Political solution urged by Assembly for situation relating to Afghanistan.

Political solution urged by Assembly for situation relating to Afghanistan

The General Assembly on 13 November called for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan, calling upon all parties concerned to work for the "urgent achievement of a political solution" and the creation of conditions to "enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour".

Resolution 40/12 was passed by a recorded vote of 122 votes in favour to 19 against, with 12 abstentions. Voting against were Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Viet Nam.

The assembly reiterated that the preservation of Afghanistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character was essential for a peaceful solution of the problem. The right of the Afghan people to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside constraints was reaffirmed.

The world body noted the "increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers". It renewed its appeal for humanitarian relief assistance with a view to "alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees", in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Finally, it expressed support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem. Mr. Perez de Cuellar was asked to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, "and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations".

The Secretary-General was also asked to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards implementing the resolution and to report to Member States on the situation "at the earliest appropriate opportunity."

In the debate on Afghanistan, held from 11 to 13 November, 56 countries spoke.

Report: In a 7 October report on the situation relating to Afghanistan (A/40/709-S/17527), the Secretary-General said there was a growing conviction on both sides that a negotiated settlement was the only possible way to achieve peace in Afghanistan. "Peace, and the degree of national reconciliation that it should entail to allow the Afghan people to decide their own future, cannot be attained by military means", he stated.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar recalled that when the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed in 1982 to move--through the intermediary of his Personal Representative on the matter, Diego Cordovez, under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs--into substantive negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement, they had reached a number of understandings that had acquired special significance and had been the subject of "different interpretations that threaten to disrupt the diplomatic process".

Those understandings had allowed negotiations to begin on a document that contained draft texts of all the provisions that the interlocutors had agreed were needed to resolve the issues involved and to establish solid foundations for good-neighbourly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The form of the settlement was to be considered and decided upon at a more advanced stage of the negotiations, he reported.

On that basis, most provisions considered necessary for achieving an effective settlement were agreed upon in April 1983. However, the interlocutors subsequently encountered serious obstacles in trying to reach agreement on some of the key provisions under consideration.

During the August 1984 round of negotiations, the question of the form of the settlement was carefully considered by the interlocutors, who agreed that the provisions concerning non-interference and non-intervention would be included in a bilateral agreement. However, it was not possible to agree on the form of other aspects of the settlement, the Secretary-General stated.

During Mr. Cordovez's May 1985 visit to the area, an understanding was reached at Kabul and Islamabad that the political settlement should consist of a set of instruments that would include a bilateral agreement on non-interference and non-intervention; a declaration or declarations on international guarantees; a bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees; and an instrument that would set out the interrelationships between the aforementioned instruments and the solution of the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Afghanistan and the USSR.

During the June 1985 talks, it was possible virtually to complete the formulation of two draft bilateral agreements, the Secretary-General said, one covering the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention, the other containing all arrangements for voluntary return of the refugees. The latter instrument could not be finalized before it had been ascertained, as envisaged in one draft provision, that the arrangements for their return were satisfactory to the refugees. The formulation of a declaration on international guarantees, which could be made either individually or jointly, was also concluded, and the text conveyed to the Soviet Union and the United States, the designated guarantors, for their comments.

During proximity talks in Geneva (27-30 August 1985), Afghanistan, referring to one of the understandings reached at the inception of the diplomatic process, reiterated that negotiations on the instrument of interrelationships should be conducted in direct talks. Pakistan, invoking the same understanding, stressed that a change in the format of the negotiations was not as yet justified. It was not possible to resolve that matter, the Secretary-General reported. Therefore a draft instrument on interrelationships could not be considered. However, the interlocutors considered the written comments received from the designated guarantors, and requested Mr. Cordovez to transmit each of the comments to the other designated guarantor. That was done on 9 September 1985. The interlocutors agreed to hold another round of talks from 16 to 20 December 1985.

In accordance with understandings reached, Iran was kept informed of the discussions and has consistently reiterated support for an early solution that would meet the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Afghan people.

It was regrettable, the Secretary-General said, that an impasse on the procedure for the negotiations currently in progress should stall the diplomatic process at a time when both sides had re-emphasized their conviction that a political settlement was possible, had expressed their "unequivocal determination" to achieve a negotiated settlement, and had indicated that agreement on the substance of all the pending texts should not present insurmountable difficulties.

However, the reasons underlying the position of both sides on the procedure for negotiations had "fundamental political import" for each of them. In connection with that procedural issue, as in connection with the substantive issues under discussion, there was a question of political will. Both sides must ensure that their determination to conclude the negotiations successfully would prevail. "I trust that in considering the decisions that are required to that end, they will bear in mind the overriding advantages of an effective settlement for the peoples of the region", he stated.

Parties concerned

Pakistan said foreign military forces in Afghanistan threatened South-West Asia's peace and stability and cast a shadow on global security. There could only be a political settlement through the diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General. Close to 5 million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran. Only the towns and bases where the Soviet forces maintained their presence were tenuously controlled by the Kabul regime. The Afghan resistance controlled the entire countryside.

Politically, morally and legally, the Soviet intervention was "indefensible". There was no alternative to a just and honourable settlement in which the right of the Afghan people to shape their internal affairs, free from outside pressure, was guaranteed. No one would desire that such a settlement should ignore the USSR's legitimate concerns.

