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Park three: the organization, functions and focus of intelligence in the RSA.

1. INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION, FUNCTIONS AND FOCUS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. 1 Organisation and functions

It is stated that "(i)n a democracy the government must exercise meaningful control over the intelligence community through a range of measures: the separation of intelligence functions; obliging the agencies to operate in a legal capacity; controlling access to the executive; and differentiating the functions of collection, reporting, coordinating and review". (1)

It is also stated that the main justification for a central intelligence agency is to co-ordinate, collate, integrate and distribute intelligence. This does, however, not imply the centralisation of all functional intelligence agencies in one structure. The necessity for the establishment of a central co-ordinating intelligence system is based on the following:

-- coordinate, collate and integrate intelligence at national level;

-- promote a multidisciplinary and strategic approach to the analysis and assessment of intelligence;

-- guard against biased approaches to intelligence in terms of sectoral and narrow departmental interests and prejudices;

-- avoid unnecessary duplication and the over-extension of

-- national resources and assets;

-- determine national intelligence needs and priorities;

-- provide national intelligence estimates;

-- structure and coordinate intelligence liaison with foreign intelligence services; coordinate intelligence collection (overt and covert) with respect to methods, means and targets;

-- coordinate counter-intelligence at national level;

-- coordinate the dissemination of intelligence products at national level;

-- provide and coordinate inter-departmental intelligence needs;

-- promote cooperation and healthy relations within the intelligence community;

-- establish and coordinate training standards and programmes within the intelligence community. (2))

Godson (3)) states that three models have been proposed and used for analysis. The first, namely the confederal model, was used in the US prior to the Second World War. The US Department of State and the Army and Navy produced individual analysis for their own consumers. Although it facilitated closer links between producers and consumers, it led to overlaps and gaps. The second model, namely the centralised model, has been dominant in the US since the mid-1940s. Better coordination led to the avoidance of undue duplication, but products tended to be "overly consensual". As a result, a third model, termed "competitive, centralized analysis", was proposed. This model was not favoured by all and the debate continues.

1.2 The focus of intelligence

As far as the post-Cold War agenda for intelligence is concerned, the US Director of Central Intelligence identified five main concerns for the future in the beginning of the 1990s. These were the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles; financial, trade and technological developments that could have an adverse affect on the US; threats to the environment, natural resources and health; political and economic development in the Commonwealth of Independent States; and narcotics and terrorism. (4))

During 1995, the new threats on which intelligence was to focus were set out as follows by the Clinton Administration in the US:

Because national security has taken on a much broader definition ... intelligence must address a much wider range of threats and dangers. [It] will continue to monitor military and technical threats, to guide long-term force development and weapons acquisition, and to directly support military operations. Intelligence will also be critical for directing new efforts against regional conflicts, proliferation of WMD, counter-intelligence, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. In order to adequately forecast dangers to the democracy and U.S. economic well-being, the intelligence community must track political, economic, social; and military developments in those parts of the world where U.S. interests are most heavily engaged and where overt collection of information from open sources is inadequate. Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide environmental, humanitarian, and disaster relief activities, technical intelligence assets (principally imagery) must be directed to a greater degree towards the collection of data on these subjects. (5))

Goodman and Berkowitz (6)) argue that collecting the information to avoid surprises is still a vital security need in the post-Cold War period. As far as the US is concerned, continuing focus on military developments in Russia; military developments in denied areas such as in Iraq and North Korea; threats to emerging democracies; economic rogues and renegades; support to operational military commanders; support of weapon systems; and support to non-traditional consumers such as environmental protection agencies and centres of disease control, remain important.

The intelligence community should therefore provide independent analysis and sift through and co-ordinate the assessments of line agencies; produce information that tests the limits of current technology; produce information that is economically feasible for other organisations; and take advantage of economies of scale, co-ordinate the joint use of common resources, and make hard choices in competing priorities. (7))

REFERENCES

(1.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Intelligence, 1994, p 5.

(2.) Republic of South Africa, Guiding Principles of the New South African Intelligence Dispensation, 1994, pp 19-20.

(3.) Godson, R, "Intelligence and Security", in Shultz, R H et al, Security Studies for the 21st Century, Brasseys, London, 1997, p 331.

(4.) Jordan, A A et al, American National Security: Policy and Process, Fourth Edition, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 161-162.

(5.) Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of US Power, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996, p 62.

(6.) Goodman, A E and B D Berkowitz, "Intelligence without the Cold War", Intelligence and National Security, Vol 9, No 2, April 1994, p 62.

(7.) Ibid, pp 308-309.

2. CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE

2.1 Organisation and functions

2.1.1 Organisation

White Paper on Intelligence, 1994 *

5. COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In a democracy the government must exercise meaningful control over the intelligence community through a range of measures: the separation of intelligence functions; obliging the agencies to operate in a legal capacity; controlling access to the executive; and differentiating the functions of collection, reporting, coordinating and review.

In the immediate term, and towards the achievement of a new intelligence dispensation, the creation of a National Intelligence Agency (see Intelligence Services Bill) is proposed for South Africa. This agency will amalgamate the members of the existing National Intelligence Service, the intelligence services of the former states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, the intelligence service of the African National Congress namely the Department of Intelligence and Security, as well as any other intelligence capabilities that meet with the necessary requirements set out in the Act.

This arrangement will lead to the eventual establishment of two civilian intelligence agencies, one focusing on domestic intelligence (and retaining the name National Intelligence Agency) and a service focusing on foreign intelligence (to be named the South African Secret Service).

The mission of the domestic intelligence service (the National Intelligence Agency) will be to conduct security intelligence within the borders of the Republic of South Africa in order to protect the Constitution. The overall aim shall be to ensure the security and stability of the State and the safety and well-being of its citizens.

The mission of the foreign intelligence service (the South African Secret Service) will be to conduct intelligence in relation to external threats, opportunities and other issues that may affect the Republic of South Africa, with the aim of promoting the national security and the interests of the country and its citizens.

The most significant departure from the old dispensation is that instead of one centralised national civilian intelligence organisation, there will be two. This arrangement will not only ensure that the new intelligence dispensation in South Africa corresponds with general international trends, but Will promote greater focusing, effectiveness, professionalism and expertise in the specialised fields of domestic and foreign intelligence.

The services will have distinct intelligence mandates and line functional responsibilities and will share essential support services to avoid costly and unnecessary duplication. They will accordingly create appropriate liaison mechanisms to deal with areas of mutual interest.

* Selected excerpts.

Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994) -- Assented to 23 November 1994 *

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT, COMPOSITION AND ORGANISATION OF AGENCY AND SERVICE

3. Continued existence of Agency and Service.--(1) There continues to exist in the Republic the Agency and the Service, as the case may be, which consist of persons who became members in terms of this Act on 1 January 1995 and persons appointed as members in terms of the provisions of this Act after commencement.

(2) The Minister shall for the purpose of the Agency and the Service--

(a) create deputy Directors-General posts;

(b) establish chief directorates, directorates and divisions; and

(c) prescribe the functions and post structures:

Provided that the creation of deputy Directors-General posts shall be done in consultation with the President.

[S.3 substituted by s.2 of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

3A. Appointment, promotion, discharge, reduction in rank and transfer of members.--(1 ) The Minister may; subject to the provisions of this Act, appoint any person, with the exclusion of the Director-General, as a member, and any member may in accordance with the said provisions be promoted, discharged, reduced in rank or grade or transferred: Provided that such appointment, promotion, discharge, reduction in rank or transfer in respect of a Deputy Director-General shall be effected in consultation with the President.

(2) Any prescribed document signed by the Minister and certifying that any person has been appointed as a member shall be prima facie proof that such person has been so appointed.

[S. 3A inserted by s. 3 of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

4. Head of Agency or Service.--(1) The Director-General concerned shall, subject to the directions of the Minister and the provisions of this Act, exercise command and control of the Agency or the Service, as the case may be.

[Sub-s. (1) substituted by s.4(a) of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

(2) The Director-General may, subject tot he directions of the Minister and the provisions of this Act, make such rules and issue such directions as he or she may deem expedient for the efficient command and control of the Agency or the Service, as the case may be.

[Sub-s. (2) substituted by s. 4(a) of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

(3) The Director-General shall, as far as is reasonably practicable, take steps to ensure that--

(a) national security intelligence, intelligence collection methods, sources of information and the identity of members of the Agency or the Service, as the case may be, are protected from unauthorised disclosure;

(b) no action is carried out that could give rise to any reasonable suspicion that the Agency or the Service, as the case may be, is concerned in furthering, protecting or undermining the interests of any section of the population or any political party or organisation; and

(c) the functions of the Agency or the Service, as the case may be, are limited to what is necessary for the purposes of the discharge of its functions in terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, and the Secret Services Act, 1978 (Act No. 56 of 1978).

(4) ......

[Sub-s (4) deleted by s.4 (b) of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

5. Powers and duties of members.--(1) A member may exercise such powers and shall perform such duties as are by or under this Act or any other law conferred or imposed upon him or her, and shall in the performance of his or her functions obey all lawful directions which he or she may from time to time receive from a person having, the authority to give such directions.

