Perche non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine militia of 1506.

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The profound crisis the Florentine republic experienced at the turn of the Cinquecento paved the way for far-reaching constitutional, economic and military reforms. On 1 November 1502 the office of gonfalonier, the Republic's highest executive office, was transformed from a bimonthly to a life term as Piero Soderini became Florence's first gonfaloniere for life for the express purpose of rendering the government of the city more stable and efficient. Financially, the failure of the traditional public credit institutions, including the state funded debt, the Monte, to raise the money needed for the Pisan War (1495-1509) forced an agreement on a direct form of taxation, the so-called decima with arbitrio. This measure, which modern historians describe as a major fiscal innovation, would substantially contribute to the resolution of the Republic's pressing demand for liquidity. Militarily, the breakdown of the Florentine territorial state and the increased awareness of the city's dependency on outside assistanc e in the face of external threats prompted the authorities to accept Machiavelli's proposal for a new native militia in 1506.

Many Florentine intellectuals and military men had advocated a revival of the militia before Machiavelli embraced the cause. In the first half of the Quattrocento, Leonardo Bruni drafted a plan for the reintroduction of a citizen militia, and after the overthrow of the Medici in 1494, Domenico Cecchi, a close follower of Savonarola, attacked the mercenary system and evoked the native militia of the medieval commune in his Riforma sancta e pretiosa. (1) In his Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze, composed in the 1520s but set in 1494, Francesco Guicciardini portrays Paolantonio Soderini as a proponent of the militia, and later in the Cinquecento, the historians Jacopo Nardi and Jacopo Pitti both came to ascribe the idea to Antonio Giacomini, a Florentine military commander who had been frequently employed in the

Pisan war at the turn of the Cinquecento. (2) But the fact that Machiavelli was the real instigator and the driving force behind the project inaugurated in 1506 seems to be a matter beyond doubt. His central role in the venture is corroborated by a number of independent sources, including Francesco Guicciardini's account in Storie fiorentine and letters by Francesco Soderini, Filippo Casavecchia, Agostino Vespucci, and Leonardo Bartolini. Today, most scholars also agree that Machiavelli was the real promoter of the operation, even though the question of his involvement in its realization remains subject to controversy. (3)

Since Machiavelli played such a crucial role in the introduction of the new militia, many historians have come to take the Roman inspiration behind the project for granted. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Pasquale Villari contended that the militia ordinance had been envisioned on the model of the Swiss and the Roman military systems, and that Machiavelli and Piero Soderini, its two chief promoters, had been motivated by their "noble patriotism" and their admiration for ancient Roman exemplars such as Manlius Torquatus, the Scipii and the Camillii. (4) More recently, C.C. Bayley, Neil Wood and Felix Gilbert have discussed the militia of 1506 along similar lines, assuming that it was Roman in inspiration and based on the ideas Machiavelli later put forward in The Art of War, begun in 1518 and published in 1521. (5) Sergio Bertelli has argued the related case that Machiavelli in this treatise sought to present and elaborate on themes dating back to his distant, but still valid, experience from the mil itia project. (6) Although the connection has some support in Machiavelli's own writings, the failure of these scholars to address the complete, or almost complete, absence of Roman references in the official writings on the militia makes the interpretation problematic.

Scholars who acknowledge Machiavelli's silence on the Romans suggest that at this early date he had not yet come under the influence of the Roman model. According to Oreste Tommasini and Martin Hobohm, the militia of 1506 took its inspiration not from ancient Rome but from the Florentine medieval tradition. (7) For Hans Baron, the lack of mention of the Roman example during the militia project highlights the differences between the Machiavellism of The Prince and the republican idealism of the Discourses. The militia ordinance, Baron argues, belongs to a period in Machiavelli's life characterized by "uninterrupted exercise in the kind of thinking which The Prince was to epitomize." In his writing from these years, Baron goes on to contend, we do not find "the slightest anticipation of the attention paid in the Discourses to the forces molding the social and constitutional life of the Respublica Romana or other republics." (8) This conclusion seems to be called into question, though, by the fact that Machiavel li already in 1503 in Del modo di trattare ipopoli della Valdichiana ribellati had called for a direct imitation of the ancient Romans in political affairs, and formulated the theory of the constancy of the world, which later was to serve as the cornerstone for his teaching based on ancient and modern examples. (9) The early date of this writing poses a major problem to Baron's interpretation of Machiavelli's fail-to bring up the Romans in relation to the Florentine militia of 1506 and raises the question of how Machiavelli's shift in attitude towards the Romans after 1503 should be accounted for.

Against this background neither of the two interpretations of Machiavelli's militia presented above offer a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between the militia project and the Roman model. A third alternative that needs to be considered. In an excellent analysis of the elaborate rhetoric of Machiavelli's draft for the new militia ordinance of 1506, the so-called La cagione dell'ordinanza, Jean-Jacques Marchand has interpreted the silence on the Romans in the text as a consequence of Machiavelli's and his employers' desire to downplay the innovative character of the new laws. By arguing in traditional terms, using established proverbs and maxims, and adopting a reassuring tone designed to allay the fears of his audience, Machiavelli tried, according to Marchand, to lend his proposal an air of normality and non-controversy. (10)

This essay explores the possibility that the Florentine militia ordinance of 1506 indeed looked back to the Roman republic for inspiration, and follows up Marchand's suggestion that Machiavelli's silence on the Roman model during his work on the militia was a deliberate strategy on his part. To understand the reasons that might have induced Machiavelli and his collaborators to adopt this tactic, one must situate the discourse on the militia within the broader context of Florentine intellectual and ideological life. The much overlooked fact that by the early Cinquecento Florentines had come to view the traditional humanist idea of imitating the ancient Romans in political and military affairs with great suspicion, if not outright hostility, deserves special attention. Given the paramount importance the Roman model was to play later in Machiavelli's theoretical works, especially the Discourses on Livy and The Art of War, the issue is also of central importance for our understanding of the genesis of his thought and the nature of his rhetoric. If it can be established that as early as 1506 Machiavelli pursued a policy based on the Roman example, this fact has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of The Prince and its relationship to the republicanism of the Discourses as Well. But before considering these interpretative issues, a general presentation of the Florentine militia project of 1506 is in order.

THE MILITIA ORDINANCE AND THE PISAN WAR

Given how important a formative experience the militia project was for Machiavelli, it is surprising how little scholarly attention this aspect of his life and work has received in recent years. The best and most comprehensive study on the Florentine militia remains C.C. Bayley's impressive, but now outmoded, War and Society in Renaissance Florence of 1961. Bayley includes a chapter on the revived militia of 1506, but his treatment of the subject is far from exhaustive and marred by serious methodological flaws. The definitive history of the Florentine militia, and its relation to the field of military thought, Renaissance humanism and the military revolution of the Renaissance, remains to be written. (11) Such a study would include a host of unpublished documents on the Florentine militia in general, and the new militia ordinance of 1506 in particular, in the Florentine archives. The present study, based exclusively on published material, does not pretend to fill this gap. But a study of more limited scope a lso has an important purpose to serve.

The first documented mention of the militia project in Machiavelli's correspondence occurred in a letter of 29 May 1504 from his friend Francesco Soderini, the cardinal of Volterra and the brother of the gonfalonier Piero Soderini. (12) In this letter, the cardinal referred to a proposal by Machiavelli for a new Florentine military ordinance presented in a now-lost letter of 24 May. In his reply, Cardinal Soderini expressed his approval of the idea, which he described as "necessary and salubrious," but dismissed "the pretext (la scusa)" Machiavelli had proposed for overcoming the opposition to it. In spite of this objection, the cardinal went on to encourage Machiavelli: "Do not leave off, for perhaps the gloria that is not given one day will be given another." (13) Continued failures on the Pisan front gave the matter renewed freshness later during the fall. In October the signoria was forced to give up its ambitious attempt to drain Pisa through a diversion of the river Arno. (14) Machiavelli, who had been deeply involved in the project, appears around this time to have readdressed the need of a new militia ordinance in a lost letter to Francesco Soderini. From the cardinal's reply of 26 October, we learn that the full reason for his reluctance to back Machiavelli's plan had been, and continued to be, his fear that influential circles in Florence might interpret the project as an attempt by his brother, the gonfalonier, to seize tyrannical power. (15)

Later in the fall of 1504, Machiavelli brought up the question of Florence's military weakness in the Decennale primo, a chronicle in verse relating the events in Italy during the ten years after the French invasion of 1494. (16) In his original dedication to Alamanno Salviati, dated 9 November 1504, he celebrated Salviati for having "maintained the liberty of one of [Italy's] foremost members," and in the poem he went on to extol him for having remedied three of Florence's "four mortal wounds (quattro mortal ferite)" that is, the rebellions of Pistoia, Arezzo, and Valdichiana. (17) The fourth wound, the Pisan rebellion, remained open, though, and toward the end of the poem, Machiavelli argued that the Florentines' road to security and a safe port (porto) would be "easier and shorter" were they to "reopen the temple to Mars." (18) As these concluding lines suggest, one of Machiavelli's principal aims in the poem was to exhort his compatriots to arm themselves in order to recover their Pisan seaport.

By this time Machiavelli's conviction that Florence needed to reinforce its military began to assume concrete form and center around the idea of a peasant militia drawn from the contado. If put into effect, such a reform would signify a sharp break with the Republic's established military tradition. Back in the early days of the commune, Florence had fought its limited wars largely with temporary levies of native troops supplemented by mercenaries hired on a short-term basis. (19) The exigencies of modern warfare and the city's internal divisions had in the course of the Trecento considerably increased its reliance on hired soldiers for its defense and territorial expansion. Although the mercenary system resulting from this development had become so well established by the middle of the Quattrocento that it was taken more or less for granted, even by its critics, the practice of arming the peasants of the Florentine territory was never completely abandoned. In times of external aggression the Republic contin ued to avail itself of temporary troop levies by imposing a so-called comando on the subject population, requiring them to provide one armed infantrymen for every household. (20) Such gente comandata had been used in the Pisan campaign as early as 1499 and played an important role in the ambitious attempt to overcome the Pisan defenses in 1505. (21) What was radically novel in Machiavelli's proposal was the idea of creating a permanent military organization throughout the territory based on part-time soldiers, who would also continue to be enrolled, trained and equipped in time of peace.

Although Machiavelli's idea cannot have displeased Piero Soderini, who already back in 1502 had sharply criticized the mercenary troops' general lack of commitment, (22) the gonfalonier's cautious nature appears to have constituted a major impediment for its realization. Another obstacle was the fears of the ottimati, who had reason to view the very idea of the gonfalonier having several thousand armed peasants at his disposal as a serious threat to their own dominant position. But internal developments in Florence and continued failures on the battlefield played into Machiavelli's hands. In April 1505 the Florentines suffered yet another humiliating defeat as they were surprised by a numerically inferior Pisan force at Ponte Cappelletto. (23) The defection of the military captain Giovanpaolo Baglioni towards the end of the month was an additional blow to the Florentine cause; it seemed to offer further evidence of the general unreliability of hired troops. (24) The Florentine commissioner Antonio Giacomini' s triumph over the Venetian condottiere Bartolomeo d'Alviano on 17 August 1505 gave the Republic new hope, which was abruptly ended when its mercenary army under the command of Giacomini and Ercole Bentivogli shamefully failed to profit from a breach in Pisa's walls on 9 September 1505. (25) In the face of these military disasters, Piero Soderini, whom many held responsible for the last rout, felt obliged, it seems, to risk incurring domestic dissent by adopting Machiavelli's plan.

The best available account of how the new militia was introduced in Florence is in Francesco Guicciardini's Storie fiorentine, written before 1512. Guicciardini here relates how Piero Soderini let himself be persuaded by "26 the Machiavelli, "in whom he had great confidence, to reform Republic's militia and to return the city to the military orders of the past. Preparations had been made for the new ordinances, Guicciardini writes, but:

since it was necessary for the reputation and conservation of a thing of such proportion that it passed through the council, and considering that it was a new and unusual thing, which the people would not support without first having seen some proof of it... the Gonfalonier began, with the authority of the signoria, but without consultation, to enroll soldiers in the contado... in the city nothing was done, because it was such a new and unusual thing that it had to be conducted little by little. (27)

Guicciardini emphasizes thus the fact that Soderini took the decision to initiate the project without first summoning the leading citizens to a pratica, as was the established practice. He gives no clear indication, though, whether the idea to begin the venture without going through the traditional channels originated with Soderini or Machiavelli.

