Past and future wars: initial stages.

Several decades ago when the world was still bi-polar the military showed a lot of interest in the early stages of war. The command and control structures worked on corresponding theoretical principles while military publications widely discussed the theory and practice of the early periods of wars. The military lost an interest in the subject in the mid-1980s and this can hardly be explained.

One should say that the "initial stage of war" concept appeared together with mass armies, which greatly affected the wars' character: they became much more expensive, the country's economy should be promptly switched from peacetime to wartime functioning, armed forces should be deployed, in short, the war affected all sides of the country's life. To win the war the sides had to resort to a wide range of political, economic, and military measures designed to mobilize all material and spiritual resources--it was no longer enough to merely fight at the fronts.

At all historical periods the countries that took up arms to score political victories were aware that wars should be carefully prepared, mobilization should be as secret as possible so that to tap the advantages of a sudden attack to rout the enemy at the war's early stages. The countries that felt themselves endangered had to resort to adequate measures (mobilization, deployment, etc.) when international tension became too obvious so that to be ready to rebuff aggression and not to be caught unawares.

The warring sides operated with haste so that to mobilize and deploy their forces before the enemy could do this; the gap between the decision to start a war and the first engagement was cut down to an absolute minimum. This became a pattern.

In World War I for example, its beginning coincided with mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops at the theaters of war to create strategic formations, move them to the start line and accomplish the mission. This was done under cover of troops waging defensive or offensive operations at the borders. Economy was mobilized at a slower pace because the side involved hopes to win before the peacetime reserves ran out. Economy was adjusted to the wartime needs when it had become clear the war would be a long one.

After World War I military theoreticians had to specify the contents of the initial period of war and bring up to date their ideas. According to their latest views the initial period covered not only preparatory measures but also the hostilities on land, in the air and at sea waged by covering armies mobilized in advance and deployed along the borders. Soviet military theoreticians presupposed that while fighting on great scale was going along the borders from the very first day of the war the main forces on both sides of the front would complete mobilization and deployment in the theater of operations.

Before the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the initial period was described as a stretch of time between beginnings of hostilities and the moment the main forces joined in. Military theory proceeded from the assumption that at the very beginning hostilities may envelop large territories to the depth of 400 to 600 km. It was pointed out that the covering troops would find themselves in a very difficult situation if mobilization and deployment along the borders became impossible.

In practice, however, the problems of the initial period, mobilization and deployment as well as readying the border military districts were not completely resolved. Nothing was done to train the corresponding structures how to mobilize national economy and adjust it to the needs of war. These key problems had never been properly discussed and reflected in the documents related to the country's and the army's war readiness. It was believed that mobilization could be carried out when the war had already begun; nothing was done to discuss the problems of strategic defense and of protecting the troops against the first air strikes. It was commonly believed that the war would start according to the old pattern in which the main forces were drawn into fighting after several days of fighting at the borders.

The war demonstrates certain new features of the initial period: a wide spatial scale and dynamism; involvement of all services; decisive nature of hostilities and their high maneuverability; splitting and enveloping actions; close enveloping and encirclement of enemy formations by mobile units and landing groups; powerful air strikes; encounter engagements and battles; and counterstrikes of defending troops.

The negative developments of the initial period were caused by lack of fighting experience: young commanders and military leaders got their appointments at the eve of the war; the failures of the early stages affected for a long time the conditions and nature of fighting at the Soviet-German front. Today, we should pay particular attention to the lessons of this war.

It confirmed that the initial period became shorter: in the Russo-Japanese War it lasted 5 months; in World War I, 2 months; in the Great Patriotic War, 3 weeks. It also confirmed that the scope and decisive nature of hostilities increased while the warring sides aimed at the most efficient results at the very beginning that could decide the course of the war. A more or less crippling blow at the aggressor is possible only if the defending country manages to reach superiority during the very limited initial period of war that depends not only on a better quality of weapons and fighting machines, the material and moral components of the troops involved but also on the skills and professional qualities of commanders and staffs, and on better trained troops.