The conflict inside Afghanistan, Pakistan stated, had created a threatening situation along Pakistan's western border which "is inflamed by the presence of tens of thousands of foreign troops". In 1985, there had been more than 200 violations of Pakistan's air space and territory, resulting in heavy loss of lives and damage to property. "Those who harbour the mistaken belief that we can be browbeaten into submission should know that the people of Pakistan will never flinch in the face of threates or coercion, nor will they be deflected from the position of principle they are determined to maintain."

Progress had been achieved in the indirect negotiations through the Secretary-General's good offices. That momentum must be maintained. However, "the Kabul side" was "resorting to dilatory tactics" to prevent consideration of the central issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops. The negotiations should focus on the issue of a time-frame for the withdrawal of those troops, Pakistan concluded.

Afghanistan said that for almost seven and a half years it had been subjected to continuously escalating armed aggression and an undeclared war of "imperialism, hegemonism and reaction". The so-called refugee camps in Pakistan were the military and training camps of counter-revolutionaries. The United States had begun training Afghan counter-revolutionaries at United States military bases. Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan might no longer be required once the causes which prompted it ceased to exist and reliable and valid international guarantees were offered that those causes would not appear again.

Pakistan's "all-out militarization drive" increasingly threatened not only afghanistan's security but also that of the region. There was no possibility of a comprehensive settlement of the situation in South-West Asia without an end to the armed and all other forms of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Pakistan was out to block in early settlement, Afghanistan maintained.

Pakistan was running a profitable business in the name of refugees, Afghanistan stated, and had "criminally used the issue for its propaganda purposes". Pakistan had effectively blocked the return of the "Afghan fugitives" through physical threats and political and economic barriers. The United states, China and Pakistan did not want a solution of that issue or any settlement of the present situation in South-West Asia. Pakistan and its "criminal patrons" were leaving no stone unturned to prevent the early achievement of a negotiated political settlement, Afghanistan said. Direct face-to-face negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be started to conclude all the necessary instruments for normalizing the situation around Afghanistan on the basis of universally accepted principles of international law.

The USSR said everything was being done by the United States to intensify subversive activities against Afghanistan and to prevent a normalization of the situation in the region. "Subversive and terrorist groups" were being trained in Pakistan and other countries by local and foreign, above all American, instructors. Those groups were then infiltrated across the border. The Aghan counter-revolutionaries were trying to terror to take Afghanistan back to the Middle Ages and hand power back to big landowners and local feudal chieftains, the USSR said. The lie about "the use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistan" had "burst like a soap bubble". As for lies about the alleged "human rights violations", the intent, apparently, was to try to camouflage the real aims of the policy of "imperialist circles" and to make people forget the crimes of the Afghan counter-revolutionaries.

However, the counter-revolution and its sponsors could not hope for success, the USSR said. The majority of Afghans supported the aims and goals of the revolution of 27 April 1978. If there was a desire to "cut through all the knots", direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had become necessary. To end the tense situation around Afgghanistan and to reach a political settlement, armed and any other interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs must cease and conditions should be created for making such interference impossible in the future. Support for the resolution would encourage Pakistan in rejecting direct negotiations with Afghanistan.

Iran said it hosted 2 million Afghan refugees. The so-called "democratic Afghan regime" represented only those external forces without whose constant firepower support it could not remain in power. Those forces were prepared to exterminate many more hundreds of thousands of Afghans to keep that "unwanted regime on its paralysed feet". All talks in which the people of Afghanistan--the main party to the negotiations--were not present were invalid. The present negotiations were devoid of validity because of the absence of the Afghan people. A solution to the problem which guaranteed Afghanistan's freedom and independence, free from the intervention and interference of all foreign forces, was not impossible. Iran remained optimistic about such a solution.

Other views: Luxembourg, on behalf of the European Community, Portugal and Spain, expressed deep concern over the human rights situation in Afghanistan. The estimated 4 million Afghan refugees should be enabled to return in dignity and safety. That would be possible only if a true political solution allowed Afghanistan to resume its status as an independent, non-aligned country and if the Afghan people were allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. The application of those principles demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. Afghanistan's occupation by the Soviet Union constituted a continuing threat to the region's stability and a danger to international peace and security.

The United States said Afghanistan was being subjected to the full force of Soviet modern-day weaponry and technology. But Soviet forces had failed to break the Afghan spirit, despite a strategy aimed at wearing down the resistance of and eroding international support for the Mujahideen. However, hostility and active opposition to the Karmal regime encompassed the entire country. The Soviets, who either directly made, or were deeply involved in, the regime's every major political military or social decision, would never succeed in imposing their will on the Afghans.

The United States was prepared to guarantee a comprehensive and balanced settlement in Afghanistan, consistent with General Assembly resolutions and predicated on a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces in a fixed and reasonable length of time. Considerable progress had been made to find a just and viable settlement that protected the legitimate security interests of all parties. The key outstanding issue was a time-table for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Without agreement on withdrawal, no solution was possible and no guarantees could be given. Instead, the carnage and destruction would continue.

China said that by relying on its strong military muscle, a super-Power had occupied Afghanistan, a small, weak and non-aligned Islamic country. That posed a grave threat to security in Asia and to world peace. The Soviet Union was trying to compel others to accept the fail accompli created by its aggression and expansion. In the process of securing a political settlement, the views of the Afghan people must be taken into full account.

India said the international community should urgently work for the evolution of a political settlement based on dialogue between the parties directly involved, whose co-operation was essential to prevent the situation from escalating any further. Constructive dialogue among the parties directly concerned would give impetus to the process aimed at finding a comprehensive settlement. The adoption once again of a resolution which was unacceptable to some of the countries directly involved might prove to be counter-productive.