After the proposal had won the support of the signoria, Machiavelli was dispatched on 30 December 1505 to the Mugello and the Casentino regions to enroll, equip and exercise conscripts aged fifteen to forty. Through the correspondence between him and the Ten, the Florentine war committee, one can follow the early development of the project in some detail. In his first report, dispatched from Borgo San Lorenzo on 2 January, Machiavelli commented on the progress made and the local population's reaction to a new militia ordinance. Most villagers who had been summoned to the enrollment turned up quite willingly, while those who failed to present themselves had not done so mainly our of fear of being assessed for new taxes. In the local podesteria, he estimated that it would be possible to recruit about 180 men of good quality. The general reception of the militia was also encouraging: "This thing pleases all the citizens I have encountered here, and everyone counts on it to succeed; and for my own part I believe so more than ever, under the condition that one here applies that diligence that the task of reforming a province demands." (28) On 5 February, Machiavelli wrote to the Ten from Pontassieve, complaining about the problems he had met with recently in Dicomano and San Godenzo. In the podesteria of Dicomano he had after great hardship been able to recruit 200 men, but this number would eventually have to be reduced considerably. The difficulty of the undertaking, he attributed to the inveterate disobedience of the people of the region and to the hostile relations between the various villages. His excuse at the end of the letter breathed frustration: "I have not been able to do these things more quickly, and he who believes otherwise, should try it himself, and he will see what it means to bring together peasants and men of this sort." (29) In their reply of 6 February, the Ten accepted Machiavelli's excuse while emphasizing the urgency of the matter. A letter of the same date addressed to him by Marcello Virgilo , the secretary of the First Chancery, that Piero Soderini was following the progress of the militia with keen interest and that the project now had begun to gain support among the citizenry. (30)

In spite of the progress achieved in the contado and the positive reactions of the rural population, strong opposition continued in the city. During February influential citizens convened in several pratiche to discuss the arming of the countryside. According to the chronicler Cerretani, many of the assembled were opposed to the innovative idea for the simple reason that the city's past rulers had refused to adopt this policy In the face of this conservative opinion, Piero Soderini argued that a new militia ordinance would not only lessen the city's dependence on hired troops and on the French, but also increase its chances of recovering Pisa. Soderini's view won the day and the talks resulted in the decision to create an infantry force of twelve thousand men. Five constables with experience from serving under Paolo Vitelli were appointed, and five battalions (bandiere) of two hundred men each were officially set up in the Valdisieve and the Mugello regions. (31)

On 15 February 1506, a display of four hundred infantry men from the Mugello took place in the Piazza della Signoria in the course of the traditional Carnival festivities. (32) The event was a great success, and the diarist Luca Landucci could enthusiastically report that it had come to be viewed as "the most beautiful thing ever to have been arranged in the city of Florence." The discipline of the peasants and their colorful white and red uniforms, the traditional colors of the Florentine popolo, appear to have made a particularly strong impression on the audience. (33) From Landucci's account we also learn that the fundamental principles underlying the project now had become public knowledge: "And these were soldiers who were to stay at home under obligation, until need arose for them to be deployed; and in this way it had been ordered that many thousands should be created in the entire contado so that there would be no need of foreigners." (34)

On 21 February, Leonardo Battolini wrote to Machiavelli from Rome congratulating him on his achievement: "Concerning the new militia, I am very glad that it is turning out as well as you indicated to me in the past. If it is helped along as is its due, I judge that it will turn out to be a wonderful thing and I shall be very happy when I see it completed, both for the good of the public and also because it is your invention." (35) Around this time, Machiavelli wrote to Cardinal Soderini exhorting him to persuade his brother, the gonfalonier, to place a forceful and severe military captain in command of the militia. The cardinal, who approved of the idea, passed on Machiavelli's recommendation in a letter of 4 March. (36) The gonfalonier promptly heeded the advice, and shortly afterwards the notoriously cruel Spanish condottiere don Michele di don Giovanni da Coriglia da Valenza, better known as don Michelotto, was contracted to lead the newly created militia. Guicciardini relates how Piero Soderini charged Ma chiavelli to seek out beforehand the opinions of leading members of the reggimento such as Giovanbattista Ridolfi, Piero Guicciardini and Francesco Gualterotti. But when it turned out that they opposed the appointment of the Spaniard, the Gonfalonier took the proposal before the Eighty, where it was passed after a third ballot. (37) Due to strong opposition from the ottimati, the original plan to appoint don Michelotto bargello del contado had to be abandoned, though, and on 1 April he was elected capitano di guardia del contado e distretto di Firenze instead by the Eighty. (38) The Spaniard was soon called into action. After a series of poor performances by the militia battalions at the Pisan front, Machiavelli wrote on 12 June to inform Giovanni Ridolfi, the Florentine commissioner at the camp in Cascina, that don Michelotto and a company of one hundred men were to be dispatched there to reinforce the militia and to inspire fear in the Pisans. (39)

Up to this point, Machiavelli seems to have been closely involved in the project at every stage. When in August 1506 he was sent to the papal court in Civita Castellana, his close associate Biagio Buonaccorsi kept him updated on its developments. On 1 September, Biagio wrote to tell him that the conscription of troop levies continued as planned and that it had been decided that the militia should be kept ready in the event of an imminent descent by Emperor Maximilian. Bastiano da Castiglione, who had been appointed to lead the operation, had been asked how quick he could have the men ready. He answered, according to Biagio, that he could provide seven hundred men within four hours time. The statement made a great impression on the authorities: "They were amazed at these words, and savored them as something of great moment." (40) A few days later, Machiavelli learned that preparations were being made in Florence to send two hundred militia down towards Piombino where Ferdinand of Aragon was expected to land so on. (41) On 9 September, Machiavelli was briefed about a successful troop display in San Miniato arranged by Bastiano da Castiglione in the presence of Jacopo d'Appiano, lord of Piombino. (42) Additional news reached him at the end of the month when Giovan Battista Soderini wrote about developments in the Mugello: "The battalions are going well, especially those of Scarperia, because the vicar pays them many compliments, and when a foreigner happens by, to honor him, he unwinds a length of it on the field." (43) Around this time Piero Guicciardini, who had been one of the militia's most influential and tenacious opponents, was replaced in the Ten by Bernardo Nasi. Shortly afterwards, on 19 September, Biagio could inform Machiavelli that a decision had been reached in favor of the militia, which would please him. Biagio also ventured to give a general assessment of how the project was progressing: "So the matter is proceeding with very good favor; but the objections every day are endless. However, it is making progress." (44)

Around this time, Machiavelli addressed Giovan Battista Soderini in a long intricate letter, which has come to be known as the Ghiribizzi. (45) The main theme of the letter, to which we will return, is why contrary modes of proceeding in political and military affairs often bring about the same results, and why similar ways frequently give rise to different outcomes. Although it is not customary to read the Ghiribizzi in the context of the militia project, the fact Machiavelli here offers a lengthy comparison of the ways of the humane Scipio Africanus and the cruel Hannibal, the two most prominent military captains of the Second Punic War, suggests the possibility of such a connection. During the fall, Machiavelli was also working on a draft for a new law regulating the militia, a document that is now called the Cagione dell'ordinanza. (46) In this writing, he explains why the arming of the Florentine territory needed to begin in the contado instead of in the city proper or in the outlying district. The actua l law was passed on 6 December, when a decision also was taken to create a new magistrate, the Nine of the militia, or the nove ufficiali dell'ordinanza e milizia fiorentina, which was assigned the task of overseeing the militia in times of peace. In case of war, the militia would pass under the control of the Ten. The same law established that the Capitano di guardia del contado e distretto di Firenze, i.e. the office held by don Michelotto, should be assigned a company of thirty cavalrymen and fifty equipped infantry troops, to be administered by the Nine. Florentine citizens and other inhabitants of the Florentine territory were to be excluded from this office. (47) Events were progressing above expectations, and on 15 December Cardinal Soderini could write to Machiavelli congratulating him on his accomplishments and exhorting him to continue to supervise the project with undiminished diligence. (48)

The Nine were elected on 10 January 1507 and entered their office three days later. The cardinal's hopes for Machiavelli's future involvement in the enterprise were fulfilled as the new magistrate immediately appointed him chancellor of the Nine, an office he was to continue to hold alongside his position as secretary of the Second Chancery; until the abolition of the Nine in September 1512. (49) Since the members of the new magistrate were rotated every eight months, Machiavelli came during the following years to constitute an important point of reference within this body, and to provide the militia with a measure of continuity. (50) In his capacity as chancellor of the Nine, he attended to matters great and small. Apart from supervising official correspondence, his daily duties included contracting military captains and the training and equipment of the militia companies. (51) He was also responsible for the installment of special boxes outside the parish churches designed to receive anonymous denunciation s against those who had either evaded conscription, illegally armed or assembled men, bought or sold arms belonging to the Republic, or committed other crimes against the ordinance. (52) In the light of Machiavelli's well documented activities during these years, it is highly misleading to claim, as some scholars have done, that his role in the realization of the ordinance was merely that of the inspirer. (53) The picture unequivocal conveyed by the available sources is that Machiavelli's influence was deeply felt throughout, and on all levels of, the project.

Although modern historiography has downplayed the accomplishments of the new militia, (54) its progress during the first year should not be underestimated. The law of 6 December 1506 stipulated that 10,000 soldiers should be raised within six months after the Nine of the militia had been installed. (55) In May 3,000 peasants were enlisted and armed, and although financial constraints forced the authorities to lower their aims, the number of conscripts rose at the end of the year to 5,000, of which 1,200 had performed in troop displays in Florence and 500 been dispatched to the front. (56) By this time the militia had also attracted attention outside Tuscany. According to Cerretani, it had come to gain such reputation that "the whole of Italy was keeping an eye on it," and this was especially true of the Venetians, who sent experienced observers to the Casentino to watch the militia conscripts exhibit their acquired skills. (57) The progress of the ordinance was also a recurrent topic during the discussions Fr ancesco Pandolfini, the Florentine ambassador, held with French representatives at the court of Louis XII of France at Blois. On 8 January 1506, Pandolfini reported home that he discussed the militia ordinance with Florimond Roberret, the king's treasurer, who commented: "You have, as far as I understand, good soldiers; but you are in need of a good captain." When the subject came up again a few weeks later, Robertet clarified the French position: "If [the emperor] ... would pass, it would be necessary for everyone to take precautions; and you are in need of a good captain." The French courtier had gone on to name some military commanders whose appointment would please the king. (58) When Louis XII himself shortly after asked Pandolfini how many soldiers the Florentines had been able to raise, the ambassador answered that they now had seven hundred soldiers at their disposal and were in the process of setting up a force of twelve thousand infantrymen, "all of whom are already armed and in regular training so that they will be able to defend and protect their state." (59) After hearing this highly exaggerated account, the king reportedly commented that this was indeed a great thing and that the numbers were impressive.

During the early months of 1507, Machiavelli continued to survey the Florentine dominion in search of suitable conscripts, and later in the year he was in charge of hiring a replacement for don Michelotto, who had been removed from office in October. (60) The secretary spent the winter at the camp at San Piero a Grado at the mouth of Fiumemorto canal on the south bank of the Arno between Pisa and the sea, where he together with the commissioner, Alamanno Salviati, the military captain Muzio Colonna and the military engineer Antonio da Sangallo, directed an attempt to cut off the supply routes to the beleaguered city by erecting a set of pilings in the Arno. (61) At their disposal they had a cavalry company and a contingent of one thousand infantrymen, more than two thirds of which came from the newly raised militia battalions. (62) A great variety of sources testify to the fact that Machiavelli played an important part in the operation. (63) He had come to enjoy greater authority than the official commission ers at this time in the eyes of the troops, (64) and, to judge from Machiavelli's reports to the Ten, the esteem was mutual. On several occasions, he wrote to his employers pouring praise on the militia companies, claiming that they were performing their task in such an exemplary manner that they must be ranked among the best infantry troops in the whole of Italy. (65)

When the project of closing off the Fiumemorto canal had been completed on 7 March, (66) Machiavelli was ordered to Piombino to negotiate the surrender of the seaport through Jacopo d'Appiano, lord of Piombino, who had been charged by the Pisans to act as intermediary in the talks. Machiavelli met with Appiano and a twenty-man Pisan delegation on 14 March, but the negotiations came to naught since the latter were prepared to concede only their contado, not their city, to the Florentines. (67) Back in the Florentine camp, Machiavelli was dividing his time among the three armies when it came to his notice that the Ten nurtured plans of transferring him to the less exposed camp at Cascina. On 16 April he wrote home to his employers urgently begging them to reconsider their decision:

It appears from that letter that Your Lordships intend to let me remain in Cascina, something that is not at all convenient, since any man of any quality can be stationed here; and if I was to stay here I would be of no use, neither for the infantry or for anything else. I know that encampment would be less dangerous and less strenuous, but had I not wanted danger and hard work, I would not have left Florence. So may it please Your Lordship, let me go between these camps and work with the commissioners on the events that may occur: here I can be of some good use; there I should be of no good use at all and I would die of despair. (68)

The Ten granted Machiavelli's request, and the secretary continued throughout the final months of the Pisan campaign to supervise a wide range of matters, including payments, transfers of constables and troops, and food provisions in all three camps where the militia battalions were stationed.

