June 2003, the US government signed a $48m contract with Vinnell Corporation for the training of the new Iraqi army.

* Erinys: A $100m annual contract was signed with Erinys, a British/ South African company, to protect oil settlements and pipelines in Iraq. The company employs 14,000 Iraqi security staff at $150 dollars each per month, and also employs dozens of British and South African ex-soldiers (Conachy, 2004; Traynor, 2003; Singer, 2003, Rubin & Schrade, 2004; Barstow, 2004; Kwok, 2006).

In the case of private military companies' involvement in Iraq, we have seen that without sufficient regulation and monitoring, they can violate international legal norms, including those related to human rights (Wolf, 2006). A new set of regulatory mechanisms is required in order to solve the accountability problem of these companies. However, the colonialist aims of the advanced Western states will probably obstruct the development of such regulation in international law. In conclusion, the numbers and power of private security forces, private military companies and mercenaries looks set to gradually increase in the future. And since their use of violence is easily able to slip off the legal hook, and cannot be restricted by any political or ethical regulation, they are free to act with the sole purpose of making money and profit in this dark and distasteful industry.

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Notes

(1.) For an elaboration of this point, see Leander, 2002.

(2.) 'While American firms tend to be larger than their British competitors (and tend to win the biggest contracts, which are handed out by the American government), British outfits grab more work from the private sector. Andy Bearpark, a former civil servant in the Department for International Development who chairs the bapsc, reckons there are around 25 decent-sized security companies based in Britain. Their services are probably the nation's biggest export to Iraq' (The Economist, 2006).