Party without a cause.

The national Republican leadership prides itself on putting winning above |ideology' - i.e., principle. As a result it supports candidates who are neither Republicans, nor winners.

THIS WAS supposed to have been the Year of the Republican. Capitalizing on the dramatic boost in party registration under Ronald Reaga, and on the retirement of scores of congressmen because of reapportionment, the Grand Old Party was poised for spectacular gains in both the House and the Senate. Indeed, at the gathering of House Republicans in Princeton two years ago, Minority Leader Bob Michel was introduced to thunderous applause as "the next Speaker of the House."

Today these expectations have run aground, and not because of a revived Democratic opposition. Rather, the threat to a Republican renaissance comes from within the party itself. In the name of pragmatism, the national party leadership is running up a curious record of defeats.

Most of those who respond to the appeals of the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee would probably be shocked to learn that these committees have no obligation to channel their support to candidates who support the Republican platform. Indeed, the GOP national committees have regularly intervened in contested primaries, promoting candidates who reject major planks of the platform over those who wholeheartedly embrace them. Put bluntly, the national party has helped to lose races that ought to have been won, and to elect "Republicans" whose views more closely resemble those of Walter Mondale or Jerry Brown that those of Ronald Reagan.

Anti-Issues Politics

WHAT especially rankles is that the money used to defeat social and fiscal conservatives has typically been raised in the name of Reagan-style conservatism. Virtually every fund-raising letter the GOP sends out talks about defeating the big-spending, liberal, anti-family Democrats.

"They don't understand issues politics," says a former senior RNC official. "They are hired to get people with an |R' after their names elected regardless of the candidate's values or ideology. They really feel threatened by the influx of social conservatives into the party."

Much of this is owing to the myth that issues politics is losing politics. Nowhere is this more a factor than on the issue of abortion. In the wake of the Supreme Court's Webster decision, Kate Michelman, spokesman for the National Abortion Rights Action League, vowed that NARAL was "going to change the face of the political landscape." She predicted an American strewn with the political corpses of those who got in the way of the pro-choice juggernaut. The prediction struck fear into the hearts of the national Republican leadership.

No such juggernaut ever materialized. The media gave much play, for example, to threats by pro-choice Republican Ann Stone to raise scads of money for her cause. Her efforts have fallen way short. And the June 1991 edition of Campaign, the non-partisan magazine for election professionals, noted that the nine best races run in 1990 were run by social conservatives. "A careful analysis of the 1990 returns reveals a contradiction of conventional wisdom regarding the electoral impact of the Webster decision," the article concluded. "Unless the abortion issue is on the front burner of a major political race, the pro-life candidate appears to hold a distinct advantage in most constituencies."

This conclusion is supported by a plethora of anecdotal evidence showing socially conservative candidates winning elections while being outspent by opponents 2, 3, sometimes 4 to 1. In the 1990 race for California's 7th Assembly District, for example, David Knowles beat incumbent Democrat Norm Waters, although Knowles received little help from the Republican establishment and was outspent 4 to 1. Knowles relied on an extensive grassroots campaign; he was able to find eager volunteers because of his strong social conservatism.

In the 1990 general election, antitax, pro-life Massachusetts Republican Robert Hedlund beat thirty-year career politician Robert Ambler to take a State Senate seat although he was outspent nearly 5 to 1. The victory was even more remarkable in that Ambler, a pro-choicer, was also antitax and had the advantage of 26 years in the Assembly. It was Hedlund's first foray into the political arena.

The same pattern was played out in Pennsylvania's 18th Congressional District, where conservative Republican Rick Santorum unseated 14-year incumbent Doug Walgren, and in Michigan, where conservative Republican John Engler beat incumbent Democratic Governor James Blanchard by a nose (.07 per cent of the vote). In both cases, victory depended on a substantial grassroots campaign, with many of the volunteers coming from the pro-life camp.

The Enemy Within

WHAT MAKES these victories more remarkable is that social conservatives often have to overcome not just the Democratic machine but the Republican machine as well. If the fund-raising ability of the party establishment were linked with the grassroots movements, the party would stand a real chance of becoming a majority and seeing its platform implemented. But, increasingly, conservative Republicans are seeing the national committees step in to override the clear wishes of the local leaders.

