Part 1 - Overview - A Perspective For The Middle East.

In the Middle East, the war against terror is being viewed with a mixed perspective. There are strong concerns, even among moderate countries and leaders, that the war could easily become a war against Islam. In fact, many commentators in the region have already said that the campaign is against Islam. At the conclusion of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) summit in Muscat on Dec. 31, similar sentiments were expressed by the rulers of the six member countries - all regarded as being firmly on the US side in the war against terror.

Observers in the region have pointed out that, ever since the collapse of Communism, the US has been looking around for a "global" enemy, and warned that radical Islam would be the most likely candidate. The events since the Sept. 11attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon seem to vindicate this viewpoint, although the US and most of its coalition partners in the West and elsewhere have repeatedly stressed that the war is against terror and not Islam. This has not convinced the "Arab street", which views the bombardment of Afghanistan and the cave-by-cave search for the Al Qaida guerrillas from a viewpoint influenced more by the rhetoric of Islamist hardliners than by the Western leaders or media.

There is also a great deal of concern that the new American war will have severe negative implications for the two main issues facing the Arab World, i.e. the Middle East peace process and the embargo against Iraq. There is every indication that the concern is justified. Despite the unprecedented use of the word "Palestine" by US President Bush and the backing for a Palestinian state, there is no indication that the demands of the Palestinians would be addressed in a way that would satisfy either them or their Arab friends - at least in the foreseeable future.

On the question of Iraq, there is now the growing certainty that one of the first targets in the second phase of the war against terror would be the regime of Saddam Hussein. Judging by the comments emanating from Washington policy makers, the question is not whether Iraq will be hit, but when. Various scenarios have already been floated, with the diplomatic groundwork being laid step-by-step at the UN and through bilateral diplomacy among the major powers. Some observers believe a military strike aimed at unseating Saddam may come as early as mid-2002 (see News Service of this week).

Beyond these two issues, however, a major underlying sense of unease is pervading the Middle East ruling superstructures - which have seen the American model of high-tech warfare being developed since early 1991 in Iraq, Serbia and Kosovo in the late 1980s, and Afghanistan in late 2001. There is a sense of defencelessness in the region, which has been exacerbated by the way the US carried out the Afghan campaign to oust the Taliban, despite some criticisms that it would suffer the same fate as the USSR in the 1980s and Britain in the late 19th and early 20th century.

The US made its aims for Phase One quite clear. First, it aimed to capture or kill Osama Bin Ladin and other top leaders of Al Qaida, and to destroy its extensive terror network. This goal is yet to be achieved, but all indications are of slow but steady success as more and more Taliban and Al Qaida leaders fall into American hands.

Second, the Taliban regime, which was clearly identified as a rogue element that supported Osama, has been replaced by a more broad-based leadership - although Washington kept its options open on the question of exactly what shape a post-Taliban Afghan leadership would take. This has been fully achieved, and the new interim administration of Hamid Karzai is co-ordinating closely with American and their subordinate NATO forces to bring peace to Kabul and spread it throughout the country.

The third aim was to create the economic conditions that will ensure that Afghanistan would not revert towards becoming a safe haven for terrorism. With the Taliban being rolled up in the south of Afghanistan, an improvement in the living conditions of the Afghans can be expected in the coming years.

To achieve these objectives, the US formed a "revolving" coalition. The implication was that the coalition, or at least some of its members, is on board on a temporary basis and that they may be replaced by new members as Phase One ends and Phase Two begins.

The coalition included key Arab allies namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others. But whether these allies can be counted on to fully back the US if it decides to expand the war against terror to countries in the Middle East, like Iraq for instance, remains to be seen. More alarming for the leaderships of these countries - particularly Saudi Arabia - is the way the American media has criticised the kingdom for everything from its support for the Taliban to its educational curriculum.