Operational fires and effects: full-spectrum capability for the ASCC.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Leading the Army's transformation at echelon-above-Corps, US Army Central Command (USARCENT) is in the final stages of its makeover as the Army's first Army Service Component Command (ASCC). The development of its multifunctional Operational Fires and Effects Directorate has been on the cutting edge of this evolution and has joined the operational fight paving the way for other ASCCs to follow.

Recognizing that the nature of each ASCC differs according to location and mission focus, this article shares developmental lessons learned, the Operational Fires and Effects roles and missions, and some thoughts on the way ahead.

Transformation. The entire USARCENT general staff already has transformed, so this article focuses primarily on the transformation and role of the Operational Fires and Effects Directorate, still a subdirectorate of Operational Maneuver (G3). This will change and fall in line with the ASCC Design Model 3.2, subordinating G3 Fires directly under the chief of staff. (See Figure 1 for the new organizational structure.)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

For organizational control, Operational Fires and Effects is subdivided into three divisions: joint fires, effects synchronization and information operations (IO). For deployment control, Operational Fires and Effects is divided further into the operational command post (CP) and the main CP elements.

For Operational Fires and Effects, a 10-12 person slice of the operational CP--designated the early entry CP--actually will precede the operational CP into theater, serving a tactical CP-like function. The early entry CP is led by the joint fires division chief (Field Artillery O6) and includes joint fires division, IO division and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel.

For the deployable ASCC, the operational CP is considered the general staff's primary deployable element. When the operational CP enters theater, it rejoins the early entry CP. The main CP initially serves as a reach-back node, but once the theater has matured sufficiently, the main CP deploys to rejoin the operational CP (see Figure 2).

For fires and effects coordination, the benefits of the ASCC structure over the legacy structure are immeasurable. Under the old construct, fires and effects disciplines were dispersed throughout the staff, and fires personnel were positioned under G3 Current Operations. Often, IO and PSYOP personnel were augmentees, joining an inadequately staffed organic IO section. Due to compartmented planning and security clearance issue, targeteers were partitioned and routinely were inaccessible to fires and IO personnel. When resourced, fire support planners resided within G3 Plans or G3 Future Operations. Finally, under the legacy construct, there simply was no counterpart to the effects synchronization division, a capability that quickly has proven indispensable within the transformed ASCC staff.

Staff Actions Synchronization. The staff transformation--from augmenteebased to organic-based--and follow-on consolidation of fires and effects functional disciplines have eliminated the stovepipes that thwarted timely sharing of information and synchronization of staff actions. However, if the effects synchronization division were not added to the lineup, just the teaming of joint fires division and IO division still would have not produced the synergistic effects we achieve today. Through its operations branch, the effects synchronization division is more than just the "glue that binds" the lethal and nonlethal capabilities of joint fires division and IO division, respectively. The divisions' target management and plans branches also provide the level of exactness that drives the entire Operational Fires and Effects Directorate.

Because the regional ASCC typically has day-to-day, real-world, theater-supporting functions; having these teams work, train and play together during routine, daily operations builds a more cohesive group if operations accelerate from shaping to domination (see Figure 3 on Page 16).

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Warfighting Functions Synchronization. It is the effects synchronization division that brings together the joint fires division (lethal) and IO division (nonlethal) and all of the "soft power" interagency combat multipliers to mass a variety of unconventional assets on a conventional problem set. These multipliers include public affairs, civil affairs, engineers, chaplain, surgeon, operational sustainment (personnel and logistics) and operational protection (military police; chemical, biological radiological, nuclear and explosive; and air defense). In coordination with others, the effects synchronization division is the lead agent for those working groups and boards that serve to synchronize USARCENT's warfighting functions.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Conceptually, our intent is to feed operational planning considerations (developed by staff operational planning teams), targeting recommendations (via the targeting working group) and IO solutions (via the IO working group) into an effects working group that meets weekly. The effects working group, chaired by the effects synchronization division chief, serves as a forum for reviewing options and plans and conducting face-to-face coordination between staffers (see Figure 4).

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Ultimately, the options, plans and other initiatives are forwarded through the monthly Council of Colonels to the monthly effects synchronization board. This synchronization process and the targeting and other subordinate processes that feed into it are designed to work throughout joint full-spectrum operations from Phase 0 through Phase V (see Figure 3).

Of the five phases, Phases 0 (Shape) and III (Dominate) are the most distinct in terms of their respective focus on either soft or hard power. This article will pay particular attention to those two phases.

Phase 0--Shape. USARCENT remains focused on a four-part mission set (see Figure 5) when engaged at operational and strategic levels as it deals with a total of 27 countries throughout the Central Asia, Middle East and East Africa regions.

