Operation Restore Hope: UN-mandated force seeks to halt tragedy.

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in famine-stricken Somalia and dismayed by the continued looting of relief supplies and attacks on UN peace-keepers there, the Security Council on 3 December called for the use of "all necessary means" to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the starving people of that Horn of Africa nation.

Contained in resolution 794 (1992), the Council action marked the first-ever UN sanction for the use of force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief. It stemmed from the assessment by the Secretary-General that the existing course of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) would not "be an adequate response to the tragedy", whose "unique character" was of a "deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response".

During debate on the historic resolution, Council members said that an "approach different from the usual form of peace-keeping operation" was warranted by the "exceptional" circumstances of anarchy and human suffering in Somalia. The resolution, Hungary stated, could be "of fundamental importance in the life of the United Nations in that it opens up the possibility of joint, determined and innovative action by which it will be possible to put an end to the hardship of an entire people".

The unprecedented text cleared the way for the 9 December deployment of thousands of armed troops from the United States and other countries to escort relief convoys in Somalia so that the massive 100-day humanitarian relief operation begun in October could continue.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a message to the people of Somalia on 8 December, said the military troops arriving in their country-known as the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF--came "to feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction"

By the text of resolution 794, adopted unanimously, the Council--acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which spells out action, including the use of, force, to be taken by the Council with respect to threats to peace and acts of aggression--authorized the Secretary-General to implement the 29 November offer by the United States to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible. The Council determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security".

It cited reports of "widespread violations of international humanitarian law" in Somalia, including reports of violence against personnel participating in impartial humanitarian relief activities and deliberate attacks on relief consignments and vehicles. Those committing such violations, in particular deliberately impeding delivery of food and medical supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population, would be held individually responsible.

The Secretary-General and Member States contributing to the international forces were authorized to make arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces. The further deployment of 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by the Council in August, was to proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General, who was invited to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the field headquarters of the unified command of the international forces.

Asserting that a final negotiated settlement of the Somali conflict was "an ultimate responsibility of the Somalis themselves", the Council also invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia. (The Secretary-General's representatives subsequently met from 4 to 15 January with the leaders of various Somali groups in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to prepare a conference of national reconciliation.)

|Restore Hope'

The first phase of the unified military response sanctioned by resolution 794 was directed by United States President George Bush on 4 December 1992. T mission--known as "Operation Restore Hope"--began on 9 December with the "successful seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by a United States Marine special-purpose air-ground task force supported by United States Navy elements", according to a 17 December letter (S/24976) from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the Security Council.

Additional forces, including initial UNITAF elements composed of troops from 20 countries, had then continued to expand the security zones in the Somali capital.

The second phase of the Operation involved securing the relief centres of Baidoa, as well as Oddur, Belet Weyne and Gialassi. The third phase involved expanding the operations to the south to secure the port and airfield at Kismayo, Bardera, and the land route from Bardera to Baidoa. The fourth and last phase was the transfer of responsibility for maintaining a secure environment to UN peace-keeping forces.

In a 22 October report (A/47/553), effects of four years of civil war in Somalia was discussed: first between supporters and opponents of President Siad Barre; then between feuding clans and factions after Mr. Barre was ousted in January 1991.

A country in ruins

Somalia was a country "in ruins", the Secretary-General stated, and there was "no functioning government in most parts". Some 300,000 people had died since November 1991 and another 1.5 million lives were immediately at risk because of famine. Almost 4.5 million of the 6 million Somalis were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases, and 700,000 had sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

Major cities in northern Somalia had been reduced to rubble, at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure had been destroyed, and 80 per cent of all social services had been rendered non-operational. The absence of government and the violence between and within clans had "plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of insecurity", which in turn hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance and threatened relief workers.

Against this grim background, the UN in October embarked upon a 100-day action programme to accelerate relief efforts in Somalia and bring in some 50,000 tons of food per month. The main providers of food aid were the World Food Programme and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The programme also dealt with vaccination of children, provisions of drugs and medical supplies, and assistance to refugees.

Although the UN had been active throughout 1992 in trying to end the fighting in Somalia, the security situation continued to deteriorate and hamper relief efforts, stated the Secretary-General in a 24 November letter to the Council (S/24859).

In March 1992, the two major factions in Mogadishu agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire, and in April, UNOSOM was established to monitor it. Additional deployments for UNOSOM, which was to grow to a strength of over 4,000 personnel, were subsequently authorized. On 16 November, following his first week in Somalia, the Secretary-General's Special Representative Ismat Kittani reported that his principal concern was that, "in the absence of a government or governing authority capable of maintaining law and order, Somali |authorities' at all levels of society compete for anything of value in the country. Armed threats and killings often decide the outcome."

Looting and banditry were "rife" and relief organizations were subject to theft, extortion, hijacking of vehicles and detention of expatriate personnel. Amidst this chaos, international aid provided by the UN and voluntary agencies had become a major source of income. In essence, humanitarian supplies had become the basis of an otherwise non-existent Somali economy.

Mr. Kittani had been appointed Special Representative for Somalia on 30 October, succeeding Mohammed Sahnoun who had resigned.

