On the development of the structure of combined-arms units.

Current shifts afoot in the views on the scale, character and aims of warfare should inevitably entail changes both in the methods of employment of combined-arms units at all levels and in their TOE structure. But historical experience teaches us that each war is certain to retain elements of the past that exist alongside new traits in military art. Shifts in methods of combat operations will not immediately lead to radical changes in strength organization. For some time, the old forms of organization will be adapting to new methods in combat operations. In this sense, the TOE organization of military units is a more conservative thing than engagement and operation methods. Its changes usually occur after military art "formulates" certain operational-tactical requirements to models of weapons and military equipment, and they are developed and handed down to line units.

Consequently, the TOE structure development problem where combined-arms units are concerned ought to be addressed in combination with efforts to develop operational-tactical requirements to models of weapons and military equipment, using the latest advances in systems analysis theory and military systemology.

Within the Land Forces weapons system* there is lately a particular emphasis on the armor subsystem. All combat arms and special forces of the Land Forces have models of armored weapons and equipment (AWE) of various types. The armored weapons and equipment form the most mass-scale type of weapons with operational large strategic formations of the Land Forces and the main weapon of combined-arms large units and units. This is why the AWE subsystem is a good example which will help us consider a possible approach to validation of development prospects for the Land Forces' weapons system.

One of the main tasks facing the AWE subsystem is to secure stability of force groupings and military units in mobile forms of military operations. This is why the crucial element in investigations into the area of validation of a prospective Land Forces weapons system is creating a methodological apparatus capable of taking into account the influence of operational (combat) stability factors where embattled military units are concerned.

This methodological apparatus understands operational stability of large strategic formations (combat stability of combined units, units and elements) as a military unit's capacity to keep its combat capability in an operation (combat operations, engagement) at a level securing its successful accomplishment, consolidation of the result, and timely preparation for subsequent actions.

Operational (combat) stability is a comprehensive property of military units at the operational (tactical) level, one determined by the amount of weapons and equipment in line units, that of supplies, level of training and other factors.

The mathematical model calculating the necessary level of operational (combat) stability is a formalized representation of the hypothesis on the lawful dependence of the expected result of an operation to be mounted by an operational (operational-tactical) large strategic formation at an expected level of operational (combat) stability of combined-arms large units, units and elements as they address operational (combat) missions in the operation.

If we accept that the Bernulli formula is lawful in this situation and can be used accordingly, the model may be presented in the following form:

[P.sub.(N)] = [n.summation over (n-k)][C.sub.n.sup.k][p.sub.(N-1).sup.k][q.sub.(N-1).sup.n-k], k = [bar.1,n]

where [P.sub.(N)] is the probability of preservation of combat stability by an N-scale military unit while it performs an operational (combat) mission;

n is the number of N - 1-scale military units within a large strategic formation;

k is the number of N - 1-scale military units which preserve their combat stability during a combat mission in an operation (engagement) and thus predetermine attainment of the aim of an operation (engagement) by an N-scale military unit;

[p.sub.(N - 1)] is the probability of performance of a combat mission (provided combat stability is preserved) by an N - 1-scale military unit;

[q.sub.(N - 1)] is the probability of an N - 1-scale military unit losing combat stability and failing to perform its combat mission.

Made during the sorting of substantially different variants using forces and weapons in an army operation (a combined-arms engagement), the graphical representation of this model is a nomogram (Fig.).

[FIGURE OMITTED]

The right-hand branch of this nomogram corresponds to such methods of operational (combat) employment of large strategic formations (combined units, units and elements) as secure the attainment of the aim of an operation (combined-arms engagement), given the obligatory preservation of combat stability in the course of combat missions by all combined units (units, elements). Its left-hand branch corresponds to such operational (combat) employment methods as secure the attainment of the aim of an operation (combined-arms engagement), given preservation of combat stability during combat missions by at least one of its combined units (units, elements). The space between the two branches corresponds to such methods of operational (combat) employment of large strategic formations (combined units, units, elements) as secure the attainment of the aim of an operation (combined-arms engagement), given preservation of combat stability during combat missions by a stipulated part of its combined units (units, elements).

This model makes it possible to identify the most expedient relations between the number of AWE units in elements, combined units and units, given preset parameters of operational stability of a large strategic formation.

Research into combat stability of a motorized company that attacks (defends) in a combined combat formation jointly with tanks may provide an insight into the workings of the model. The number of company personnel who operated on the battlefield outside of their IFVs varied between 66 and 112, the number of IFVs between 10 and 17, and tanks between 3 and 17.

The modeling established the following:

* an increase in the number of the IFVs from 10 to 13, given the 0.3-0.5 probability of their battlefield engagement with fires, leads to a more considerable enhancement in an element's combat stability than within the 13 to 17 range;

* from the point of view of enhancement of an element's combat stability during a combat mission, the most rational number of tanks in a company combat formation, considering that the company has 13 IFVs, is between 5 and 17 (keeping in mind that the combat capabilities level of a tank makes it possible to hope for the probability of it being engaged with fires during a combat mission in the range from 0.2 to 0.2);

* increasing an IFV's survivability to such a level as makes it possible to hope for the probability of it being engaged with fires during a combat mission in the range from 0.1 to 0.2 pays the way to using a combined combat formation made up of tanks, IFVs and dismounted motorized infantry in armor terrain within a maximally broad range of combat conditions.

Of course, this model cannot take into consideration in full measure all factors influencing such a complex process as a combined-arms combat. But it seems indisputable that only a comprehensive approach to this problem will enable a most complete and justified determination of development prospects of the TOE structure of Land Forces units at different levels.

Col. A.G. FEDOTOV

Candidate of Military Sciences

Col. Yu.G. SHATILO (Res.)

Candidate of Military Sciences

* Land Forces weapons system is a component part of the weapons system of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which is a totality of mutually related organizational units necessary for equipping large strategic formations, combined units and units of the Land Forces for them to be able to defend Fatherland in warfare in theaters of operations.