Out of the sand: operational effects for CJTF-7.

During wartime, operational-level targeting is typically directed against enemy forces beyond the range or capabilities of tactical-level commands. These "deep fires" shape the battlespace, setting the conditions for subordinate commanders to achieve their supporting missions.

Yet once conventional enemy combat forces are defeated, the need for operational effects does not end. As the mission transitions to post conflict operations, the effects required by the commander also shift, moving from predominately lethal operations to a mix of lethal and nonlethal options.

Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), the senior military headquarters in Iraq, recognized the necessity for broad, wide-ranging effects at the operational level of war. (1) Upon the cessation of major combat operations after the invasion of Iraq, the military mission changed from the destruction of Iraqi military forces and the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime to the establishment of a secure environment in Iraq; this was to facilitate the emergence of a self-determined government and Iraqi-led security institutions. This new mission required broad-spectrum targeting options to affect a battlespace in which enemy forces and non-hostile entities coexisted.

Previous post-conflict targeting experience, notably in the Balkans, dealt with nonlethal targeting in support of tactical peacekeeping operations, not with theater-wide operational-level effects necessary for counterinsurgency operations in an area as large and complex as Iraq. (2)

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This article discusses how the CJTF-7 information operations (IO) staff built upon tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed in the Balkans and created a process capable of synchronizing lethal and nonlethal assets in operational-level shaping operations from August 2003 to July 2004.

Operational Effects. The first challenge to developing an operational-level targeting methodology was to define the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations. Identifying the differences between the echelons established "lanes" and reduced the likelihood that each level of command would delve into its subordinates' responsibilities.

From the CJTF-7 perspective, effects at each echelon were characterized as follows. (3) Tactical effects were those produced by local actions and resulted in effects limited to a subordinate command's area of responsibility (AOR). These effects, planned and executed by division staffs, were typically shorter in duration and required less time to create because of their focused application.

Operational effects addressed threats common across the Iraqi theater or, at the very least, threats that crossed subordinate division boundaries. In addition to geographic considerations, operational-level effects sought to shape long-term missions and events--generally 60 days or more in the future. (4)

Strategic effects were those that addressed threats outside the Iraq theater, to include destabilizing foreign influences. CJTF-7 depended upon its higher headquarters, US Central Command (CENTCOM), to generate region-wide effects in support of operational and tactical-level operations in Iraq.

Guidance. Identifying the operational effects required by the commander began with the CJTF-7 campaign plan. The plan outlined the commander's long-term objectives and supporting key tasks. This guidance served as the commander's intent for developing the broad, theater-wide effects required to support the mission. These planned effects were then periodically validated and refined using other sources of guidance, notably CENTCOM's theater strategic objectives and the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA's) goals. (5)

Input from the subordinate commands was another essential planning component. Each division operated in a unique battlespace that required discrete tactical effects. (6) Division staff input was solicited to help CJTF-7 planners tailor operational effects to the threat and conditions present in each division AOR. In this way, the theater-wide plan was nested through a series of locally tailored effects that individually contributed to accomplishing the operational-level mission. Division-level input also helped CJTF-7 planners identify and plan for tactical situations and threats that had the potential to destabilize the entire theater.

Assets and Capabilities. In an ideal situation, each echelon of command has assets that can produce the effects needed for its mission. However, CJTF-7 had only a few organic assets capable of creating theater-wide effects. Most assets, including those commonly assigned at the operational level, could only create localized effects and, therefore, were assigned to the subordinate divisions.

While this increased tactical unit capabilities, it dramatically limited the operational-level commander's ability to produce deep effects with his own assets. Thus, the generation of theater-wide effects was built on the synchronization of tactical assets with the few available operational- and strategic-level capabilities in support. A notable exception was IO, which had the capability to disseminate information throughout the Iraqi theater of operations using national media networks. This gave the CJTF-7 commander the ability to project his message throughout his AOR as well as to counter misinformation directed against Coalition Forces. Even so, because multiple media outlets and other sources of information were available to the populace, theater-wide effects were best supported through the synchronized use of tactical-level media and information assets.