(2) If a judge as defined in section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No. 127 of 1992), is convinced, on the grounds mentioned in a written application complying with directives issued under subsection (7), that--

(a) information which has or could probably have a bearing on the functions of the Agency or the Service as contemplated in section 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, can be obtained on any premises and such information is of substantial importance to the Agency or the Service in the discharge of its functions; or

(b) there is on any premises information which has or could probably have a bearing on the functions of the Agency or the Service as contemplated in section 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, which information is required by the Agency or the Service for the proper discharge of its functions.

and that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by other means, he or she may issue the Agency or the Service with a direction authorising any member when reasonably necessary--

(i) to enter such premises;

(ii) to search such premises with the purpose of obtaining such information;

(iii) to examine, copy, photograph or transcribe any article, document or other material on such premises; and

(iv) to remove any article, document or other material from the premises, for as long as is reasonably necessary, for the purposes of examining, copying, photographing or transcribing it, as the case may be.

(3) (a) A Direction referred to in subsection (2) shall be issued by the judge concerned for a specific period not exceeding three months.

(b) A direction referred to in paragraph (a) may be executed by a member of the Agency or the Service, as the case may be, provided that such member has been authorised thereto by another member of such Agency or Service holding a post of at least general manager;

[Para. (b) substituted by s. 5 (a) of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

(c) A member who executes a direction or assists in the execution thereof shall not later than the expiry of the direction referred to in paragraph (a) return an article, document or other material that was taken into possession in terms of subparagraph (iv) of subsection (2) or cause it to be returned to the premises in question unless the judge referred to in subsection (2) is of the opinion that by returning the said article, document or material the security of the Republic will be prejudiced, and accordingly directs that it be disposed of otherwise.

[Para. (c) inserted by s. 5 (b) of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

(4) The judge referred to in subsection (2) may, upon a written application complying with the directives issued under subsection (7), extend the period referred to in subsection (3) for a further period not exceeding three months at a time, if that judge is convinced that the extension is necessary for a reason mentioned in subsection (2).

(5) An application referred to in subsections (2) and (4) shall be heard and a direction issued without any notice to the person, body or organisation to which the application applies and without hearing such person, body or organisation.

(6) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or the common law, the entry of any premises or the handling of any property, article, document or any other material in or on relating so such premises by a member shall not be unlawful if it is done on the authority of a direction issued in terms of this section.

(7) The Judges President of the several Divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa may jointly issue directives to uniformly regulate the manner and procedure of applications in terms of subsection (2). ...

31. ......

[S. 31 repealed by s. 22 of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

* Selected excerpts. Act as amended by the Public Service Laws Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 47 of 1997) [with effect from 1 July, 1999--see title PUBLIC SERVICE] and the General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No. 66 of 2000). GENERAL NOTE: In terms of section 23 of Act No. 66 of 2000, the expression "the Deputy President or", is deleted wherever it occurs.

Intelligence Services Bill [B58B--2002] *

BILL

To regulate the establishment, administration, organisation and control of the National Intelligence Agency, the South Africa Secret Service and the South African National Academy of Intelligence; to establish and regulate the Intelligence Services Council on Conditions of Service; to repeal an Act; ** and to provide for matters connected therewith.

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT, COMPOSITION AND ORGANISATION OF AGENCY, SERVICE AND ACADEMY

Continued existence of Agency and Service

3. (1) The National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service continue to exist and consist of the persons--

(a) who became members in terms of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994), whose names appear on the personnel list;

(b) appointed as members in terms of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994, after its commencement;

(c) appointed as members in terms of this Act after its commencement.

(2) A former member of a non-statutory service may apply to have his or her years of service in a non-statutory service recognised for purposes of pension benefits, subject to the provisions of the Government Employees Pension Law, 1996 (Proclamation No. 21 of 1996), if he or she became a member of the Agency or the Service between 1 January 1995 and 31 March 2004.

(3) (a) The President must appoint a Director-General for each of the Intelligence Services.

(b) A Director-General is the head and accounting officer of the Intelligence Service, in question.

Composition of Agency and Service

4. (1) The Minister must for each of the Intelligence Services--

(a) create posts of Deputy Director-General and of Assistant Director-General;

(b) establish chief directorates and directorates and prescribe the functions and post structures thereof;

(c) establish divisions and prescribe the functions and post structures thereof.

(2) The creation of Deputy Directors-General posts must be done in consultation with the President.

Establishment of South African National Academy of Intelligence

5. (1) There is hereby established a South African National Academy of Intelligence as an organisational component in terms of the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), of which the management and administration is under the control of the Minister.

(2) The Academy--

(a) must provide training for persons in, or conduct such examinations or tests as a qualification for the appointment, promotion or transfer of persons in or to, the Intelligence Services or departments, as the case may be, as the Minister may prescribe; and

(b) may issue diplomas or certificates to persons who have passed such examinations or tests.

(3) The Academy must have a Training Fund of which the funding consists of--

(a) all moneys which immediately prior to the commencement of this Act were moneys defrayed for training under the Agency;

(b) money appropriated by Parliament from time to time for promoting training under this Act;

(c) any other money accruing to the Training Fund in terms of this Act or from any other source.

(4) (a) The Training Fund must be administered by the Chief Executive Officer.

(b) Money in the Training Fund must be utilised to promote training under this Act, but money or other property donated or bequeathed to the Training Fund must be utilised in accordance with the conditions of the donation or bequest in question.

(c) The Chief Executive Officer may invest money in the Training Fund which is hot required for immediate use in such a manner as the Minister may approve with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance.

(5) (a) The end of the financial year of the Training Fund is on the last day of March in each year.

(b) The Chief Executive Officer must--

(i) keep records of money received by, and disbursements made from, the Training Fund and of its assets, liabilities and financial transactions;

(ii) at the end of each financial year, prepare annual financial statements reflecting money received by, and disbursements made from, the Training Fund and its assets and liabilities.

(c) The records and annual financial statements must be audited annually by the Auditor-General in accordance with the Security Services Special Account Act, 1969 (Act No. 81 of 1969).

(6) The Chief Executive Officer must, at the end of each financial year, submit the report of the Auditor-General and the annual report of the Academy compiled in accordance with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999), to the Minister and the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence for consideration.

(7) The Academy may co-operate with any institution of higher learning, in the Republic or elsewhere, to achieve its objectives.

(8) The accreditation and recognition of the Academy's qualifications must be done in accordance with the provisions of the South Africa Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995).

Appointment of head and deputy head of Academy

6. (1) The President must in accordance with the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), appoint a head of the Academy who is also the Chief Executive Officer, principal and accounting officer of the Academy.

(2) The Minister must appoint a deputy head of the Academy who is responsible for the curriculum and research function of the Academy: Provided that if the post level of the deputy head is at the level of a deputy director-general, the Minister must make the appointment with the concurrence of the President.

(3) The deputy head must perform his or her functions subject to this Act and any other laws governing the Intelligence Services.

Composition of Academy

7. The Minister may create the post structures necessary for the functioning of the Academy, but the posts in such structures may not exceed the posts in the structures contemplated in section 4 in seniority.

Powers and duties of members

11. (1) A members must, in the performance of his or her functions, obey all lawful directions received from a person having the authority to give such directions.

(2) If a judge as defined in section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 1992 (Act No. 127 of 1992), is satisfied, on the grounds mentioned in a written application complying with directives issued under subsection (5), that--

(a) there is on any premises information which has or could probably have a bearing on the functions of the Intelligence Services as contemplated in section 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), which information is of substantial importance and is necessary for the proper discharge of the functions of the Intelligence Services;

(b) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by other means, he or she may issue the Intelligence Services with a direction authorising any member when reasonably necessary--

(i) to enter such premises;

(ii) to search such premises with the purpose of obtaining such information;

(iii) to examine, copy, photograph or transcribe any article, document or other material on such premises; and

(iv) to remove any article, document or other material from the premises, for as long as is reasonably necessary, for the purposes of examining, copying, photographing or transcribing it, as the case may be.

(3) (a) A direction referred to in subsection (2) must be issued for a specific period not exceeding three months.

(b) A direction referred to in paragraph (a) may be executed by a member of the Intelligence Services who is authorised to do so by a senior member of such Intelligence Services holding a post of at least a director.

(c) A member who executes a direction or assists in the execution thereof must, not later than the date of expiry of the direction referred to in paragraph (a), return any article, document or other material that was removed in terms of subsection (2)(b)(iv) to the premises in question unless the judge referred to in subsection (2) is of the opinion that the return of the said article, document or material will prejudice the security of the Republic, in which case the judge may direct that it be destroyed or stored elsewhere.

(4) The judge referred to in subsection (2) may, upon a written application complying with the directives issued under subsection (5), extend the period of validity of the direction for a further period not exceeding three months at a time, if the extension is necessary for a reason mentioned in subsection (2).

(5) The Judges President of the several Divisions of the High Court of South Africa may jointly issue directives to uniformly regulate the manner and procedure of applications in terms of subsection (2).

Establishment of Intelligence Services Council on Conditions of Service

22. (1) There is hereby established an Intelligence Services Council on Conditions of Service Which consists of not more than three persons or members appointed on contract by the Minister, one of whom must be Chairperson.

(2) The members contemplated in subsection (1) must be fit and proper persons with a thorough knowledge of the functioning of the Intelligence Services.