The Secretary-General concluded that while a massive amount of aid supplies had been readied for the 100-day action programme, humanitarian assistance that actually reached the needy was "often barely more than a trickle". If security issues were not effectively addressed, the UN and non-governmental organizations would "not be able to provide the relief assistance urgently in the amounts needed now in Somalia".

The same conclusion was reached at the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 3 to 5 December. It was stated there that the 100-day programme had "presented only partial success" due to intensified insecurity and that armed gunmen and other elements with heavy weaponry had to be disarmed and demobilized to ensure the return of law and order in Somalia.

Five options

Following informal consultations among Council Members at which the view was expressed that the situation in Somalia was intolerable, the Secretary-General, in a 29 November letter (S/24868), outlined five options the Council had in creating conditions for uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to Somalia.

The first option was a continued deployment of UNOSOM under the existing principles of UN peacekeeping operations, which the Secretary-General said "would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia".

Another possibility would be to abandon the idea of using international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities, withdraw UNOSOM's military elements and leave humanitarian agencies to negotiate arrangements with leaders of clans and factions. While this option had been advocated by some agencies, the Secretary-General said he was "more than ever convinced of the need for international military personnel to be deployed in Somalia".

The other three options involved the possible use of force, either by UNOSOM undertaking a show of force in Mogadishu, which could possibly convince lawless elements to stop abusing the international relief effort, or by a country-wide enforcement operation. Such an operation could either be under UN command and control or be undertaken by a group of Member States authorized by the Security Council.

The Secretary-General noted that while a country-wide operation under UN command would be consistent with the recent expansion of the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace and security and its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security, the Secretariat, already overstretched in managing greatly enlarged peace-keeping commitments, did not have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size and urgency required in Somalia. Thus, it would be necessary for Member States to provide not only troops but also personnel both in the field and New York.

In his recommendation, the Secretary-General said that there was no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Any forceful action should preferably be under UN command and control, but if that was not feasible, a Council-authorized operation undertaken by Member States was to be considered. In either case, the objective of the operation should be precisely defined and limited in time, in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.

The Secretary-General told the Council that United States Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had informed him that if the Council would authorize the use of forceful means to ensure aid delivery, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing such an operation.

In a 24 December letter to the Council President (S/25014), the Charge d'Affairs of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the UN expressed her gratitude to the Council for adopting resolution 794 and said she could "only commend the operations undertaken by the Unified Military Command led by the United States". During the four phases of Operation Restore Hope, United States forces were to build to approximately 28,000 personnel, augmented with UNITAF forces from 20 countries that had committed to provide over 17,000 personnel. As a result of the operation, food distribution was improving in the beginning of 1993, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.

It was of great importance that the last phase of the Operation--the transition from UNITAF to a peace-keeping operation under UN control--be achieved as soon as possible, in line with the wishes of the Council, the Secretary-General stated in a 19 December report (S/24992) in which he described action taken under resolution 794.

The military component of UNOSOM at the time was composed of 564 troops, consisting mainly of a 500-strong battalion, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters staff. Also, the Secretary-General on 18 December had authorized the deployment of about 100 additional personnel to strengthen UNOSOM headquarters.

The main activities of the UN force included: working with UNITAF to maintain security at Mogadishu airport; providing movement control for UN flights; and escorting all UNOSOM personnel and food convoys within the city of Mogadishu.

The Secretary-General also discussed his vision of future activities and the preconditions for transition, which he had outlined in a letter to the United States President. At least the heavy weapons of the organized factions would have to be neutralized and brought under international control and irregular forces and gangs had to be disarmed. It was necessary to consolidate agreements with leaders of all the organized factions for effective cease-fires. The Unified Task Force and UNOSOM should try to induce individuals to hand in small arms and weapons and begin the task of clearing mines.

Moreover, the mandate the Council might entrust to a new UNOSOM would have to be enlarged from one of monitoring the cease-fire in Mogadishu and providing security for humanitarian activities to a new mandate which should continue to cover the whole territory of Somalia and include preventing any resumption of violence, taking action against factions which violated the peace and maintaining control over the heavy weapons brought under control by UNITAF.

The Secretary-General said it would be "a tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks".

As of 18 December, four States had contributed to a fund for the benefit of the international operation in Somalia. Japan contributed $100 million and pledges were also made by Saudi Arabia, Finland and the Philippines.

Steps towards reconciliation

The results of a technical meeting between the UN and various Somali groups on reconciliation, which took place at a coordination conference in Addis Ababa in early December, were encouraging, the Secretary-General stated. A list was compiled of 12 Somali political movements to be invited to a formal meeting in Addis Ababa on 4 January, which was to prepare a conference of national reconciliation.

By resolution 47/167, adopted on 18 December, the General Assembly welcomed the idea of convening an international peace conference on Somalia under the auspices of the UN and African regional organizations. The Assembly stated that lasting peace could be achieved through a process of national reconciliation, "culminating in a final, comprehensive, politically negotiated settlement among all the political entities and segments of the Somali people".

It outlined the considerations that would govern the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia: "strict observance of a cease-fire, full cooperation with United Nations peace-keeping forces, national reconciliation, assistance to refugees, displaced persons and returnees, a constitution that guarantees democracy, freedom and justice, and free and fair elections".