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Pakistan As The Hub Of Nuclear Proliferation Is Poised To Lose Strategic Sovereignty.


*** Specific Report In The British Tabloid Sunday Mirror Says Osama Bin Ladin Has Been 'Boxed' Into A Narrow Strip Of Land On The Pakistani Side Of The Border With Afghanistan By Elite SAS (1) (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, www.sas.com) A software company that specializes in data warehousing and decision support software based on the SAS System. Founded in 1976, SAS is one of the world's largest privately held software companies. See SAS System.  Troops & US Special Forces; It Notes That The Only Thing Left Is To Decide The Timing Of His Capture, With Pakistan Having Begun It Own Offensive

*** As Hardline Theologians Win In Iran's Polls, The Country Gets Set For A Period Of Uncertainty, And Perhaps Violence

NICOSIA - New details being revealed with increasing frequency about the extent of Pakistan's nuclear sales to Iran, Libya and North Korea suggest that the country has become the most significant proliferation proliferation /pro·lif·er·a·tion/ (pro-lif?er-a´shun) the reproduction or multiplication of similar forms, especially of cells.prolif´erativeprolif´erous

pro·lif·er·a·tion
n.
 problem facing the US. Behind the scenes co-operation between intelligence agencies across the world, led by the US, has resulted in the unravelling of the proliferation network set up by Pakistan's top nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, NI & BAR, HI (Urdu: عبدالقدیر خان) (born April 1, 1936 in Bhopal, British India) is a Pakistani Scientist and metallurgical engineer widely regarded as the founder of
, with Libya and Iran having set things in motion by disclosing the assistance in nuclear expertise and technology received from Pakistan.

For Washington, the challenge lies in determining whether or not the disclosures made by Libya and Iran reflect the full extent of their dealings with Pakistan; whether the transfer of technology by Pakistan did not extend to other countries in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia (sä`dē ərā`bēə, sou`–, sô–), officially Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, kingdom (2005 est. pop.  for example; whether any Pakistani government in future would transfer nuclear expertise or technology if given the right price; and whether radical Islamist movements in Pakistan or Al Qaeda have got access to, or possession of, either nuclear bombs or radiological weapons radiological weapon: see radiation weapon.  ("dirty nukes"). In any event, the US now faces the challenge of containing and controlling the nuclear programme in Pakistan in a way that does not destabilise Verb 1. destabilise - become unstable; "The economy destabilized rapidly"
destabilize

change - undergo a change; become different in essence; losing one's or its original nature; "She changed completely as she grew older"; "The weather changed last night"
 the regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf General Pervez Musharraf (Urdu: پرويز مشرف) (born August 11 1943) is President of Pakistan and the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army who came to power in wake of a coup d'etat. .

The unveiling of the proliferation network was a highly sensitive Adj. 1. highly sensitive - readily affected by various agents; "a highly sensitive explosive is easily exploded by a shock"; "a sensitive colloid is readily coagulated"  operation, carried out mostly behind the scenes, and involving a co-ordination of geo-political events, pressure exerted through high level statements from the US, direct pressure applied during face-to-face contacts with the target countries or through third parties, and hinted threats of military action if co-operation was not forthcoming. The targets of these pressures were Iran and Libya, to start with. It was after these two states succumbed to the pressures and agreed to open up their nuclear facilities for inspection that the American focus shifted overtly to Pakistan, and in a more restrained fashion on Malaysia.

However, media reports collated by APS from various sources confirm that the US, and a few other Western powers, were aware of key aspects of the proliferation structure well before the war on Iraq was launched. The Pakistani press has reported that the Musharraf regime was in recent months presented with evidence of Khan's activities going back several years, including minute details of conversations and agreements between Khan and buyers from Iran and Libya, as well as middlemen based in Dubai.

An APS assessment of the strategic dimension of the US-led operations involving military, diplomatic and economic moves as well as political inducements suggests the following: (1) the attack on Saddam's Iraq was a crucial part of efforts to prevent the prospect of additional nuclear powers emerging in the Islamic world; (2) aggressive diplomacy on the nuclear programmes of Iran

and Libya was carefully timed to peak in December 2003, roughly when Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein

(born April 28, 1937, Tikrit, Iraq—died Dec. 30, 2006, Baghdad) President of Iraq (1979–2003). He joined the Ba'th Party in 1957. Following participation in a failed attempt to assassinate Iraqi Pres.
 was captured; (3) the disclosures made by Iran and Libya were used in January to apply pressure on Pakistan to roll-up the proliferating Proliferating is the multiplication of a certain thing. Often it is used as a biological term to describe the increase of cells due to cell division.

Look under proliferate or proliferation for more details.
 network of Khan and, more importantly, to apply one major brake on Pakistan's nuclear weapons development and production programme; and (4) other brakes will be applied in the coming months as more revelations come to light, with Malaysian investigations into the nuclear component supply chain and the role of the son of Malaysia's prime minister in this throwing up additional details about buyers, financiers and sellers.