(3) The functions of the Intelligence Services Council are--

(a) to make recommendations to the Minister on the development of policies on conditions of service and human resource matters;

(b) to make recommendations to the Minister on improvements of salaries and fringe benefits of members on an annual basis;

(c) for purposes of making recommendations as contemplated in paragraphs (a) and (b)--

(i) to conduct research;

(ii) to review such policies;

(iii) to evaluate and monitor the implementation of such policies;

(iv) to invite the Director-General, the Chief Executive Officer, the Chairpersons of the staff forum, members and any other interested party to give representations on any matter relating to the purview of its functions;

(v) to evaluate representations contemplated in subparagraph (iv);

(vi) to confer with the Public Service Commission.

(4) The Chairperson may co-opt a Director-General or the Chief Executive Officer to participate in the functioning of the Intelligence Services Control Council: Provided that such Director-General or the Chief Executive Officer does not have voting powers.

(5) The conditions of service of the members of the intelligence Services Council may be determined by the Minister in accordance with the conditions of service applicable to members.

(6) The Intelligence Services Council must perform its functions impartially, without bias, fear or prejudice.

(7) The Minister may appoint members or persons to give research, administrative logistical and technical support to the Intelligence Services Council.

Disclosure of classified information or material by former members

(2) Subsection (1) applies to any information or material received by the former member during, or subsequent to, the former member's employment or other service with the Intelligence Services or the Academy, as the case may be, that was marked as classified or that the former member knew or ought reasonably to have known was classified.

27. (1) Subject to section 10(3)(a), a former member may not disclose in any form or any manner any information or material to any other person unless the Director-General concerned or the Chief Executive Officer, as the case may be, has granted permission for the disclosure or such information or material.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Director-General concerned or the Chief Executive Officer may consult any member or person to advise him or her on the consideration of applications by former members for permission to disclose classified information or material.

(4) The Minister may prescribe the manner in which applications for disclosure of classified information or material by former members must be processed.

Employment in private security industry

28. (1) A former member may not, for a period of three years after leaving the Intelligence Services or the Academy, render a security service unless he or she has obtained a clearance certificate from the Director-General concerned or the Chief Executive Officer, as the case may be.

(2) The Minister may prescribe the manner in which any former member may apply for a clearance certificate referred to in subsection (1).

Prohibited communications by former members

29. No former member may communicate in the Republic or elsewhere in a manner that is likely to be detrimental to the security of the Republic with any person--

(a) who is or was a member, representative or associate of the Intelligence Services or the Academy or a foreign intelligence service;

(b) who co-operates or has co-operated with the Intelligence Services or the Academy in respect of matters concerning the security of the Republic.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OBJECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BILL, 2002

2. CONTENTS OF BILL

The Bill seeks to regulate--

(a) the retirement age of members of the Intelligence Services, which is 60 years, and to provide for the Minister to extend the years of service to 65 years on account of public interest;

(b) the establishment of the Intelligence Services Council on Conditions of Service which will comprise:

-- a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Commissioner and research staff who will:

* conduct research and make recommendations to the Minister on conditions of service; and

* review and monitor implementation of policies on conditions of service;

(c) the establishment of the South African National Academy of Intelligence which will provide intelligence training;

(d) the activities of former members of the Intelligence Services relating to:

-- Disclosure of classified information which is prohibited without the approval of the Director-General concerned or the Chief Executive Officer;

-- Employment in the security industry which is restricted for a period of three years after the former member has left the Intelligence Service concerned unless permission is granted by the Director-General concerned;

-- Communication with associates, members or representatives of the Intelligence Services in a manner that is likely to be detrimental to the security of the Republic.

* Selected excerpts. Bill, as amended by the Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence Legislation (National Assembly).

** The repeal of the whole of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994).

National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994

(Act No. 39 of 1994) - Assented to 23 November 1994*

4. Establishment of National Intelligence Coordinating Committee.--(1) There is hereby established a National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, which shall consist of--

(a) the Minister;

(b) the Coordinator for Intelligence appointed under section 5 (1), who shall be the chairperson;

(c) the Director-General of the Agency;

(d) the Director-General of the Service;

(e) the chief of the intelligence division of the National Defence Force; and

(f) the head of the intelligence division of the South African Police Service,

[Para. (f) substituted by s. 25 of Act No. 66 of 2000.]

or the alternates of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (b) to (f), and such members of departments of State who are coopted by Nicoc on a permanent or an ad hoc basis.

5. Coordinator for Intelligence.--(1) The President shall appoint a person as Coordinator for Intelligence, who shall, subject to the directions and supervision of the Minister--

(a) manage and administer the functions of Nicoc referred to in section 4 (2); and

(b) establish such structures and committees as are necessary for the efficient functioning of Nicoc.

(2) ...

[S 5 substituted by s. 5 of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

* Selected excerpts. Act as amended by the National Strategic intelligence Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 37 of 1998) and the General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No. 66 of 2000).

The Intelligence Community as published on the National Intelligence Agency Website*

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NICOC)

NICOC is also supported by a staff complement which is responsible for day-to-day co-ordination.

In terms of the Act, NICOC is required to co-ordinate intelligence supplied by the members of the national intelligence structures and to produce and disseminate intelligence with regard to matters of national strategic importance. In order to facilitate coordination, NICOC has established Provincial Intelligence Coordination Committees (PICOC's) in the nine provinces and several functional committees.

NICOC's direct clients are the President, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs. Other clients include government departments, Premiers, provincial governments and parliamentary committees.

National Intelligence Agency Annual Report: April2001 to March 2002, First Edition**

Shifting Dynamics

Decentralisation

NIA members collecting information should have a profound understanding of the dynamics of the society in which they work, a thorough connection with their community and the insight and knowledge to. advise government accordingly on security matters. This consideration resulted in a general reorganisation of NIA from 2000 to focus primarily on strengthening our capacity in the provinces by decentralising most of our operational activities and many support functions in and to the provinces.

The decision to decentralise our activities to the provinces is central to our business priorities. In line with Government's drive to emphasise service delivery towards a better life, we are convinced that we can be more responsive to the needs of our clients by promoting proximity and accessibility to them. Client relationships can therefore be fostered at provincial level and services customised to client needs. Additionally, a closer working relationship will result in a better understanding of our mandate and areas of responsibility by the client. By strengthening the overall capacity in the provinces, we will be better positioned to respond qualitatively and directly to security threats where they occur.

* Selected excerpts. Website addres: http://www.nia.org.za

** Selected excerpts.

Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Bill [B59B--2002]*

BILL

To provide for the establishment of a company that will provide electronic communications security products and services to organs of state; and to provide for matters concerned therewith.

Establishment of Comsec

2. There is hereby established a juristic person to be known as Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd.

Principal objective of Comsec

3. The principal objective of Comsec is to ensure that critical electronic communications are protected and secure.

Functions

7. (1) The functions of Comsec are to-

a) protect and secure critical electronic communications against unauthorised access or technical, electronic or any other related threats;

(b) provide, with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Agency defined in section 1 of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994), verification services for electronic communications security systems, products and services used by organs of state;

(c) provide and co-ordinate research and development with regard to electronic communications security products, services and other related services;

(d) perform any other function not inconsistent with this Act that is necessary for the effective functioning of Comsec.

(2) For purposes of the function contemplated in subsection (1), Comsec must--

(a) develop, design, procure, invent, install or maintain secure electronic communications systems or products and do research in this regard;

(b) provide secure electronic communications services, systems and products;

(c) provide cryptographic services;

(d) train and support users of the electronic communications systems, products and related services; and

(e) provide consultancy services on the security and protection of electronic communications services, systems and products.

(3) Subject to applicable labour law, Comsec may with the approval of the Minister acting with the concurrence of the Minister responsible for an entity or establishment of the State which performs functions similar to those referred to in subsection (2), integrate such an entity or establishment into Comsec.

(4) Comsec may co-operate with any organisation in the Republic or elsewhere to achieve its objectives.

(5) Comsec, the members of its Board and its employees must, in the performance of their functions in terms of this Act, comply with the policies and regulations relating to security of communications made in terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994).

(6) The head of a telecommunication service provider must, at the request of Comsec and at Comsec's expense, render such assistance as may be necessary for the execution of the function of Comsec contemplated in this section.

(7) Comsec is exempted from the licensing requirements contemplated in--

(a) the Broadcasting Act, 1999 (Act No. 4 of 1999); and (b) the Telecommunications Act, 1996 (Act No. 103 of 1996).

Critical electronic communications infrastructure

21. (1) Comsec for its own account must provide protection to critical electronic communications infrastructure, such as computer systems and programmes of organs of state.

(2) Comsec must co-ordinate research and development regarding any security risk that may arise in relation to critical electronic communications infrastructure.

(3) The Minister may, on the recommendation of Comsec, identify critical communications infrastructure and request Comsec to provide the necessary protection.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OBJECTS OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (PTY) LTD BILL, 2002

1. CONTENTS OF BILL

This Bill seeks to establish Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd ("Comsec") as a private company in terms of the Companies Act, 1973, with the State as the sole shareholder. The objective of Comsec is to protect and secure certain electronic communications of organs of state against unauthorised access or other related technical or electronic threats.

In terms of the proposed Bill, Comsec may be. exempted from certain provisions of the Companies Act by a declaration made by the Minister of Trade and Industry in the Gazette after a recommendation from Comsec and a request from the Minister for Intelligence Services. Such request must be fully motivated.

