Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.

Kuran argues that agents choose "public preferences" which are contrary to their "private preferences" in order to attain "reputational utility." Such "preference falsification" pushes, in turn, ideas away from private consciousness, originating "knowledge falsification" (i.e., indoctrination). Kuran's book is well-argued, never dull, and studded with diverse anecdotes. It is destined to become a classic, providing a methodological individualistic alternative to Karl Marx's theory of ideology. In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx reasoned that the gap between the objective politics of French peasantry and its subjective hostility towards progressive politics is the result of rationalization - i.e., where peasants avoid cognitive dissonance resulting from supporting the oppression they have to endure: what Marxists later called "false consciousness."

Kuran discusses committee voting rules, freedom of free speech, politics as meddling in other people's choices, propaganda, public opinion, revolution, and affirmative action. The discussion proceeds in light of a three-way distinction among "reputational utility," "intrinsic utility," and "expressive utility." While intrinsic utility is the familiar one, expressive utility emerges only when one has the courage to express intrinsic utility in public. One may suppress expressive utility in order to obtain reputational utility, the approval of pertinent observers.

I find that "reputational utility" invites double counting. This is apparent in the three case studies to which Kuran dedicates eight out of the nineteenth chapters. First, Kuran attributes the stability of communist regimes in Eastern Europe to preference falsification, the pursuit of reputational utility where "living a lie" has almost become part of private preferences through brainwashing. However, how can such reputational utility be different from well-calculated method to attain intrinsic utility, employment? Second, Kuran argues that the caste system in India persisted because many untouchables genuinely believed in the system and, in order to receive reputational utility from upper caste members, ostracize their cohorts who try to improve their profession. However, such reputational utility can be traced also to well-calculated strategy to gain economic favors. Third, Kuran traces the reluctance of the U.S. public to criticize openly affirmative action to the fear of being stigmatized as "racist." But why does the reputational utility of supporting affirmative action differ from other goods which bolster intrinsic utility?

The tenuous status of Kuran's "reputational utility" is apparent from the story with which he commences his book. You are invited to a dinner. Your host is happy about his newly decorated living room - a decoration which you find unpleasant. When asked, you hide your private preference. Is such a choice a preference falsification? In some places Kuran is clear that the choice is not a falsification if your concern is your host's feeling. But in other places Kuran [p. 61] argues that "doing in Rome what Romans do" is necessarily indicative of preference falsification. Aside from this minor ambiguity, Kuran seems to hold that the incident expresses falsification, but under three contradictory cases. First, it is a falsification if you wanted to appease your host because she is in a position to improve your career (similar to the communist regimes and caste system). Second, Kuran's model in chapter two of continuously, but positively declining expressive utility suggests that your choice is a falsification if you wanted to protect your reputation given that the majority at the dinner party seemed more educated about decor and you did not want to look a fool. And thirdly, Kuran suggests that it is a falsification if you wanted the approval or applause of others.

In the first case of dishonesty, Kuran's "expressive utility" should have become negative as soon as you deviate from integrity. In this case, "reputational utility" is nothing other than dishonest intrinsic utility which you opportunistically try to secure. In the second case of cautiousness, Kuran's "reputational utility" consists of the impressions you make on others. Such a choice may save you from appearing assertively stupid in cases were your knowledge about interior decoration is minimal. If you are not an expert on trade theory (what Kuran calls "soft knowledge"), it is good for your reputation not to be self-assertive in a seminar full of experts. In this case, "reputational utility" would be redundant: To pursue your reputation is, in fact, to satisfy a cautious expressive utility. In the third case of distorted character, Kuran's "reputational utility" amounts to seeking approval of others rather than self-approval. This may indicate self-deception, where the approval of others is taken by the agent as the major mark of his distinction. In such a case, "reputational utility" is nothing other than a distorted expressive utility usually exhibited by (weak) neurotic agents.

Given these three meanings, Kuran cannot sustain the independent status of "reputational utility." It is either dishonest intrinsic utility, a cautious expressive utility, or a distorted expressive utility. If the category "reputational utility" exists, it is not as fundamental as the other two. To wit, when Kuran [chapter 15] formulates his theory of why revolutions are unanticipated, he hardly uses "reputational utility." Instead, he bases the argument on agents having different thresholds at which they switch to the opposition. Such a threshold is determined by the "chances of being punished" and the intensity of "expressive needs" [p. 254]. Kuran argues that since one reaches closer to his threshold as more people join the revolution, no wonder that a small event may engender "revolutionary bandwagon." But such a positive feedback does not hinge on an independent "reputational utility." One can simply argue, as Kuran's model implies but never states, the positive feedback arises from the fact that there is safety in number: cost declines with the rise of number of people joining the revolution.

One can benefit from Kuran's critique of Marxist, relative deprivation, and structuralist theories of revolution. These objectivist theories are usually successful at identifying the impending great forces behind the revolution - but only after the fact. They fail to explain why similar great forces in other countries have not led to revolutions. However, Kuran's subjectivist theory makes revolution arbitrary, totally depending on a single spark to start the prairie fire or "a strategic error ... rendered fatal by a series of coincidences" [p. 280]. It is true that a strategic error is important, but only insofar as delaying or affecting the form of the change. And Gorbachev's refusal to intervene in 1989 East European developments is not simply an accident, but rather is a reflection of USSR's deepening crisis as the 1991 incompetent coup attests. Agitators must have included the crisis in their risk assessment. The fact that the revolutions were unanticipated does not make them the prerogative of that person who has intense expressive utility ready to translate objective misery into an uprising. While it is true that deprivation or hunger is not a sufficient condition, Kuran's adventurous hero is not the necessary condition. The hero can he ex post found a fanatic. There has to be a teleological vision of potentially better political order - a subject which Kuran's individualistic model cannot handle.

In fact, while Kuran discusses the fear of stigma (such as being called a "racist"), he fails to note that the stigma indicates a constitutional vision, a "public truth," where public preference coincides with private preference. No political community can function without some sacred ideals - even in liberal democratic regimes. Kuran does not view politics as implying such sacred visions; he rather sees it essentially as one special interest group (as animal right groups) trying to meddle or impose its preferences on other groups. To wit, he [pp. 93-97] confuses the constitutional public truth with preference falsification, and regards Tocqueville's observation about loyalty in American politics (the silence of the minority once a decision is made) as an indication of preference falsification.

Also, Kuran cannot tell us, without resorting to the individualistic normative standard, that the animosity towards the American Nazi Party [p. 85] is not preference falsification while the support of affirmative action is. Or, Kuran cannot state that Soviet citizens must have been indoctrinated ("knowledge falsification") when secret surveys reveal that they (while critical of the communist establishment) support the socialist ideals, without implying that American citizens must have also been indoctrinated when they (while critical of the Washington establishment) support capitalist institutions. The implicit normative standard which identifies a priori "true" private preferences also characterizes Marx's framework: one cannot tell if the proletariat support of capitalist system is false consciousness unless one already adheres to the socialist normative ground.

Kuran's theory is suitable for the analysis of fashion cycles, bandwagons, or the sudden form of revolution. It is not suitable, however, for the analysis of causes of revolution, i.e., why alternative visions of the good society succeed or fail. On the other hand, Kuran's "expressive utility" is robust and I wish it received more attention. Other readers will find in this book other gems to pick. Academics as well as educated persons will come back after reading the book more enriched on how to understand our complex world.

Elias L. Khalil University of Chicago