Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy.

Paul C. Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. xvi + 244 pp. $35. ISBN: 0-300-07682-7.

Paul Allen's new history of Philip III's diplomacy is quite timely. It appears in the wake of the numerous reassessments of Philip II's policymaking during the recent 400th anniversary of his death and the general rehabilitation of Philip III and his court by scholars of the period. Until recently, Philip III has been portrayed, at best, as a king dominated by his courtiers and favorites, and at worst, as "the laziest king in Spanish history"(4). In fact, Philip III has rarely been the central figure in studies about the Spanish court, as much of the historiography of the period has dealt with his powerful and colorful favorite, the Duke of Lerma. However, both Magdalena Sanchez's recent study of the women at the court of Philip III and Paul Allen's new book offer much more sophisticated examinations of the Spanish court and royal policy during his reign (1598-1621).

Allen argues that while the Duke of Lerma may have been singularly important in the formulation of domestic policy at the court of Philip III, he did not dominate the realm of foreign policy. Instead, Philip was actively involved, working closely with his councils and advisors to formulate a coherent response to Spain's complicated international entanglements. According to Allen, the main focus of Philip III's diplomacy was the development of a "peace strategy." Philip wanted to use strategically negotiated peace treaties as a means encourage his enemies "to abandon their military pursuits for a time, while simultaneously maintaining [his] own military establishment, thereby weakening them seriously in the event of a future engagement"(ix). Once the Spanish regrouped both economically and militarily, they could reinitiate conflict from a more advantageous position. Thus, "Philip's decision to resume the war against the Dutch at the end of the Twelve Year's Truce in 1621 and Spain's subsequent involvement in wars with England and France, were not, therefore, the product of the failure of the Spanish peace policy but were rather conscious decisions to carry out the grand strategy that the king and his ministers had conceived at the beginning of the century" (x).

The book begins with the legacy of three-front warfare (France, England, and the Netherlands) that Philip III inherited from his father, Philip II. Upon taking the throne, in order to consolidate his position, Philip entered into negotiated peace treaties with all his northern enemies during the first decade of his reign. In meticulous detail, Allen then describes the complex military and diplomatic interventions that followed, focusing on the conflicts with England and in the Netherlands. Allen's archival work is impressive, but while carefully researched, he does not provide clear evidence of the creation and implementation of an overarching diplomatic strategy. Philip, both as king and as strategist, is remarkably absent from much of the text. His centrality to the implementation of foreign affairs is lost in the minute detail of the conflicts, particularly in the chapters devoted to the war in the Netherlands. Moreover, if, in fact, peace was a critical aspect of Philip's diplomatic policy, why then did t he other critical players in Spanish diplomacy, key among them Archduke Albert in the Low Countries, fail either to understand that such a grand strategy existed or to carry it out as the king wished? Even Allen's discussions of the conflicts within Philip's Council of State undermine the existence of and support for a carefully devised policy. His advisers were constantly at odds over the proper action to take. Throughout the narrative, Philip III's foreign policy decisions seem to have been imposed upon him by forces outside of his control, among them Dutch rebels, uncooperative and expensive generals and governors, and the ever problematic English, rather than the results of a coherent strategy.

Despite its problems, this book has much to offer. It urges scholars of early modern Spain to reconsider the dynamics involved in governing a world-wide empire fraught with religious division and economic instability. It also encourages historians to rely less on the simplistic explanations of the interplay between a weak king and his favorite. Philip III was a powerful king at a critical moment in European history. Paul Allen does much to remind us of that.