Paving the way for air maneuver: defeating COE OPFOR air defenses.

The world witnessed the devastating effectiveness of US air power and the ruthless efficiency of attack aviation during Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf. The US rapidly defeated Iraq's air defenses, considered some of the best in the world. Operations in Iraq and then Bosnia and Kosovo have hammered home the same lesson to nations opposing the United States: nothing less than a first-class air defense network will do. In the decade following the Gulf War, nations around the world have spent significant time and treasure upgrading and improving the quality and quantity of their air defenses.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) contemporary operational environment (COE) opposing force (OPFOR) replicates these worldwide improvements in air defenses. The air defense artillery (ADA) capabilities of the COE OPFOR are designed to blunt the American military's superior fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft advantage.

The COE OPFOR's air defenses are an ultra-modem, high-density integrated air defense system (IADS) using a dangerous mix of infrared (IR) man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), guns, gun-missiles and medium- and long-range missile systems all tied into a substantial air surveillance radar system. Now more than ever, fire supporters must enable the US air power advantage with prolific and effective suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

COE OPFOR ADA Order of Battle.

While the exact composition of the COE OPEOR varies with each exercise or rotation, the COE OPFOR has a structure that forms the basis for understanding the nature of the threat. (See Figures l, 2, 3 and 4 on Pages 15, 16, 17 and 18.)

The OPFOR has brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and division tactical groups (DTGs) within an operational strategic command (OSC). Each BTG has a battalion of ADA. Each DTG has a brigade or regiment of ADA, usually a mix of mobile medium-range systems and, possibly, some long-range systems allocated from the OSC.

The OSC retains control of two to three brigades of additional ADA, usually a mix of MANPADS units and long-range theater air defense systems. This creates a 3:1 quantitative increase in air defense assets when compared to the old OPFOR--in addition to a dramatic qualitative increase in the types of ADA weapons systems and in their effective ranges and capabilities.

COE ADA OPFOR Strengths. The weapons systems mix creates a difficult challenge for US aircraft and SEAD planners. The mix is a combination of low-, medium- and high-altitude coverage of the long-range radar-equipped SA-10/11/12 systems; low- to medium-altitude coverage of the medium-range radar-equipped 2S6, Crotale and SA-8b of the divisional and brigade ADA assets; and the low-altitude IR MANPADS threat found in OPFOR maneuver units. This creates an overlapping and redundant threat of mobile long-range systems, mobile medium-range systems and point-defense MANPADS, the latter unseen from an intelligence collection and targeting perspective.

Quantity. The sheer number of ADA systems increases the number of artillery firing units required for SEAD. Where SEAD plans used to have a maximum of 10 to 12 targets, US forces now routinely deal with SEAD plans with 20 to 30 targets.

Quality: Integrated Radar-Based Systems. Targeting ADA used to focus on destroying separate radars that enabled rapid neutralization of the entire gun-based air defense system. We used to find the Dogear radars and destroy them, severely degrading the S-60- and SA-13-based air threat.

Now, the majority of weapon systems in the ADA order of battle have their own integrated radar or on-board radar. This requires the SEAD planner to target every ADA weapon system rather than a few carefully selected critical nodes. This is another key factor in driving up the number of targets in a SEAD plan and the artillery firing units required to execute it.

Quality: Increased Range and Mobility. The air defense network is more lethal and mobile than its predecessor. Frontline ADA systems have an excellent combination of range and mobility--some systems can fire on-the move. The COE OPFOR equivalent of direct support (DS) ADA (2S6 and Crotale) can range out to 10 kilometers, and its DTG ADA brigade assets (2S6, Crotale, SA-8b and SA-15) can often extend out to 15 kilometers. Because of the weapons' longer ranges and overlapping area coverage, more ADA systems can attack aircraft at one time and at standoff ranges from the AH-64D Apache helicopter's self-SEAD capabilities. The mobility of these air defense systems also creates a requirement for near continuous intelligence collection to maintain a relevant targeting picture.

Exploiting COE ADA OPFOR Vulnerabilities. Aspects of the COE ADA threat can be exploited, however. While the OPFOR has acquired a substantial increase in range and all-weather, all-aspect capabilities, his ADA is now primarily radar-equipped, and he relies on those radars for tracking and engagement. This allows the US to conduct proactive targeting using electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection assets by streamlining the ELINT processing time from acquisition to targeting team to shooter.