The Bill also seeks to authorise Comsec to integrate agencies of the State which provide services similar to those of Comsec, into Comsec. All organs of state will have to procure and access electronic communications products and systems with the verification and approval of Comsec. However, organs of state may be exempted from the application of this Act.

The affairs of Comsec will be managed by a Board of nine Directors, one of whom will be a Chief Executive Officer.

* Selected excerpts. Bill, as amended by the Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence Legislation (National Assembly).

2.1.2 Functions

National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994) -- Assented to 23 November 1994*

2. Functions relating to intelligence.--(1) The functions of the Agency shall, subject to section 3, be--

(a) to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse domestic intelligence, in order to--

(i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people;

(ii) supply intelligence regarding any such threat to Nicoc;

(b) to fulfil the national counterintelligence responsibilities and for this purpose to conduct and coordinate counterintelligence and to gather, correlate, evaluate, analyse and interpret information regarding counter intelligence in order to-

(i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people;

(ii) inform the President of any such threat;

(iii) supply (where necessary) intelligence relating to any such threat to the South African Police Service for the purposes of investigating any offence or alleged offence; and

(c) to gather departmental intelligence at the request of any interested department of State, and, without delay to evaluate and transmit such intelligence and any other intelligence at the disposal of the Agency and which constitutes departmental intelligence, to the department concerned and to Nicoc.

[Para. (c) substituted by s. 2 (a) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(2) It shall, subject to section 3, be the functions of the Service--

(a) to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse foreign intelligence, excluding foreign military intelligence, in order to--

(i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people;

(ii) supply intelligence relating to any such threat to Nicoc;

[Sub-para. (ii) substituted by s. 2 (b) of Act No. 37 of 1998.)

(b) to institute--

(i) counterintelligence measures within the Service; and

(ii) in consultation with the Agency, counterintelligence measures outside the Republic; and

[Para. (b) substituted by s. 2 (c) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(c) to gather departmental intelligence at the request of any interested department of State, and, without delay to evaluate and transmit such intelligence and any other intelligence at the disposal of the Service and which constitutes departmental intelligence, to the department concerned and to Nicoc.

[Para. (c) substituted by s. 2 (c) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

3. Functions of other departments of State with reference to national security intelligence.--(1) If any law expressly or by implication requires any department of State, other than the Agency or the Service, to perform any function with regard to the security of the Republic or the combating of any threat to the security of the Republic, such law shall be deemed to empower such department to gather departmental intelligence, and to evaluate, correlate and interpret such intelligence for the purpose of discharging such function: Provided that such department of State--

(a) other than the National Defence Force when employed for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) of the Constitution or when discharging the counterintelligence responsibilities entrusted to its intelligence division; and

[Para. (a) substituted by s. 3 (a) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(b) other than a police service established under any Act of Parliament, when a member of such service is investigating any offence relating to the security of the Republic or is performing any other function relating to the security of the Republic,

shall not gather departmental intelligence within the Republic in a covert manner: Provided further that such department of State--

(i) other than the National Defence Force through its intelligence division;

[Sub-para. (i) amended by s. 3 (b) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(ii) other than a police service established under any Act of Parliament, when a member of such a service is, with the knowledge and approval of Nicoc, investigating an offence relating to the security of the Republic or is performing any other function relating to the security of the Republic;

(iii) other than the Agency, when a member of the Agency is performing its counter-intelligence responsibility contemplated in section 2 (1) (b), with the knowledge and approval of the Service,

shall not gather departmental intelligence outside the Republic in a covert manner.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the National Defence Force through its intelligence division may--

(a) whenever the President on the advice of the Minister of Defence is of the opinion that conditions are such that the said Force has to prepare itself for possible employment for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) (a) of the Constitution; and

(b) upon having been authorised by Nicoc acting with the concurrence of the Cabinet,

gather domestic military intelligence in a covert manner within the geographical area and the timescales specified in such authorisation.

[Sub-s. (2) substituted by s. 3 (c) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(3) It shall be the duty of any department of State that comes into possession of national security intelligence or information which may be of value in the preparation of the national intelligence estimate referred to in section 4 (2) (c) to transmit such intelligence and information without delay to the relevant service forming part of the National Intelligence Structures, with an indication of the reliability of the source of such information.

(4) Subsection (3) shall not be construed as affecting the continued existence and functioning or the establishment of any intelligence service by any department of State for the purpose of performing its departmental intelligence functions under this Act.

4. (2) The functions of Nicoc shall be--

(a) to coordinate the intelligence supplied by the members of the National Intelligence Structures to Nicoc and interpret such intelligence for the use by the State and the Cabinet for the purposes of--

(i) the detection and identification of any threat or potential threat to the national security of the Republic;

(ii) the protection and promotion of the national interests of the Republic;

(b) for the purposes of the functions contemplated in paragraph (a)--

(i) to coordinate and prioritise intelligence activities within the National Intelligence Structures;

(ii) to prepare and interpret intelligence estimates;

(c) to produce and disseminate intelligence which may have an influence on any state policy with regard to matters referred to in paragraph (a) for consideration by the Cabinet;

(d) after consultation with the departments of the State entrusted with the maintenance of the security of the Republic, to coordinate the flow of national strategic intelligence between such departments;

(e) at the request of any Department of State, to coordinate the gathering of intelligence and without delay to evaluate and transmit such intelligence and any other intelligence at the disposal of the National Intelligence Structures and which constitutes departmental intelligence, to the department concerned; and

(f) to make recommendations to the Cabinet on intelligence priorities.

(3) The Agency shall provide logistical, technical and administrative support to Nicoc.

[S. 4 substituted by s. 4 of Act No. 37 of 998.]

5. Coordinator for Intelligence.--(1) The President shall appoint a person as Coordinator for Intelligence, who shall, subject to the directions and supervision of the Minister--

(a) manage and administer the functions of Nicoc referred to in section 4(2); and

(b) establish such structures and committees as are necessary for the efficient functioning of Nicoc.

(2) The National Intelligence. Structures shall, at the request of the Coordinator for Intelligence, render such assistance as is necessary for the performance of his or her functions contemplated in subsection (1).

[S. 5 substituted by s. 5 of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

* Selected excerpts. Act as amended by the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 37 of 1998) and the General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No. 66 of 2000).

National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill [B51 B-2002] *

GENERAL EXPLANATORY NOTE:

[ ] Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from existing enactments.

----- Words underlined with a solid line indicate insertions in existing enactments.

BILL

To amend the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, so as to exclude the Minister as a member of Nicoc; to redefine counterintelligence; to provide for security screening by the relevant members of the national intelligence structures; to further define the functions of the Minister pertaining to co-ordination of intelligence; and to regulate the functions of the National Intelligence Structures; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

Amendment of section 1 of Act 39 of 1994, as amended by section 1 of Act 37 of 1998 and section 24 of Act 66 of 2000

1. Section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), is hereby amended--

(a) by the substitution for the definition of "counterintelligence" of the following definition:

"'counter-intelligence' means measures and activities conducted, instituted or taken to impede and to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence operations, to protect [classified] intelligence and any classified information, to conduct security screening investigations and to counter subversion, sabotage and terrorism aimed at, or against personnel, strategic installations or resources of the Republic;"; and ...

Amendment of section 4 of Act 39 of 1994, as amended by section 37 of Act 37 of 1998 and section 25 of Act 66 of 2000

4. Section 4 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the deletion of paragraph (a) of subsection (1).

Amendment of section of Act 30 of 1994, as amended by section 5 of Act 37 of 1998

5. Section 5 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the deletion of paragraph (b) of subsection (1).

MEMORANDUM OF THE OBJECTS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AMENDMENT BILL, 2002

1. The National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994) ("the Act") was promulgated in 1995 to provide for:

-- The establishment of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee ("Nicoc");

-- the Co-ordinator of Intelligence within the national intelligence structures;

-- the defining of the functions of the national intelligence structures;

-- a Co-ordinator who would be responsible for the coordination of intelligence;

-- Nicoc to advise Cabinet with respect to national strategic intelligence.

2. In 1995, subsequent to the promulgation of the Act, the President called for the demarcation of the political responsibility of the Minister responsible for Intelligence and that of the Coordinator of Intelligence.

3. As a result of the abovementioned, the Act was amended in 1998 to provide for:

-- Separation of the responsibilities of the Co-ordinator from those of the Minister for. Intelligence Services with regards to co-ordination of intelligence;

-- the Minister as a member of Nicoc to advise Cabinet on co-ordination of intelligence;

-- a Co-ordinator who would be chief functionary of Nicoc;

-- Nicoc and the Co-ordinator to function under the supervision of the Minister of Intelligence;

-- the Minister as the political head responsible for coordination of intelligence.

4. A review of the functioning of Nicoc was conducted and a need arose to strengthen the legal mandate, in order to put intelligence at the centre of government business.

5. CONTENTS OF THE BILL

(a) To exclude the Minister as a member of Nicoc;

(b) To define counter-intelligence to expressly: encompass security screening investigations and treason as elements of the definition of counter-intelligence;

-- encompass security screening investigations; and

-- include treason as part of the definition;

(c) To define subversion;

(d) To empower the Minister to establish structures to assist him or her in the advisory function to Cabinet and the national executive on co-ordination of intelligence and national strategic intelligence;

(e) To provide for the Agency to supply counter-intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc;

(f) To provide for the South African Police Service to coordinate crime intelligence and to supply crime intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc; and

(g) To provide for regulations on:

-- security screening investigations;

-- co-ordination of intelligence; and

-- protection of information.