During spring 1509 the Florentine stranglehold proved too much for the beleaguered city. In mid-April, three hundred Pisans are reported to have gathered in front of the Palace of the Anziani pleading that they were dying of hunger and tired of waiting for a help that never arrived. (69) On 24 May a Pisan delegation departed for Florence to sue for peace, accompanied by Machiavelli and Alamanno Salviati. (70) The official act of surrender, in which the Pisans, "with humility and reverence," begge the Florentines to accept them and their descendants as their loyal subjects for all time to come, was signed in Florence on 4 June, and countersigned for the Florentines by Marcello Virgilio and Niccolo Machiavelli. (71) On 8 June the Pisan magistrates handed over the keys of the city to the Florentine representatives, and shortly after the Florentine army headed by its commissioners could enter the exhausted and starving city in triumph. (72)

The Pisan rebellion, the fourth wound of the Florentine republic, which Machiavelli had lamented in Decennale primo, had now finally been remedied, and the secretary had, played a major part in the venture. Writing on 8 June to congratulate him on the vicotry, Agostino Vespucci, a colleague in the chancery, vividly described how the news was received in Florence: "Here it is not possible to express how much delight, how much jubilation and joy, all the people here have taken in the news of the recovery of that city of Pisa: in some measure every man has gone mad with exultation: there are bonfires all over the city, although it is not yet three in the afternoon; just think what they will do this evening after nightfall." (73) This was arguably the high point of Machiavelli's chancery career. By returning Florence to the military order of her medieval past, he had succeeded in doing what many Locals commentators only a few years before had judged to be unrealistic and next to impossible. (74)

SILENCE ON THE ROMANS

The absence of references to the Roman republic in the official documents regarding the militia is intriguing not only in the context of Machiavelli's personal development, but also the Florentine tradition in general. References to Roman antiquity and Roman examples occurred frequently in Florentine political debates during the Quattrocento. Rome's constitutional arrangements (the mixed constitution, the Senate, the dictatorship, the militia), and the virtuous examples of great Roman statesmen and military captains were most quoted. In a city that took pride in its Roman origins, called itself "the daughter of Rome," and sought legitimacy by claiming to be the natural heir of the Roman republic, such appeals to the Roman legacy were part of the normal routine. In the Laudatio Florentinae urbis, Bruni had celebrated Florence's military achievements with explicit reference to the city's Roman heritage and the military system of the Roman republic. Later, in De militia, he had advocated a return to a classicall y inspired citizen militia based on a combination of elements derived from the military systems envisaged by Greek philosophers like Plato and Hippodamus and Romulus' Roman militia. (75)

The practice of invoking the Romans in political and military matters continued during the Medicean regime. As Alison Brown has shown, Cosimo de' Medici was in his lifetime frequently compared to Roman statesmen such as Cato, Camillus, Cicero and Augustus. (76) Portraits of Roman military heroes like Brutus, Mucius Scaevola, Camillus, Decius Mus and Scipio Africanus held prominent places in the decorative programme for the Sala dei Gigli in the palace begun in the 1470s. (77) During St John's Day in 1491, Lorenzo the Magnificent staged a Roman triumph showing Aemilius Paulus after his conquest of Macedonia, broadcasted the idea that Medicean liberality caused Florence's growing prosperity. (78) After the return of the Medici to Florence in 1512 references to the ancient Romans became commonplace again within ritual, artistic, literary and political contexts. During the St John's Day celebrations of 1513, the new regime staged four triumphs with Roman imperial motives, featuring Julius Caesar, Pompey, Caesar A ugustus and Trajan accompanied by scrolls and tablets. (79) This symbolic enactment was followed two years later on 15 August 1515, when Lorenzo de' Medici the younger, as the first Florentine in modern times, was created captain general of the restored Florentine militia. The legal document establishing the new order proclaimed that Lorenzo's appointment had been prompted by a desire to repeat "if not completely at least in part" the glorious achievement of the Roman republic which, under the command of its own citizens, had made itself "most glorious and almost Lady of the whole world." (80)

The restored republic of 1494-1512 constituted a notable exception from this general pattern. Contrary to what Felix Gilbert argues, (81) the Roman example appeared rarely in the recorded political discussions of early Cinquecento Florence. In the debates preceding the creation of the Great Council in 1494 and the transformation of the gonfalonierate into a life office in 1502, the constitutional model evoked was not ancient Rome, but the modern Venetian republic. (82) Although it is true, as Gilbert remarks, that the Roman dictatorship occasionally came up in the pratiche when the crisis of the Florentine state was discussed, it was rarely, if ever, recommended as an example. Bernardo Rucellai's statement of 5 July 1502 gives a fair idea of how far contemporary Florentines were prepared to go in that direction: "Amid dangers the Romans created a dictator, one finds that he never did anything but good." But the protocol adds: "still it did not appear to him [Bernardo] that one should do this, because it is no t in the custom of the city; instead he would certainly give authority to the Ten." (83) Thus, although he approved of the Roman dictatorship in principle, Bernardo Rucellai was not prepared to advocate it in the case of Florence. Even so, the comment stands out as an exception to the general rule, since it is one of the few instances in the Consulte e pratiche, where the Romans are adduced and commented on in a positive spirit.

The absence of documented Roman-inspired public rituals during the Restored Republic is also conspicuous in comparison to Lorenzo the Magnificent's frequent use of Roman imagery in his public myth-making. The ambitious artistic program executed in and around the palace to celebrate the glorious deeds of the Florentine republic also lacks references to the Romans. (84) When they do appear in artistic production, it is with decisively negative connotations, as in Filippino Lippi's fresco cycle in the Strozzi chapel in Santa Maria Novella, commissioned in the 1480s, but executed mainly between 1500 and 1502. (85)

Other contemporary sources also show that the cultural climate in early Cinquecento Florence was imbued with strong anti-Roman sentiments. From a pratica summoned on January 28, 1506, to debate the still unresolved problem of Arezzo, we learn that Machiavelli's bold and radical call in Del modo of 1503 for a direct imitation of the Roman imperial strategy in dealing with a rebellious city provoked strong opposition within the Florentine reggimento. On this particular occasion, the Machiavellian alternative of winning Arezzo either by benefits or by destruction came up; Francesco Pepi and Pierfrancesco Tosinghi openly advocated it. But their radical proposal was emphatically rejected by the pratica, which opted for a more moderate approach based on the traditional Florentine middle way. Francesco Guicciardini's father, Piero, who later was to oppose Machiavelli's ideas on the militia, summed up in the closing statement what appears to have been the general view of the meeting. Seconding Giovanbattista Ridolfi, another influential opponent of the militia, he claimed that the Florentine authorities ought to furnish the fortress of Arezzo, keep the city under surveillance, and introduce good government there. Winning over the Aretines through favors and benefits he judged both unrealistic and impossible. The idea of sending new settlers to the town, a policy previously proposed by Machiavelli in Del modo and now restated by Pepi and Tosinghi, Guicciardini opposed on the grounds that this "was a Roman thing (era cosa de' Romani)" that was not practiced anymore. (86)

When Machiavelli returned to the question of Florentine control of Arezzo some ten years later in the Discourses, he sharply criticizes the official Florentine position. As in Del modo of 1503, he establishes a connection between the Roman conquest of Latium and Florence's recovery of Arezzo by quoting Camillus's speech in Livy, where the triumphator claimed that Rome now could secure its domination over the Latin peoples by either destroying or benefiting them. If the Florentines in 1502 had followed the Roman example and benefited some of the rebels by bestowing "exemptions, privileges, and citizenship (donando loro la citta)" on them, "securing them on every side," (87) and punishing others by sending colonies there, deporting the local population to Florence, and "scattering them so that they could no longer do harm through arms or plots," (88) they could have "made their empire secure and the city of Florence most great (grandissima)." (89) But instead, the Florentines had pursued their traditional polic y of the middle way, by banishing some of the Aretines, sentencing others to death, depriving everyone of their honors and ancient ranks, and leaving the city standing.

In what appears to be a direct reference to the debates of the day, Machiavelli responds to the objections raised against the policy of destruction advocated by Pepi, Tosinghi and himself: "If any citizen counseled in the deliberations that Arezzo should be destroyed, those who appeared to be wiser said that it would be of little honor to the republic to destroy her since it would seem that Florence lacked forces to hold her." (90) In Machiavelli's view it was instead the policy of the middle way, or via del mezzo, advocated by the "wise men" of the day that had brought Florence into disrepute, giving the city a reputation for ignorance and cowardice. True honor, Machiavelli argues, does not consist in governing a state under thousand dangers, but in providing for its security by punishing those who sin (pecca) against it. (91)

The strong negative views attached to the Romans at the turn of the Cinquecento in Florence appear as well in the sources commenting on the militia. The Savonarolans' attempt to revive the Florentine militia in the 1490s was defeated by leading citizens who invoked the ancient Roman republic as an example of warning against the arming of the people. According to them, the fall of the Roman republic had largely been brought about by ambitious generals, who had come to gain a personal following among their soldiers. (92) An elaborate version of this argument is in Francesco Guicciardini's Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze (c. 1521-25), (93) set in 1494 shortly after the expulsion of the Medici. When the creation of a new Florentine militia comes up in the course of the discussion, the aged Bernardo del Nero, a former Medici servant and the main voice of the dialogue, expresses strong misgivings: "And don't quote the Romans to me (ne mi allegate e' romani), where military discipline was extremely flourishing und er a popular and tumultuous type of government." According to Bernardo, the Roman army had been established and received its form in the monarchic period, "so when the city became free, it was not difficult, or something new, to maintain a profession which had nourished the city for hundreds of years already -- and which, it can be said, was a common one, since all the peoples of Italy were armed." (94) Had the Romans been forced to consider introducing the militia during a period when the city was plagued by internal strife, they would most certainly have refrained from doing so. (95) In Bernardo's view Rome's defective internal orders and chaotic way of administering its domestic affairs should be condemned for the same reasons as its military system should be admired.

Later in the conversation, the issue of the militia is readdressed by Piero Guicciardini, Francesco's father. After praising Bernardo for expressing what the great majority of the Florentines think of the Roman example, Piero asks him to comment on the contrary view, held by "a few people," according to which Rome's good arms should be seen as a product of the city's good education, good laws and good orders. Against this opinion, which reads like a summary of Machiavelli's position in the Discourses, (96) Bernardo argues that the Roman republic's defective and harmful constitution soon would have collapsed if had not been compensated by the outstanding virtue of the Roman people and their exemplary military system, which the Republic had inherited from the kings. (97) Should Florence's new rulers, in spite of Bernardo's warning, go ahead with their attempt to reintroduce the militia in the city, they would find that it would be hard, if not outright impossible, to convince the people of Florence to accept an idea so new and so contrary to the custom of the city. The notion of a militia modeled on the military systems of the medieval Florentine commune and of ancient Rome, Bernardo claims, would seem "to some impossible, to many dangerous, and to almost everyone ridiculous." (98)

Guicciardini's Dialogo not only gives us a general idea of how Florentines at the turn of the Cinquecento viewed the imitation of Roman modes and orders, but also provides a plausible explanation for the conspicuous absence of references to the Roman republic in the official writings on the new militia of 1506. If the view attributed to Bernardo del Nero can be seen as representative of Florentine attitudes, there existed at the time a strong and widespread opposition to the imitation of the military and political orders of the Roman republic.