Lethal SEAD: Counter-ADA Fire. In fighting the COE OPFOR during a BCTP Warfighter, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, found the COE ADA capabilities created a requirement for a focused counter-ADA fight that closely resembles the artillery counterfire fight.

The 3d Division's analysis and control element (ACE) reduced this time to a 30-minute cycle, enabling the division FA intelligence officer (FAIO) and the aviation brigade fire support element (FSE) to conduct targeting drills similar to those used to assess and process Q-37 acquisitions. This enables a proactive counter-ADA plan that kills threat systems as acquired, if the ELINT target location error (TLE) is within acceptable accuracy levels.

Nonlethal SEAD: JSEAD and Deception. The OPFOR's radar-based ADA also increases the effectiveness of joint SEAD (JSEAD)--for example, EA-6B Prowler jamming and high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) engagements of the OPFOR ADA.

The OPFOR ADA systems are networked to some degree. At a minimum, the OPFOR uses his long-range radarequipped systems and air surveillance radars to cue other ADA systems to incoming aircraft. Identifying and jamming these communications nets at critical times can degrade the system and force individual ADA systems into fighting a piecemeal, rather than integrated, battle. It is important to remember, however, that the individual component systems are still very capable of destroying aircraft and must be dealt with as well.

While the COE OPFOR has a large number of capable systems, he arrays them in depth across his battlespace. By deceiving the ADA network and isolating portions of it, US forces can overwhelm specific sectors and conduct air operations with relative success.

This is particularly true in close operations by attack helicopters at night. By operating on the friendly side of the forward-line-of-own-troops (FLOT), the helicopters minimize the number of medium- and long-range ADA systems that can engage aircraft. By operating at night, the helicopters negate the primary short-range threat (MANPADS IR) significantly.

Deception of the network can be achieved via a mix of false attacks using UH-60s or AH-64s along the width of the division's battlespace. The use of USAF and USN target drones and aircraft-towed decoys can augment this deception effort. Deception may be required to force the frontline ADA threat to activate its radars so friendly forces can acquire the systems with ELINT collectors.

Combining these jamming and deception efforts with lethal SEAD and JSEAD attacks greatly complicates the tactical problem for the OPFOR ADA and its decision-makers.

Repeated lethal and nonlethal attacks along multiple avenues of approach paired with deception operations using other aircraft, ideally simultaneously conducted with close air support (CAS) attacks from a different direction, will dilute and degrade the network. Use of these tactics destroys key frontline ADA assets, reduces the ADA threat at the critical point or sector and forces the threat to replace them with other systems previously arrayed in depth.

Over several days, this process opens gaps in the IADS and, eventually, allows friendly forces to overwhelm the threat. To execute this type of operation, however, requires a systematic approach to SEAD rather than the single-mission or single-event approach we currently use. In effect, it requires a detailed SEAD campaign fought over days or weeks and waged at the division and corps levels.

SEAD Campaign Planning. SEAD campaign planning is not a new idea, but it may be a new concept for Army planners and targeting teams at the division level.

The USAF has designed and fought SEAD campaigns for several decades as part of its "counterair" and "air superiority" campaigns. While the scope and tools employed in Air Force campaigns cannot all be employed directly by tactical-level organizations, the concepts and approaches are applicable.

The 3d Division adopted and modified many of those tools and tactics to attack the COE OPFOR ADA. Most of the planning occurred at the aviation brigade. The division main command post (DMAIN) and the division targeting team provided extensive intelligence support and resources for the plan.

Early on in SEAD campaign planning, units must accept that they face an integrated system rather than a large number of independent threat systems. The comparison is similar to the difference between a large number of individual howitzers and rocket launchers and a division artillery. The former has a quantitative value as a potential capability that is only realized when it's paired with a command and control system for planning and executing operations. The latter has that organization, communications and expertise that allows it to create effects greater than the sum of its parts.

In recognizing the nature of the threat, decision makers also must commit to conducting detailed and resource-intensive operations to negate and destroy the IADS threat. Without their commitment, no amount of planning will matter. Their support will be required to enforce the allocation of scarce resources and fight for the joint assets needed to wage this kind of campaign.

While each IADS is different, there are several key areas that targeting teams should analyze to begin their assessment. (See Figure 5.)