Figure 5: US Army Central Command Four-Part Mission Set

1. Provide a forward-based Army
service component command
to plan and, upon order, conduct
full-spectrum operations
across the US Central Command
area of operations.

2. Provide Title 10 support and
services to theater Army
forces commands and directed
Army support to other
services.

3. Conduct TSC activities.

4. Support force rotations,
conduct combined and joint
reception and staging operations,
and provide theater
sustainment and other support
as required to forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan and the Horn of
Africa.

As illustrated in Figure 4, the USARCENT battle rhythm is geared toward day-to-day, real-world shaping operations, classified in the joint lexicon as "Phase 0 operations."

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations defines the shaping phase as: "Joint and multinational operations ... performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies....'Shape' phase activities ... may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another."

USARCENT maintains two headquarters--the forward CP, based at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and the rear CP at Fort McPherson, Georgia. The forward CP maintains Parts 2 and 4 of the four-part mission set (see Figure 5). The majority of Parts 1 and 3 are administered from the rear CP where the bulk of Operational Fires and Effects is based. These CP locations are not to be confused with the deployment construct of operational CP and main CP.

Theater security cooperation activities, coordinated through the G3 Civil International Military Affairs, are one subset of theater engagement and are so wide-ranging that the greater USARCENT staff can contribute to activities accomplishment. Theater engagement activities include exercises, operations, planning conferences, command and staff consultative talks, exchanges, seminars and workshops, leadership education, symposiums, senior leader visits and engagements, and orientation visits.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Targets of Opportunity. In a typical month (see Figure 4), USARCENT targeteers continuously review all sources of intelligence and reporting, looking for new opportunities to develop theater engagement activities. One key consideration in this effort is to look for ways to enhance a country's ability to stand with us in the War on Terrorism (WOT) and/or bolster its indigenous counterterrorism capabilities. For example, if a particular country's army expresses an interest in or demonstrates a need for enhanced medical or engineer capabilities, this could translate into a medical or engineer information exchange; while another country might benefit from a visit by US senior NCOs offering recommendations to improve its NCO corps or training.

These targets of opportunity are developed and submitted to the targeting working group for staff consideration, vetting and further development. Once a target is deemed viable, it is forwarded to the effects working group for inclusion into the broader USARCENT engagement framework. After a review by the Council of Colonels, it is briefed to the commanding general.

IO Working Group. Items flowing from the IO working group follow a similar process. This is essentially a strategic communications process, and the USARCENT Commanding General sees it as such.

Some engagement opportunities must be preceded by a commander's offer to the host nation. For instance, the actual senior leader engagement may be the primary purpose of a country visit. The IO working group, in coordination with Civil International Military Affairs, participates in the development of objectives, themes and messages for country visits and offers of assistance.

Other engagement opportunities are "domestically-focused" and include senior leader visits with key decision makers at the combatant command, Department of the Army and Joint Staff. We must put forth the same effort for domestic communications as we do for international communications.

No process is complete without a feedback process integrated within the execution loop. Key to this assessment process is feedback garnered through domestic and international engagement opportunities. This entire process is facilitated through the biweekly assessment working group and monthly effects assessment board. Assessments are driven by our four-part mission focus and our ongoing theater engagement and security cooperation initiatives.

The CENTCOM AO may be the most critical focus area for current US strategic engagement. It contains all three WOT theaters--Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa--and requires our constant attention to contain future threats, build relationships to mitigate those threats, and to ensure our continued access to support ongoing combat operations. USARCENT's Phase 0 operations are critical and ongoing. The Operational Fires and Effects Directorate leads the staff in ensuring we meet these challenges head-on.

Phase III--Dominate. USARCENT retains its legacy mission of operating as a forward-based ASCC to plan and, on order, conduct full-spectrum operations across the USCENTCOM AO. This means we must be prepared to serve as a land component command as previously performed in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF) or a joint task force (JTF) headquarters or both. Before transformation, USARCENT was not resourced organically to perform either of these missions and heavily relied on external personnel augmentation to operate as such.

Today, USARCENT's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) fully accommodates requirements for land component command operations and includes several joint billets. While any JTF mission would require a joint manning document to account for particular joint personnel requirements, the construct of a JTF is mission-dependent; any potential requirements are so varied as to make it impractical to account for all of them on our MTOE.

Should a JTF mission be assigned, our joint billets, including several in Operational Fires and Effects, provide us the joint personnel cadre needed to establish a continuity baseline for the addition of more joint personnel. For example, the target management branch contains billets for Air Force and Navy targeting personnel--critical in the coordination and deconfliction of cross-service targeting requirements.