World War II that enveloped nearly all Europe showed that strategic success in the conditions of a surprise attack and the resulting difficult situation could be achieved only if the countries had prepared thoroughly and well in advance its armed forces as well as its national economy, had switched it on the wartime tasks to supply the army and the navy with everything they needed.

Today, it is not enough for any state to build up a very developed military-economic potential; the country needs conditions in which material means for the armed forces are produced on time and in adequate quantities, in full conformity with the specific defense tasks. From this it follows that a definite part of the defense economic sector should be functioning without interruptions to supply modern weapons so that to replace the morally obsolete ones and to maintain the high technical level.

Today, some of the countries have developed industries able to produce high tech precision weapons of various types of basing. This means that in future the use of high precision weapons of varied basing, forces and assets of EW and wide-scale information operations will form the content of the new-generation wars.

I am convinced that high-precision conventional weapons and weapons based on new physical principles as well as information means of struggle rather than numerous land forces will play the decisive role in armed struggle. From the very beginning of aggression military actions will unfold along a wide front, they will reach great depths; will call for maximal exertion, and will pursue the most decisive aims. Therefore, it is signally important to maintain constant readiness of the armed forces and national economy to switch from peacetime to wartime functioning.

Massive use of conventional high-precision weapons against military and economic objects can cripple any state in any corner of the world; destruction of potentially hazardous objects may cause global ecological catastrophe. This means that the warring sides should organize well in advance and consistently carry out measures within the country's air and space defense as well as measures designed to protect each of its citizens. The course and outcome of such war will depend on the degree to which the armed forces are equipped with high-precision weapons and military machines based on latest technological principles.

There is no doubt that the new-generation wars will start with air-space operations the results of which may decide the outcome of the war. It is in the course of such operations that one of the sides may gain superiority in command and control of troops and weapons and in the air-space and land spheres of the armed struggle. In this way, the military-political and strategic aims of the war can be attained even before the sides engaged their main forces in fighting.

When planning an aggression the enemy tries to carry out the widest possible range of measures designed to camouflage its intentions (movement of troops and materiel, troop deployment, mobilization and operational deployment). Past experience proved that duping the political leadership of the country to be attacked is the most efficient solution of the problem of a surprise attack. The future aggressor may carry out special disinformation operations that would include a complex of interconnected and carefully coordinated wide-scale measures carried out through diplomatic channels, state-owned and private networks including transmission of false commands in the command and control systems.

The recent experience of the United States and its allies suggests that in the new-generation wars it will be impossible to reach any aims by strategic actions and operations carried out by armed forces of any state without gaining information superiority.

One can also suggest that the new-generation wars will consist of two stages only: the initial and the concluding ones. The initial period will consist of an air-space operation and systematic air warfare in all directions and to the country's entire depth. The aggressor will deliver missile and air strikes to interfere with mobilization, concentration and deployment of the defending side in the theaters of war aimed at creating strategic formations able to carry out important tasks designed to rebuff the aggressor.

The enemy will aim, first and foremost, at the main control points of state and military importance, at the key military-industrial objects; it will try to disrupt the system of administration and command and control of its armed forces. The crippled system of state administration, demoralized population as well as disheartened soldiers will give the aggressor superiority in achieving the military-political aims of the war.

By way of conclusion I would like to say that although the end of the 20th century brought about dramatic changes in the life of the world community--the Cold War ended; the military-political situation changed considerably; the threat of a large-scale or even nuclear war diminished--the new relations between states are still based on military force. The very existence of powerful and efficient means of armed struggle makes it possible to pose the boldest political and strategic aims. The aggressor will strive to achieve them in a short war. This means that in the new military-political and economic conditions the problem of the war's initial period has acquired even more importance: we need corresponding theoretical substantiations and practical steps designed to prepare our armed forces to new-generation wars.