SEAD and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).SEAD campaign planning follows a logical thought process similar to the MDMP. First is the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the ADA network. The intent is to identify how the system operates; its strengths and weaknesses; and the actions, capabilities or equipment the system requires to operate in an integrated form. The critical nodes, actions and processes are identified as high-value targets (HVTs). These form the basis for high-payoff targets (HPTs) and the HPT list (HPTL) as in any other targeting process.

First planners look at the objectives to support the commander's goals. Mission analysis for the operation usually identifies particular tasks for fire support. These usually identify air freedom of maneuver as an essential task for the division and aviation brigade.

It is important to refine the essential task statement of "what to achieve" into discrete tasks and effects that must be accomplished to meet the objective. Is destruction required to achieve the objectives or will suppression suffice? Is the entire IADS the focus or will specific sectors or air defense systems at given times and phases be adequate? By determining these requirements early, planners can enable a more focused approach in developing courses of action (COAs) later.

The SEAD campaign planning process next looks at what intelligence collection assets are available to locate and monitor the HVTs within the IADS. The ability to find and track specific IADS HVTs is the limiting factor in the ability to target and engage these HVTs. Those found by collection assets are nominated as HPTs. At this point, HVTs/HPTs should not be limited by engagement capabilities. JSEAD assets, if made available, allow engagement throughout the division's area of operations.

Each COA is tailored to the operational plans and time line of the division or corps. A SEAD campaign has some general requirements and phases that help structure the overall campaign plan.

The first phase develops a picture of the strength, locations and disposition of the ADA threat. This is a collection-heavy phase that identifies the type, quantity, locations and operating patterns of the air defense network. This phase may require the SEAD planner to take measures to force the network to activate its radars so friendly forces can acquire and attack them. This phase often initiates the campaign's deception operations and sets the stage for early efforts to degrade the network with lethal attacks. It is a shaping operation designed to set the conditions for rotary-wing attack assets along or beyond the FLOT.

As operational requirements dictate the employment of aviation assets and GAS along and beyond the FLOT, the SEAD campaign shifts its focus to specific sectors and (or) threat systems that must be negated to enable rotary-wing and GAS attacks within the division's overall scheme of maneuver. This phase is generally characterized by continued active and passive measures to acquire, track and engage ADA weapon systems along with rotary-wing feints and decoy operations to disorient and dilute the ADA coverage and achieve air freedom of maneuver in selected sectors. Artillery-delivered SEAD fires increase in this phase both to reduce the selected threats to Army aviation and fixed-wing forces and to conduct lethal deception on targets in and out of the key sector. Electronic attack by jamming FM communications on ADA command and control nets just before actual and decoy rotary-wing attacks reduces the integration of the network and forces individual ADA systems to acquire threats and fight independently.

The use of JSEAD assets to attack long-range ADA weapons systems, air surveillance radars and target acquisition radars begins to increase in this phase. This phase continues division shaping operations with a new focus on disrupting and destroying key ADA network integration nodes that threaten friendly air maneuver in a sector.

The effects of SEAD campaign actions begin to accumulate and generate confusion, causing the OPFOR to reshuffle air defense assets. The OPFOR will replace destroyed ADA systems by repositioning his remaining assets. He also will alter his operational patterns to try to compensate for previous weaknesses in the integrated network.

These enemy countermeasures generate a renewed requirement for focused intelligence collection and analysis. As the collection process identifies changes in the network's disposition and operational patterns, immediate attack by lethal and nonlethal assets should be directed. The key is to respond faster than the network can react. These actions will disrupt the ADA network further and force acquisition and engagement gaps to appear in the IADS. Air defense assets will begin to fight separate, piecemeal battles against air threats, reducing their effectiveness and increasing their vulnerabilities.

As gaps appear and ADA threats are destroyed, the IADS will disintegrate. The network will disappear, leaving individual weapon system operators and small units afraid to activate their radars or engage aircraft after seeing the repeated danger in doing so. The amount of airspace each node is supposed to cover will have increased to the point where overlapping fields of fire across both the width and depth of the division sector will no longer exist. At that point, friendly rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft will be able to conduct relatively unrestricted air maneuver that requires only local suppression efforts.

Effects-Based Approach. The 3d Division used an effects-based approach for COA development in SEAD campaign planning. Having identified the HPTs within the air defense network, the targeting team examined the effects needed on both the network and HPT sets to achieve objectives.