Bright Star Exercise 2007. USARCENT recently validated its new construct while serving simultaneously as a combined JTF and combined forces land component command during the Bright Star Exercise 2007 at Cairo West Air Force Base, Egypt. This critical, biannual exercise involved more than 14 participating countries--including many countries from the Middle East and Western Europe--and more than 31,000 personnel. Joint forces from US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF, now US Air Forces Central or USAFCENT) and US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), as well as many of the participating countries, provided the joint force multipliers essential to any combined-arms exercise. Observer/ Trainers from US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) were on hand to validate USARCENT as JTF-qualified.

Coalition partners were integrated into each staff section and contributed to the exercise's overall training value. Operational Fires and Effects included fires, targeting, intelligence, electronic warfare, IO, public affairs and legal personnel from coalition land, air and maritime components. The exercise provided ample opportunity to work through the intricacies of multiple rules of engagement, targeting restrictions, unique features of coalition warfighting equipment and other issues that inevitably arise in any coalition partnership, including the ones we currently participate in throughout the CENTCOM AO.

The CP exercise portion of Bright Star 2007 provided opportunities for USARCENT staff, including Operational Fires and Effects, to migrate Phase 0 tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) into a more high-intensity conflict scenario encompassing Phases I-IV. A four-week battle rhythm transitioned into a daily cycle is shown in Figure 6 on Page 18.

With the exception of shift changes and future operations working groups, Operational Fires and Effects was the executive agent for the remaining events--a significant coordination responsibility. In fact, in their final evaluation, JFCOM observers deemed Operational Fires and Effects the de facto "staff center of gravity."

This in no way minimizes the impact or contributions of parallel staff sections, but highlights the unique, effects-based approach of Operational Fires and Effects to bring together the full spectrum of warfighting functions.

However, there is a tacit, implied responsibility of such a staff relationship. The USARCENT commander sees Operational Fires and Effects as the de facto coordinator for the strategic communications responsibilities. Requisite authority must accompany additional implied responsibility always. As such, the Operational Fires and Effects chief is charged with tasking authority across the general staff to incorporate subject matter expertise for all strategic communications.

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

The Way Ahead. Operational Fires and Effects continues to improve its "foxhole." The following outlines some of our lessons learned.

Leadership. Operational Fires and Effects is led by a Field Artillery colonel (the de facto USARCENT fire support coordinator) with a corresponding sergeant major. Given this leader's roles and responsibilities, we believe this billet should be filled with, at minimum, a colonel with brigade command experience. The fires brigade commanders for subordinate corps (three of which we controlled in Bright Star 2007) are also Field Artillery colonels. Consequently, the Operational Fires and Effects chief should report directly to the ASCC chief of staff (per ASCC Design Model 3.2) vice the G3.

Infrastructure. While it would be impractical to standardize field infrastructure (tents, vans, etc.) across ASCCs, given Operational Fires and Effects's wide-ranging synchronization responsibilities within the staff, we must resource the infrastructure required to carry out these duties. This includes a large enough workspace so as not to stovepipe subordinate actions. It also includes sufficient space for meetings, working groups, briefings and boards--independent from workspace.

Additionally, the information technology requirements for such a robust Operational Fires and Effects, including coalition and joint partners, necessitate an organic systems administration capability. We have no such organic capability, which poses additional burdens for our G6.

Sphere of Responsibility and Personnel. As Civil International Military Affairs essentially is an effects-achieving staff element, there is merit in merging it with Operational Fires and Effects. A senior colonel leads Civil International Military Affairs, which clearly would pose a leadership-deconfliction issue; we believe consideration of who is in charge should take a backseat to what is most functional and cohesive. Similarly, the G3 Space personnel should be merged with Operational Fires and Effects, and due consideration should be given to merging air defense capabilities as well.

Operational Fires and Effects has several joint billets that do not appear to be fill priorities for their respective Services. We must be as demanding in filling these key billets as we are willing to fill like-Army billets on our sister Services' staffs.

We believe there is overlap in the functionality of the target production branch (joint fires division) and the target management branch (effects synchronization division). While each has a unique role in the overall targeting process, there may be good results derived from combining the two branches to group special skill sets and low-density specialties and consolidate the targeting process--cradle to grave.

We believe the ASCC must have an assessment cell. Operational Fires and Effects does not have an organic assessment cell, and we believe this is the most critical functionality we lack. Our overall planning and targeting processes are at great disadvantage without this critical node in the Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess loop. JTFs in both OIF and OEF have contracted and/or are additionally resourced for assessment cells, and these cells always are affiliated with their effects cells. Whether this ASCC assessment cell is resourced with military or contract personnel, this resourcing must happen for us to be effective.

