On the muse of history and the science of culture.

WHEN I FIRST BEGAN to learn about general semantics, the principle that most intrigued me was the idea that there could be way to apply a scientific method to human interactions and communications. The more I learned about this theory, the more practical and even obvious it became to me. If applying a scientific way of thinking can work for human interactions on a day-to-day basis, why not apply it to other fields of study, such as history, that deal with human interactions? I see no reason not to and neither does Robert L. Carneiro, author of The Muse of History and the Science of Culture.

In keeping with the objectives and methods of this class and of general semantics as a whole, I have chosen to write about this book through a series of thoughts, questions, comments and critiques inspired by the content of the book itself and by related book reviews.

I found this book to be one of the more thought-provoking pieces of writing I have read in my undergraduate career. It poses many compelling questions about our views of history. Carneiro discusses topics such as, does history have a pattern or is it just a series of unpredictable and unrelated events? He explains the various philosophies of history that can offer answers to these questions and more. In the concluding chapters of the book, Carneiro proposes his own set of "laws of culture" as a supplemental and personal answer to these questions. I appreciate the fact that even though Carneiro maintains strong opinions about many of these topics, he gave more than one side of each argument so that the reader could draw his or her own conclusions.

One of the reasons this book resonated with me is because Carneiro approaches the science of history from an anthropological perspective, which is one of my fields of study. Through most of the book, he seems more concerned with directional trends in social institutions throughout history rather than focusing on specific events as examples of overarching historical theories.

Before relating some of the book's quotations and examples to general semantics are discussed, I would like to provide a brief overview of each section of the book.

The first chapter is about the debate on overarching philosophies of history. Most contemporary historians "remain hostile" to the idea of a philosophy of history. Earliest attempts were heavily influenced by religion, and most authors were philosophers and not historians. This type of theory was quickly rejected, and for some time historians did not even attempt to create philosophies because of their aversion to "broad generalizations inherent in any philosophy of history." The idea of creating an overarching theory was once again embraced in the early 1900s and aimed at incorporating orders of historical events and determinants of the orders.

The second chapter describes the changing definitions of the subject of history. History has been used as a term to describe everything humans have ever done, the surviving record of everything humans have done, or the selection, arrangement and presentation of aspects of this surviving record. It has taken the form of a narrative practice, a recounting of objective facts, literature, universal history, cultural history, and "new" history that looks at a broad spectrum of cultures.

The "thorny thickets" of history are dealt with in the third chapter, including free will (which Carneiro decidedly rejects) vs. determinism, moral judgments, and contingency in history and historical relativism.

The next two chapters focus on the driving factors of history, such as race, deities, and great men and ideas as prime movers of historical stories. Carneiro maintains that these approaches to history are outdated, and in the next chapters discusses the approaches he believes are full of merit--a combination of evolutionist and materialist views. This is where his anthropology background factors in the most. Carneiro asserts that "individual people and particular events must be transcended through conceptualization not as inherently unique entities but rather as recurrent phenomena." (3)

In the chapter titled "Are There Laws of History?" Carneiro states that "one of the hallmarks of physical science is that it formulates laws governing the phenomena it studies." He then explores the question, "Can history do the same?" Scientific laws are principles that assert an unvarying relationship between two or more events under stipulated conditions. Carneiro asserts that these laws can be found in history.

In the final chapters, he proposes "laws of culture" rather than philosophies of history, and insists that an anthropological view can offer tentative laws that are similar to the laws of natural sciences--that is, laws that are neither vague, nor self-evident, which can be tracked and proven by a scientific method. Interestingly, he asserts that there is a direct mathematical relationship between the "size of a village and its tendency to fission" and that this relationship and the form it takes can be discerned through research about the society. He also claims that there is an order, or a hierarchy, by which societies have evolved certain traits, which can also be statistically proven.

Although for the most part it was not the overarching theories or propositions of laws that grabbed my attention, one of the main points that struck me throughout the first half of the book was the revelation of the subjective nature of history. We have been taught the topic of "history" throughout our lives and schooling as if it is a concrete subject with knowable facts that do not change. We have learned that history is not something that can be made up or an area of study that is still evolving. How many times have we heard "you can't rewrite history" or "you can't change history, but you can learn from it?" It is almost embarrassing that until reading this book I have thought of history as an objective topic. Sure, I know that certain cultural perspectives and historians themselves can put "spin" on a historical event, but I never realized the extent to which this spin can be taken, and the power this has over readers and students like me.

I cannot include here all of quotes and assertions in this book that I found particularly interesting. In fact, one of my only critiques would be that this book poses too many interesting questions. As one question was posed, I hardly had time to reflect on an answer of my own before being prompted to think about another question. For a historian or anthropologist who has researched subjects like historiology, this book may be a summation of arguments the researcher has already encountered. However, it was the first time I had been introduced to many of these debates, and I felt somewhat overwhelmed with what seemed like the enormous size and weight of these questions.