There are several reasons to focus on the effects rather than targets. First, it is the effect rather than the target or target set that achieves an objective. A unit can engage and even destroy specific targets without achieving its objective if the targets require additional effects to achieve the objective. In addition, physical suppression or destruction may not be necessary to achieve the desired effect.

By focusing on desired effects, SEAD planners can husband scarce resources. By focusing on effects, they can identify the requirements in time and space and in their proper order and linkage.

Second, there are often several ways to create a desired effect. If the goal, for example, is to prevent medium-range airdefense systems from attacking Army aviation assets as they cross the FLOT to engage enemy armor in a specific engagement area at a specific time, there are several ways to achieve this. There is the more traditional lethal SEAD plus jamming and deception means already discussed. But if the OPFOR ADA node requires permission from its higher headquarters to fire before it can launch missiles, disrupting its FM communications by ground or air assets may achieve the effect.

Planners should consider all possible ways to create the desired effect. This approach allows the targeting team to use the maximum number of means to achieve its goals.

By identifying the required effects in the proper sequence and by linking them to the various methods available to create the effects, the targeting team begins developing COAs. As options for achieving the effects are chosen in a COA, the resources and positioning or range requirements are identified and sequenced for lethal and nonlethal JSEAD, GAS, artillery, deception aircraft/decoy/drone missions and FM communications jamming. As these resources are committed, other options are identified to achieve concurrent or near-concurrent effects.

The specific intelligence collection requirements to achieve these effects are similarly identified, sequenced and correlated in time and space. This begins a "wargaming" process that assesses the options that best achieve the desired effects and develops an integrated plan that executes the decide, detect, deliver and assess phases of the targeting process.

Unlike traditional wargaming in the MDMP, however, the 3d Division iteratively reviewed each required effect and its chosen method, sequenced in time and space, to develop the plan in detail. Like the MDMP, it results in a synchronization tool we called a SEAD campaign execution matrix. (See Figures 6 and 7.)

We found that other targeting priorities and requirements must be interwoven with the SEAD planning process. If other target sets are of higher priority, their requirements for intelligence collection and engagement assets are factored into the SEAD COA. first, and then the means to create the desired SEAD campaign effects are chosen from the remaining options. If other target sets are of lower priority, the process helps to prevent the dilution or diversion of collection assets and engagement means in the overall targeting process.

The DMAIN plays a critical role here. It provides the "sanity check" on the SEAD plan and confirms the campaign meshes with the division's scheme of maneuver and meets the commander's intent and priorities.

A SEAD campaign execution matrix allows all members of the targeting team to visualize the resources employed in the campaign, the interrelationships between different actions, the effects they are designed to achieve, the nesting of the SEAD campaign in air tasking order (ATO) cycles and the division's operational phases and time line. It is, in effect, a blueprint or roadmap of how the IADS will be identified and attacked.

This visualization is critical because, inevitably, some resources, particularly JSEAD assets, will not be provided or provided in the quantities requested. Intelligence collection means will be diverted or the collection plan altered in some fashion. Rotary-wing asset availability could be reduced by maintenance issues, combat losses or unanticipated missions. Each of these potential changes will have an impact on the plan. The SEAD campaign execution matrix allows staff officers and decision makers to assess the second and third order impact of these changes.

The SEAD campaign reflects a series of linked collection, deception and lethal and nonlethal attack actions to create a set of effects to defeat the COE OPFOR ADA, enabling friendly aviation air maneuver. The combination of lethal and nonlethal indirect fires with fixed- and rotary-wing observation and attack aircraft remains one of the Army's most potent combat teams. Neutralizing threats to our air assets is a key targeting function, The Army's fire support community must employ the entire spectrum of joint and combined arms assets to pave the way for air maneuver.

Figure 6

Supperssion of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Campaign Execution Matrix Day
1, Phase IIIC2 (Attack in Zone)

                SUN 271800 JAN (D+2)
                         to
                MON 282400 JAN (D+2)     MON 280001 JAN (D+3) to
                      - ATO C            MON 280600 JAN (D+3) - ATO C

TOT/                    None             Replicated TOT: 0500
Replicated
TOT

UH-60s                  None             9 (Optimal); 5
Req'd                                    (Adequate - single RT);
                                         4 (Minimum - single RT)

Routes &                None             H-1 (0400) [C.sup.2]
Times                                    A/C established in ROZ

UH-60                   None             H-0:30 (0430) RT
Actions                                  Georgia, RT Iowa
                                         Fly the routes at 90 kts,
                                         200 ft. echeloned
                                         by team. At RP,
                                         fire Chaff, drop to 100 ft.
                                         Return along same RTs, 90 kts,
                                         free cruise trail formation.