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Prioritization. Because operational capabilities were limited, prioritization was essential to plan achievable results. The theater of operation was large, almost 169,000 square miles (slightly larger than California) and complex. At any particular time, there were several major military operations and governance programs in execution as well as a number of Iraqi religious, historical and political events. The result was a layered series of critical events with implications for mission accomplishment. The impact of these events and the limitations of Coalition Force capabilities required a prioritization of effects in terms of time and space.

Effects planners used a long-range calendar to identify when and where operational effects were needed. The calendar portrayed known critical events and operations for the next six months, to include major coalition operations, planned CPA programs and important Iraqi cultural events.

By organizing these events on a timeline, the timing of their impact on the coalition's mission became apparent. Planners were then able to plan effects that shaped the operating environment in a rational, progressive manner. Furthermore, by knowing where these events were expected to occur, planners could focus the production of effects on specific, manageable geographic areas.

Effects Objectives. Effects objectives (EOs) were used to apply the commander's guidance to the events identified on the future events calendar. Building upon emerging joint doctrine, EOs described the intended results of all lethal and nonlethal actions taken by the command. Rather than using Army essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) that were too prescriptive at the operational level, broader EOs articulated the results needed to shape the battlespace without dictating the specific actions necessary to create the effects.

EOs were effects-based, meaning they articulated the commander's desired outcome or result for both lethal and nonlethal actions in terms of desired effects. Crafted in plain language, an EO consisted of an operational-level formation, function and purpose (i.e., what would be accomplished for friendly forces). An example objective is: Foreign terrorists are unable to attack Iraqi transportation infrastructure in order to maintain coalition freedom of operation. (7)

Method was deliberately omitted from the format of EOs because the objectives were designed to convey commander's intent, not prescribe specific actions. On the other hand, establishing a purpose for each EO enabled each staff element to focus lethal and nonlethal force on the achievement of the effect.

Once EOs were developed, staff element planners determined what lethal and nonlethal actions were needed to support the EOs. These were then written as essential effects tasks (EETs).

Essential Effects Tasks. EETs translated the broad concepts of the EOs into discrete actionable tasks. EETs were modeled after EFSTs as described in current fire support doctrine. The main difference between EETs and EFSTs was that fire support tasks were generally planned and executed exclusively through fire support channels with a lethal focus while effects tasks were written to include any available lethal and nonlethal capability, particularly IO and civil military operations (CMO). EETs followed the Army doctrinal format for EFSTs--task, purpose, method and effect--with a few minor adjustments for the realities of the operational mission (see Figure 1).

Task. Tasks were written in the Army doctrinal format of targeting objective, formation and function. However, conventional targeting objective terminology (i.e., destroy, disrupt, delay or limit) proved inadequate to describe actions directed at the non-combatant populace. Therefore, alternative terminology was selected and defined to describe more subtle, nonlethal effects. For example, "inform" was used to explain actions to provide specific information to a target audience.

Purpose. The purpose of each EET was nested to support the purpose of its parent EO. By linking a task's purpose to an EO, planners were able to explain how disparate EETs were focused to support a single effect. Although by doctrine a task's purpose is typically written in terms of the "maneuver purpose," CJTF-7 planners approached this in terms of the "friendly purpose" because the command needed effects to support nonmilitary entities, such as the CPA.

Method. At the operational level, the method of task execution was broad to avoid micro-management and stifling subordinates' initiatives. CJTF-7 often designated divisions to execute specific tasks, relying on the division staffs to select a method appropriate to their own operations. On the other hand, the method specified for tasks executed by CJTF-7's assets were more detailed.

Effect. Effect was used to describe the condition expected to result from task execution. By identifying the effect, CJTF-7 planners had a baseline for developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess the operational effects.

Effects Cycle. To incorporate effects planning into the staff battle rhythm, planners used a modified Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess ([D.sup.3]A) cycle (see Figure 2). A planning assumption was made that 30 days were needed to create an effect across the theater. With this in mind, CJTF-7 adopted an eight-week cycle that addressed all phases of the targeting process. Divided into two-week segments, a specific targeting function was performed during each segment. Thus, the Decide function was accomplished in the first two-week segment, Detect in the second segment, Deliver in the third and the Assess function was executed during the last two weeks of the cycle.