* Selected excerpts. Bill, as amended by the Ad Hoc committee on Intelligence Legislation (National Assembly).

National Intelligence Agency Annual Report: April 2001 to March 2002, First Edition *

Intelligence Domains

The A-Function (Domestic Intelligence)

Section 2(1)(a) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994, dictates that NIA will be responsible for domestic intelligence. This task refers to the gathering, correlating, evaluating and analysing of intelligence on any internal activity factor, or development, which is detrimental to the national stability of the Republic, as well as threats or potential threats to the constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and well-being of its people.

The primary objective is to identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people and supply intelligence regarding such a threat to NICOC. In this regard NIA must fulfil a pro-active or early warning role of scanning and assessing the total domestic security situation to identify any signs or warning signals of impending threats (patterns, trends and relationships) and to forewarn the policy maker or executive departments of a looming crisis. Furthermore, NIA must perform a reactive monitoring role when a crisis has already arisen. The purpose of this is mainly to analyse the extent and implications of the crisis and to continuously advise government on such issues. NIA also has the responsibility to identify opportunities for the government.

The uniqueness of the task of NIA lies in its responsibility to monitor the entire national security environment to safeguard and promote national interests.

The B-Function (Counter-Intelligence)

Section 2(1)(b) of the aforementioned Act determines that NIA will fulfil the national counter-intelligence responsibility. It will in effect conduct and coordinate measures and activities taken to impede or neutralise the effectiveness of foreign or hostile intelligence services, to protect classified intelligence, to counter subversion, terrorism and sabotage aimed at the Republic of South Africa.

SAPS, the SANDF and SASS all have a counter-intelligence responsibility only insofar as it relates to their own organisations. Additionally, SASS has an external responsibility in consultation with NIA.

The C-Function (Departmental Intelligence)

Section 2(1)(c) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act also dictates that NIA has a departmental intelligence responsibility. Hence, NIA has the obligation to liaise intelligence to other state departments, which could assist them in the execution of their line-functional responsibilities. The state departments, however, will only receive intelligence that deals directly with these responsibilities. ...

Responsibilities of National Counter-Intelligence

NIA's Counter-Intelligence Role and Responsibilities

Our security role is to formulate policy and directives for the implementation of countermeasures within client institutions and to ensure, by monitoring through assessments and surveys, that the countermeasures are effectively implemented. NIA also has a responsibility to identify the nature of the counter-intelligence threats. Countermeasures are then formulated to combat specific threats.

From the National Strategic Intelligence Act it is clear that the process of implementing counter-intelligence measures is primarily aimed at creating a condition of security surrounding the personnel, information and material of the State. In creating this secure environment, threats specifically relating to espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism need to be countered. To these threats should be added acts or omissions of own personnel that can be exploited by adversaries.

National Security Responsibilities

The following national security responsibilities fall within our ambit:

-- Vetting. Our national responsibility is to screen all client personnel including those of NIA itself - who work with or otherwise have access to classified or sensitive information or environments.

During the 2001/2002 period 3 180 requests for personnel clearance were received. In the same period over 16 000 record checks for special events were received and finalised. A total of 1 379 Confidential to Top Secret clearances were also issued in the same period.

-- Security Policy Formulation and Auditing. We have a national responsibility to formulate countermeasures through security policies, procedures and regulations, as well as to ensure the standardised implementation thereof throughout the client environment. This function entails the identification and formulation of measures pertaining to appropriate areas of specialisation, namely, Security of Information, Security of Information Technology, Aviation Security and Physical Security.

Three training courses for security managers in the Government Sector were presented. This resulted in the training of 150 officials. The modular-based course presented over a period of two weeks dealt with all aspects of security. Security awareness training workshops were also conducted for top management and personnel and approximately 30 clients.

Thorough surveys were conducted for 82 clients, which included those parastatals that form part of the NIA client list. After-hours inspections were undertaken at most of the Ministries and national government departments.

The audits resulted in the introduction of several security awareness programmes, the appointment of security managers in client departments, as well as the devising of steps to draft internal security policies and implement the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) policy of Government.

The contents of security awareness workshops are aimed at:

-- establishing a security relationship and enhancing the efficient functioning of the institution;

-- familiarising staff with their personal obligations in relation to maintaining adequate security;

-- determining the relationship between the security programme objectives and the proposed security measures;

-- familiarising staff with the functions of the various components of the intelligence community;

-- explaining relevant statutory or common law requirements regarding security; and

-- clarifying relevant regulatory requirements.

-- Security Investigations. We are also responsible for conducting investigations into security breaches that occur within government departments and facilities.

-- Internal Protective Security. The responsibility for the physical security of all NIA offices, NICOC, the Ministry for Intelligence Services and the Office of the Inspector-General for Intelligence is an equally important function. Our Agency is also responsible for the provision of VIP protection services to the Minister for Intelligence Services, the Director-General of NIA and the Coordinator for Intelligence.

-- Focus on IT Security. MA has a crucial function in securing, advising and monitoring the State/client information technology (IT) assets and information, as well as applying the unique countermeasures required to address impending threats to them.

Our Agency is also responsible for formulating countermeasures in the form of guidelines, polices, directives, etc, specifically relating to IT security, that need to be implemented by client institutions.

Counter-Espionage Responsibilities

Contextualising and Defining Counter-Espionage

The White Paper on Intelligence describes counter-intelligence as "offensive and defensive activities to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign/hostile intelligence operations; to protect sensitive information; and to counter subversion, sabotage and terrorism directed against personnel, strategic installations and material".

Within this context defensive activities, or more popularly known as protective security, would relate to defensive measures and procedures instituted to protect information, material, installations and personnel that are of national importance.

As the offensive dimension of counter-intelligence, counterespionage is designed to detect, neutralise, or prevent espionage activities through the identification, penetration and manipulation of individuals, groups or organisations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities.

Espionage activities are conducted to acquire information or assets relating to sensitive political, socio-economic and scientific matters unlawfully or in an unauthorised manner. Espionage poses a threat to South Africa's national interests and the effective countering thereof is essential in ensuring domestic welfare and international competitiveness.

* Selected excerpts.

About NIA as published on the National Intelligence Agency Website *

Functions and Mandate

The National Strategic Intelligence Act of 1994 defines the primary functions of NIA

In view of these functions, NIA is responsible for the following:

-- To fulfil a proactive, anticipatory or early warning role of scanning and assessing the total (economic, social, political and environmental) domestic security situation to identify and report to the policy maker or executive departments any signs or warning signals of threats or potential threats to the constitutional order and the safety of the people.

-- To perform a reactive monitoring role of tracking events when a threat/crime has been identified or a crisis has already arisen, without duplication of the role of other executive departments. The purpose of this monitoring role is mainly to enhance investigation and prosecution by providing tactical information and intelligence to enforcement and prosecution institutions and to decide the extent and implications of threats or potential threats to the national security of the Republic and the safety of the people.

-- To provide an integrated multi-analytical strategic projective assessment of patterns, trends and of security relevant issues, to provide strategic early warning and to enhance NIA's support/involvement in policy formulation.

* Selected excerpts. Website address: http://www.nia.org.za

National Intelligence Agency Pamphlet published on the National Intelligence Agency Website *

Domestic Intelligence

Domestic Intelligence in conventional terms relates directly to priorities such as terrorism, sabotage and subversion. However, the acceptance of the White Paper on Intelligence published in 1995 outlines the new philosophy and principles of intelligence and this coupled with recent internationally accepted interpretations of security has led to the adoption of a new approach by the NIA.

Guarding our constitutional democracy is vital to ensuring security, stability and development. Ensuring the development of our country both at a socio-economic, trade and technological level is likewise of critical importance to stability.

This has directed NIA to redefining our understanding of Domestic Intelligence a new interpretation that underpins the work we do.

Critical to the delivery of domestic intelligence are the elements of early detection of threats, timeous reporting and identification of opportunities for the country.

Counter-Intelligence

This function is best described as the "first line of defence" to ensure the protection of South Africa's strategic interest. To effect this core function, the NIA performs a number of activities or security tests that are aimed at preventing or countering any potential threats. The range of tests include security competence testing, security audits and investigations. Identifying loopholes in our security systems is perhaps a better way of explaining this function. Detecting and countering foreign espionage falls within this ambit.

Departmental Intelligence

NIA has a departmental intelligence responsibility. Hence, NIA has the obligation to liaise intelligence to other state departments, which could assist them in the execution of their line-functional responsibilities.

* Selected excerpts. Website address: http://www.nia.org.za

2.2 Focus

White Paper on Intelligence, 1994 *

8. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL REALITIES FACING SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

A complex interplay of international, regional and domestic developments, of both a positive and negative nature impact on national security, and consequently the mission of the intelligence community in South Africa. The next section of this White Paper highlights the most critical of these developments.

8.1 International dimension

With the shifting international balance of forces, intense interest has shifted onto the successful South African transition. South Africa is perceived as an area of intense economic opportunity by foreign nations competing to achieve trade and industrial advantage in this regard. Notwithstanding this, with the demise of apartheid and the Cold War, new political and economic relationships of cooperation and support with various countries have become both desirable and possible.