In The Art of War, as well as in the Discourses, Machiavelli expresses a sharp awareness of the negative view on the Roman model prevailing among the Florentine ottimati at the beginning of the Cinquecento. When the dialogue's main voice, the distinguished military captain Fabrizio Colonna, begins to present his proposal for a revival of the military orders of the ancients, one of his young interlocutors, Cosimo Rucellai, is quick to recognize the close resemblance between Fabrizio's program and the Florentine militia ordinance of 1506, abrogated at the return of the Medici in 1512 but reintroduced in 1515. This observation gives rise to an interesting exchange between Fabrizio and Cosimo on the pros and cons of Machiavelli's militia:

Cosimo. Then you would set up a militia ordinance similar to the one that exists in our villages?

Fabrizio. What you say is right. But to say the truth, I would arm, officer, exercise, and order them in a manner that I am not sure that you have used.

Cosimo. Then you praise the ordinance?

Fabrizio. But why not, would you like me to condemn it?

Cosimo. Many wise men have blamed it and continue to blame it.

Fabrizio. You contradict yourself when you say that wise men lays blame on the ordinance. It is easy to be held wise and to be in the wrong.

Cosimo. Its poor performance makes us hold this opinion.

Fabrizio. Mind you, so you don't impute to it a fault which might be of your own making; as you will come to understand before the end of this argument." (99)

As Fabrizio here makes explicit, this brief discussion on the Florentine militia serves as an introduction to the classically inspired military system presented in the work. But before Fabrizio is allowed to develop his program, Cosimo confronts him with the criticism that the idea of arming the people usually meets. Regardless of whether the militia is good or bad, he argues, it is considered to do more harm than good. If the militia is bad, the state is sure to suffer defeat and come to ruin; if it is valorous, the city will instead run the risk of being taken over by its commanders. Cosimo goes on explain how historical and contemporary examples are being adduced to discourage from introducing the militia. Here the Roman republic appears with the modern examples of France and Venice: "They quote the Romans (100) ([alilegano i Romani), who, by means of their own arms lost their liberty." (100) Fabrizio contests this negative judgment on the Romans by claiming that it is based on a shortsighted view. In his opinion, it can never be harmful to arm ones own citizens and subjects as long as it is done in a legal and orderly manner, and this he promises to demonstrate in the course of the conversation. (101)

In the passages quoted from the Discourses and The Art of War, Machiavelli responds to contemporary criticism against the Roman model and attacks the supposed political "wisdom" of the "wise" men of Florence, i savi, a category that included men like Piero Guicciardini and Giovanbattista Ridolfi. The great sense of continuity and the firmness to principles these retrospective comments bespeak lend credibility to the view that the militia project of 1506 was based, at least in part, on the example of the Roman military system. But while working on the militia was Machiavelli aware of the contentious nature of Roman example? A good indication that so was the case is in the Chiribizzi of September 1506. After discussing the fixity of human nature and the variations of the times with references to Hannibal and Scipio, Machiavelli here breaks off his argument by remarking that it is not common usage, or opportune, to quote the Romans: "But since it is not common practice to quote the Romans (perche non si usa alle gare i Romani), Lorenzo de' Medici disarmed the people in order to hold Florence, while Giovanni Bentivoglio armed them to hold Bologna. " (102) Judging from this comment, Machiavelli was well aware of the controversy surrounding the ancient Romans in contemporary Florence.

In summary, the strong negative connotations the ancient Romans had come to be invested with at the turn of the Cinquecento go a long way to explain the strict silence Machiavelli and his associates observed on the Roman model throughout the militia project. In the eyes of the ottimati, the ancient Roman republic contained features that made it simultaneously both too monarchic and too popular to serve their ends. For the majority of the Savonarolans, the Romans were simply too pagan, too secular and too imbued with evil to invite imitation. (103) Machiavelli had gone against the tide when he in Del modo of 1503 boldly, but imprudently, advocated a direct imitation of Roman imperialism in Florence's dealing with the Aretine rebellion. What did he learn from the opposition he encountered on this issue, and how does the militia project of 1506 relate to the Roman model? These are the two question that will be our main concern in the concluding section of this essay.

MANLIUS TORQUATUS AND DON MICHELOTTO

Machiavelli's contemporary army correspondence shows that the informal discussions on the militia between himself and Francesco Soderini, Biagio Buonaccorsi, and Filippo Casavecchia drew upon ideas of a different order from the functional and down-to-earth approach in the official discourse. From this correspondence we learn that the operation was based on theoretical, but unstated, principles. In his letter to Machiavelli of 4 March 1506, Francesco Soderini concedes that the enterprise would yield an even better result if the secretary were able to dedicate "all the force of his wit (l'ingegno) and [his] learning (doctrina)" to it. (104) The cardinal's statement seems to imply that Machiavelli at the time had come to acquire a theoretical knowledge of military affairs, probably based on the study of ancient treatises, which we may assume he had expounded in conversation with the Cardinal.

A similar impression comes from Filippo Casavecchia's congratulatory letter to Machiavelli following the recovery of Pisa in 1509, where he makes an oblique reference to Machiavelli's "philosophy (filosofia)" and goes on to include his friend among the greatest prophets of all times: "Your philosophy (filosofia), I think, will never be comprehensible to crazy people (a' pazzi), and there are not enough wise men to go around: you understand me, even if I am not putting it very well. Every day I discover in you the greatest prophet that the Hebrews or any other people ever had (el maggiore profeta che avessino mai li Ebrei o altra generatione). Nicolo, Nicolo, in truth I tell you that I cannot say what I would like." (105) Casavecchia is here, apparently alluding to an argument of Machiavelli's which he has either read, or more probably, listened to in conversation. His remark seems also to imply that he has understood his friend's line of thought, even if he now is incapable of giving a good account of it. Wha t Casavecchia exactly means with Machiavelli's "philosophy," we can only guess, but as the context of the remark indicates, it is reasonable to assume that it was linked in some way to his theories on the militia.

The assumption that Machiavelli by this time had gained a theoretical understanding of military and political affairs, which he was putting into practice in his work on the militia, receives further confirmation from his own statement at the outset of the Ghiribizzi of September 1506. In this letter addressed to Giovan Battista Soderini, Machiavelli maintains that his insight into human affairs is based on his reading about, and his experience of, the actions of men. (106) This claim, which directly anticipates his famous declarations in the dedicatory letters of The Prince, the Discourses, and The Art of War about classical learning and modern experience as the twin sources of his theory, suggests that the writings of classical authors had become an important source of inspiration for him already at the this early date. His extensive use of Livy in Del modo and his discussion of Scipio and Hannibal in the Ghiribizzi also supports the argument. (107)

The frequent references to Machiavelli's studio, doctrina and filosofia in his private correspondence, and the often lofty and animated rhetoric of the letters, centered around historical exemplars like Manlius Torquatus, Moses, Cicero, Scipio and Fabius Maximus, show that the private discussions among him and his associates were not as low key as their official writings suggest. There are also intriguing connections between the classical examples conjured up in these letters and Machiavelli's later work. Manlius would in the Discourses to serve as Machiavelli's prime model for a reformer of a citizen militia, and Moses would reappear in The Prince as an example of an armed prophet, that is, a ruler who founds a state by introducing new laws and new military orders. What are we to make of all this? Of course, it is possible that these correspondences may be purely coincidental. But since we are dealing with a culture that to a large extent understood itself in terms of imitation and impersonation of classical exemplars, we should be open to other, more imaginative, readings as well.

An important case in point is Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, one of the ancient worthies brought up in connection to the militia project, who later came to play an important role in Machiavelli's theoretical works. The following explores how Cardinal Soderini's reference to this exemplary figure in connection to the appointment of the controversial don Michelotto as captain of the militia in 1506, and Machiavelli's subsequent discussion of the Roman general in the Discourses, can shed light on the motives and strategies governing the militia project.

To evaluate Manlius' relevance to the appointment of don Michelotto and the militia ordinance at large, it is important to get as accurate and detailed picture as possible of the circumstances under which the Manlian example arose in the correspondence between Machiavelli and the Soderini brothers in 1506. As we have seen, Machiavelli wrote, shortly after the successful troop display in Piazza della Signoria in February that year, a long letter to Francesco Soderini informing him about the progress of the enterprise. From the cardinal's reply of 4 March, we know that Machiavelli in this lost letter discussed the general importance of military discipline, calling attention to the Italian soldiers' lack of it as the main reason for their inferiority vis-a-vis foreign troops, and expressing a desire to engage more fully in the militia project. In his reply, the cardinal apparently recapitulates and summarizes in an approving tone some of the main points of Machiavelli's argument:

It should not be thought that other nations in these times are superior to our foot soldiers, except because they have kept discipline, which has been banished for a long time now from Italy. You must get no small satisfaction from the fact that such a worthy thing should have been given its beginnings (sia dato principio) by your hands. Please preserve and bring it to the desired end.

You write wisely that this idea requires justice above all, both in the city and in the contado. Although His Lordship the Gonfalonier understands public necessity and is exerting every effort to that end, nevertheless, stimulated by your writing, we recall at present a nd shall not cease to recall in the future what you write about it, which we still judge to be necessary. (108)

In his letter, Machiavelli had discussed a matter that was a central and lifelong concern: how to introduce new military orders in a province where the memory of such practices has been lost. In his view, there cannot be good arms where good discipline and good laws are lacking. In Cagione dell'ordinanza, composed later in the year, he argues that the only way Florence could obtain justice (iustitia), of which the city has little, and good arms (armi), of which it has none at all, is by "organizing itself militarily by public deliberation." (109)

Later, he would devote much time to the question of military discipline in The Prince and the Discourses, where the novel modes and orders he promotes are primarily Roman as in the Discourses, or "ancient" without further specification, as in The Prince. In Discourses III.30 he claims that military commanders and guards of cities should avoid arming the people "tumultuously," and follow instead the example of Marcus Furius Camillus, the Roman consul and military commander who never "permitted a multitude to take up arms except with a certain order and a certain mode." (110) They should enroll and select their soldiers and officers with care, and establish where they should assemble and where they should go. In Discourses 111.36 he compares the armies of ancient Rome, modern France and the modern Italian states. Whereas the Romans possessed both ardor (furore) and order (ordine), and the French ardor but no order, the Italians, we are told, have neither natural ardor, nor accidental order." (111) Military disc ipline is also a main theme of The Art of War. In this work, where through his mouth-piece, Fabrizio Colonna, Machiavelli presents a military organization that could best be described as a reformed version of the Roman military system, the principles of recruitment and training a militia are outlined in great detail. Machiavelli here argues that the Romans with relatively small, but well-disciplined, armies were able to challenge and defeat their powerful neighbors, (112) and quotes Pyrrhus, the Greek warlord, who had been in the habit of saying that he was be prepared to take on the whole world with as few as fifteen thousand good and well-disciplined soldiers. (113)

Since Cardinal Soderini had collaborated closely with Machiavelli on their joint diplomatic missions to the courts of Cesare Borgia and Pope Alexander VI in 1502-03, it is reasonable to assume that already by March 1506 he had acquired a good understanding of the Secretary's views on military affairs, and that even prior to that date the two men had discussed the importance of military discipline and the special qualities required of a military commander charged with the monumental task of creating disciplined soldiers out of crude and inexperienced conscripts. Against this background, it seems highly unlikely that the cardinal's brief comment contains anything new in relation to these previous discussions and to Machiavelli's lost letter.