During the Decide segment, the CJTF-7 staff developed EOs and supporting EETs based on the commander's guidance, current intelligence estimate and an assessment of the previous effects cycle. This information was written into an order that directed action by operational- and tactical-level commands. This order was issued at the end of the two-week Decide portion of the cycle.

During Detect, subordinate division planners used the two weeks to plan and refine their execution of the CJTF-7 order. The order was then executed during the Deliver phase. As part of execution, assessment data was collected in each division AOR. During the Assess portion, the CJTF-7 staff took the collected assessment data and conducted an assessment working group to analyze the data, estimate the effectiveness of the operation and recommend changes to future effects plans.

Products. The primary product developed by the effects process was an "effects order." Issued every two weeks, the order was critical to the success of the operational-level effects planning process. Without a written document that articulated the commander's intent and concept of effects, subordinate commands could not synchronize operations with each other, thus defeating the purpose of the process.

Written in the standard five-paragraph format, the content of the effects order described the operational-level threat and situation in theater, priorities for the period of execution, a concept of effects, tasks to staff and subordinate commands and coordinating instructions.

To synchronize tasks, an effects synchronization matrix, or ESM, was attached to the order. This document synchronized EETs between the six subordinate divisions and the CJTF-7 staff. (See Figure 3, Page 25.)

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Other attachments to the effects order were a "Commander's Talking Points Card" and assessment requirements. Produced by the IO staff, the talking points card provided messages for leaders and Soldiers to use when interacting with the populace during the effects period to synchronize the message throughout the Iraqi theater. These talking points were tailored to support the effects discussed in the order.

Assessment requirements established the data collection and reporting necessary to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of the EOs and EETs. Because collection and reporting tasks could quickly overwhelm the staffs, reporting was kept to the absolute minimum needed to develop an accurate picture of the situation across theater.

Assessment. Fundamental to the success of the effects process was an ability to assess the plan's execution and operational effectiveness. By assessing the operation, planners sought to refine effects and tasks planned for the future as well as develop an estimate of how the battlespace was changing based upon the ongoing shaping operation.

However, assessment was a problematic part of the methodology. Because there were multiple variables impacting the operational environment, establishing a linkage between cause (i.e., executed tasks) and effect (i.e., desired effects or observed results) and then measuring the resulting effects was a continual challenge. Not only was evidence of direct cause and effect linkages rare, but many operational-level effects were intangible (e.g., gaining popular support). Thus, identifying discrete, physical criteria to assess effects was often very difficult, if not impossible.

To address this problem, CJTF-7 planners approached assessment by primarily focusing on measuring both actions and effects individually and establishing correlations between EOs, tasks and effects, when possible. (See Figure 4.) While establishing causality was important, it was more critical to determine whether the intended effect was in place or not and that task execution was synchronized and appropriately supported the commander's intent.

MOEs were used to determine if the EOs had been achieved. Several MOEs were needed to measure each EO, using a variety of objective and subjective criteria. (8) Data to support the MOEs was derived from unit and staff reporting, intelligence analyses and third-party polling statistics.

Measures of performance (MOPs) were used to assess tasks. MOPs measured how well an EET was executed and determined if execution of the plan needed adjustment. To capture data to evaluate MOPs, CJTF-7 depended upon specific reporting from the executing command. An example of a MOP is the number of local media outlets that broadcasted election-support messages (objective metric).

If MOPs indicated that EETs were executed within the plan's intent, yet MOEs indicated that the desired effect had not been created, then planners re-evaluated the effects plan to determine if modifications to the EOs and EETs were necessary. These proposed changes to execution then were incorporated into future effects cycles.

"Effects-based operations" have been buzz words in the joint targeting community for some time. However, most of the discussion has focused on conventional warfighting missions while ignoring the importance of creating operational effects to support post-conflict operations. Experience in Iraq shows that there is a need for theater shaping operations after the cessation of conventional combat.

CJTF-7 successfully interpolated conventional targeting methodology into a theater-level effects process. Some modifications were necessary to account for operational realties, but on the whole, the [D.sup.3]A methodology proved suitable for use at the operational level.

More work is clearly required to fully integrate lethal and nonlethal capabilities into a unified operation. Task and effect terminology for nonlethal actions is ill-defined and, of course, assessment remains the greatest challenge.