I found it easier to focus my attention on some of Carneiro's more specific statements and to compare those to the ideas I have learned from general semantics. One review stated:

  Carneiro deserves praise for dealing with one of the most important
  questions in both social science and history. This book will have the
  effect of helping social scientist and scholars more self-consciously
  examine their assumptions regarding the nature of history and the role
  the social sciences and the humanities in historical
  investigations. (1)

I think this is one of the many areas in which Carneiro, either knowingly or unknowingly, parallels the ideas of general semantics. I believe one of the major factors that general semantics stresses is the ability to critically evaluate the assumptions and inferences humans tend to make--to assess possible "filters," other options, backgrounds and things overlooked. Here, Carneiro reinforces this idea and applies it to the specific field of history, urging social scientists not only to focus on the historical happening, but the complexities of the cultural setting to both explain and predict historical events.

When discussing the multiple explanations of history as it has been used ... historically ... Carneiro states that one view held that "if history forgets or neglects to tell a story, it will inevitably forfeit much of its appeal and much of its authority." From a general semantics point of view, we can observe that: 1) it is impossible to recount all historical events; 2) historical events are inter-related in that they affect and influence people, events, etc.; and 3) one cannot claim to know all the facts about a particular historical event. I am not sure that this takes away from the authority of history, but it is a nice reminder to be cognizant of the fact that there are always other factors involved and that even the best recounting or theory will have assumptions and inferences automatically built in.

Near the end of the book, Carneiro proposes an explanation for historical change, reinforced by the theory that "in the development of Western civilization, not every great advance was made by the same peoples, but rather, the torch was handed on from one society to the next." To the best of my knowledge, this theory is a perfect example of that which differentiates humans from the rest of the organisms on this Earth--the ability to time-bind.

However, Carneiro's argument implies that there is a hierarchy of advances, with each advance built upon by the next society. I am not certain that I agree with this conclusion. To be sure, I have not studied anthropology or history in as much depth as the author, but I agree with Stephen Shennan in his review of the book when he states that "... this sort of view clearly sees 'social evolution' as a goal-directed process and leads us in the direction of characterizing different stages as opposed to describing and explaining real historical processes." (4) I believe it is more likely that progressions of societies result not from linear or "goal-oriented" processes that can be directly traced from one generation and one society to the next, but rather a tangled web of ideas and unique innovations that may or may not be transferred to other societies. I also believe that this kind of characterization puts a value judgment on "more" or "less" advanced societies.

When discussing the idea of a universal history, Carneiro cites Herbert Butterfield, who said, "Universal History has ceased to hold a prominent place in our interests, presumably because it spreads the mind over so wide an area that the knowledge can hardly avoid becoming too thin" and also that most professional historians lack the "global knowledge and comparative perspective needed" to undertake this task. This reminded me of the summary of formulations listed in Section 26 of Kenneth Johnson's General Semantics: An Outline Survey. (5) One of these formulations states that "the more territory a map covers, the less it can say about that territory." I think that this statement holds true not only for the idea of a "Universal History," but also for many of the other "overarching" theories of history. As we generalize to a wider and wider range of facts and ideas, important details tend to get lost.

Perhaps the most interesting topic to me was the debate among historians about free choice vs. determinism. Carneiro states that in terms of developing a scientific method to explain history, "if there is a science [of man] there is no free choice." He argues that most historians choose to believe in free choice (he states that it can even be determined that most will believe in free choice) because determinism takes the "joy" out of life and leaves people unable to "rejoice in the open vistas that free will seemed to afford them." He follows this statement with the idea that however hard determinants may be to define, "lack of awareness of determinants is no guarantee they do not exist." Although the idea of free will is a romantic one, I tend to agree with the author when he cites Einstein's observation that humans act under "external compulsion ... and internal necessity."

Carneiro recounts an interesting anecdote that underscores the principle of cultural and historical relativism. In the 1700s, Sir Walter Raleigh wrote a book titled History of the World. Shortly afterward, while imprisoned in the Tower of London, he witnessed from his cell window an altercation involving other prisoners. Later, he discussed this event with others who had witnessed the 'same' event. Raleigh was dismayed to realize that each of the witnesses had interpreted the altercation differently. As Carneiro explains, Raleigh asked himself, "If four men seeing the very same event have four different versions of it, how could anyone possibly rely on the word of a historian writing about events that happened centuries before?" Then Raleigh threw his book into the fire.

This story is a good example of the "to-me" principle in general semantics. Almost everything is up to individual interpretation, and it is necessary to understand that factors from personal background and biases to physical sensing abilities differ greatly from person to person. I can't help but sympathize with Sir Walter Raleigh's hopelessness when he decided to destroy his book.