In his reply to Machiavelli of 4 March, the cardinal promised to intercede with his brother, the gonfalonier, on his behalf concerning the militia. He did not waste his time. Writing to Piero on the very same day, probably with Machiavelli's lost letter by his side, the cardinal had passed on, perhaps word by word, what Machiavelli wrote about the importance of military discipline: "And Your Lordship knows by study and by experience that nothing has made the military art illustrious in the way that discipline has. ... And I am sure that if Your Lordship wants to renew the military art in the Florentine nation, as a thing hodie summe necessaria, you will first of all renew the obedience of justice (la obedienza per la justizia) in the city as well as the contado." He had then gone on to propose that a strong and fearful military captain should be placed in command of the militia: "it would be easier [to achieve this] through some captain similar to Manlius Torquatus, rigorous and severe (rigido et severo), wh o in things of uncertain nature would proceed by executing the facts." (114) After arguing that the military captain ought to be granted a personal guard of fifty men of arms, the cardinal brought his request to a close with a comment on the great value of military discipline:

"And greater things have been performed with few people when discipline have governed them, than by great armies when badly disciplined." (115)

We can only speculate as to what could have induced Cardinal Soderini to bring up the name of the fearful Manlius Torquatus, the Roman consul, who in a truly unchristian fashion had sacrificed his own son to restore discipline in the Roman army, and whose contribution to the subjugation of Latium in BC 340 found a vivid description in Livy. But since the cardinal on this occasions acted as an intermediary between Machiavelli and the gonfalonier, it seems reasonable to assume that the example of Manlius originated from Machiavelli's lost letter of February-March 1506. Taking into consideration the Secretary's early interest in Livy, evident from his us of Camillus' speech on the two extremes in Del modo of 1503 in conjunction with the fascination he displays for the character of Manlius in the Discourses, this conclusion seems all the more probable. The fact that Francesc Soderini in his letter to the gonfalonier repeats the claim from Machiavelli lost letter that a military reform of the Florentine republic c an be effectively introduced only if justice and discipline are observed in the city as well as the contado adds further credibility to this inference. (116) But the most compelling reason for attributing the original reference to Machiavelli is the fact that the two qualities associated with Manlius in Francesco Soderini's letter, severity and rigidity, severo e rigido, reappear in Machiavelli's discussion of the Roman captain in Discourses 111.22. Here Machiavelli claims that Manlius commanded his troops "with every kind of severity (severita)," (117) and inquires into why the consul was "constrained to proceed so rigidly (si rigidamente)." (118)

If we were to reconstruct what happened on 4 March 1506 on the basis of these observations, the most likely scenario would be that Cardinal Soderini, upon receiving Machiavelli's now lost letter, sat down to write two letters: a reply to Machiavelli and a plea on his behalf addressed to Piero Soderini. Writing to the gonfalonier, with Machiavelli's letter in front of him, the Cardinal simply passed on Machiavelli's comments on the need of a firm rule in the city and the contado and his advice to place a "severe and rigid" captain, similar to Manlius torquatus, at the head of the militia. (119)

Although we cannot determine precisely how Machiavelli's original recommendation was phrased, nor how much Cardinal Soderini revised or add to it, we know that it resulted in the hiring of Cesare Borgia's former captain, the feared don Michelotto, on 1 April. A closer look at the personal curriculum of this colorful character helps to show how controversial the choice of don Michelotto actually was. (120) Miguel Corella, or don Michelotto, was of Spanish origin. He had served in Cesare Borgia's army at least since 1497, and was considered to be one of the duke's most trusted and loyal captains. (121) Apart from policing the anarchic Romagna region and commanding Cesare Borgia's foot soldiers, he appears also to have been the duke's first choice for the delicate task of killing off political opponents. The murder by strangling of Alphons of Aragon, Duke of Bisceglie, the second husband of Lucrezia Borgia, on 18 August 1500 in the Vatican has been attributed to him, and alleged to have been committed on the dir ect orders of Cesare. (122) Shortly afterwards, don Michelotto was dispatched by the duke to Orvieto to wipe out certain troublesome citizens there. He also participated in the duke's military campaign in the Romagna that year and took Piombino in 1501, a city over which he ruled as Cesare's governor until April 1502. In June, he is reported to have strangled and drowned the young lord of Faenza, Astorre Manfredi, who had been taken prisoner by Cesare Borgia. (123) This crime was soon to be followed by the murder of Giulio Cesare Varano, lord of the rebellious city of Camerino, and the exceptionally cruel sack of Pergola and Fossombrone. (124) On 31 December 1502, he was yet again acting as the duke's henchman when in Senigallia he arrested and subsequently strangled two of the duke's most prominent military captains, Vitellozzo Vitelli and Oliverotto of Fermo, an episode later immortalized through Machiavelli's vivid account in The Prince. (125)

In December 1503, don Michelotto was captured by the Florentines as he passed through their territory, and was subsequently handed over to the pope. (126) From then until August 1505 little is known about his doings and whereabouts, but as Roslyn Pesman Cooper has shown, we have reason to believe that he throughout these years continued to enjoy the protection of the Borgia family.

What made the Florentine authorities eventually decide to appoint the controversial Spaniard as guard of the countryside and the outlying district is unknown. But there is no doubt that Cardinal Soderini stood behind the choice. On 26 August 1505, at the time when the Florentines were preparing themselves for what they expected to be the final assault on Pisa, he wrote a letter to his brother, the gonfalonier, recommending the Spanish captain. If the Florentines decided to hire him, the cardinal said, don Michelotto would demonstrate to them that he was a loyal servant of all his masters. (127) Francesco Soderini was in all likelihood not the only supporter of the Spaniard's cause. Given the fact that Machiavelli was the driving force behind the militia project, had come to gain a reputation for expertise on military affairs and stood on good terms with the Soderini brothers, it is difficult to imagine his counsel not being sought on the matter. Machiavelli had, moreover, during his long legation to the court of Cesare Borgia in 1502-03 acquired direct personal experience of the ways and methods of don Michelotto. (128) That Machiavelli and the Spaniard got on well together is evident from the letter don Michelotto wrote to the Secretary on 15 September 1507. Here he evokes their mutual friendship, claiming that he knows that Machiavelli "loves" him and "is fond" of him, and promises to "tell him things and give [him] living proof of them that will frighten [him]." (129) In the light of Cardinal Soderini's and Machiavelli's well-developed mutual understanding on military affairs, and their personal acquaintance with don Michelotto, we have good reason to believe that were jointly involved in the decision to bring the proposal to hire don Michelotto before the councils. (130)

This brings us to the scholarly dispute on the motives behind don Michelotto's appointment. Some years ago Carlo Dionisotti advanced the controversial thesis that back in his chancery days Machiavelli had nurtured plans to make Piero Soderini prince of Florence and to use the militia and its commander, don Michelotto, for this purpose. (131) This view has been rejected by Gennaro Sasso, who maintains that there is simply no contemporary evidence to support Dionisotti's thesis. This may be true, but there were widespread fears at the time that the gonfalonier planned to use the Spaniard in the way Dionisotti claims, and there are instances in Machiavelli's work that point in that direction as well. (132) Dionisotti's hypothesis should therefore not be so easily dismissed. The main problem with Sasso's refutation, is that it does not offer an alternative logic for hiring don Michelotto, other than the rather weak -- considering the notorious reputation of the Spaniard -- explanation that Piero Soderini and the Florentine authorities appreciated his military and organizational skills. What made the cautious Piero Soderini accept the extremely controversial idea of appointing don Michelotto? We should look for this alternative logic in Machiavelli's discussion on Manlius Torquatus in the Discourses, which reads very much like a comment in retrospect on his experience with the militia in general and don Michelotto in particular.

Machiavelli discusses Manlius on several occasions in the Discourses, but his most elaborate treatment of this enigmatic figure occurs in chapter III.22, where Manlius' severe methods are contrasted to the humane ways of Valerius Corvinus. At the outset of the chapter, Machiavelli sets himself three problems to solve. First, he asks what prompted Manlius to act so rigorously, and conversely, what made it possible for Valerius to proceed in such a humane fashion. Secondly, he poses the question how it came about that these two captains, by employing diametrically opposed methods, could come to accomplish identical results, display the same virtue, make similar conquests, and win equal triumphs and military honors. Or to put it in Machiavelli's own terms: how could contrasting modes (modi) create the same effect (il medesimo effetto)? And thirdly, he addresses the question of which of these two captains should be preferred as a model for emulation.

Having set the issues, Machiavelli goes on to analyze Manlius's character and way of proceeding, which in Livy's account included great piety towards his father and the Roman republic, as well as an extraordinary severity towards his own son, whom he executed for having breached discipline by engaging the enemy against his explicit orders:

So, when a man such as this comes into command, he desires to find all men similar to himself; his harsh spirit makes him command strong things (cose forti), and the same spirit wishes them to be observed. And it is a very true rule that when one commands harsh things (cose aspre) it is necessary to make them be observed with harshness (con asprezza); otherwise you will find yourself deceived. It should also be noted that to wish to be obeyed it is necessary to know how to command; for those know how to command who compare their qualities with the qualities of those who have to obey, and when they see a proportion they command, if a disproportion, they abstain. (133)

Since it takes a rigorous and harsh nature to command "strong things," Machiavelli argues, the extraordinarily severe and cruel Manlius was of great utility to the Roman republic at a time when this form of command was needed. By using exceptional means, rulers of Manlius' type have the ability to "reduce the orders of [the republic] towards their beginning and into their ancient virtue (verso il principio loro e nella sua antica virtu)." This, Valerius, who found the Roman army well-ordered and well-disciplined, did not have to do. Instead, he could "proceed humanely, like him to whom it was enough that the usual things observed in Roman armies be observed." (134) While Manlius had to employ extraordinary (istraordinari) modes to acquire his soldiers' obedience, Valerius, who had inherited the discipline created by him, was able to uphold the same degree of loyalty without going outside the existing orders (gli ordini). But since both captains had equally obedient armies at their disposal, they were able to accomplish similar feats and win the same honors. Hereby, Machiavelli solves the first two problems he had set himself.

He then turns to consider which of the two captains is the more praiseworthy and the best example to imitate. Finding that Livy bestows equal praise on both, he realizes that the question needs to be rephrased. He therefore asks instead: which of these two Romans is the better example to follow for a prince, and which is the most suitable model for a citizen of a republic? The answer he offers may come as a surprise:

in a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I believe the procedure of Manlius to be more praiseworthy and less dangerous, because this mode is wholly in favor of the public and does not in any part have regard to private ambition. For by such a mode, showing oneself always harsh to everyone and loving only the common good, one cannot acquire partisans. (135)

According to this logic, which seems to have a direct bearing on the hiring of don Michelotto in 1506, a republic would have relatively little to fear from a severe and rigorous military captain like Manlius. Instead, the real threat against the liberty of the Republic is posed by humane and likeable commanders of Valerius' type, who can be expected to gain a personal following among their soldiers. If such a captain is given a command of long duration,

Machiavelli claims, he can easily produce "bad effects against the liberty" (136) of the republic and "prepare the way to tyranny." (137) As we can see, Discourses III.22 provides a strong and consistent argument for why a republic, like the Florentine, should put its trust in a Manlian rather than a Valerian captain. This line of reasoning can also explain and justify, in retrospect, the appointment of don Michelotto back in 1506. (138)

The extant correspondence between don Michelotto and the Nine of the militia offers a view of the Spaniard's office that conforms well with the impartial and disinterested character Machiavelli attributes to Manlius' command. In the instructions don Michelotto received on 3 March 1507, the Nine made clear that the captain should avoid "getting involved in any matter of civil nature." (139) The Spaniard appears to have found it difficult to follow this directive, though, for later that fall there were widespread complaints in Florence that he had got himself embroiled in local feuds during his policing of the contado. Writing to Machiavelli from Firenzuola on 15 September 1507, shortly before his dismissal from office, don Michelotto acknowledged in responding to his critics the non-partisan status of his office: "For I still have the instructions that Your Lordship gave me already a year and a half ago, and I have them in my heart and inside my head: that is, you told me that I should never eat in the house o f the head of a party and I should never become friendly with banished men." (140) Like the Manlius of the Discourses, who is said to have had no "private ambition" and to have loved "nothing but the common good," don Michelotto claimed that his only partisanship was to "those who serve Your Most Exalted Lordship, and who are obedient." (141) Whether the Spanish captain here was speaking his own mind, or tailoring his assurances to suit the expectations of his employers, must remain an open question. But what this evidence clearly suggests is that don Michelotto's office never was designed, or conceived of, as a means of making Piero Soderini tyrant of Florence. Therefore, we may now conclude with greater assurance that Dionisotti's hypothesis must be refuted.

The question remains as of to what extent don Michelotto's office actually was patterned on the commanding example of Manlius. When we consider Machiavelli's treatment of the examples of Manlius and Valerius in the Discourses in relation to the Florentine militia of 1506, it is easy to see why he -- and Cardinal Soderini -- should have considered the situation in which Florence currently found itself to be more congenial to the ways of Manlius than to those of Valerius. The militia was an innovation with regard to contemporary Florentine military practice. It was also conceived of, and presented, by its promoters as a return to the virtuous ways of the early Florentine commune, or to speak in the terms of the Discourses, as a return to the republic's beginning and "ancient virtue." (142) Moreover, here were simple peasants and mountain-dwellers designated to be shaped into soldiers, "harsh things" in need of a strong command. Whereas Valerius' ways would have been sufficient, if not necessarily preferable, at a later date when a well-functioning military system had already been put in place, the situation in Florence at the turn of the Cinquecento required a strong, severe and capable captain of the Manlian type.