On a more negative note, new global political, social and economic problems are filtering South Africa's borders. International extremists have forged links with their South African counterparts, whilst international drug cartels, use our country both as a transit route for their trade and as a market, thus corrupting our social system.

Lastly, there has been a dramatic increase in foreign intelligence activities in South Africa. Apart from classic political and military espionage, other activities of foreign/hostile intelligence services and industrial espionage agents have increased markedly in the economic, technological and scientific fields.

8.2 Regional dimension

Because of its relatively advantaged economic position, South Africa is regarded as a pivotal centre of development for Southern Africa and indeed, for the rest of Africa. The social and economic problems of the region will continue to affect South Africa. It can reasonably be argued that there will not be peace and stability in South Africa until conditions of peace prevail in the rest of Southern Africa. Indeed South Africa has a moral responsibility to contribute towards the development of the rest of Africa. It must define its relationship with the continent away from domination and destabilisation, towards a relationship of cooperation and mutual respect.

At the same time unrealistic expectations of South Africa must be tempered. The pressing socio-economic problems of our own country suggest that we must make these our first priority. The relationship we enter into with other African countries must be designed to promote political stability, regional security, and our mutual economic growth and development, as well as a lessening of dependence of the African continent on the countries of the North, in favour of the development of the South.

8.3 Internal dimension

Massive socio-economic degradation, with poverty, hunger, homelessness and unemployment being the order of the day, will render the political changes meaningless if they are not accompanied by a significant improvement in the quality of our people's lives. Whilst politically motivated violence is on the decline, there has been an increase in common criminal activities.

These socio-economic problems call for creativity and commitment in the implementation of the RDP. At the same time the government and society must be firm in dealing with crime and lawlessness.

* Selected excerpts.

Statement from the Ministry for Intelligence Services Intelligence Programme 2000 -- 07 February 2000 *

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES 2000

The key National Intelligence Priorities for the year 2000 are aimed at combating:

-- Attempts to destabilise the Constitutional Order, Subversion, Sabotage and Terrorism, and in particular urban terrorism;

-- Corruption;

-- Crime;

-- Espionage;

-- Poor protective security within the State;

-- Regional Security Dynamics;

-- Continental Stability Issues;

-- International economic and technological threats and opportunities as they relate to South Africa;

-- Ensuring an environment conducive for free and fair local government elections;

-- Extremism and terrorism;

-- Addressing arms smuggling with a special focus on drug dealers;

-- Taxi violence; and

-- Involvement of foreign and South. African Security Companies in African conflicts.

Frequently Asked Questions

as published on the National Intelligence Agency Website **

... NIA serves the people of South Africa in two ways. Firstly, NIA provides government with intelligence on domestic threats or potential threats to national stability, the constitutional order, and the safety and well being of our people. Examples of such threats are terrorism, sabotage and subversion. This allows government to implement policies to deal with potential threats and to better understand existing threats and thus improve their policies.

Secondly, NIA fulfils the national counter intelligence responsibility. This includes both defensive and offensive activities. For example, on the defensive side, NIA advises government departments on their security measures; while on the offensive side NIA identifies, monitors and neutralises (with the co-operation of other government departments) foreign or hostile intelligence services that seek to gain access to classified information.

NIA's collection efforts are divided into two categories, namely the collection of open information and the collection of secret information. Both are required because open information clearly does not reveal all the intentions and plans or hidden agendas of organisations and persons involved in, for example terrorism or espionage. Hence, the need for secret information that is collected by covert means to gain a full understanding of threats.

NIA's activities are directed by the South African government's requirements. Thus, NIA responds to specific requests (what clients have requested), anticipated needs (what clients should know), and situational realities (critical events and developments).

NIA will only investigate developments where there are indications of individuals, groups and/or organisations with deliberate intent to cause potential harm to the state or its citizens. Coupled to this, the likely intensity and magnitude of the impact on domestic security and stability would be important guiding tools for any further investigations.

NIA focuses on individuals, groups and organisations that engage in the following:

Terrorism, which refers to the deliberate and premeditated attempts to create terror through symbolic acts involving the use or threats of lethal force for creating psychological effects that will influence a target group or individual and translate it into political or material results.

Sabotage, which refers to activities or purposeful omissions conducted or planned for purposes of endangering the safety, security or defence of vital public or private property, such as installations, structures, equipment or systems.

Subversion, which includes activities directed towards undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed towards, or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction, or overthrow by violence of the constitutionally established system of government in South Africa.

Espionage, which is the unlawful or unauthorised activities conducted for acquiring information or assets relating to sensitive social, political, economic, scientific or military matters of South Africa or for their unauthorised communication to a foreign state.

Organised Crime, which refers to the origins of and reasons behind organised crime, to identify the key role players (corrupters and corruptees), the nature and extent, modus operandi, routes, etc and to do trend analysis. ...

The uniqueness of the task of NIA lies in its responsibility to monitor the entire domestic environment so as to explain the full scope of the nature of events and threats as well as the impact thereof on national security and stability. In comparison, other departments' responsibilities are confined to those issues and threats directly related to the functions of the department, for example, the South African Police Service (SAPS) would focus on criminal activity only.

NIA is an intelligence service, not a law enforcement institution. We are only responsible for ensuring that government is warned and informed of real and potential threats. Other government departments are responsible for the actions that must be taken to neutralise threats.

* Selected excerpts.

** Selected excerpts. Website address: http://www.nia.org.za

3. MILITARY (DEFENCE) INTELLIGENCE

3.1 Organisation and functions

National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994

(Act No. 39 of 1994) -- Assented to 23 November 1994 *

2. (4) The National Defence Force shall, subject to section 3-

(a) gather, correlate, evaluate and use foreign military intelligence, and supply foreign military intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc, but the National Defence Force shall not gather intelligence of a non-military nature in a covert manner;

(b) gather, correlate, evaluate and use domestic military intelligence excluding covert collection, except when employed for service as contemplated in section 201 (2) (a) of the Constitution and under conditions set out in section 3 (2) of this Act, and supply such intelligence to Nicoc; and

[Para. (b) amended by s. 2 (e) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(c) institute counter-intelligence measures within the National Defence Force.

* Selected excerpts. Act as amended by the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 37 of 1998) and the General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No. 66 of 2000).

White Paper on Defence -- As approved by Parliament, May 1996 *

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

The principles of civil-military relations have special relevance to defence intelligence. The intelligence legislation which has been promulgated and the RSA Intelligence White Paper, provide for an ethical code of conduct, parliamentary oversight and executive control in respect of all intelligence agencies.

Defence intelligence structures are also subject to the scrutiny of the Inspector-General of the SANDF and the various mechanisms provided for in the new intelligence legislation. These mechanisms include the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, and an Inspector-General responsible for defence intelligence.

The Ministry will ensure that a fair and acceptable balance is reached between the need to protect sensitive information and the demands for freedom of information in respect of intelligence activities.

The main functions of the Intelligence Division of the SANDF are the conducting of military intelligence and counter-intelligence, and the gathering of external military information. The primary aim of the latter function is to provide the SANDF with advance warning of potential military threats and instability, and thereby with maximum time for defence preparation. An effective intelligence capability is essential as a force multiplier and to ensure that force levels are kept to the lowest level in times of peace. Intelligence is also the basis of all defence planning and the conduct of all operations.

Intelligence liaison and the sharing of intelligence with other states will be undertaken in accordance only with guidelines issued by the Minister of Defence, in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, and in co-operation with NICOC.

The National Strategic Intelligence Act provides that, where the SANDF is deployed internally, the Intelligence Division may only gather domestic military intelligence in a covert manner with the authorisation of the Chairperson of NICOC acting with the concurrence of NICOC and Cabinet. Such covert collection shall be limited to the geographical area and time-scales specified in the authorisation.

Defence Intelligence structures shall not initiate or participate in any operations of a non-intelligence nature.

* "Defence in a Democracy", Chapter 2. Selected excerpts.

Defence Bill (B60B--2001] *

Application of strategic and operational intelligence

34. The Intelligence Division must, subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), gather, correlate, evaluate and use--

(a) strategic intelligence for purposes of--

(i) ensuring national security;

(ii) assisting in the formulation of defence policy;

(iii) assisting in the determination of defence strategy;

(iv) assisting in the execution of defence and foreign policy;

(v) ensuring the security of defence assets of whatever description; and

(vi) assisting in the co-ordination of foreign military assistance; and

(b) operational intelligence for purposes of--

(i) assisting in the execution of operations in line with defence strategy;

(ii) assisting in the preparation of forces in order to get them ready for combat;

(iii) providing support for combat forces;, and

(iv) ensuring the security of the forces.

Co-operation with other intelligence services

35. The Intelligence Division must co-operate with any other intelligence service or body created by or under any other law.

Counterintelligence by Intelligence Division

36. The Intelligence Division must, in accordance with any policy, procedure or norm determined by the Minister and in consultation with the National Intelligence Agency established by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 38 of 1994), conduct and institute counterintelligence measures and activities within--.

(a) the Ministry of Defence;

(b) the Department; and

(c) the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa, Limited, established in terms of section 2 of the Armaments Development and Production Act, 1968 (Act. No. 57 of 1968).

