Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords.

In this objective, thorough, penetrating work, Professor Shibley Telhami, who teaches government at Cornell University, "infuse[s] international relations theory with empirical events [relating to the Camp David accords], and demonstrate[s] the compatibility of bargaining theory and realist theory while indicating the empirical relevance of both" (p. 4). As such, this is one of the most serious attempts made by any scholar to combine theory and Middle East Studies.

Also somewhat unusual is the book's personal touch, including an English translation of the report in a Cairo newspaper in December 1976 that Telhami, an "Israeli (Christian) Arab," had been allowed to come to Egypt in order to study at Al-Azhar University (p. 17). Not only did the experience of the author, the first Israeli citizen admitted to Egypt, reflect the changing outlook of the Sadat regime, but it was his study of religion and related matters, to which he had looked for explanations for the conflict going on around him, that made way for a realization that Middle Eastern conflicts are not in fact the result of something unique about the region's culture or religion. This realization induced him instead to study political science in order "to raise general questions about war and peace and other issues of international relations," with the Middle East his "primary laboratory" and the Camp David accords serving as "a central case for [his] general theoretical interests" (p. x).

This is an important contribution to the theory of international relations which should be assigned to students who may not have any particular interest in Camp David or in the Middle East. On the other hand, many people who are concerned with the substance of the book are likely to be repelled by a theoretical and methodological focus that will strike them as abstruse or pedantic. In reality, the author provides conceptual tools that greatly enrich his analysis, but, while the reader who chooses to skip over some of the more theoretical material will miss something of importance, he or she will still be able to benefit a great deal. The "overview" chapter at the beginning was apparently written with such readers in mind; the formidable methodological material in Chapter 2--which carefully clarifies such matters as the distinctions among positive, prescriptive and abstractive theories and copes with the problem of levels of analysis, that is, "overall international politics," regional politics, and the "international variables" of "the system of government and leaders' personalities" (pp. 39-40)--will be rewarded by the more thorough treatment that the rest of the book provides.

Basing his analysis on extensive research (including interviews with many of the people who played key roles in the drama), the author focuses on two main substantive questions, the first of which relates to the preferences of Egypt and Israel. In tackling this first question, Telhami provides us with some especially incisive chapters on the foreign policy concerns of these actors stated in the context of the changing global and regional distribution of power. He argues that the changes in Egyptian policy in particular resulted from the new distribution of power rather than being primarily the product of domestic factors (including economic problems and the growing influence of a business class resulting from the infitah). He points to the "increased strategic and regional parity between" the superpowers in the 1960s that made it necessary for Egypt to shift to alignment with one of them, with Cairo's "regional objectives" subsequently dictating a shift to the other superpower (p. 46).

As for the regional level, Telhami argues that the changed distribution of power within the Arab World "altered Egyptian preferences, so that Arabism was no longer useful ... as a means of attaining regional independence and leadership." (He denies that Egypt ever deliberately used Arabism in such a way.) Under the new circumstances, "a strategic alliance with the United States" might better serve Egyptian interests through block[ing] Israeli regional hegemony by competing with Israel for American support" and "paradoxically, return Egypt to leadership in the Arab world" and that Sadat's initiative offered the prospect of facilitating the latter goal but endangered the Israelis' "more important international objective" by rivalling it for the favors of the United States (p. 13).

The author also disputes the idea that something about Anwar al-Sadat personally dictated the changed course in Egyptian policy. It is pointed out that, far from being simply more inclined to look to the West, Sadat in fact "initially favored closer ties with the Soviet Union" (p. 11), apparently going to the extreme of offering "the Soviets facilities beyond what they had requested" in order to obtain arms (p. 66).

It is interesting that in stating the United States' primary concerns, Telhami seemingly gives equal weight to international and domestic levels of analysis, namely on the one hand to the two goals of "minimizing Soviet influence and securing the flow of oil" and, on the other hand, to support for Israel ("deriving from domestic politics in the United States"). He points to the "inherent tension between [these goals] that can be reduced only by ameliorating the Arab-Israeli conflict" (p. 14).

The author's second main task is to show how, given the concerns of each party, the negotiations led where they did. It is here that he emphasizes the role of lower-level variables, that is, of the type of government and characteristics of individuals, showing "that centralized systems of government ('strong states') [such as Egypt's] are less conducive to optimal bargaining than decentralized governments ('weak states') [such as Israel's] are" and that "president Sadat's personality was especially unsuited to good bargaining" (p. 4), particularly in contrast to Prime Minister Menachem Begin. (Students of comparative politics will notice that Professor Telhami, intentionally or otherwise, uses the terms "strong" and "weak" states in ways that differ from recent usage in the literature of their field.) American behavior in the negotiations is put somewhere in the middle, less effective than Begin's but more so than Sadat's.

The author shows that Sadat, who began the negotiations with an insistence on the sort of comprehensive settlement that Israel rejected, wound up accepting a bilateral treaty with an "entirely symbolic" agreement on the West Bank and Gaza that failed to exclude the possibility that "the status quo could be maintained indefinitely" (p. 9). On the issues both of Israeli settlements and "linkage" of the two agreements, Telhami concludes that "Egypt did not try hard enough, that it did not sufficiently test the limits of Israeli compromise" (p. 16). For it's part, the United States is presented as having "a set of domestic priorities ... that often undermines its international objectives" (p. 138), which would have been enhanced by a comprehensive settlement and by an active role as a participant in the negotiations that would have involved pressure on Israel. Instead, President Jimmy Carter is shown to have been so in need of some kind of agreement that, rather than blaming Israel publicly for a breakdown, he chose the politically safe alternative of "warn[ing] Sadat that he would blame the failure on Egypt" if the Egyptian president reacted to Begin's intransigence by walking out (p. 140).

Such a situation led to a "stunning victory for Israeli negotiators", with "the final accords ... not [being] significantly different from the original Begin proposal" that Sadat had labelled "ridiculous" (p. 159). One learns from Telhami that Sadat's ineptness extended to revealing his bargaining strategy--to which only one other member of the delegation was privy--to Carter at the beginning of the talks, warning him that this must be kept secret to avoid totally undermining his negotiating position--but with the American president then proceeding to reveal much of the Egyptian president's plans to the Israelis, whose "fallback position" remained secret (pp. 163-164). Thus, Begin was able to brag about not having to compromise (p. 187).

The author concludes that the Egyptian-Israeli peace is not viable in the long run in the absence of a general settlement, for he believes that Pan-Arabism's decline is not necessarily permanent and that "Egypt may once again be one of its advocates." Neither is he optimistic about any resolution of the conflict in light of the "domestic realities" and "short term impressive military superiority" of Israel, which he believes will share in the ultimate "tragic" consequences (p. 203).