Pentagon reviewing proposal to create 'Logistics Command'.

Seeking to fix longstanding snags in military logistics operations, the Pentagon is considering a possible merger of the U.S. Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency.

Shortcomings in what the Defense Department calls the "sustainment" of forces in the field--the ability to keep troops fed, ammunition stocked and vehicles fueled over an extended deployment--have prompted a number of studies and calls for reform.

How to best manage and execute logistics operations has been debated for decades. It is not uncommon to hear that military commanders "don't trust the system" to deliver the needed supplies on time. The problem becomes particularly acute in wartime, when the logistics pipelines are overstretched.

With the United States at war in Iraq, Afghanistan and with forces deployed in peacekeeping roles elsewhere, the "sustainment" problem will get worse, unless the Pentagon takes action to revamp logistics practices, officials said.

"All things have a time for change. Maybe this is the moment to change," said Navy Rear Adm. Christopher Ames, director of plans and policy at the U.S. Transportation Command.

Ames believes that combining Transportation Command and DLA under a single organization would go a long way to improve the logistics support to U.S. forces. Commanders in the field today do not get adequate support, due to a lack of synchronization between transportation and supply providers, Ames said in an interview.

"We have two stovepipes," he said. One is the Transportation Command, responsible for moving equipment and troops. The other is DLA, which purchases and stores supplies.

"Right now, the two are not joined in a harmonious end-to-end system," said Ames. "We have fragmented into stovepipes two different elements that should be joint: transportation and supply." The upshot is that the suppliers are not making the most efficient use of transportation resources, he said. "To best support the war fighter, we have to maximize the productivity of each of our precious lift assets."

Further, the current system is "convoluted," he explained. Anyone would have a hard time sketching in a wire diagram "the way we order parts, the way we ship them, the way we draw them from warehouses, the way they are moved to vendors, on trains, planes and ships, before they get to the end user.

A merger of DLA and Transportation Command would create a "single accountable individual" who would be responsible for the entire logistics process, said Ames. "Commanders want a single face to turn to when they want to know 'Where is the stuff?'"

With separate chains of command, coordination is difficult. The Transportation Command, headed by a four-star officer, reports directly to the defense secretary. Overseeing DLA is the office of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

Essentially, Ames said, "We have various folks in charge of the supply side and one person in charge of transportation. ... If we could put both under one person and make him accountable for supply and transportation, we would have a better system."

Ideally, "If one person had responsibility for end-to-end logistics, then he would have knowledge of the requirement, before the supplies roll off the assembly line, he would know when it's due. He would ensure there is a harmonious marriage between production, transportation to the right type of lift asset and ensure that its arrival at point of debarkation was synchronized with the departure of the appropriate vessel and prioritize accordingly."

For the supply chain to work efficiently, said Ames, one person has to have "end-to-end visibility" of every step in the process--from the time a soldier in the field makes a request to final delivery.

Under the current setup, supplies from DLA, for example, are handed off to the Transportation Command to be shipped. "But neither one of them provides end-to-end visibility, from source of supply to ultimate destination. Each has its niche of information."

Ames suggests that the Defense Department should assign a combatant command--a U.S. Logistics Command, for example--to oversee all the functions now done by Transportation Command and DLA.

It is not yet clear whether the office of the defense secretary plans to move forward with the creation of a Logistics Command. As is the case any time the government contemplates major reorganizations, the bureaucracies tend to protect their "rice bowls."

Ames said resistance to change is expected. "Prudent decision makers will have opportunities to examine both sides and make a reasoned decision. Perhaps that decision breaks rice bowls."

DLA officials declined to comment for this article. A DLA spokesperson referred all questions to Alan Estevez, the assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for supply chain integration.

Estevez said it is too early to predict what will happen. "I don't know if there is going to be a merger," he said. "The Department is looking at it."

It would be premature to conclude a merger is needed, before the Defense Department establishes the "business process" that should be followed, in order to improve the logistics support to front-line forces, Estevez said. "Any organizational fixes should follow the business process." His office is working on ways to improve business practices, under a program called Future Logistics Enterprise.