On the face of it, the Spaniard appeared to be the perfect choice for filling the role of "the rigorous and severe" Manlius. Apart from a reputation as an extremely ruthless, not to say vicious, commander -- Guicciardini describes him as "an extremely cruel man, terrible and much feared (uomo crudelissimo, terribile e molto temuto)" (143) -- he had during his days with Cesare Borgia acquired useful experience in organizing a militia and making soldiers out of ordinary peasants. (144) The tasks the Florentine authorities assigned don Michelotto in 1506 could also be described as Manlian, or analogous to those Manlius performed in the rise of ancient Rome. Upon entering his office on 31 March 1506, don Michelotto was immediately charged with policing the Mugello region. Landucci relates how, after having led a display of a hundred infantrymen and fifty cavalrymen in Florence on 19 April, he was sent to the Mugello and the Casentino on 1 May 1506 to quench certain troubles and burn houses. (145) Later in June he was, ordered to the Pisan front together with one hundred men in an attempt to spark terror in the Pisans and to create respect for the new ordinance. (146) In March 1507 he was given anew the assignment to police the Mugello region, this time with the express order to suppress "scandals" and prevent all forms of gatherings. (147) On 2 June he was sent to a village called the Villa in the mountainous region above Dicomano to arrest twenty-five men, who shortly before had started a brawl in which one man had been killed and four seriously injured. (148) In mid-July, the Nine were considering sending him to Firenzuola to set an example for those conscripts who were contemplating hiring on with the Venetians: "We plan to send Don Michele there to inspire terror in those who wish to disobey, and to give reputation to this thing." (149) As this brief account makes evident, the Florentines were determined to exploit the Spaniard's natural Manlian ability to strike fear into friends and foes alike to the full.

Apart from the policing of the Florentine countryside, don Michelotto's assignments consisted of the training, the shaping and the organizing of the peasants of the contado into a well-disciplined military force. This is, for example, how Machiavelli describes his role, when in a letter to Giovanni Ridolfi of 12 June 1506 he explains the reason for sending the Spaniard to the front with a company of infantry troops: "And since he was used to command and to handle similar men during his time with the duke [i.e., Cesare Borgia], we think that he, when it is possible, should be lodged there together with [the soldiers], so that he can first train them, and then, if he need to go somewhere on short notice, could be there quickly with his [own] infantrymen together with [the soldiers], who, since he has inspected them and handled them in the displays, can better join together in battle." (150) Also in this regard don Michelotto's assignment bears an intriguing and tantalizing resemblance to the one Machiavelli cl aims that Manlius Torquatus performed in connection to the revival of Roman military virtue in the fourth century BC.

What can we conclude on the basis of these observations? Although the lack of direct evidence and the elusive and fragmentary state of the documentation make it difficult to settle the question of the possible Manlian and Roman inspiration behind don Michelotto's office and the militia project in a conclusive way, there are several weighty reasons for assuming that such motivations were at work. First, Manlius' name is explicitly mentioned by Cardinal Soderini in close connection to his correspondence with Machiavelli and the hiring of don Michelotto. Second, Machiavelli had already in Del modo of 1503 argued that the Florentines should imitate the ancient Romans, who once had been the "masters of the world (padroni del mondo)," by treating the rebel cities of the Valdichiana region according to the same methods as the Romans had used when subjugating the rebellious Latin peoples) (151) Third, we know, also from Del modo, that Machiavelli at the time took a particular interest in the part of Livy (books VII and VIII), where both Manlius and Camillus, the hero quoted in Del modo, appear. That the historical episode associated with their names -- Rome's final subjugation of Latium -- carried a special significance for the Secretary at the time he was engaged in reestablishing Florentine rule in the contado and the distretto, need little explanation. Fourth, Machiavelli had already in the Ghiribizzi of September 1506 addressed the issue that underlies his discussion of Manlius and Valerius in Discourses III.22, namely, how does it come about that the same modes of proceeding lead to different outcomes and different modes yield the same result. His detailed comparison of Scipio and Hannibal in that letter -- which he elaborates on in Discourses III.21, the chapter immediately preceding the one on Manlius and Valerius -- shows that Machiavelli already in 1506 viewed ancient exemplars in the way that would inform his treatment of Manlius in the Discourses.

Finally, Machiavelli's interest in the Roman model at the time he was working on the militia ordinance is also suggested by a comment he makes in a letter to Francesco Vettori of 10 August 1513. Relating a conversation he had many years ago with Pellegrino Lorini, who had been commissioned by the Florentine authorities in 1500 to enroll Swiss soldiers for a campaign against Pisa led by the French captain Jean de Polignac, Lord of Beaumont, Machiavelli writes:

And Pellegrino Lorini told me long ago that when [the Swiss] came to Pisa with Beaumont, they often discussed the virtue of their militia with him -- how it was similar to that of the Romans and what reason might prevent them from one day doing as the Romans [had done]. They bragged about having given

France every one of his victories up until then, and they did not know why they might not one day fight for themselves.152

This is a comment rich in implications. Apart from anticipating Machiavelli's favorable account of the Swiss in The Prince and The Art of War, where he portrays them as a nation that has come close to reviving the infantry orders and military virtue of the ancients, the remark appears to have a direct bearing on the militia project of 1506 as well. For if Machiavelli as early as 1500 or thereabout had become impressed by the Swiss attempt to imitate the Romans in their militia u as this comment clearly suggests u this would make it all the more likely that he himself, when given the opportunity to introduce the militia in Florence a few years later, would look to the same Romans for inspiration. (153) If the Swiss could compare themselves to the Romans and follow their example, why should not the Florentines, with their long-standing claim to a Roman legacy, be able to do the same?

With this in mind and taking all the other correspondences, connections and hints into consideration, the evidence speaks strongly in favor of the conclusion that the new Florentine militia of 1506 took its inspiration from the Roman example, and that Machiavelli during his work on the ordinance continued to seek inspiration from Livy and to entertain the same positive view of the Romans as he had articulated in Del modo. Rather than assuming that he temporarily renounced the Roman model during his militia years, the evidence presented here suggests that Machiavelli by this time had come to realize that this political and military ideal would have to be suppressed, and kept secret, if the ordinance were to stand a chance of gaining the local support it so badly needed. This, in turn, would mean that the fundamental principles of Machiavelli's political teaching, to a far greater extent than has previously been assumed, were developed, evaluated and put into practice in connection to the militia project long b efore they appeared in writing.

CONCLUSION

The new militia of 1506 is one of the most intriguing episodes in the political history of the Florentine Renaissance, and carries great importance fo the light it sheds on the cultural modes and intellectual life of early Cinquecento Florence. This was a period that was characterized to a large extent by strong negative views of the example of the ancient Roman republic, the political, cultural and military ideal that had been at core of Renaissance humanism ever since the days of Petrarch. Situated within the context of the general Renaissance development, the intense anti-Roman sentiments of these years must be seen as a local intermezzo with few repercussions outside Florence. But even though it was short-lived, coming to an abrupt end with the return of the Medici to Florence in 1512, this reaction is of considerable general interest for the way in which it came to highlight many of the underlying contradictions and tensions of Renaissance political thought. Against the background uncovered here, it is p aradoxical, to say the least, that it was precisely during this period of anti-Romanita that Machiavelli and the Soderini brothers managed to introduce the military reform that many Quattrocento humanists had called for with explicit references to the Roman model. Part of the reason why they succeeded, was because they adopted a pragmatic step-by-step approach and chose to downplay the role of the Roman example in their official writings on the ordinance.

The militia project is crucial for our understanding of Machiavelli's changing attitude to the Roman example and his intellectual development in general as well. Back in 1503 the secretary had argued in Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati that in dealing with the Aretine rebellion Florence should imitate the Roman imperialist strategy based on a policy of the two extremes -- rule by destruction and by benefits. This advice clearly constituted an open challenge to the general view of the day, and consequently stood no chance of winning the support of the governing circles of Florence. In a pratica of January 1506, Piero Guicciardini had dismissed the idea of using the two extremes against Arezzo, because he judged it to be a "Roman thing." Machiavelli drew a lesson from his failure on the Aretine issue, and came to change his rhetorical strategy in the following years. It is within this context, that we should understand his and his associates' silence on the Roman model during the milit ia project. After the Medicean restoration in 1512, the Romans reappeared in Machiavelli's work, and in Florentine culture at large, with a vengeance. In The Prince, they are the prime model for expansionist warfare and imperialist strategy, and later in the Discourses and The Art of War Machiavelli devotes extensive analysis to their political and military system, and to the mentality that was the driving force behind their unprecedented territorial expansion and empire building. In these two latter works, Machiavelli also comments on the militia project of 1506, defending it against criticism and implying that it was based on the same Roman principles, as he elaborates on in his theoretical writings of the post-1512 period. These comments and the many suppressed references to the Romans in the unofficial writings on the militia suggest that the new Florentine ordinance took its inspiration from the military might of the ancient Roman republic.

(1.) On the militia in the writings of the Quattrocento humanists, see Bayley, 219-40. On Cecehi's view of the militia, see Tommasini, 1:343-46, and Chabod, 330.

(2.) Nardi, 1990, 130: "e cosi de' Nove della milizia, e a suo tempo e per la maggior parte per suo indirizzo e ordini fu fatta l'ordinanza della nostra milizia del contado." Compare Nardi, 1838-41, 1:371.

(6.) See Bertelli, 320.

(3.) Nicolai Rubinstein argues that Machiavelli's role in inspiring the project was considerable, while "the political realization was left to others" (Rubinstein, 1972, 16). A far greater role in the political maneuvering behind the project is ascribed to Machiavelli by Villari, 1:531, and Dionisotti, 1967, 960-75, rpt. in Dionisotti, 1980: 3-59.

(4.) Villari, 1:525 and 529.

(5.) Bayley, 249-50 and 256-58, Wood, xiv, and Gilbert, 1986, 22-23. Compare Butters, 106.

(7.) Tommasini, 1:342, and Hobohm, 1:51. For the same view, see also Chabod, 334-35.

(8.) Baron, 2:138-40. Quotation from p. 138.

(9.) In Del modo Machiavelli establishes a connection between the Roman republic's subjugation of Latium and Florence's current attempt to curb the Aretine rebellion by quoting the humanist commonplace that "history is the teacher of our actions (la istoria e la maestra delle azioni nostre)." The world, he assures us, has "always been inhabited in the same way by men, who have always had the same passions." There have always been those who have served and those who have commanded, and among those who have served, some who have done so willingly, and others who have done so unwillingly. In this constant order of things, towns and people have rebelled and been reconquered according to the same basic pattern. Should someone be in doubt about this, Machiavelli argues, he is welcome to reflect upon "Arezzo and all the towns in Valdichiana which last year did a thing very similar to what the Latin peoples did." For even if the ways in which the Aretines and the Latins revolted and were retaken differ considerably, the basic facts underlying the rebellion and the reconquest remain the same. For this reason, Machiavelli concludes, nothing should prevent the Florentines from following the Roman example of treating the rebel cities to either destruction or benefits according to merit. See Machiavelli, 1997, 1:24.

(10.) See Marchand, 133-141. Compare Tommasini, 1:352.

(11.) On the development of military thought and methods of warfare during the Renaissance, see Pieri, Mallet, 1974 and 1994, and Parker, 6-44.

(12.) On Francesco Soderini in general and his role in the militia project in particular, see Roslyn Pesman Cooper, 1982a, 342-57, and Lowe, 60-62.

(13.) Machiavelli, 1961, 126. Here and throughout, quotations in English from Machiavelli's correspondence are based on the translation by Atkinson and Sices, Machiavelli, 1996b.

(14.) For a recent discussion of the attempt to redirect the Arno and Machiavelli's role, see Masters, 96-101.

(15.) "Machiavelli, 1961, 135. For a commentary, see Marchand, 124n.

(16.) Machiavelli's original intention had been to dedicate the poem to Alamanno Salviati, who had vouched for Piero Soderini in the election for the gonfalonierate in 1502. But when the poem was published in February 1506, Machiavelli withdrew the dedicatory letter and chose to address it to the Florentine people instead.