Our ASCC lacks an organic interagency process or supporting US government civilian staff, including a political advisor. We rely on CENTCOM for support in the interagency process, and our lack of a political advisor inhibits our diplomatic coordination and initiative in theater.

Schooling and Utilization. This is an area where we believe we excel and strongly recommend other ASCCs follow suit. Our command has been exceptionally forward-looking in its approval of the institutional training and schooling required for our officers and NCOs to perform at such a high level. Joint and functional training--including the Joint Operations Fires and Effects Course, Joint Firepower Course, Joint Air Tasking Order Process Course, Operational Electronic Warfare Course, Battle Staff NCO Course and others--provide the necessary baseline for those new staff members who need them to operate effectively at this level.

We urge developing ASCCs to follow suit and expend the resources needed to equip their personnel properly for the tasks at hand. Additionally, we urge other ASCCs to capitalize on their invested training by ensuring their staffs, especially their staff NCOs, are positioned accordingly and given the opportunity to exercise their new-found skills.

The transformation of the numbered-Army construct to incorporate the ASCC role and the evolution of the subordinate Operational Fires and Effects Directorate remains a work in progress. USARCENT has embraced its first-in-the-Army opportunity aggressively and continues to improve, while still supporting the ongoing WOT. As other ASCCs execute their transformations--especially Seventh Army (US Army Europe), Sixth Army (US Army South) and Fifth Army (US Army North)--USARCENT stands ready to share TTPs and benefit from our counterparts' lessons learned.

ADA--Relevant, Ready and Engaged

When I spoke to dozens of senior Army career counselors and retention NCOs at the Worldwide Retention Training Seminar, in St. Louis, Missouri, December 2007, it seemed the consensus was that Air Defense Artillery (ADA), as a Branch, is "going away."

This belief, based upon the facts that ADA no longer has the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle in the active inventory and has reduced the number of Avengers, meant to them that ADA was shrinking and in the process of disappearing.

Nothing is further from the truth. ADA is here to stay--relevant, ready and engaged.

Relevancy. ADA Soldiers are supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom with a battalion (plus) of Avengers performing nontraditional ADA missions in Iraq. ADA Soldiers also support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, providing both traditional and nontraditional support in the War on Terrorism. By watching the skies and safeguarding geopolitical and strategic assets, ADA ensures protection for the US and our allies. Air Defense officers and NCOs assigned to military transition teams train and support hundreds of Iraqi soldiers. In fact, ADA is evolving to counter threats from not-so-friendly nations, providing an umbrella of protection for our homeland and our allies.

Capabilities. The ADA Branch is engaged in a transformation, ensuring its endurance and relevance for many decades to come. No other branch can do what ADA does. The Patriot Missile System's capabilities were proven effective in war and have become a strategic asset in support of our National Command Authority's foreign policy. The ADA's newly tested and proven Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense system will provide an umbrella of protection to our homeland against long-range ballistic missiles fired from anywhere in the world. The new Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System increases the protection that our forces receive on the battlefield from all missile threats.

Opportunities. New assignment opportunities have opened up for both officers and enlisted. As ADA brigades restation across the globe in support of Base Realignment and Closure recommended initiatives, Soldiers can request assignments in any region of the continental US (CONUS) and many locations outside CONUS as well. With the addition of AD and Airspace Management cells in every brigade combat team, our Soldiers will can serve in pure ADA units or alongside their comrades of other combat arms branches.

The ADA's future remains exciting. We are at the cutting edge of technological advances with new systems, improvements to previously fielded systems and the planning of future capabilities. This translates to future service opportunities, promotions and professional development for ADA Soldiers. ADA remains relevant, ready and engaged.

CPT Carlos Chaparro, AD

Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General

Fort Bliss, Texas

By Chief Warrant Officer Four John A. Robinson and Colonel Billy F. Sprayberry, both FA

Chief Warrant Officer Four John A. Robinson, Ed.D, Field Artillery (FA), is the Targeting Officer for US Army Central (USARCENT). He has served as Targeting Officer for Combined Joint Task Force(CJTF)-Mountain in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) I; CJTF-180 in support of OEF III; and 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, for the Central Command Combined Air Operations Center in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III and OEF V. He holds a Doctorate in Education from Argosy University at Sarasota, Florida.

Colonel Billy F. Sprayberry, (FA) is the Chief of Operational Fires and Effects, USARCENT. He has served as the Targeting Officer for 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, deploying in support of Operation Desert Storm; Commander of 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment (2-4 FAR), deploying to OIF I; and Corps Targeting Officer for NATO Rapid Deployable Corps--Italy, deploying in support of the International Security Assistance Force VIII. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army Force Management School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.