* Selected excerpts. Bill, as amended on 24 July 2002, and presented by the Portfolio Committee on Defence (National Assembly).

Department of Defence, Annual Report 7998/99 *

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

The process of democratisation during the past five years in South Africa has brought about fundamental changes in the approach and conduct of defence intelligence. In line with the changes and expectations, DI has transformed dynamically from the "as is" to the "to be" structures. The conduct of intelligence was centralised under the functional control of one organisation DI.

The vision of DI was formulated to maintain constant relevance to the service of the DoD and the country. The mission statement provides for an intelligence, CI and foreign relations service to the DoD. With these principles in mind, and on the basis of the mandate of DI as formulated in the National Strategic Intelligence Act, Act No 39 of 1994, as well as the challenges of acceptability, effectiveness and resource constraints and the need to participate in inter-departmental work forums, DI will support the national interests of South Africa effectively.

Because of the fundamental nature of the changes demanded by the redesign and transformation of DI, the greatest part of the Division's efforts of necessity went into the migration from the old to the new. The new organisation has been staffed with due consideration for affirmative action requirements. The voluntary severance package system has detrimentally influenced the skills capacity of the Division and the in-service training of new incumbents has been identified as a priority for the new year. The basic organisation of DI consists of the Subdivisions Intelligence Processing, CI, Collection, Foreign Relations and Intelligence Support.

Subdivision Intelligence Processing. Subdivision Intelligence Processing has the mission to produce intelligence over the entire spectrum for force employment and decision-making. Its assessment ability indeed constitutes the instinct, which gives early warning to the DoD on threats and opportunities in the strategic and operational environments. It will contribute to ensuring that the SANDF's combat forces are prepared and ready to deal with any situation when called upon. The subdivision has re-evaluated DI's strategic partners and priorities and the result was that intelligence co-operation is better directed and more focused than in the past.

Subdivision CI. Subdivision CI has the mission to ensure the security of the employed forces and the defence family. It constitutes that ability of the DoD to mount self-defence against hostile elements and forces, The subdivision started to implement the redesigned CI system, designed to centralise responsibility and accountability for all covert CI activities and CI measures. The greatest part of the effort of the subdivision in the review period, was to transform and migrate according to the transformation guidelines. A CI for Operations Centre was established to provide centralised CI support to employed forces. Information technology security is also one of the priorities and security monitoring has shown that the incidence of breaches of IT security is still at an unacceptably high level. ...

Subdivision Collection. The Subdivision Collection is responsible for the collection of information for intelligence production. The Directorate for Geographic Information (responsible for co-ordinating the joint effort of Landward Mapping, the Hydrographer and JARIC) and the Infocentre (a facility for the collection and indexing of intelligence information for exploitation by the processing function) also form part of this subdivision. The subdivision has succeeded in one of the main aims of transformation, namely to stamp out duplication and to bring all the military collection agencies under the control of DI. ... Liaison with other departments is maintained and the co-ordination of geospatial information in the SANDF was formalised.

Subdivision Foreign Relations. Subdivision Foreign Relations is responsible for operating the SANDF and foreign attache system and for the servicing of memoranda of understanding with other countries. Related tasks, such as the scheduling and programming of visits and protocol services, are also performed by this subdivision. ...

Subdivision Intelligence Support. Subdivision Intelligence Support provides specialised support to DI. This centre provides, among others, training, education, finance, personnel utilisation and general support services. DI employed 801 uniform and Public Service Act Personnel. This number will increase as the staffing process is completed. ...

Activities, as well as the output of DI, are well co-ordinated through normal command and control procedures, as well as the introduction of the Directorate Integration and Dissemination as a watchdog over the integrity of DI products.

* "Five Years of Defence in a Democracy," Introduction, Defence Intelligence Section. Selected excerpts.

Department of Defence, Strategic Plan for FY 2002/03 to 2004/05, 31 January 2002 *

INTELLIGENCE

Defence Intelligence Programme

The Defence Intelligence Division provides intelligence collection, analysis, holistic assessments, formal briefings and military threat assessments. This, for the planning and the conduct of military operations, for Defence policy making and planning, for capability development, and for the support of wider Government decision making. Defence Intelligence produces current intelligence and counter-intelligence reports, signals analysis, communications and information security, and imagery and geo-spatial data.

Funding

The Defence Intelligence Programme is funded per sub-programme as follows
Objective/Sub-Programme 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
 R 000s R 000s R 000s

Strategic Direction. To direct the 118 871 118 019 127 751
Defence Intelligence (DI) function 5 080 14 345
in accordance with approved policy.

Defence Intelligence Services. To 12 583 13 938 14 345
collect and process intelligence in
support of operations and the
planning processes in the DOD.

Defence Counter Intelligence 4 620 5 080 5 769
Services.
To collect and process counter-
intelligence in support of
operations and the planning process
in the DOD.

Intelligence Liaison Services. To 1 858 1 858 1 858
provide an intelligence liaison
service to the DOD.

Defence Intelligence Support 8 705 9 674 9 627
Services. To render and/or
facilitate all support services to
Defence Intelligence.

Intelligence Training. To train all 2 547 1 999 2 121
defence Intelligence functionaries
in the conduct of intelligence and
related subjects
 149 184 150 568 161 471

Planned Outputs: FY 2002/03

 Sub- Output
 programme

Defence Intelligence Services Defence Intelligence
 capabilities as ordered by
 as C SANDF.


Defence Counter-intelligence
Services

Intelligence Liaison Defence Defence Intelligence
Intelligence capabilities required for
 ordered commitments as
 ordered by C SANDF.

Support Services Defence Defence Intelligence support
Intelligence Training to the DOD as ordered by C
 SANDF.

 Sub- Output
 programme measure/indicator

Defence Intelligence Services Defence Intelligence
 capabilities as specified
 field in the SANDF Force
 Preparedness Schedule.

Defence Counter-intelligence
Services

Intelligence Liaison Defence Defence Intelligence
Intelligence commitments (internal and
 external) as specified in
 the STFEP.

Support Services Defence Defence Intelligence support
Intelligence Training as per service agreements with
 clients.

 Sub- Target
 programme

Defence Intelligence Services Combat Readiness States as
 per CRS -- Combat Readiness
 Schedule.


Defence Counter-intelligence
Services

Intelligence Liaison Defence
Intelligence



Support Services Defence
Intelligence Training


* Selected excerpts.

3.2 Focus

Department of Defence, Defence Report 1999/2000 *

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

During the past year Defence Intelligence (DI) focussed on contingencies in African areas of conflict, the general elections and inauguration of the President. DI contributed towards The Early Warning Centre for the Office of the President (EWCOP), the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), other state departments, the DOD in general and CJ Ops in particular. DI participated in various inter-departmental intelligence, Counter-Intelligence (Cl) and collection-related projects co-ordinated by NICOC. This included membership of the NICOC Drafting Team, the Functional Security Committee and the SANDF/ARMSCOR Security Committee. DI participated in interdepartmental working groups (IWGs), the most important being IWGs on the SADC countries (concentrating on conflict areas), crime, especially illegal firearms and illegal immigrants, corruption within the DOD, urban terrorism, provincial security appraisals, information systems security revision and VIP protection and training.

REPRESENTATION OF ATTACHES

The SANDF has representation in ... (several) countries, ... Apart from the above resident Military Attaches (MA's), ... (some) countries are covered by shuttle accreditation. ...

... there are ... (also) foreign military representatives in South Africa.

MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)

Defence MOU have been signed with ... (several) countries to date ... (and) successful Defence Committee meetings were held ... A number of co-operation programmes originated from these MOU's as well as from requests received for assistance ... The SANDF training exchange programme includes amongst others, air force apprentice, staff course and intelligence training. ...

ISDSC CONFERENCES

During the SADC Organ Ministerial meeting in Swaziland, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence from South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe resolved the problem of the SADC Organ Structure as mandated by the summit in Maputo. The ISDSC Principal Secretaries and Directors General held one, and the Defence Chiefs two meetings. The Defence Intelligence Standing Committee, Regional Chaplains' Work Group, Standing Maritime Committee and Military Health Conferences held nine conferences.

Department of Defence, 2000/2001 Annual Report including the Report of the Auditor-General *

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

FY 2000/01 has been a successful year for the Defence Intelligence (DI) Division. The main emphasis was placed on the production of intelligence (including counter-intelligence), support to operations, developing strategic partnerships and confidence-building within the defence intelligence structures of the member countries of the South African Development Community (SADC). Dl also participated in national intelligence structures to provide a defence intelligence input at national level, as well as to ensure "checks and balances" in respect of the national and deparmental intelligence picture. Management objectives in general were also achieved. DI personnel underwent development, functional and in-service training, although a backlog is still being encountered in respect of middle management development courses. DI will strive to improve the quality of service further so that the decision-making process can be enhanced.

INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING

Sub-division Intelligence Processing (SDIP) Business Plan. The SDIP Business Plan was implemented for the first time during the review period and together with the SDIP Financial Control Committee, provided a mechanism to ensure that the budget was spent according to set objectives. Management objectives in respect of personnel and finance were also achieved. Support to the defence industry, in the field of military technology, is being expanded, with SDIP members representing DI on various technological councils, committees, boards and working groups.

Conduct of Intelligence. The improvement of the intelligence product, both in respect of quality and quantity, has been one of the major successes during the past year. The bulk of these reports and assessments served to warn and inform the DI top management of threats against and opportunities for SADC member states and South Africa.

