Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government, and Peace.

This book is an uncritical account of the diplomatic history of Palestinian autonomy negotiations.

Chapter One, "An Introduction to the Arab-Israeli Conflict," divides pre-Camp David history into three stages. Stage one sketches the history of Zionism until the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.

Sicherman portrays stage two as regional competition between the two superpowers. Nasser's anti-Western activity resulted in the 1956 war which Israel joined to defeat the Egyptian threat to its survival. The War of Attrition that followed the 1967 war and Arafat's takeover of the PLO created a more dangerous situation.

Stage three deals with events after the PLO defeat in Jordan and Sadat's launching of the 1973 war "when most Israelis were at prayer". Two political shifts occurred after the war: 1) Sadat's leaning toward Washington; and 2) the PLO's international ascendance. U.S. peacemaking was both a way to prevent another war and "a diplomatic tool to limit . . . Soviet influence". Carter was the first President to include Palestinian political rights to a "homeland" in a comprehensive U.S. peace plan. Sicherman posits that the Camp David Accords had demonstrated that: 1) peace required full U.S. backing; and 2) either Arabs and Israelis continue in conflict until one of them wins or come to see that peace is in the interest of both parties.

Chapter Two, "Origins of Autonomy," revolves around the notion that this concept was "fathered by Menachem Begin" under pressure from a changed U.S. policy. After 1973, the PLO called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Carter declared that the U.S. would open discussions to make the PLO a partner to a negotiation if the PLO accepted Resolution 242. On 10 August 1977 Begin told Cyrus Vance that Israel would give "'our Arab neighbors in Judea, Samaria and Gaza full cultural autonomy' and a choice of Israeli citizenship". That was essentially Jabotinski's concept of "personal autonomy."

Chapter Three, "'A Little Air': Autonomy and Camp David," recounts the maneuvering of Israel, Egypt and the U.S. to bring about the Camp David Accords with Palestinian autonomy built into them. Autonomy was crucial to "justify separate peace as not separate at all". Neither Begin and Sadat wanted the Palestinian issue to stand in the way of a peace treaty between them. Consequently, the issue of autonomy was set aside to sign the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Chapter Four, "The 'Good Faith' Negotiations: 1979-1980," is a technical account of the first stage of the autonomy negotiations that focuses on the two American Special Negotiators, Robert Strauss and Sol Linowitz. Strauss, tried unsuccessfully to secure PLO support. This stage ended with Linowitz concentrating on Israel and Egypt agreeing to "functional issues", presenting "models" of autonomy. Linowitz selected Israel's version to pursue negotiations. Sicherman further describes the two models and the deteriorating security situation in the occupied territories.

Chapter Five, "Bad Luck and Bad Timing: 1981-1982, "focuses on the second stage of the negotiations. To Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the Palestinian issue was secondary. Haig found in the Middle East a "consensus of strategic concern" and autonomy was merely to solidify Israeli-Egyptian relations. Egypt and Israel started autonomy negotiations soon after Saudi Prince Fahd announced his alternative plan to Camp David. They were interrupted after Sadat's assassination but resumed under Mubarak who later suspended them because of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Haig wanted the U.S. to use the invasion strategically to: 1) seriously damage Soviet interests; 2) help Lebanon "recover independence"; and 3) cripple Arab rejectionists.

Reagan advanced his plan (which Israel rejected) whose "fatal difficulty . . . was the failure to produce an Arab party ready to negotiate". The failed autonomy negotiations still have future implications: 1) interim agreements do change; 2) U.S. help is essential; and 3) any autonomy deal must work for Israel and the Palestinians.

Chapter Six, "From Autonomy to Self-Government," deals with how the U.S. and Israel attempted to "repackage" the autonomy plan. Those attempts failed, including a Sharnir-Rabin plan of self-rule (the term that replaced autonomy) that was a "military-diplomatic offensive to turn the mounting Intifada-PLO tide".

After the Gulf war the Palestinians from the occupied territories were represented in a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to negotiate self-government, not independence.

Chapter Seven, "American Policy and Palestinian Self-Rule," explores why the Arabs, Palestinians and Israeli are in need of peace. Sicherman proposes "lessons from the past" for American diplomacy in order to achieve self-government for the Palestinians: 1) the U.S. should be impartial and involved continually since it is the only power that has credibility and clout with all parties; and 2) direct Presidential intervention at crucial moments is essential to success.

Sicherman informs us that "the Palestinians have failed to convince Israel (and others) that their 'two state' solution would not threaten Israeli security". Politics is about consent as much as aspirations. Self-government "is a concept of limits" and though it may be deficient, so is the status quo.

The test then is if self-rule is better than the status quo. Sicherman then gives a treatise on the Jordanian Option and why it failed. But after the Gulf war, he writes, it may again become a viable option. Finally, Israel's choice goes beyond autonomy; it has to do with real risks: security, political evolution toward a Palestinian state and linkage between autonomy and peace agreements with the respective Arab states.

Chapter Eight, "Land and Water, Security and Peace," discusses the overlapping Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian interests in self-government. However, five issues of disagreement remain. Of those, Jerusalem is a final status issue. Land and water resources and security are the two real issues. The settlements are "a 'subset' of the issue of communal safety and control" and the source of authority would resolve itself once the others are. The author suggests ways to solve the resources and security issues. By first developing the Middle East region economically and secondly by Israel taking care of any external threat with U.S. assistance. Terrorism will probably continue. On that and Palestinian self-government, Sicherman advocates "the council of imperfection".

Sicherman's work suffers heavily as a mechanistic, technical account of diplomacy. It is almost completely devoid of a political analysis of power. Ostensibly objective, Sicherman's narrative betrays the biases he worked so hard to conceal. Its history is selective, skimpy and unproblematical - events are recounted as a matter of fact while hardly recognizing scholarship that is not pro-Zionist. Sicherman's diplomatic focus, his version of history and concentration on technicalities transform the term "peacemaking" into a code word for what is beneficial to U.S. foreign policy.

National chauvinism is deeply imbedded in Sicherman's narrative. The Palestinian is to be given autonomy despite the PLO's earlier exclusion and opposition. An important question that should be asked of Sicherman is, why is he supporting autonomy (for which his argument remains unconvincing) rather than a Palestinian state that would restore national sovereignty to the Palestinians? Sicherman has painted himself into an intellectual corner that prevents him from analyzing the Palestinian question in a holistic manner that deals with the tensions of history as reflected in the relevant scholarship.

Autonomy is defined and promoted as an instrument of peace (stability). One wonders whether the autonomy negotiations will even produce stability, especially after the 1993 Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles that seems to have been many years in the making.

Ibrahim G. Aoude is a professor in the Ethnic Studies Program, University of Hawaii.