It was this that helped give us David Duke in Louisiana. Over strong protests from local Republicans, the RNC persuaded Democratic Governor Buddy Roemer to re-register and run as a Republican. Billy Nungesser Sr., chairman of the Louisiana Republican Party, complains that "the RNC did not consult with the state party and in fact tried to persuade the state party not to hold its annual endorsing convention." Angry Louisiana Republicans went ahead and endorsed Representative Clyde Holloway, a Reaganite with an excellent reputation for pulling in Democratic votes. Because of Roemer's weaknesses (among other things, running for the GOP nomination, he could barely bring himself to mention either the word "Republican" or the name of George Bush), David Duke edged him out in the primary, leaving the RNC in the embarrassing position of having to endorse Democrat Edwin Edwards.

California Republicans have similar complaints. At Governor Pete Wilson's behest, both the RNC and the NRSC have been spending big money to thwart the candidacies of popular conservative Republicans.

There are two senatorial elections in California this year: the normally scheduled one, to replace retiring Senator Alan Cranston, and one to ratify or reject John Seymour, the man Pete Wilson appointed as his own midterm successor. The popular conservative Representative Bill Dannemeyer is challenging Seymour; however, the NRSC listed Dannemeyer as a candidate for the Cranston seat (for which solid conservative Bruce Herschensohn is an announced candidate) in its For the Record bulletin mailed to several thousand Inner Circle donors.

NRSC spokesman Wendy Burnley says this was an honest mistake made by a low-level staffer. Conservative leaders in California doubt it. It was well known that Dannemeyer was entering the race for the express purpose of defeating Seymour, who has often voted against conservatives on taxes, has opposed Proposition 13, and is on record for both gay and abortion rights. Dannemeyer had expressly informed. Senator Phil Gramm, head of the NRSC, of his intention, which was reported in several major newspapers.

In the 1990 gubernatorial primary in Illinois, Steve Baer, an across-the-board Reagan conservative, found himself facing an uphill battle for his party's nomination: both President Bush and then-RNC chief Lee Atwater had endorsed opponent Jim Edgar. Edgar was another pro-choice Republican who ran on a platform of raising income taxes. There was even an RNC plot (headed off when Baer supporters got wind of it) to persuade Reagan to endorse Edgar on the false basis that he was running unopposed. Edgar eventually won the general election, but he was arguably no more conservative than his Democratic opponent.

In Kentucky, the RNC and NRCC entered a contested congressional primary on the side of pro-choice moderate Al Brown. Facing Brown was the conservative Tim Hardy. Despite out-spending Hardy 10 to 1, Brown, the RNC, and the NRCC beat him by only four hundred votes - less than 1 per cent of the total votes cast. Brown went on the lose the general election by 20 points to Ron Mazzoli, the incumbent, pro-life Democrat.

The Kentucky race is an excellent example of the potency of a grassroots campaign. Virtually everyone on Brown's staff was a hired gun, whereas Hardy kept his overhead low with a full-time staff of volunteers. The consensus is that if Hardy had raised money for one more piece of direct mail he would have won the primary. Moreover, he would have had the credentials to go up against the pro-life Mazzoli in the general election.

One race that did receive attention in November was conservative Republican Kirk Fordice's upset victory for governor in Mississippi - the first Republican to hold that position since Reconstruction. A successful businessman and a true conservative, Fordice received lukewarm support from the RNC, which, true to form, had backed pro-choice, moderate Republican Pete Johnston in the primary. The campaign was a classic grassroots effort showing how Republicans could capitalize on issues such as workfare, civil rights, school choice, etc.

Perhaps the most blatant example of the national party meddling to the detriment of a conservative candidate occurred in the July 1991 special election in California's 5th Assembly District. The primary (which in effect was the election, since no Democrat had filed for the race in the heavily Republican district) pitted conservative Republican activist Barbara Alby against B. T. Collins. Collins, a former chief of staff for Governor Jerry Brown and a "self-avowed atheist," came over to the GOP just a few years ago. He is on record as having donated money to some of the state's most liberal Democrats, including the ultra-left Speaker of the Assembly, Willie Brown.