Task: Inform local populace of foreign terrorist efforts to sabotage
Iraqi transportation infrastructure.
Purpose: Reduce Sunni populace support for terrorist attacks.
Method: Use local and national media outlets.
Effect: Local populace provides information on foreign terrorists to
Coalition Forces.

Figure 1: Example of an Essential Effects Task (EET)

Effects-Based Objective:

1. Foreign terrorists are unable to attack Iraqi transportation
infrastructure in order to maintain coalition freedom of operation.

Decide          Detect                    Deliver
Target Set      Target       Location      Asset       Task

Sunni Populace  Urban Sunni  Samarra,      MND-NC      Inform that
                Populace     Bayji, Balad              foreign
                                                       terrorists are
                             Baghdad       TF Baghdad  trying to
                                                       sabotage Iraqi
                             ITO           CJTF-7      transportation
                                                       infrastructure.
IED Makers      Muthana      Fallujah      MND-W       Neutralize
                al-Haram                               ability to plan
                                                       and [C.sup.2] IED
                                                       attacks.

Decide          Deliver
Target Set      Purpose           Method           When

Sunni Populace  Reduce Sunni      Division         NLT 10 Dec
                populace          engaged local
                support for       media outlets.
                terrorist         CJTF-7 National
                attacks.          Media Outlets
IED Makers      Maintain          Division Raid    08 Dec
                security around
                election polling
                sites.

Decide          Assess
Target Set      Desired Effect

Sunni Populace  Sunni populace
                provides
                information on
                foreign
                terrorists to
                Coalition
                Forces.
IED Makers      Polling sites are
                not attacked
                with IEDs.

Legend:
[C.sup.2] = Command and control
CJTF = Coalition Joint Task Force
IED = Improvised Explosive Device
ITO = Iraqi Theater of Operations
MND-NC = Multinational Division--North Central
MND-W = Multinational Division--West
TF = Task Force

Figure 3: Effects Synchronization Matrix (ESM). These operational
effects and tasks are fictitious for purposes of this example.

Endnotes:

1. CJTF-7 was the senior military command from June 2003-May 2004. It has since been redesignated Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).

2. Previous articles in Field Artillery discussed the utility of using a targeting methodology to focus and synchronize tactical, nonlethal combat power into an effects-based shaping operation. These writings, based on experiences gained in Bosnia and Kosovo, validated the concept of nonlethal fires in support of tactical operations during a mission in which the populace was generally compliant. However, the Balkan experiences did not address the integration of lethal and nonlethal fires in an environment where hostile and nonhostile entities co-existed. Previous articles addressing nonlethal targeting include: "Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in Bosnia" by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Curtis. IN, Captain Robert B. Curris, and Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, AD (July-August 1998); "Nonlethal Targeting Revisited: The Kosovo Experience" by Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L. Gonzales and Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, AD (May-June 2001); and "Information Operations in Bosnia" by Captain Timothy D. LaBahn (November-December 2001).

3. Effect is "the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions," taken from "Effects-Based Operations White Paper," Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J9 Concepts Department, 18 October 2001.

4. The time periods selected for each echelon were not arbitrary. It was thought that 30 days were required to initially create effects at the operational level and an additional 30 days were needed to firmly establish the effect.

5. CPA was the civilian administrative body charged with facilitating the re-emergence of Iraq-led governance. CPA was dissolved after the Interim Iraqi Government took charge at the end of June 2004. Before CPA was replaced. CJTF-7 provided direct support to many CPA programs and activities.

6. Operational-level planners had to remain cognizant that Iraq, as a battlespace, could be divided into several distinct sub-regions. For example, the Kurd-dominated regions in the north, as compared to the Shiite Arab regions in the south, had its own geographic, structural and cultural characteristics that impacted military operations in different ways. Unfortunately, these sub-regions did not neatly correspond to subordinate command boundaries.

7. During their tenure at CJTF-7, the authors developed and crafted many formats for EOs, none of which were completely satisfactory for a joint coalition. During post-deployment analyses, the description for constructing effects from the JFCOM Operational Net Assessment (ONA) study seemed to be a better alternative as outlined in "Joint Warfighting Center or JWFC, Doctrine Pam 4 Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment," 24 February 2004. This example objective was crafted for this article. It is purely illustrative and was not derived from any real-world operation in Iraq.