To say that combining Transportation Command and DLA would fix the gaps in the system would be a flawed premise, he noted, because "you would not be addressing the entire supply chain, but only one supplier and the transportation provider, rather than all the suppliers." DLA is one among several military agencies and private entities that purchase and manage supplies, Estevez said. "There are lots of ways to improve the process. Merging DLA and Transportation Command does not establish a single point of contact in the supply chain."

Short of a merger, he added, there should be greater collaboration between the suppliers and the transportation providers, making more information available to each other. The key issue, said Estevez, "is not whether we are making the optimum use of the transportation. It's whether we are optimally supporting the demand of the customer."

Traditionally, commanders lack confidence in the system, because "they haven't built a strong relationship" with suppliers. Under the Future Logistics Enterprise, he said, "we are pushing the coordination and collaboration between customers [war fighters] and suppliers. ... In wartime, there are constraints in the pipeline, so the customer has to prioritize."

RELATED ARTICLE: War prompts urgent requests for sniper rifles.

The Army has purchased several hundred new .50 caliber sniper rifles, many of which were shipped to Iraq at the outset of the war.

The weapon has not yet been "type-classified" as an official acquisition program, but urgent requests from light-infantry and special-operations units prompted the Army to accelerate the deployment of the so-called XM 107 long-range sniper rifle.

The rapid fire, semi- automatic rifle works at standoff ranges of 1,000 to 1,500 meters.

When the war broke out in Afghanistan, the Army bought 50 XM 107 rifles for Army Special Operations units, for the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne divisions. Since that time, "several hundred XM 107s have and continue to be fielded to select units" fighting in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, said Army spokeswoman Beth Sarratt.

She said the XM107 is scheduled to be type-classified in the coming months, with a large-scale production contract to follow shortly afterwards. The manufacturer is Barrett Firearms.

The Army hopes to begin fielding the rifle in late 2003, upon successful completion of various tests, said Sarratt. The Army could order as many as 3,000 XM107s.

The XM107 is considered a "commercially available, non-developmental item," which makes the procurement less cumbersome than Army-unique weapons.

"Both technical and operational test and evaluation have been conducted to certify that the weapon meets Army operational requirements," she added. "Independent system evaluations are currently in progress as a pre cursor to any type-classification action."

The XM107 is designed to replace the M82A3 sniper rifle, said small-arms expert Charlie Cutshaw.

The 23-pound, 4-foot long XM107 is both lighter and shorter than the M82A3, also made by Barrett. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have used variants of the M82 sniper rifles for more than 20 years.

Army and Marine snipers typically employ .50 caliber rifles to disable parked aircraft (by shooting at the engine), destroy radar vans and mobile communications systems. Special operators in Afghanistan, however, employed the XM107 as anti-personnel weapons against Taliban fighters.

Additionally, the .50 caliber rifle commonly is used to destroy unwanted unexploded munitions.

The ammunition for the XM107 is a .50 caliber BMG (Browning Machine Gun) 12.7 x 99 mm round. The services, nonetheless, are considering other types of rounds, said Cutshaw.

This month, the Army is beginning the process of selecting a new night-sight and a new telescopic day-sight for the XM107. The night-sight will be a military-unique 3rd Generation image-intensification scope. For the day-sight, the Army is expected to select a commercial off-the-shelf optic.

Until the new sight is available, XM107 shooters are using a thermal weapon sight.

Ideally, snipers would like to have a combined thermal/image intensifier sight in their weapon, a technology that is still in early stages of development, said Maj. Roy Manauis, a procurement officer for Army soldier systems. "Snipers like to positively ID the target," he said.

The thermal sight works OK at night, but the resolution is not as sharp as snipers would like, Manauis said. Snipers also would like for the night sight to clip on the day optic. "They don't want to have to take off the day optic" when they are using the night sight.

Sandra I. Erwin