Another subject I found interesting is the principle of cultural history. Carneiro focuses on this subject, although from my understanding it sounds a little less scientific in principle. He cites Sir Francis Bacon as having a "truly noble plan" that "should tell the origins, progress, migrations ... declines ... chief controversies and school of thought, principal authors, best books ... etc." This sounds highly inferential and subjective to me, picking the "best books" and "chief controversies." I believe this is an interesting premise--to include not only one small slice of historical events, but most of the actions and cultural components surrounding it--but I wonder how one can even start to attempt that kind of a recounting without exhibiting major biases.

Perhaps that is the best conclusion to draw from Carneiro--that all of history, all of the theories and accounts, all the stories and perspectives, leave some things out and are inevitably skewed because of the assumptions that historians (and social scientists and anthropologists alike) make in their formulations. Although some "concrete" theories have been proposed, it is important as educated citizens for us to realize that history as a whole cannot avoid subjectivity. As in the other sciences, and in general semantics, it is important that we continually and critically analyze the things we label as historical 'facts.'

NOTES

1. Binford, Lewis R (2001). "Where Do Research Problems Come From," American Antiquity, 66(4), 669-678.

2. Carneiro, Robert L (2000). The Muse of History and the Science of Culture. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

3. Graber, Robert (2001). "The Case for Cultural Evolutionism," Amazon Review. http://www.amazon.com/Muse-History-Science-Culture/dp/0306462737.

4. Shennan, Stephen (2002). "Cultural evolution: contemporary viewpoints. The muse of history and the science of culture, Applying evolutionary archaeology: a systematic approach, Seriation, stratigraphy and index fossils: the backbone of archaeological dating. (book review)," Antiquity 76(291), 253-256.

5. Johnson, Kenneth G. (2004 revised). General Semantics: An Outline Survey. Institute of General Semantics, Fort Worth, Texas.

Quotes to Ponder

From The Muse of History and the Science of Culture

History is not merely an account of external events, but an explanation
Of them.
EDWARD P. CHEYNEY

History:

1. Everything that human beings have ever done

2. The surviving record of everything that human beings have ever done

3. The selection, arrangement and presentation of certain aspects of this surviving record.

If history forgets or neglects to tell a story, it will inevitably
forfeit much of its appeal and much of its authority.
HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

After I have read three of four thousand descriptions of battles, and
the terms of some hundreds of treaties, I have found that fundamentally
I am scarcely better instructed than I was before. From these things I
have learned only events.
VOLTAIRE

If it is free to a man to choose what he will do or not do, there is no
adequate science of him. If there is science of him, there is no free
choice.
JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE

Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance
with inner necessity.
ALBERT EINSTEIN

Scientists did not assess the moral character of their subject
matter ... did not say that gravitation was good or mitosis was bad ...
and should not the historian emulate the scientist in this regard?
ROBERT L. CARNERIO

We admit that by universal estimation, Hitler was a diabolical monster,
yet he cannot be fully understood by labeling him as such. He was also
the expression of certain tendencies ... exemplified the inclination of
militaristic states to create empires.
ROBERT L. CARNERIO

There is a general path of social development along which, owing to
special circumstances, some peoples have advanced a great way, some a
less way, some but a very little way.
JOHN FISKE

From various other sources

It should be known that history is a discipline that has a great number
of approaches.
IBN KHALDUIN OF TUNIS

All history becomes subjective; in other words there is properly no
history, only biography.
RALPH WALDO EMERSON

History is a science, no more and no less.
J. B. BURY

The past does not influence me; I influence it.
WILLEM DE KOONING

History proves nothing because it contains everything.
EMIL CIORAN

No harm's done to history by making it something someone would want to
read.
DAVID MCCULLOUGH

History is not history unless it is the truth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN

To look back upon history is inevitably to distort it.
NORMAN PEARSON

Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
GEORGE SANTAYANA

History is merely a list of surprises. It can only prepare us to be
surprised yet again.
KURT VONNEGUT

History is the science of what never happens twice.
PAUL VALERY

The past is malleable and flexible, changing as our recollection
interprets and re-explains what has happened.
PETER BERGER

Clio, the muse of history, is as thoroughly infected with lies as a
street whore with syphilis.
SCHOPENHAUER

There is no history of mankind, there is only an indefinite number of
histories of all kinds of aspects of human life.
KARL POPPER

Writing intellectual history is like trying to nail jelly to the wall.
WILLIAM HESSELTINE

People are trapped in history, and history is trapped in them.
JAMES BALDWIN

History never repeats itself; at best it sometimes rhymes.
MARK TWAIN

History isn't really about the past--settling old scores. It's about
defining the present and who we are.
KEN BURNS

A historian has many duties. Allow me to remind you of two which are
important. The first is not to slander; the second is not to bore.
VOLTAIRE

MARISA SLEETER *

* Marisa Sleeter, our new Berman Scholar, is a senior in the Schieffer School of Journalism at Texas Christian University. She will graduate in May with a double major in International Communications/Anthropology and a minor in Spanish. She is a participant in the TCU Honors Program, a student worker in the TCU Study Abroad office, and has been active in the TCU band, Habitat for Humanity, the National Society of Collegiate Scholars and the TCU Leadership Council.