(17.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:102, vv. 355-69. The question of who is indicated in this lines is contested. On the problem of the respective roles played by Salviati and Piero Soderini in Decennale primo, see Sasso, 1970, 216-228, rpt. in Sasso, 1988, 2:165-96. On the same issue, see also Pesman Cooper, 1982b, 126-28.

(18.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:107, vv. 549-50: "ma sarebbe il cammin facile e corto / se voi il tempio riaprissi a Marte." The port (porto) mentioned four verses above is a clear allusion to Pisa.

(19.) Bayley, 3. On the early Florentine militia, see Waley, 70-108, and Friedman, 41-43. On the Florentine military system of the second half of the Quattrocento, see Mallett, 1979, 1:149-164, and 1990, 174-77.

(20.) Chabod, 331-32.

(21.) On the use of gente comandata in 1505, see Machiavelli's letter to Antonio Giacomini of 19 August in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:50.

(22.) Pesman Cooper, 1982a, 348-49.

(23.) See Buonaccorsi, 100.

(24.) Pesman Cooper, 1982a, 346.

(25.) See Butters, 102-04, and Bayley, 251-52. The contemporary chroniders Parenti and Cerretani both claim that the introduction of the militia was a direct consequence of these military defeats. For quotations, see Pesman Cooper, 1982a, 349n. On the hopes created by Giacomini's victory over d'Alviano, see Buonaccorsi, 115, and Machiavelli's letter to Giacomini of 19 August 1505 in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:48-51. On his presence in the camp during August 1505, see ibid., 51-55.

(26.) Guiccuardini, 1931, 277: "in chi si confidava assai."

(27.) Ibid., 282.

(28.) Machiavelli to the Ten 2 January 1506, in Machiavelli, 1964, 2:927. The punishment for not appearing at the enrollment was a fine of twenty lire and four lashes.

(29.) Machiavelli, 1964, 2:930.

(30.) Ibid., 931.

(31.) Cerretani, 1993, 118. On the organization of the militia, see Chabod, 333.

(32.) Other similar displays were staged in Florence in April and June that year.

(33.) Landucci, 273: "E cost fu tenuto la piu bella cosa che si ordinassi mai per la citta di Firenze."

(34.) Ibid: "E questi erano soldati e stavansi a casa loro obrigati, quando bisognassi che sieno mossi; e a questo modo ordinava di farne molte migliaia per tutto el contado in modo che non bisognassi avere de' forestieri."

(35.) Quoted from Machiavelli, 1996b.

(36.) This letter has previously been falsely dated to 1507. On the date, see Rubinstein, 1972, 15.

(37.) Guicciardini, 1931, 281.

(38.) Villari, 1:526, and Butters, 108.

(39.) See Villari, 1:527 and 530. According to Villari the rest was successful.

(40.) Machiavelli, 1961, 157: "In sulle quail parole si maravigliorono giustamente, come cosa di grande momento."

(41.) Ibid., 158-59.

(42.) Ibid., 160-61.

(43.) Quoted from Atkinson and Sices, trans. and eds., 137.

(44.) Quoted from ibid., 133. In his letter to Machiavelli of 2l September, Biagio informed Machiavelli that Nasi "e homo da bene et vi ama non poco," and in the letter of 30 September he refers to him as "vostro amico" (Machiavelli, 1961, 163 and 165).

(45.) Ibid., 228-31.

(46.) Text in Machiavelli, 1997, 1:26-31.

(47.) Text in ibid., 31-43. See also Villari, 1:531, Tommasini, 1:366, and Nitti, 1:343. The ordinance was approved in the Council of Eighty by 62 to 28 votes, and in the Great Council by 841 votes against 317.

(48.) Machiavelli, 1961, 174-75.

(49.) Villari, 1:531. To judge by a letter from Agostino Vespucci to Machiavelli of 28 December 1506, in which Vespucci expresses his desire to be transferred to the Nine, Machiavelli's appointment as Chancellor of the Nine was regarded, at least in some quarters, as a pure formality. See Machiavelli, 1961, 175-77.

(50.) It was also stipulated that the members of the signoria, the Ten and the Eight could not be elected to the Nine.

(51.) See Canestrini, 393, 406, 410-11, 414-15, 418-19 and 423.

(52.) The importance of this form of accusations in a republic is emphasized by Machiavelli in Discorsi 1.7-8 (1997, 1:217-22). Compare Canestrini, 391, 394, 402, 424, 429.

(53.) "For this view, see Rubinstein, 1972, 5-25, esp. 7 and 16, and Pesman Cooper, 1982a.

(54.) Pieri, 442: "La milizia del Machiavelli non parve ai contemporanei nulla di straordinario, e il suo ricordo si lega soprattutto alla fama letteraria e politica dell'autore." For a similar view, see Butters, 106 and 134-37.

(55.) "Machiavelli, 1997, 1:35.

(56.) Cerretani, 1993, 120, and Tommasini, 1:362.

(57.) Cerretani, 1994, 347: "Et hebbe tantta reputatione che tutta Italia vi pose l'ochio et maxime la republica veneta che mandorno in chasenttino homini pratichi a vedere tale torniamentto." Later, the Venetian condottiere Ramazotto sought to hire soldiers among the Florentine militia conscripts; see Canestrini, ed., 424-27 and 476-77. On the recurrence of this problem, see Machiavelli's letter to the Ten of 7 March 1509, in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:242-43.

(58.) Quoted from Bertelli, 85: "Voi avere, secondo intendo, buone genti d'arme; ma avete bisogno d'un buon capo ... Se pure passassi [i.e. the Emperor], sara necessario che ciascuno si rassetti; e voi avete bisogno d'un buon capo."

(59.) Quoted from Tommasini, 1:371: "quali sono gia tutti armati e al continuo bene disciplinati per poter difendere e guardare lo stato loro."

(60.) Machiavelli, 1961, 185-86. See also Machiavelli's so-called Ghiribizo circa Iacopo Savello; text in Machiavelli, 1997, 1:44-45. Don Michelotto had been reappointed "Capitano di guardia del contado e distretto" as late as 27 February 1507. See Villari, 1:531. To judge by Acciaiuoli's letter of 4 December, Machiavelli was at the time seeking to have the office formerly held by don Michelotto renamed bargello despite the opposition of many leading citizens. See also Tommasini, 1:354n.

(61.) This plan repeated a strategy employed by the Florentines when they had first conquered Pisa in 1406, see ibid., 333, and Cerretani, 1994, 354.

(62.) Later a camp was also established at Mezzana to block the routes from Lucca to Pisa. On the Florentine camps in 1509, see Guicciardini, 1931, 338-39, and Guicciardini, 1929, 2:288. See also Villari, 2:97-99, and Tommasini, 1:446-48.

(63.) See for example the letters from Biagio Buonaccorsi and Piero Soderini to Machiavelli of 20 and 21 February in Machiavelli, 1961, 189-93. See also the dispatch from the Ten to Machiavelli of 15 February in Villari, 2:97.

(64.) On this issue, see Ridolfi, 107.

(65.) Machiavelli to the Ten 7 March 1509 in Machiavelli, 1813, 7: 241-42: "Quanto a fanti, le compagnie sono bellissime; e quanto allo stare iota volentieri, di quella di Antonio, e di Morgante io non ne ho avuto al mondo una briga." Machiavelli to the Ten 16 April 1509 in ibid., p. 260: "ed in veto la fanteria che ha Antonio cosi bella fanteria, come io credo sia oggi in Italia."

(66.) Machiavelli to the Ten 7 March 1509 in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:240-45.

(67.) On the negotiations, see Machiavelli, 1813, 7:246-55. See also Guicciardini, 1931, 334, Tommasini, 1:449-52, Villari, 2:99-103, and Ridolfi, 1963, 106-7.

(68.) Machiavelli to the Ten 16 April 1509 in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:261. Eng. trans. in Ridolfi, 1963, 107.

(69.) Antonio de Filicaia to the Ten 14 April 1509 in Machiavelli, 1813, 7:257.

(70.) Ibid., 272.

(71.) The official document is published in Tommasini, 1:685-701.

(72.) On the entry see Cerretani, 1994, 378, abd Buonaccorsi, 141. Compare Jacopo Nardi, 1838-41, 1:371. On Machiavelli's involvement and on the celebrations in Florence, see also Vaglienti, 223.

(73.) Machiavelli, 1961, 194: "Qui non e possibile potere exprimere quanta letitia, quanto jubilo et gaudio tutto questo popolo habbi preso della nuova della ricuperatione di cotesta citta di Pisa: ogni huomo quadammodo impaza di exultatione; sono fuochi per tutta la citta, ancor che non sieno le 21 hore: pensate quello is fara stasera di nocte," Atkkinson and Sices (180) render the somewhat crypitcal "le 21 hore," "three in the afternoon. " See also Filippo Casavecchia's letter of 17 June, ibid., 196.

(74.) Butters, 134-37, de-emphasizes the role played by the militia in the recovery of Pisa, and argued that this was due more to the successful peace-treaty concluded with Lucca, France and Spain at the beginning of 1509. Regardless of whether Butter's inference is correct, this view appears not to have been shared by Machiavelli and many of his contemporaries. See for example Nardi, 1838-41, 1:358.

(75.) Griffiths, 135-43.

(76.) Brown, 1961, 186-222, reprint in Brown, 1992, 3-40.

(77.) See Rubinstein, 1995, 61-67.

(78.) On the staging of this triumph, see Trexler, 451-52 and 486.

(79.) See Chretien, 63.

(80.) See Stephens, 154.

(81.) Gilbert, 1965, 36-37. The generally reliable index of the Consulte e practiche for the period 1498-1512 lists only five references to the Romans. See Fachard, ed., 1988 and 1993.

(82.) On the importance of the Venetian model in Florence at the turn of the sixteenth century, see Pocock, 111-13; Gilbert, 1965, 9-10, 36-37, 76, 78, and 102-04; Gilbert, 1968, 477-86; Weinstein, 151-156, 248-49, 251-53, 260-63, and 274; and Cervelli.

(83.) Fachard, ed., 1993, 2:821: "Et e' Romani ne' pericoli facevano uno dictare, ne si truova facessi mai se non bene; ma non parrebbe gia si facessi, perche non e di consuetudine della citta; ma darebbe bene auctorita a' X."

(84.) On the artistic decorations in and around the palace during this period, see Rubinsten, 1991.

(85.) On Filippino Lippi's frescos in the Strozzi chapel, see Berti and Baldini, 218-23.

(86.) Fachard, ed., 1988, 77: "fornire la forteza, guardare bene la citta et governarli bene. Che mandarvi nuovi habitatori era cosa de' Romani, et che non si usa al presente. Et vincerli con benefitii non si possano."

(87.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:388: "faccendo ai beneficati esenzioni, privilegi, donando loro la citta, e da ogni parte assicurandogli."

(88.) Ibid.: "dissiparongli talmente che con I'armi e con il consiglio non potevono piu nuocere."

(89.) Ibid.: "il che se avessono fatto, arebbero assicurato lo imperio loro e fatto grandissima la citta di Firenze, e datogli quegli campi che per vivere gli mancono."

(90.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:389.

(91.) Ibid.

(92.) Bayley, 237-39.

(93.) "Although Guicciardini's dialogue is written more than thirty years after the alleged meeting took place, we have good reasons to take Guicciardini's word, when in the preface to the dialogue (1932, 4) he states that the text is an authentic recapitulation of a conversation related to him by his father, Piero, one of the participants in the discussion. We can therefore assume that it presents a fair account of the intellectual dimate in Florence at the start of the Cinquecento. The English translation is Alison Brown's, see Guicciardini, 1994.

(94.) Guicciardini, 1932, 92; trans. Guicciardini, 1994, 90.

(95.) "Ibid., 156.

(96.) Compare Francesco Guicciardini's criticism of Machiavelli's view of the relationship between Rome's military orders and constitutional arrangements in "Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli," in Guicciardini, 1936, 10-11, 13-14, and 43.

(97.) Guicciardini, 1932, 154-55; trans. Guicciardini, 1994, 150.

(98.) Guicciardini, 1932, 91: "a qualquno parebbe impossibile, a molti pericolosa, a quasi tutti ridicula." trans. Guicciardini, 1994, 89.

(99.) Ibid., 547.

(100.) Ibid., 547: "Allegano i romani, i quali, mediante queste armi proprie, perderono la liberta."

