Post OIF: a new mindset for MLRS firing battery training.

One of the credos that the Army preaches is "train as you fight." While we probably do that relatively well as an organization, there are exceptions. Unfortunately, combat is not like the pre-OIF rotations at the National Training Center. Fort Irwin. California, with intensive emphasis on the military decision-making process (MDMP) and training constraints.

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From an MLRS perspective, training at the NTC for a firing battery was nonexistent, relative to the maneuver unit company team and its direct support (DS) brethren. Traditionally, the MLRS batteries are icons on a computer screen, not vehicles and people on the ground.

Accordingly, the MLRS battalion must train its batteries for combat. To change the dynamic in the training environment, we first have to change how we view ourselves as MLRS artillery officers and NCOs.

The intent of this article is not to criticize the NTC, which has already updated its training considerably, but rather to put the onus on MLRS battalions to train their firing batteries more realistically, ultimately preparing them for the fluidity of combat operations.

My observations are based on having served in every position as a lieutenant in a firing battery, my experience as a liaison officer to a DS battalion at the NTC and, most importantly, as a battery operations officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the 3d Infantry Division's MLRS battalion: 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery (1-39 FA).

No Force Protection in OIF. I've overheard several battery commanders talking about battery security say something about "having maneuver all around us" in combat or "We're going with notional security because our guys will get burnt out rotating between the FDC/BOC [fire direction center/battery operations center] and LP/OPs [listening post/observation post]." As a lieutenant without any combat experience up to that point. I routinely "took those answers to the bank," often using them myself.

The battery commanders thought they were correct in anticipating maneuver forces protecting their flanks; they had never experienced combat either. Furthermore, the field grades usually concurred with the battery leadership, trusting their judgment as battery commanders and first sergeants.

The assumptions made about battery security stem from years of complacency in the MLRS community about being in close contact with the enemy. The notion that we provide deep fires by delivering rockets and missiles translates for many into a false idea that we will never get close enough to the enemy to need any type of force protection or even to call on the maneuver units that supposedly are to our left, right, front and rear.

After fighting a swift and offensive war in Iraq, the MLRS mindset now has to change so firing batteries are better prepared, especially psychologically, for providing real-life force protection--engraining it in their minds that the M2 .50 caliber machine gun is not a paperweight.

Digging fighting positions and improving them with every passing hour is a start along with using Class IV to reinforce vulnerable areas. Due to training area constraints, especially at Fort Sill, many units hide behind the range control regulation that requires prior approval before digging in. Rather than taking the time to go through the proper channels to get permission to dig, units fail to accomplish this essential force protection objective. How can a battery commander train for combat without accounting for all variables (like the time and resources) he will have to consider in a time of war?

Operations officers and BOC chiefs have to understand that their fire direction Soldiers along with others from the battery headquarters will man the fighting positions and other security points. Accordingly, they will have to manage shifts to maximize force protection at critical times, staff a competent FDC and provide their troops a basic amount of rest.

The concept of notional security for the BOC and battery headquarters should be scrapped immediately. The only way to prepare a soldier for the mental and physical exhaustion of armed combat (with real bullets) is to test his mettle in peacetime training, so he is not surprised after he finds himself digging a foxhole.

Occupation in OIF. Oftentimes in OIF the maneuver forces to our front drove through an area unopposed and called it "cleared." Yes, doctrinally, it was cleared--in the sense that they observed no enemy forces. However, when follow-on forces, such as MLRS batteries, occupied these areas, lingering combatants armed with rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars were hiding in bunkers and trenches.

The tankers and infantrymen were in a race to Baghdad and, therefore, did not eliminated all opposition. They achieved their objectives and continued on. Meanwhile, the MLRS platoon leaders had the task of conducting security sweeps for which they were neither trained nor equipped.

Reconnaissance and surveillance is in the job description of the platoon leader, and most of the skills required for these tasks are basic soldiering proficiencies. However, MLRS platoon leaders are not trained to conduct more complex tasks, such as clearing a building or an enemy weapons cache four kilometers square.

