Operation Atrina: history lessons.

Geographic peculiarities of the Northern Fleet operation zone force our submarines to proceed to the Northern, Central Atlantic and then to the Mediterranean Sea or other regions of combat activities and patrolling along the only one direction in the Norwegian Sea with its three arms: either between the Faeroes and the Shetland Islands, or between the Shetland Islands and Iceland, or between Iceland and Greenland (the Denmark Strait). This notorious Faeroes-Iceland line with its underwater hydrophones of the SOSUS American stationary antisubmarine system and mobile NATO antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces is well known to our submariners and has always been a real headache. NATO antisubmarine warfare forces have always tried to intercept and track our submarines at this line. It was necessary to find, train and practically test effectiveness of secured deployment methods of first of all nuclear submarines in the Atlantic as well as to demonstrate that if required we can become undetectable, ready to covertly deliver strikes as well as to deliver nuclear weapons counterstrikes at the surface targets located in the hostile territory. Such methods were trained and approbated by carrying out continuous fleet special operations. The most significant and effective among them was the operation with "Atrina"* code-name performed by a group of multipurpose SSNs in 1987. Leaping ahead we should say that this operation carried out in early 1987 raised a big stink in the Pentagon, caused numerous queries in the Congress and somewhat shocked the US Navy Command. But first things first.

The oldest (the first) multipurpose SSN force of the Northern Fleet was selected to perform this operation. It included the most up-to-date at that time submarines manned with well-trained commanders and officers who had a unique experience of joint SSN operations in the Atlantic. In June 1985 five submarines of this division performed the "Aport" preliminary joint operation in the area of the New Foundland bank with the aim to disclose US SSBN patrolling routes and NATO ASW forces tactics. This operation resulted in obtaining important information about detecting and long-term tracking SSBN.

Five SSNs with the most well trained crews and commanders were selected for the Operation Atrina (Captain 2nd Rank M.I. Kliuev, Captain 2nd Rank I.O. Alikov, Captain 2nd Rank Popkov, Captain 2nd Rank B.Yu. Muratov, Captain 2nd Rank Smelkov). Captain 1st Rank A.I. Shevchenko was again assigned the SSN task force commander.

Preparation of the operation was personally controlled and supervised by Admiral I.M. Kapitanets, the Northern Fleet Commander taking into account the experience of preparation and joint activities of SSNs in the Operation Aport. Never before the Northern Fleet has conducted such careful and purposeful joint training of commanding officers of SSNs, fleet aviation and all operation support forces, which guaranteed the success. Besides this, to secure concept and plan of the operation a solid legend was used as a cover. Even the nuclear submarines commanders found out the missions of their ships and details of the operation at the very last moment.

The Operation Atrina started in early March 1987: all five SSNs left the base in sequence. Usually nuclear submarines went on combat duty alone, less often in pairs. This time nearly whole division of multipurpose SSNs was going to the ocean. Americans of course registered their disappearance from the base. But, apparently they didn't worry too much knowing that SSNs would go along the usual route. But this time Americans brought their eggs to a wrong market. On a certain day and at a certain hour all nuclear submarines "suddenly" made a turn. And from rather stretched column a hydroacoustic screen** of SSNs was formed, which was going West at full speed. Nuclear submarines "disappeared" without being detected by ASW forces.

Feeling nervous about the "disappearance" of the whole SSN division that was approaching US coast with unknown mission the Pentagon leaders and US Navy Command dispatched dozens of patrol planes and powerful forces of antisubmarine warfare ships. It was a real hunt with use of the wide range of forces and facilities of submarine search: surface warships with their sonars, ship-based ASW aircraft and land-based patrol aircraft planting the barriers and whole fields of sonobuoy and using onboard magnetometers, thermal direction finders, biologic track indicators, etc. As SSN commanders reported at that time the density of ASW forces and their efforts concentration in the area of search had been such that sometimes it had been impossible to surface for a communication session. But everything was useless--nuclear submarines vanished without a trace.

The US ASW forces failed to detect our SSNs, which in the mean time entered the Sargasso Sea and skirted the notorious Bermuda Triangle from time to time altering heading. Six US multipurpose SSNs left Norfolk to search for the Shevchenko task force not counting those submarines that were performing routine patrolling in the Atlantic; three squadrons of antisubmarine aircraft, three hunter-killer teams of ships (one of them was the British team with Invincible aircraft carrier), three ships of long-range sonar intelligence were additionally detached for the search. Our SSNs had been operating in the Atlantic for almost three months without being detected or tracked by US and NATO ASW forces.

The missions were fully accomplished: US and British submarines deployed during the operation in the Atlantic were detected; underwater and surface navigation situation in the Atlantic region insufficiently described by other naval intelligence means was disclosed. All our SSNs successfully returned home. Their commanders and the Division Commander were awarded with the Red Banner Orders. Other officers, warrant officers and sailors of the SSNs' crews distinguished in this operation also got governmental decorations.

Fleet Admiral V.N. CHERNAVIN (Ret.)

Hero of the Soviet Union

Vladimir Nikolayevich CHERNAVIN was born on April 22, 1928 in Nikolayev. Graduated from Preliminary Naval School (1947), M.V. Frunze High Naval School (1951), High Naval Officers Class (1954), Naval Academy (1965), General Staff Academy (1969). He served on diesel and nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet starting from the position of the artillery-and-torpedo combat unit commander of the diesel submarine to the Commander of SSBN. After that, Chief of Staff, Commander of Submarine Naval Squadron; Chief of Staff, Commander of Submarine Flotilla; Chief of Staff, Commander of the Northern Fleet; Chief of the Main Naval Headquarters. From 1985 to 1992, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Participant and head of numerous unique submarine cruises, including cruise under the Arctic ice. Author of more than 60 scientific works, several books and many articles dealing with naval topics. At present time, Chairman of the Submariners Union of Russia.

* "Atrina" is a specially made word to keep conceptual styling of the preparing operation in secret from the enemy even in its codename.

** Hydroacoustic screen--a combat formation of SSNs in case of their team use; it is built up in the zone of probable hostile ship activities to close it by operation zones of own hydroacoustic equipment.