(101.) See Fabrizia's explicit Statement in this connection: "Pertanto questi vostri uomini savi non deono misurare questa inutilita dallo avere perduto una volta, ma credere che, cosf come e' si perde, e si possa vincere e rimediare alla cagione della perdita. E quando ci cercassero questo, troverebbono che non sarebbe stato per difetto del modo, ma dell'ordine che non aveva la sua perfezione; e, come ho detto, dovevano provvedervi, non con biasimate l'ordinanza, ma con ricorreggerla; il che come si debbe fare, lo intenderete di mann in mano (Machiavelli, 1997, 1:548).

(102.) Machiavelli, 1961, 229: "Ma perche non si usa allegare i Romani, Lorenzo de' Medici disarmo ii popolo per tenere Firenze: messer Giovanni Bentivogli per tenere Bologna lo armo."

(103.) This was not the case for Savonarola himself, though. On his use of Roman examples, see for example Brown, 1992, 272-73.

(104.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:120: "alle quale metterete tutta la forza de l'ingegno e dottrina vostra."

(105.) Machiavelli, 1961, 196: "La vostra filosofia non credo che abbi a esser mai capacie a pazzi; e' savj non son tanti che bastino: voi m'intendete, benche non abbi sf bello porgere. Ongni df vi scopro el maggiore profeta che avessino mai li Ebrei o altra genetatione. Nicolo, Nicolo, in verita vi dico che io non posso dire quello vorrei."

(106.) Ibid., 228-29.

(107.) In Discorsi III. 36, Machiavelli himself claims that it is possible to acquire a firm understanding of military affairs from the reading of Livy alone: "E perche, con il testimonio di Tito Livio, ciascuno intenda come debbe essere fatra la buona milizia e come fatta la tea (Machiavelli, 1997, 1:507).

(108.) Machiavelli, 1961, 178: "Ne si vole credere che le altre natione ad questi tempi siano superiore al nostro peditato, se non perche loro retengono la disciplina, quale gia gran tempo e shandita de Italia. Et non debbe essere poca la contenteza vostra, che per vostre mano sia dato principio a si degna cosa: vogliate perseverare et condurla al desiato fine. Saviamente scrivete che ad questo principio sopra tutto bisogna la iustizia, cosf ne la cita come nel contado. Er benche lo ilimo S.r Confaloneri intenda la necessita publica ed ad quella dia ogni opera pure, excitati dal scrivere vostro, al presente recordamo et non cessaremo per lo advenire di recordare quanto ne scrivete, che ancora noi stimiamo sia necessario." Eng. trans., Machiavelli, 1996b, 120-21.

(109.) Machiavelli, 1997, 26-27: "ordinarsi all' armi per deliberatione pubblica." On the close attention paid to military discipline during the early stages of the militia project, see for example Machiavelli, 1961, 163-64; Machiavelli, 1997, 1:29-30 and 40-41; and Canestrini, 414, 423 and 427-29.

(110.) Machiavelli 1997, 1:493: "non permette mai che una moltitudine pigli l'arme se non con certo ordine e certo modo."

(111.) Ibid., 507: "dove non furore naturale ne ordine accidentale."

(112.) Ibid., 658.

(113.) Ibid., 658.

(114.) Passerini, 304: "Et sa V.S. per dottrina et per esperienzia che nissuna cosa ha fatto illustre l'arte militare se non la disciplina ... Et sono certo che volendo vostra Signoria renovare in la nazione fiorentina l'arte militare, cosa hodie summe necessaria, avanti ogni cosa renovara la obedienzia per la justizia, si ne la citta come nel contado; onde per esemplo fia piu facile cominciare preponendo qualche ministro simile a Manilo e Torquato, rigido et severo; el quale ne le cose liquide proceda alla esecuzione de fatto." There is some confusion about how Cardinal Soderini's reference to the Roman example should be transcribed. While Passerini renders it "Manlio e Torquato;" Jean-Jacques Marchand quotes it as "Manli Torquato," see Marchand, 125. If Francesco Soderini here was referring to two different Re mans, as Passerini's citation implies, the other Manlius would most probably be Manliu Capitolinus, who saved Rome from the Gauls in 390 BC. Since Machiavelli in Discorsi III.8 depicts Manlius Capitol inus as embodying similar qualities to Manlius Torquatus, the question of how this reference should be read does not seriously affect the argument presented here. I have chosen to accept Marchand's reading, which I also find to be the most reasonable one. For if the Cardinal's intention had been to bring up both Manlius Capitolinus and Manlius Torquatus. why did he nor simply write "Capitolino e Torquato" to avoid confusion? For another possible explanation to the little inserted "e" between "Manlio" and "Torquato," se note 119 below.

(115.) Ibid., 304: "Et anche piu grande cose sono fatte con poca gente quando Ia disciplina le ha governate, che non s'e fatto con grandi eserciti male disciplinati."

(116.) That Machiavelli actually made this claim is evident from Francesco Soderini's reply to him of 4 March 1506 (Machiavelli, 1961, 178): "Saviamente scrivete che ad questo principio sopra tutto bisogna la iusrizia, cosf ne la cita come nel contado." In the letter to hi brother of the same date, the Cardinal similarly argues that the military reform under discussion requires a revival of "la obedienzia per la justizia, sl ne la citta come nel contado." Forth latter quotation, see note 114 above.

(117.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:476: "con ogni generazione di severita."

(118.) [bid. "fu costretto procedere sf rigidamente."

(119.) If so was the case, the little inserted "e" between "Manlio" and "Torquaro" in Francesco's letter to Piero of 4 March could be explained as a simple misrepresentation of Machivalli's original reference to Manlius Torquatus. Compare note 114 above.

(120.) On don Michelotto, see Tommasini, 1:351-54, Dionisotti, 1980, 3-59, Sasso, 1969, 1-36, reprint in Sasso, 1988, 2:57-118, and Pesman Cooper, 1982a.

(121.) Biagio Buonaccorsi, 84 speaks of him as Cesare Borgia's fidatissimo.

(122.) Mallett, 1969, 176-78.

(123.) Cerretani, 1994, 303. See also Mallett, 1969, 185-87.

(124.) Compare Cerretani, 1993, 64.

(125.) On this episode, see ibid., 69 and Cerretani, 1994, 314-15. For a general account, see Mallett, 1969, 203-4. Don Michelotto's criminal career continued after the deeds in Senigallia. On 18 January 1503, he is reported to have strangled and drowned Paolo and Francesco Orsini in Pieve di Cento and, according to Cerretani, he was then sent to Citta di Castello where he cut to pieces the bishop of the town, Vitelozzo's brother Giulio. See Cerretani, 1993, 69, and Cerretani, 1994, 315. At the end of July 1503, he captured and disposed of two of Cesare Borgia's captains, who had tried to desert him. He was later in the year repaid for his faithful and dedicated service, when the duke created him lord of Montegridolfo. He also stood by Cesare Borgia after the death of Alexander VI on 21 August, and is documented to have served under the Duke as late as December 1503. See Cerretani, 1993, 86, and 90.

(126.) capture is commented on in Cerretani, 1993, 94-95 and Cerretani, 1994, 328. Machiavelli, who was the Florentine envoy to the curia at the time, wrote home to inform the authorities that the arrest had been greeted with satisfaction at the court since it was regarded as an opportunity "to disclose all the cruelties involving robberies, murders, sacrileges and other innumerable evils which for the last eleven years have been committed in Rome against God and against men." See Machiavelli, 1964, 2:702.

(127.) Pesman Cooper, 1982a, 351.

(128.) For explicit comments by Machiavelli on don Michelorto during his mission to the court of Cesare Borgia in late 1502, see Machiavelli, 1964, 2:287, 294, 347-48.

(129.) Quoted from Machiavelli, 1996b, 161.

(130.) Dionisotti argues (1980, 3-59) that Machiavelli was responsible for don Michelotto's appointment, Pesman Cooper makes the case (1982a, 352) for the nomination being the work of Cardinal Soderini. Machiavelli had during his diplomatic mission to Cesare Borgia in late 1502 sought to persuade the Florentine authorities to grant the duke, don Michelotto's employer at the time, a military condotta.

(131.) Dionisotti, 1980, 3-59. For a critical view of this thesis, see Sasso, 1988, 2:57-118.

(132.) Here I am referring especially to Discord 111.3 (Machiavelli, 1997, 1:422-23) which Dionisotti does not quote.

(133.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:476-77: "Vedendo dunque un uomo cosi fatto a grado che comandi, desidera di trovare tutti gli uomini simili a se, e l'animo suo forte gli fa comandare cose forti e quel medesimo, comandate che le sono, vuole si osservino. Ed e una regola verissima che, quando si comanda cose aspre, conviene con asprezza farle osservare, altrimenti, te ne troverresti ingannato. Dove e da notare che, a volere essere ubbidito, e neeessario saper comandare: e coloro sanno comandare che fanno comparazione dalle qualita loro a quelle di chi ha ad ubbidire, e quando vi veggono proporzione, allora comandino, quando sproporzione, se ne astenghino."

(134.) Ibid., 477.

(135.) Ibid., 1997, 1:479: "in uno cittadino che viva sotto le leggi d'una republica, credo sia piu laudabile e meno pericoloso il procedere di Manlio: perche questo modo tutto e in favore del publico e non risguarda in alcuna parte all' ambizione privata: perche tale modo non si puo acquistare partigiani, mostrandosi sempre aspro a ciascuno ed amando solo il bene commune."

(136.) Ibid., 479: "cattivi effetti contro alla liberta."

(137.) Ibid., 480: "Preparano la via alla tirannide."

(138.) Jacopo Nardi, who frequented the Orti Oricellari together with Machiavelli, portrays the Florentine military commander Antonio Giacomini in his Vita di Antonio Giacomini as a virtuous middle way between Manlius and Valerius: "Ma tornando alla considerazione della severita di [Giacomini], per la quale diciamo che egli dentro e fuora fu specialmente nominato e essaltato, questa cosa era degna di grandissima maraviglia, ch'egli fusse amato e desiderato e parimente reverito e temuto da' suoi soldati, con cio sia cosa che dal timore nasca l'odio, come si vede manifestamente da una parte per gli essempi di Lucio Papirio e di Manlio Torquato, amendue per la loro severita temuti e odiati" (Nardi, 1990:126). It is worth noting that Nardi here uses the same categories as Machiavelli employs in Discorsi III.22 (Machiavelli, 1997, 1:476-80).

(139.) Canestrini, ed., 411: "Ricordiamovi solo per ultimo, che non vi travagliate in alcuna cosa civile."

(140.) Quoted from Machiavelli, 1996b, 162.

(141.) Ibid., 160.

(142.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:198: "antiqua virtu." Compare Discorsi III. 1 (ibid., 416-20), and Guicciardini, 1931, 281-82.

(143.) Ibid., 1931, 281.

(144.) This project is celebrated by Machiavelli in chapter eight of Il principe.

(145.) Landucci, 275. Compare Dionisotti, 1980, 12, and Cerretani, 1993, 120.

(146.) Vaglienti, 205 and 208.

(147.) See the instructions given to don Michelotto in Canestrini, ed., 410-11.

(148.) Ibid., 418-19.

(149.) Ibid., 426: "Noi disegnamo, per dare terrore ad chi volessi disubbidire, e rendere reputazione ad questa cosa, di mandare costa Don Michele."

(150.) Letter from Machiavelli to Giovanni Ridolfi of 12 June 1506: "Ed essendo dall'altro canto uso, mentre fu con il Duca, a comandare e maneggiare simili uomini, pensiamo, quando si potessi, che sarebbe da alloggiarlo costi con loro, accio prima lui li praticassi, e dipoi, bisognando correre in un subito in qualche luogo, fossi pur presto con li suoi fanti insieme con loro, i quali per averli veduti e maneggiati in su le mostre, possono etiam meglio convenire costa nelle fazione." (Quoted from Villari, 1:527).

(151.) Machiavelli, 1997, 1:24-25.

(152.) Machiavelli, 1961, 280: "Et Pellegrino Lorini mi disse gia che quando si vennono con Beaumont a Pisa, spesso havieno ragionamento seco della virtu della militia loro, et che l'era simile a quella de' Romani, et quale era la cagione che non potessino fate un dl come e' Romani; vantavansi d'haver dato a Francia tutte le victorie haveva haute fino a quel di, et che non sapevano perche e' non potessino un giorno combattare per loro proprii." Translation based on Machiavelli, 1996b, 250.

(153.) On Machiavelli's view of the Swiss militia, see Walderer, and Najemy, 160 and 183.

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