The APS assessment concludes that most details of proliferation that have emerged so far relate to the enriched-uranium route towards weapons development. Details of the plutonium plutonium (pltō`nēəm), radioactive chemical element; symbol Pu; at. no. 94; mass no. of most stable isotope 244; m.p. 641°C;; b.p. 3,232°C;; sp. gr. 19.  route have not yet been revealed, although some hints have been dropped in this respect. It is expected that disclosure of such details will involve a closer examination of proliferation by Pakistan to elements of Al Qaeda. So far the focus has been on proliferation by the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL KRL - Knowledge Representation Language. A frame-based language.

["An Overview of KRL, a Knowledge Representation Language", D.G. Bobrow and T. Winograd, Cognitive Sci 1:1 (1977)].
) at Kahuta.

Little attention has been paid to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) (Urdu: ادارہ جوہری توانائی پاکستان ) is responsible for nuclear applications development in , which specialised in developing weapons through the plutonium route. It has been established that two of the agency's top scientists - Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (or Bashir-ud-Din Mehmood, b. 1940) (Urdu: سلطان بشیر الدین محمود  and Chaudhury Abdul Majeed Abdul Majeed (Dhivehi: އަލްއަމީރު އަބްދުލްމަޖީދު ރައްނަބަނޑޭރި  - had met with Osama Bin Ladin in August 2001, with former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Noun 1. Inter-Services Intelligence - the Pakistan intelligence agency; a powerful and almost autonomous political and military force; has procured nuclear technology and delivery capabilities; has had strong ties with the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups  (ISI ISI International Sensitivity Index, see there ) director Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul Lieutenant General Hamid Gul (Urdū: لیفٹننٹ جنرل حمید گل) is a retired Pakistani general most famous for heading ISI after the Soviet War, and for instigating the Kashmir  present at the meeting (see News Service No. 7).

Another line of investigation would be the possibility of proliferation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to Islamabad in October 2003, the prospect of a nuclear deal between the two countries was discussed in the Western media. But so far, none of the information released to the public about Dr. Khan's proliferation activities appears to involve Saudi Arabia. One month ahead of Prince Abdullah's visit, the Guardian newspaper of London reported that "a strategy paper being considered at the highest levels in Riyadh" was examining the issue of going nuclear. The paper claimed that "UN officials said there have been rumours going back 20 years that the Saudis wanted to pay Pakistan to do the research and development on nuclear weapons". It pointed out that, in 1999, a Saudi military delegation led by Defence Minister Prince Sultan visited Pakistan and toured its secret nuclear facilities at Kahuta and was briefed by Dr Khan (see News Service Vol. 59, No. 19).

So far the position of the Pakistani military establishment, which has ruled the country for several decades, is that all the proliferation activity was carried out by Dr. Khan and his associates, with no knowledge or involvement by the armed forces. But this posture is increasingly being questioned by US think-tanks which note that, if this were the case, then the Pakistani military would have no real control over the nuclear programme - leading to an even stronger case for custodial control of the country's strategic assets by the US. Until now, President Musharraf has flatly refused an IAEA IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency.  inspection regime for Pakistan and/or intrusive checks on its nuclear infrastructure. He may not be able to resist the pressure for much longer.

Virtually every week a new proposal is being put forward by the US for the "joint" safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In the latest such move, following a briefing by the senate intelligence committee on Feb. 19, several US senators wrote to President Bush about the urgent necessity to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear equipment, and Bush then approved a $560m grant, which will go entirely into the safeguard systems, their operation, and maintenance. It has been reported that the command-and-control equipment will comprise locks, codes and software more sophisticated than what the UN has installed in the North Korean atomic installations.

The implications of such a system for Pakistan are enormous; it would mean that Islamabad would not be able to activate its nuclear weapons without US co-operation. In effect, this would mean nullifying Pakistan's nuclear capability. It remains to be seen whether the scheme would be approved by the Pakistani leadership - but one observer says that if not this system at least some variation of it will be put in place in the coming months.

The observer also notes that, in view of the upcoming US presidential elections and the stunning advances of Democratic candidate John Kerry Editing of this page by unregistered or newly registered users is currently disabled due to vandalism. , Bush is in no position to soft-pedal on Pakistan as that would become an easy target against the Republican president. There are already numerous articles in the media pointing out the confusion among the minds of the American public caused by the fact that the foremost ally in Bush's war against terror is Pakistan, which has done more than any other country to endanger US security, while the target for the war was Iraq which - as it now emerges - had no surviving nuclear weapons programme.

Meanwhile, Gen. Musharraf has launched a Pakistani military offensive on Al Qaeda. This will be followed by a US offensive to capture Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri.
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Publication:APS Diplomat News Service
Date:Mar 1, 2004
Words:1383
Previous Article:Saudi Arabia's Fate Hangs In A Steadily Shifting Balance.
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