Operation Iraqi Freedom and the future of the helicopter.

There is a push in the Defense Department and the broader national security community to identify the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom rapidly in order to influence near-term programmatic, budgetary and even political decisions. Joint Forces Command, which had some 30 analysts in the field during the campaign, already is going around Washington with a lengthy briefing of lessons learned.

The rush to draw conclusions about the war creates a danger to arrive at conclusions the wrong lessons will be learned.

For example, as the result of a single incident early in the conflict, many experts came to believe that the day of the armed helicopter had ended. The incident in question was a raid by 34 Apache AH-64D Longbow helicopters of the 11th Aviation Regiment on elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard's Medina Division on the night of March 24. The unit ran into an ambush, and 27 of the Apaches were so severely damaged that they could no longer operate. The Iraqis defeated the 11th not with sophisticated weapons and tactics, but with a few well placed scouts to warn them of the Apaches' approach and a fusillade of small arms fire from hundreds of individual weapons.

This single event sent shockwaves through the Army's aviation community and the halls of the Pentagon. Confronted by insufficient resources to transform all parts of the force structure equally, the Pentagon's leadership was looking for discriminators that would suggest where scarce acquisition dollars should be spent.

The obvious question raised by the events of March 24 was this: If aircraft flying well outside the range of enemy anti-aircraft fire can provide highly accurate close air support, is there still a role for vulnerable armed helicopters?

The answer is yes. The full story of the Apache's performance is much more positive than the events of March 24th suggest.

Other Apache units performed admirably and without significant losses in conjunction with tactical aircraft and Army indirect fire systems to shape the battlefield.

The enormous firepower of the Apaches and their ability to maneuver close to the ground enabled them to serve as a major ground force multiplier.

The real lesson from Iraq (this is the same lesson first experienced during the conflict in Afghanistan) is that the role for armed helicopters in this new kind of war is to help shape the close-in battlefield and to provide on-call fire support for ground forces.

The U.S. military has lots of ways of killing armored formations. The original role for the Apache and similar systems as tank killers is being changed by advances in long-range, high-altitude precision strike. Their role in the kinds of wars the United States is likely to fight for the next several decades is different, but still vitally important.

Before the Pentagon or the defense experts dismiss attack helicopters as "Cold War" weapons systems they would do well to examine the record of the Marine Corps' attack helicopters.

AH-1 attack helicopters performed extremely well. During the war in Iraq, they provided rapid, on-call fire support for Marine ground forces. None were shot down. The potential of the attack helicopters--when used in conjunction with fixed wing systems, both the F/A-18 Hornet and the AV-8B Harrier--was particularly striking.

Rather than abandoning rotary wing attack platforms, the Marine Corps plans to improve their existing attack helicopter fleet with the AH-1W Super Cobras and the AH-1Z. These are enhanced versions of the venerable AH-1 Cobra and UH-1 Huey, respectively, that the Marines have employed for many years.

With new avionics, an enhanced airframe, improved engines and greater payload, the AH-1W and AH-1Z will carry a wide range of munitions and be able to respond rapidly to any possible combat situation. They will be the work horses of the Marine attack helicopter fleet.

Attack helicopters will serve as a vital component of the joint and integrated air-land force. This too was demonstrated by Operation Iraqi Freedom.

When free to operate, attack helicopters pounded Iraqi fixed positions, bunkers and urban fortifications. Close coordination with ground forces enabled attack helicopters to operate extremely close to the front lines. Where air defense fires were encountered, fixed wing aircraft, artillery and rocket systems provided suppressive fire that opened the way for the attack helicopters.

Operation Iraqi Freedom also demonstrated the value of the rapid movement of ground combat forces by land and air. Air-inserted Special Operations Forces seized critical terrain in Western and Northern Iraq. This type of warfare is what the transformational V-22 Osprey was designed to support

So, before hasty and incorrect lessons are drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom, it would be well to examine closely the full record of Army and Marine Corps helicopter operations in that conflict. The results may surprise many.

Dr. Daniel Goure

ARLINGTON, VA.