Collins was in the race because Governor Wilson persuaded him to run to stop Barbara Alby, one of California's premier conservative Republican volunteer leaders. Then, again at Wilson's bidding, the RNC entered the race full force. During the primary the RNC paid for at least seven direct-mail pieces, spending a minimum, of $76,000 to defeat Mrs. Alby.

Even so, Collins won by only four thousand votes in the primary and actually received seven hundred votes less than Mrs. Alby on election day. The margin of victory was provided by a massive absentee-ballot program coordinated by the RNC, using lists targeting liberal Democrats provided by Tom Hayden, the left-wing activist and former husband of Jane Fonda.

Though Barbara Alby did not win, she once again demonstrated just how effective a conservative grassroots campaign can be. At the start of the campaign her name recognition was 17 per cent, versus 80 for Collins. Initial polling gave Collins a 45 to 20 per cent lead. Had Mrs. Alby had the money to mount an absentee-ballot program early on, she might have pulled it off - and for a small fraction of what Wilson and the RNC had to spend to defeat her.

The RNC seemed bent on forming a de-facto alliance between the Democratic and Republican establishments. Just as it had done in Louisiana, the RNC went over the heads of California Republican Party officials. "I feel the RNC should have stayed out of it," said state chairman Jim Dignan. "We have a mechanism for endorsement at the county and state board level that should have been respected."

Social Disdain

WITH THESE case histories you might think the RNC would be re-examining its strategy. On the contrary, social conservatives are less welcome than ever in the national party structures. Roy Jones, a former consultant to the NRSC and the former political director of the Moral Majority, attributes this pattern not to any organized conspiracy but to a set of attitudes among those who hold the reins, most of whom he describes as country-club Republicans. "The people at the national level are technicians. They are there to win races. They pride in not taking positions on ideological issues." Most of these old-guard Republicans, he says, are unwilling to share power with the large influx of social conservatives.

Judy Cresanta, a national committeeman from Nevada, was one of the many social conservatives who came on board in 1988. "The RNC regional director, Steve Kinney, would not work with conservatives in the Western states," she says. "In the three and a half years I was on the National Committee, Steve Kinney telephoned me one time." Another committeeman, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says that "there has been a concerted effort to stack key committees with liberals and moderates and to ignore or undercut participation by social conservatives." Arizonian Jack London, a committeeman of 11 years, supports the charge. "It's a Reagan committee, but the plums are being handed out to the Bush people." By plums London means appointments to such crucial committees as the resolutions committee.

Mark Nuttle, former executive director of the NRCC, sees a various circle. Because social conservatives are grossly underrepresented within the group of political professionals who run the day-to-day operation of the GOP, they are not in a position to bring other conservatives into the leadership. "At the national party level," says Nuttle, "conservatives no longer have a spokesman."

Gary Bauer, senior domestic-policy advisor under Reagan, cites a spectacular gaffe by the political professionals - a series of replies sent out by the RNC to letters thanking RNC chief Clayton Yeutter for his public show of support for the pro-life party plank on the Evans & Novak TV show. According to Bauer, the RNC thank-you letters emphasized the "big tent" and made on acknowledgment of Yeutter's support for the pro-life plant. "If the Republican Party leaders continue to undercut and alienate pro-family social conservatives," says Bauer, "we may lost them and the grassroots politics they have brought back to the Republican Party."

No Excuse

ALL THREE national Republican committees maintain that they merely support the candidates brought forward by the local parties, and for the most part this is true. But in the cases where there has been notable intervention, the pattern has been against the heirs of Ronald Reagan and in favor of those who oppose, sometimes loudly, major elements of the Republican platform. The committees would at least have some excuse if they could show a clear pattern of victory. But all too often their "pragmatism" means freezing out an electable conservative in favor of a liberal or moderate Republican who then gets creamed at the polls. Increasingly the big tent is translating into a smaller and smaller party.

All the relative advantages Republicans enjoyed under Reagan are still there, largely because the Democrats are in even greater disarray. But even if George Bush wins again this November, the GOP will continue to take a beating at every other level so long as the national leadership remains hostile to the grassroots issues. At the very least, the dismal electoral record of the last four years ought to provoke a re-evaluation of what Republicans mean by success. Are they there primarily to promote the philosophy of limited government and traditional values, as their fund-raising literature suggest, or are they playing a game of Rs and Ds with no regard to the philosophy they are helping to bring to power?