Intelligence Support to Operations. During the review period seven intelligence contingencies in support of operations were developed. The contingencies on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia/Eritrea were updated on a continuous basis, while those in Angola, Zimbabwe and Lesotho were updated monthly. Those in Sierra Leone and Swaziland have been discontinued, but can be re-activated if required. The capacity of the subdivision dictates that only three contingencies and one large-scale exercise can be. conducted at any given time. Should more contingencies develop, DI, together with Chief of Joint Operations, will have to prioritise tasks.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Sub-division Counter Intelligence (SDCI) has the mission of ensuring the security of the DOD and the employed forces. This mission is executed through measures (security policy, advice and authorisations) to enable the DOD to exploit or inhibit espionage activities as well as subversion and sabotage by adversaries. SDCI has rendered a quality service to its clients, despite the shortage in skilled and trained personnel.

Apart from a large number of counter intelligence (CI) threat analysis inputs, security inputs were also provided on security related national and departmental policy, such as the Open Democracy Bill, the Justice Administration Bill, the Draft Defence Bill, the Fire Arms Control Act and the International Convention for the Prevention of Terrorist Bombings. Directorate Departmental Security actively participated in the drafting of the Policy on Aerial Photography and also gave inputs into the revision of the Minimum Information Security Standard (MISS). The drafting of project security and media plans for the big acquisition programmes were overseen. ...

COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

Participation in Inter-Departmental Forums. DI again participated in various interdepartmental intelligence, CI and collection-related projects coordinated by NICOC. DI also participated in interdepartmental working groups (IWGs), the most important being IWGs on the SADC countries, concentrating on conflict areas, crime, especially illegal fire-arms, and undocumented migrants, corruption within the DOD, urban terrorism, provincial security appraisals, information systems security revision and VIP protection and training. As part of the Drafting Team, DI assisted in the coordination and interpretation of intelligence, the management of the production and dissemination of DI intelligence, which could have an influence on departmental matters or policies of other departments, and recommendations to NICOC on intelligence advice and priorities.

Directorate Integration and Dissemination (DID). DID is mainly responsible for the provision of final DI products to the DOD and national clients. These inputs played a decisive role in decision-making and the guidance of strategic planning processes. As watchdog over the integrity of Defence Intelligence, it succeeded in contributing to high-quality products. DID actively participated in the compilation of integrated departmental intelligence products and played a key role in the formulation of the National Intelligence Estimate.

* Selected excerpts.

4. CRIME INTELLIGENCE

National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994) -- Assented to 23 November 1994 *

2. (3) It shall be the function of the South African Police Service, subject to section--

(a) to gather, correlate, evaluate and use crime intelligence in support of the objects of the South African Police Service as contemplated in section 205 (3) of the Constitution; and

[Para. (a) substituted by s. 2 (d) of Act No. 37 of 1998.]

(b) to institute counter-intelligence measures within the South African Police Service,

in order to supply crime intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc.

Manual of the South African Police Service in Accordance with Section 14 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000) **

2.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

(2) CRIME INTELLIGENCE

(a) Main functions:

-- Crime Intelligence Gathering

-- Crime Information Analysis

-- Crime Information Management

-- Counterintelligence

-- Technical Support

-- Secret Services Account

-- Rapid Deployment Intelligence

(b) General Comment:

This division is regarded as a line function division of the SAPS specifically responsible for the maintaining an effective information gathering, centralised and integrated information analysis and management function and a technical intelligence support service, on both a tactical and strategic level, in order to enhance and fully service the South African Police Service and its interdepartmental clients with crime intelligence.

The division is responsible for national standards and policy relating to the above issues. Although there are Crime Intelligence components at area and provincial levels reporting operationally to the area commissioner and provincial commissioner respectively, these components function in accordance with national policies and guidelines as issued by this division. The division has a national capacity for handling national level crime intelligence matters. The division is accountable to the Deputy National Commissioner: Crime Intelligence and Crime Detection. ...

2.4 INVESTIGATION UNITS OR COMPONENTS

(2) CRIME INTELLIGENCE

-- Creating strategic crime reports and establishing crime pattern analysis capabilities at all levels of policing within the Service.

-- Establishing and maintaining the network as well as the undercover crime intelligence-gathering capacity of the Service.

-- Managing and coordinating crime information through the establishment of crime desks in support of identified clients.

-- Instituting counter-intelligence measures in accordance with applicable legislation.

-- Managing the Secret Services Account that has been established in terms of the Secret Services Act, 1978 (Act No. 56 of 1978).

-- Establishing and maintaining an effective efficient technical support capacity in the Service.

* Selected excerpts. Act as amended by the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 37 of 1998) and the General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No. 66 of 2000).

** Selected excerpts.

National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill [B51B-2002] *

GENERAL EXPLANATORY NOTE:

[ ] Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from existing enactments.

_____ Words underlined with a solid line indicate insertions in existing enactments.

Amendment of section 2 of Act 39 of 1994, as amended by section 2 of Act 37 of 1998

2. Section 2 of the principal Act is hereby amended--

(a) by the addition to subsection (1)(b) of the following subparagraphs:

"(iv) supply intelligence relating to any such threat to the Department of Home Affairs for the purposes of fulfilment of any immigration function; and

(v) supply intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc;"; and

(b) by the substitution for subparagraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (3) of the following subparagraphs:-

"(a) to gather, c6rrelate, evaluate, co-ordinate and use crime intelligence in support of the objects of the South African Police Service as contemplated in section 205(3) of the Constitution;

(b) to institute counter-intelligence measures within the South African Police Service; and".

(c) by the addition to subsection (3) of the following paragraph:

(c) to supply crime intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to Nicoc."

* Selected excerpts. Bill, as amended by the Ad Hoc Committee on intelligence Legislation (National Assembly).

5. PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT UNIT

South African Ministry for Intelligence Services, 2002 *

Necessity for Focussed Support

Having realised the special support required by the Presidency to perform such responsibilities on the continent, the Presidential Support Unit (PSU) was established with a limited mandate. The unit formally came into being on 1 November 2001.

The experience obtained during the involvement of the former President Nelson Mandela as facilitator of the Burundi Peace Process informed the decision of the need for focused support to South Africa's role in conflict resolution on the continent.

At the time a support unit was established to assist Mr Mandela in the management of the process. This support team then assisted President Thabo Mbeki in grappling with the issues and securing the facilitation process by providing timely and accurate information and sound advice on the problem.

The successful outcome of the process and the experience gained signalled to government that a need indeed existed for this type of support. South Africa's own experience of peaceful resolution of conflict has positioned our country to increasingly be called upon to assist in the mediation of conflict in other parts of the world.

Indeed, when the responsibility of brokering a ceasefire in Burundi was delegated to Deputy President Jacob Zuma, this unit of experienced officials was called upon to provide invaluable support and expertise on the situation.

Location

The intelligence community has various layers of responsibility both in terms of mandate and its clients.

The two collection arms of the Civilian intelligence community are the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret Service (SASS). These are referred to as Intelligence Services.

The second layer of responsibility is the coordination and integration of all intelligence -- with this function being performed by the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). Information processed by the NICOC is passed on to the Ministry for Intelligence Services, which in turn ensures that these products are disseminated to its various clients.

The Ministry is not an intelligence unit -- as it does not have the capacity or legal mandate to conduct intelligence operations. The Ministry is in part mainly responsible for ensuring the distribution of the intelligence products to various state departments, the Presidency and other relevant bodies.

Through the provision of intelligence products, the Ministry is in fact ensuring that its responsibility of advising the various arms of government is met. Increasing demands from our various clients led to the Ministry establishing specialised advisory structures to ensure optimum service delivery to its clients. The Presidential Support Unit is one such advisory structure that provides the necessary support to the Presidency on conflict resolution missions. Another unit is the Client Liaison Unit that interacts with and advises government departments.

Role and Responsibility

The role and responsibility of the Presidential Support Unit is briefly summarised as follows:

-- to provide prompt and accurate information on conflict situations of concern to the Presidency

-- to provide intelligence support in processes relating to conflict of concern to the Presidency

-- to sensitise the intelligence community about the needs of the Presidency

-- to monitor all conflict situations in which South Africans are involved or are likely to be involved

-- to proactively develop strategies for engagement in any designated conflict

-- to participate in conferences and seminars relating to conflict resolution for those countries of concern to the Presidency

-- to provide briefings to Cabinet on peace and security processes, particularly on the African continent.

Relationship between the PSU and Government Departments & Agencies

The PSU consults with and coordinates its Presidential support activities with all relevant government departments whose mandate overlaps with the responsibilities of the Unit. The Presidency is the primary client of the Unit. The Ministers for Intelligence and Foreign Affairs are also clients.

The PSU plans to develop relationships with partners outside of government, who can contribute to the South African government's conflict resolution initiatives.

Location and Accountability

The PSU is located in the Ministry for Intelligence Services and is directly accountable to the Minister for Intelligence Services.

* Selected excerpts.
COPYRIGHT 2002 University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies
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Title Annotation:Republic of South Africa
Publication:Institute for Strategic Studies
Article Type:Topic Overview
Geographic Code:6SOUT
Date:Nov 1, 2002
Words:15239
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