One of two things has to happen: either we train MLRS platoon leaders to do more advanced infantry-related tasks, or we have maneuver troops work for MLRS units--the latter will never happen. The Field Artillery School should consider revising reconnaissance and force protection training for an MLRS firing platoon leader, which could mean splitting the MLRS and cannon officer basic course lieutenants earlier in the cannon-heavy curriculum. In the short term, units must be innovative in adopting ways to train their platoon leaders.

Additionally, launcher chiefs must be flexible enough to operate in terrain and surroundings that are novel and not covered in Field Manual 6-60 Tactics. Techniques and Procedures for Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). The small villages that are not visible on maps and the irrigation ditches and arable land in central Iraq are challenging occupation platforms.

There was a definite preconception that OIF was going to be fought in the open desert. From a training perspective, very few of us were prepared for operating in some of the areas we did--open desert with sprawling wedge formations it was not.

Maintenance and Logistics. Remarkably and to the credit of operators and our exceptional maintenance team, my battery enjoyed a stellar combat maintenance posture in the harsh and unforgiving desert climate. The lesson to take from this is to exercise our vehicles consistently when we are not actively training in a field environment. The launchers and heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) ammunition haulers require attention, but they are extremely reliable when put to use. Allowing equipment to sit in the motor pool for weeks at a time is inexcusable, but it happens all too often in the garrison setting.

A comprehensive and coherent maintenance program spearheaded by battery maintenance experts and battalion executive officers not only can keep vehicles better postured, but also benefit the Army economically by reducing the dollars spent on repair parts needed due to neglect and inactivity.

This is especially true of the HEMTT fleets. Taking care of vehicles extends past a before-operations preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) with "no faults found" and requires the operator to dispatch the vehicle, drive it, critique it and identify potential shortcomings.

"Command Maintenance Monday" is an admirable concept, but the same emphasis on maintenance is lacking from Tuesday through Friday. Commanders at all levels should scrutinize how they do business in the motor pool outside of the parameters of Command Maintenance Monday to be responsive to the needs of our aging equipment.

For maintenance and training, why not acquire more "load test pods" to keep the cranes and launchers operating under the same stress of handling live pods in combat? Annual load tests do just that--test a cable and crane only once a year.

Critics of increasing the load test frequency to exercise cable and pulley systems may say the equipment will fail more often when put under the stress and strain of combat conditions. In OIF, we found the equipment to be remarkably reliable. Second, I would rather test and know the limits of my equipment before reaching a combat theater rather than learn the hard way in combat when supply lines are nonexistent.

Realistic maintenance and logistical training at home station is essential to provide battery and battalion commanders a glimpse of the variables and planning considerations they could encounter on the battlefield. Actually running a logistics personnel and administration center (LOGPAC) during training rather than making a quick trip to the motor pool to grab a part from the prescribed load list (PLL) cage may be painful, but there is no motor pool to run to when sitting in the middle of a combat zone.

Shooting rockets and training on the command and control piece of our profession are not items that go neglected by the majority of units. The time-consuming and important tasks, such as force protection, are what we do not train on enough; in combat they become critical. Some additional tasks to consider for training are realistic combat vehicle loads, driver's training with a full supply of live pods and others.

When combat comes, there is no way to turn back the hands of time, our most important training resource. We can, however, use the training time allotted to better prepare ourselves for the realities of war, which include internalizing more of a warrior ethos, rather than seeing ourselves at a distance from the close fighting.

Regardless of where the next fight takes us after Iraq. force protection, occupation and maintenance/logistics will be extremely important. MLRS battalions must execute realistic, demanding training for their batteries to fight the War on Terrorism.

By Captain Chad M. Gibson

Captain Chad M. Gibson served as the Operations Officer for C Battery, 3d Battalion, 13th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System, MLRS) (3-13 FA) while attached to 1-39 FA (MLRS) from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Currently, he is the Adjutant for 3-13 FA. He has served in every lieutenant position at the MLRS battery level. He is also a 2002 graduate of the University of Oklahoma, holding a Master of Education with an emphasis in Educational Psychology.