One air force pilot's response to "Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda". (Letters to the Editor).

I am a retired USAF colonel with 22 years experience flying fighters. I served as a forward air controller (FAC) flying OV-10s in SEA [Southeast Asia] with 165 combat missions in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. I flew A-10s as a flight examiner and instructor pilot (IP) and F-16s as an IP and squadron commander. On the Air Staff, I helped plan the Desert Storm Air Campaign and later helped organize the Gulf War Air Power Survey, the most comprehensive review of the role of air power in Operation Desert Storm.

I am writing in response to LTC Christopher F. Bentley's suggestions for Air Force improvements in his article "Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda" (September-October 2002).

AC-130 Squadron in Light Infantry Divisions. In light of joint doctrine calling for air power to be centrally controlled by an airman, I suggest LTC Bentley reconsider his statement that "Every light infantry division needs an AC-130 squadron." Doctrinal precepts are often arrived at through costly wartime lessons; the Kasserine Pass during World War II provided lessons in applying air power.

USAF Major Shawn Rife's article "Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of Air Power" in the Autumn/Winter 1998-99 Joint Forces Quarterly reviews those lessons. The essence is captured in Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's statement, "Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments [i.e., assign it to a division], you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset--its flexibility."

In summation Major Rife wrote, "There were many reasons for the American debacle at Kasserine Pass, but perhaps the most significant... was the poor handling of the combat air assets... Most of the principles of war were ignored. The treatment of air power as flying artillery to be parceled Out in support of ground formations at the point of attack squandered aircraft on costly and frequently inconsequential missions, ensured that other aircraft were underutilized in the midst of disagreements over priorities, and left many more lucrative targets untouched."

Granted, air power's primary mission in Operation Anaconda was supporting ground forces, but doctrine shouldn't be rewritten from one experience. LTC Bentley might see his statement in a different light if I used the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing to make a similarly inappropriate assertion: "Every fighter wing needs a light infantry battalion defending its base."

The following comments respond to his remark that the "inabilities of aircraft to break self-imposed USAF altitude restrictions, slow their strike speed down or strafe the battlefield restricted [their] ability to deliver timely munitions in close support of troops [GAS] on the ground."

Altitude Restrictions. The threat is the primary reason altitude restrictions are imposed. The early FACs in SEA could fly at 500 to 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) as the threat was principally small-arms fire, heavy machine guns and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades]. My generation of FACs had a "floor" of 10,000 feet mean sea level (2,000 to 9,000 feet AGL) based on radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), ranging in size from 23- to 100mm, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Whenever friendly ground forces were in a tight spot in Vietnam, FACs and attacking aircraft frequently ignored altitude restrictions; such actions increased aircraft losses, but often helped save "friendlies."

Safe separation from bombs is another reason for altitude restrictions. Airplanes carry bombs in a "safe" condition; once dropped, the bomb's "safing" wires are pulled, allowing the fuzes to arm it after it falls a minimum distance--you don't want a bomb "hot" immediately after it's dropped because multiple bombs dropped on a single pass sometimes bump into one another and could explode prematurely.

Bombs dropped too low won't arm, which is not a bad thing because if they detonated, they could "frag" an airplane as substantial bomb fragments are hurled thousands of feet AGL. While not used in Operation Anaconda, drag devices provide safe separation by rapidly slowing bombs to keep delivering aircraft out of the frag pattern.

Additionally, smart bombs require high-altitude releases. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) use laser energy or global positioning system (GPS) inputs to "get smart" and steer to a target using small fins that can only alter their ballistic trajectory to a limited degree. PGMs must be dropped into an imaginary funnel-shaped basket that narrows near the ground; drop a PGM outside the basket and it can be smart but physically unable to fly to the target.

Once released, laser-guided bombs get smart by first finding and then guiding to the laser energy illuminating the target. Similarly, an airplane talks to a GPS-guided bomb before releasing it so the bomb knows where both it and the target are located. After release, a GPS-guided weapon must acquire its own GPS lock-on to remain smart. Thus, higher release altitudes increase the probability of PGMs' falling into the basket and getting smart.

Without laser or GPS guidance, PGMs are ballistic projectiles; the inertia imparted from the delivering aircraft and the effects of wind and gravity determine where they fall.

Friendlies may be reassured when they can see the aircraft providing them CAS, but smart bombs are as accurate when dropped from high-flying bombers as when dropped from low-flying fighters. PGMs provide CAS when dropped in the basket with time to get smart.

Slow-Flying Aircraft. Regarding slowing aircraft over the battlefield, it helps pilots see what is unfolding on the ground, but aerodynamics require that aircraft maintain speed to remain maneuverable. F-16s can operate at 200 knots, but maneuverability at that speed is limited. Pilots couldn't adequately react to AAA and SAMs, especially when carrying bombs.

Slow flight is further limited by the high pressure-altitudes at which Operation Anaconda took place; pressure-altitude influences both the airspeed and engine thrust available.

Strafing Missions. Finally, having employed strafing against enemy troops, I would like to disabuse LTC Bentley of any belief that it greatly influences battles. Strafing is a psychological weapon at best; a determined enemy often will keep attacking despite it.

Further, strafing from even a slow-mover, such as the A-10, is challenging (ever try to hit someone with a snowball thrown from a moving car?) and the volume of firepower is not that great.

Effective strafe involves an approximate two-second burst of fire that sends 120 to 180 rounds down range. Longer bursts are counterproductive as strafing fighters traverse the ground at speeds of 500 to 1,000 feet per second, creating bullet dispersal that is further exacerbated by the heating of gun barrels. Also, pilots who "press" the target are likely to overfly it and the associated threat while risking flight through their own ricocheting bullets.

Further, asking pilots to strafe is like asking troops to charge a bunker; both will do it but the pay-off may not be justified by the expected losses. There is a direct correlation between the number of strafing passes made and the likelihood of getting shot down as strafing or dive-bombing aircraft present enemy gunners with a somewhat stable target--just as charging troops would if they slowed their advance to raise and sight their weapons.

As impacting the ground has a near-perfect probability of kill ([P.sub.k]) against aircraft, there is little margin for error as pilots make strafing or bombing passes and they face small arms fire, AAA and SAMs. Further, they can only try to get out of range of any threat, whereas ground troops can take cover.

Also, attacking airplanes will continue to close on a target as their inertia must be overcome before any pullout appreciably increases the distance from a threat.

Finally, strafing accuracy is not outstanding--pilots qualify with 25 percent hits on the controlled range where they shoot at a 28-foot parachute canopy suspended between two telephone poles with a cease-fire at 2,000 to 3,000 feet from the target. Top Guns in the F-16 score in the high 50 percent range while A-b Top Guns score more than 80 percent; hitting tank-sized targets is easier than hitting human-sized targets.

"Bunting" (pushing the nose of the aircraft down while strafing) will concentrate the strafe pattern and increase scores on the range--but also the likelihood of getting shot down in combat.

Inclosing, LTC Bentley's article is an opportunity to demonstrate the utility of joint live-fire training in peacetime, so all members of the joint team understand one another's capabilities and limitations when the real shooting starts.

Col Dale C. Hill, USAF, Retired Burke, VA