Lethal                  None             H-1 (0400) 2 x ATACMS attack
SEAD                                     suspected SA-10/11/12
(Arty)                                   positions VIC airfields
                                         west of Matmata Mtns.
                                         H-0:20 (0440) 6-8 Target
                                         Deception SEAD
                                         fired at identified
                                         ADA targets,
                                         possible inclusion
                                         of templated targets. Time-
                                         driven SEAD with TOT at 0440.

Lethal SEAD             None             H-0:10 (0450)
(Air)                                     2 x sorties F-16 CJ
                                         attack suspected SA-6/11
                                         positions VIC Gabes,
                                         EI Hamma, Tabaga Ridge.

EW (Ground)             None             H-0:20 (0440) Jam
                                         ADA [C.sup.2] nets NLT 0440.

EW (Air)                None             None

CAS                     None             H-0:10 (0450) 2 x sorties
                                         attack 903 BTG
                                         VIC PL Pittsburg
                                         (Div CAS or AI/Div target)

ACAs/          Air Corr Falcon 1 - PT    Air Corridors
Air Corr/        1: PC100750 PT 2:       Georgia and Iowa
NFAs                  NC530750           Air Corridor Falcon 2 -
                   PT 3: NC530800        PT 1: PC200500 PT 2: PC030500
                   PT 4: NC950800        PT 3: NC500500 PT 4:
                 Min ALT: Max ALT:       NC500700 Min ALT: Max ALT:
                                         Air Corridor Falcon 3 -
                                         PT 1: PC200500 PT 2: PC030500
                                         PT 3: NC500500 PT 4:
                                         NC500700 Min ALT: Max ALT:
                                         ACA Knighthawk 1 -
                                         PT 1: PT 2: PT 3: PT 4:
                                         Min ALT: Max ALT:

Drones/      H-6 (2300) Sortie           H-4 (0100) Sortie 2 - IP over
Decoys       1 - IP over                 Gulf of Gabes, proceed east
             Gulf of Gabes, proceed      along PL Tampa to Western
             west along PL Miami to      Div Boundary. Turn north for 20
             Western Div Boundary.       km, turn east to Div Eastern
             Turn north for 15 km,       Boundary, RTB. H-0:30 (0430)
             turn east to Div Eastern    Sortie 3 - IP over
             Boundary, RTB.              Gulf of Gabes, proceed east
                                         along PL Tampa to Western
                                         Div Boundary. Turn
                                         north for 20
                                         km, turn east to
                                         Div Eastern Boundary, RTB.

Drone        RT 1 - IP: PC100750         RT 2 - IP: PC200500 PT
Routes       PT 1: NC530750              1: PC030500 PT 2: NC500500
             PT 2: NC530900 PT           PT 3: NC500700 - RTB
             3: NC950900 - RTB           RT 3 - IP: PC200500 PT
                                         1: PC030500 PT 2: NC500500
                                         PT 3: NC500700 - RTB

ISR          ELINT Focus/Target Set:     ELINT Focus/Target Set: SA-8b
Systems      SA-8b (Landroll - H Band),  (Landroll - H Band), 2S6M
             2S6M (Hot Shot - E Band),   (Hot Shot - E Band), Crotale
             Crotale (Mirador IV - E     (Mirador IV - E Band), SA-15
             Band), SA-15 (H Band)       (H Band) VIC Gabes,
             VIC Gabes, EI Hamma,        EI Hamma, Tabaga Ridge.
             Tabaga Ridge.               (0001) UAV On Station
             (1700) JSTARS On            (0500) JSTARS Off Station
             Station

Legend:

ACAs = Airspace Coordination Areas

ADA = Air Defense Artillery

AI = Air Interdiction

ALT = Altitude

ATACMS = Army Tactical Missile System

ATO = Air Tasking Order

CAS = Close Air Support

[C.sup.2] = Command and Control

ELINT = Electronic Intelligence

EW = Electronic Warfare

IP = Initial Point

ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JSTARS = Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

kts = knots

NFAs = No-Fire Areas

PL = Phase Line

PT = Point

ROZ = Restricted Operating Zone

RP = Release Point

RT = Route

RTB = Return to Base

TOT = Time-On-Target

UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

VIC = Vicinity of

Figure 7

SEAD Campaign Execution Matrix Day 1, Phase IIIC2 (Reconnaissance)

                   MON 280600 JAN (D+3) to
                 MON 281200 JAN (D+3) - ATO D

TOT/Replicated               None
TOT

UH-60s Req'd                 None


Routes & Times               None


UH-60 Actions                None




Lethal SEAD     H+3 (0800) 4-6 Target SEAD
(Arty)          plan fired at ADA targets
                acquired during last operation

Lethal SEAD                  None
(Air)

EW (Ground)                  None


EW (Air)                     None

CAS                          None

ACAs/                        None
Air Corr/
NFAs



Drones/                      None
Decoys




Drone                        None
Routes


ISR             ELINT Focus/Target Set:
Systems         SA-8b (Landroll - H Band),
                2S6M (Hot Shot - E Band),
                Crotale (Mirador IV - E
                Band), SA-15 (H Band) VIC
                Gabes, EI Hamma, Tabaga
                Ridge.
                (0400) UAV on station

                MON 280600 JAN (D+3) to
                MON 281200 JAN (D+3) - ATO D

TOT/Replicated  Replicated TOT: 1730
TOT

UH-60s Req'd    5 (Adequate - single RT);
                4 (Minimum - single RT)

Routes & Times  H-1(1630) [C.sup.2] A/C established on
                Roz H-0:10 (1720) RT Iowa

UH-60 Actions   Fly the routes at 90 kts, 200 ft,
                echeloned by team. At RP, fire Chaff,
                drop to 100 ft. Return along same RTs,
                90 kts, free cruise trail formation.

Lethal SEAD     None
(Arty)


Lethal SEAD     None
(Air)

EW (Ground)     H-0:10 (1720) Jan ADA [C.sup.2]
                nets NLT 1720

EW (Air)        None

CAS             None

ACAs/           Air Corridor Iowa
Air Corr/       Air Corridor Falcon 4 - PT 1:
NFAs            PC300500 PT 2: PC200320 PT 3:
                NC750320 PT 4: NC750550 PT 5:
                NC990550 Min ALT: Max ALT:

Drones/         H-Hr (1730) Sortie 1 - IP Over Gulf
Decoys          of Gabes, proceed west along PL
                Oakland to center to Matmata Mtns
                (75 Easting). Turn north for 23 km,
                turn east to Div Eastern Boundary, RTB.

Drone           RT 1: -IP: PC300500 PT 1: PC200320
Routes          PT 2: NC750320 PT 3: NC750550 PT: 4:
                NC990550 - RTB

ISR             ELINT Focus/Target Set: SA-8b
Systems         (Landroll - H Band), 2S6M (Hot Shot -
                E Band), Crotale (Mirador IV - E Band),
                SA-15 (H Band) VIC Matmata Mtns,
                Internment Camps, Mareth.
                (1600) UAV Off Station
                (1700) JSTARS On Station

IADS Target Features Inclue-

* Air surveillance and early warning radar systems.

* On-board radars versus remote radar "hubs" that control a number of firing units.

* Communications systems, particularly transmission means (UHF, VHF, FM, telephone, wire, etc.).

* Command and control nodes or headquarters that exercise engagement decision-making authority.

* Operating patterns and tactics (rotating radar coverage among medium-range systems, silent cuing by air surveillance radars, air defense ambush tactics, etc.).

Figure 5: Key Areas of the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)

Major Brooke H. Janney, US Army Reserve (USAR), until recently was on active duty in the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, where he last served as the Aviation Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO). He has left active duty to pursue a doctorate in National Security Studies. Also with the 3d Division, he was the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator (AFSCOORD) while deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other assignments include serving as the Battalion Fire Direction Officer (FDO) and Battalion Task Force FSO in the 2d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery and Commander of A Battery, all in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York; in the latter position, he deployed to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. Major Janney also deployed to the Gulf for Operations Desert Shield and Storm as the S1 with 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, Germany. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, receiving a Mast er of Military Operational Arts and Science from the Air University there.