8. Objective metrics are those that are discreetly measured using quantitative numeric data and uninfluenced by personal emotions or prejudices. Subjective measures involve qualitative data deduced by an individual or a group based upon their perceptions but are prone to bias. However, subjective measures can account for the nearly infinite subtle elements that cannot be modeled feasibly by objective metrics.

RELATED ARTICLE: 4th ID Stands Up Army's First Fires Brigade

Sixteen December 2004 was the effective date (E-date) for the Army's first Fires Brigade in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. The new brigade is part of the modular reconfiguration of the division, including making FA battalions organic to the brigade combat teams (BCTs). The 2d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), or 2-20 FA (MLRS), the former divisional composite FA battalion, is the "base piece" for the new Fires Brigade.

The mission of the Fires Brigade is to plan, prepare, execute and assess precision strike, counterstrike, mobile strike and close fires for a designated joint force commander (JFC), unit of employment (UEx or UEy) and subordinate BCTs (units of action), employing joint and organic fires and capabilities to achieve distributive effects in support of commanders' operational and tactical objectives. The Fires Brigade also must be prepared to execute full-spectrum combat operations as a BCT, if assigned an area of operations or to augment combat or combat support forces.

The modular reconfiguration fundamentally changed the organization, mission, operations and future training of the Iron Gunners. The division artillery (Div Arty) transformed into the Fires Brigade, an independent brigade, comprised of 2-20 FA (MLRS); Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), Fires Brigade; and A/26 FA (Target Acquisition). The Fires Brigade is standing by to receive personnel and equipment for its brigade support battalion, 589 BSB, and the 324th Network Signal Company. The brigade also may have an organic tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) company.

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Simultaneously, the Div Arty's M109A6 Paladin battalions have become organic to the 4th Division's BCTs. 4-42 FA is now part of 1BCT, 3-16 FA is in 2BCT and 3-29 FA is organic to 3BCT. Additionally, the Fires Brigade set the conditions for creating a fourth organic Paladin battalion in direct support of 4BCT: 2-77 FA. The new battalion is being established at Fort Hood in the First Quarter of FY05.

The Fires Brigade can serve as the force FA headquarters (FFHQ) for a UEx, provide reinforcing fires to another FFHQ or be assigned to any of the Army command or support relationships outlined in FM 3-0 Army Operations. The Fires Brigade task organization could include a combination of one to six rocket/missile and cannon battalions as well as other enablers, such as ground maneuver; reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA); and information operations (IO) resources. Finally, with augmentation, the Fires Brigade can assume control of and conduct operations in its own area of responsibility.

The brigade has an organic joint fires and effects cell (JFEC). In coordination with UEx, UEy, joint and multinational headquarters, the Fires Brigade employs Army and joint fires as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF), IO, civil affairs (CA), and Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.2][C.sup.2]) elements.

The brigade will be able to integrate the employment of lethal and nonlethal surface-to-surface, air-to-surface and ground maneuver effects in executing the orders of higher headquarters. The Fires Brigade has the organic command, control, communications and information ([C.sup.3]I) capabilities to receive, plan, coordinate and execute mission-type orders from the UEx.

Intuitively, this new configuration will change the way we train and fight. This force design is critical to the ability of the UEx and supported joint formations to rapidly deploy and employ combat power. 4th Infantry Division Fires Brigade--continuing to lead the Army in Transformation.

CPT Michael M. Stump

Assistant S3, Fires Brigade

4th ID, Fort Hood, Texas

By Robert C. Cordray, III and Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, AD

Robert C. Cordray III is a contract employee with US Army 1st Information Operations Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He recently returned from Iraq where he participated in effects planning and assessment efforts at the senior headquarters in Baghdad. He is a former 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Field Artillery officer with his last assignment on the battalion staff of 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery. Readers may contact him at [e-mail].

Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, Air Defense Artillery (AD), is a contract employee with the US Army 1st Information Operations Command. Since 1998, he has been deployed with Army information operations field support teams to Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. He also teaches two courses on information operations at the American Military University online. Major Romanych holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. Readers may contact him at [e-mail].