On the concepts of "military threat" and "military danger" and their correlation in Russia's military security system.

Among the conceptual questions concerning the military security of the Russian Federation, the problem of the correlation of military threat and military danger ranks with special prominence. At the same time, in spite of the fact that the investigation of the above problem is of fundamental theoretical and practical importance, at the present time, regrettably, such key security notions as "threat" and "danger," "challenge" and "risk" have neither been worked out, nor validated scientifically as the generally acknowledged concepts. This question has already been commented on by military scientists in the Voennaia mysl' journal, namely, by V.L. Manilov, A.F. Klimenko, N.P. Klokotov, M.M. Kasenkov, V.P. Sinetskii and others. (1)

S.B. Ivanov, Russian Federation Defense Minister, in the interview to the weekly Itogi, also touched upon the issue of the meaning of "threat," stating that, in these latter days, its content had drastically changed from the purely standard military threats to the so-called uncertainty factors, which are understood by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to mean the situation, conflict or process, "which can bring about a significant change of geopolitical environment in the regions of Russia's vital interests, or can directly endanger its security." (2) In this connection, the continued scrutiny of the above concepts, encompassed by the "uncertainty factors," seems advisable, likewise, the identification of their correlation in the military security sphere.

To figure out the meaning of the concepts under review, let us turn to their etymology. S.I. Ozhegov defined "threat" as "pledge to inflict injury, harm on someone" (3); V.I. Dahl interpreted "threat" as actions or intentions "to threaten, menace, bully, to bring about danger or to cause apprehension, to hold under pain of fear or apprehension, to make threatening gestures." (4) Modern Russian language dictionaries define the notion of "threat" as "intimidation, promise to inflict trouble, harm on someone," (5) "promise to cause harm, trouble," (6) "intention to inflict physical, material or different harm on public interests, as well as on individuals or on their interests." (7) Thus, generally speaking, the Russian language treats the notion of "threat" as the phenomenon implicating the intent of causing some damage, harm to someone or to something.

Although some official documents refer to the security threat of the Russian Federation as the potentially existing phenomenon, which under certain unfavorable conditions can become the reality capable of inflicting damage on the state, society or the individual, none of them contain any sufficiently clear definition of the essence of security threats. For instance, in the Law of the Russian Federation dated 5 March 1992 No. 2446-1 "On Security" (Art. 3), threat is defined as "the set of conditions and factors constituting danger to the vital interests of the individual, society and the state," (8) which does not fully reflect the essence of the phenomenon under review.

The notion of "threat" can be derived from the definition of "security" contained in the Law on Security--"the regime of protectibility of the vital interests of the state, society and of the individual against internal or external threats." Precisely this approach is proposed by military scientist V.S Pirumov in his writings, when he defines the notion of "threat" as "entitative opportunities for inflicting any damage on the individual, society, or the state." (9)

But, this definition, in our view, can hardly qualify for sufficient precision or fullness. The second part of it referring to the objects of threat and to its consequences (the infliction of damage) sounds good, whereas the first part, which treats "threat" only as entitative opportunities for inflicting damage, raises doubts because, apart from the entitative opportunity for realizing threat, the intentions (volition) of one of the political entities to cause damage to certain interests of another political entity should also be available, because threat would not be real without it.

Let us consider a somewhat different approach, proposed by the authors of the monograph Russia's National Security Concept. They, view security threats as potential hazards to political, economic, military, ecological and other values, among them to spiritual and intellectual values, of the nation and of the state. (10) Although the above definition is sufficiently broad, containing the list of the security spheres of the objects, which threats can be directed against, it does not qualify for the sufficiently comprehensive definition either, because it refers to threats as potential phenomena only. At the same time, besides potential threats, there are quite specific and real threats known to exist, which is testified by the numerous facts of today (inter-ethnic conflicts, armed extremism, societal criminalization, etc.).

It is evident that the above-mentioned definitions of security threat do not cover all the aspects of the phenomenon under review, suffering from halfness: in one case, threat is treated as a real phenomenon, in another instance, it is defined, alternatively, as a potential phenomenon.

Supposedly, "threat" represents itself as the set of two components: both as subjective intentions, and objective opportunities for inflicting some damage. At the same time, the designs (volition) of the eventual enemy are viewed as the intentions directed against the vital interests of the state, society and of the individual, and the opportunities are understood to mean the availability of the adequate forces and facilities needed for the implementation of those designs.

Having considered "threat" from the dichotomy of intentions and opportunities for the infliction of damage, we have not fully brought to light the essence of the pending notion of "threat," which is a complex idea having yet another etymological meaning: "possible danger," (11) "implying any danger." (12) It follows thence that the concept of "threat" is akin to the notion of "danger" being so interrelated, at the same time, that even S.I. Ozhegov misses the tautology, when he defines "threat" in terms of "danger" and vice versa: "threat is a possible danger," (13) and "danger is a possibility of threat, a threat implying something very bad or some misfortune." (14) Consequently, the above notions are worth refining, needing a more concrete definition and the enucleation of the general and of the particular. The notions of "danger" and "threat" are fairly common in the politico-military sphere, both oftentimes used in one and the same connotation. It is rather difficult to delineate exactly the boundaries of each of those concepts. But, at this juncture, it is ever more firmly established among the experts that "threat" is the extreme level of danger (immediate danger), whereas "danger" is a possible (potential) threat. For instance, V.L. Manilov suggests that the concept of "threat" be treated in terms of the notion of "danger": "threat is the immediate "danger" of inflicting damage on vital national interests and on national security, overriding local boundaries and affecting the principal national values: sovereignty, statehood, territorial integrity." (15) At the same time, he treats the notion of "danger" as the infliction of damage on important national interests and national security on the restricted (local) scale.

Thus, the concepts of "threat" and "danger" share the opportunity for inflicting some damage on security. What are the distinguishing criteria for both phenomena? Notwithstanding their affinity and homogeneity, it is also possible to segregate a number of differences.

First, "threat" differs from "danger" by the degree of preparedness for the infliction of certain damage. "Threat" is the extreme aggravation of contradictions, the situation, which directly precedes the conflict, when the preparedness of one of the political entities is manifest in using force in respect of the specific object for the attainment of one's own political or other aims. As V.A. Zolotarev points out, "military threat is the established intention of any state (the group of states) to unleash war against another state (the group of states), or to inflict damage on its national interests and sovereignty by aggressive actions. " (16)

Whereas, "danger" implicates the potential threat of inflicting damage on certain interests, for which adequate conditions need to be created (the accumulation of capabilities and the formation of intentions).

Second, "threat" must implicate two components: intentions and capability for inflicting damage on security interests, whereas "danger" is limited by the availability of one of those components. Schematically, the given differences can be presented in Table 1.

Third, "threat" always bears the personified, specifically targeted nature, which implies the availability of the obvious subject (source) and the object, against which its action is directed. As distinct from "threat," "danger" contains the hypothetical, oftentimes non-targeted nature, with its subject and object not being obviously manifest.

Having analyzed the significant differences between the concepts of "threat" and "danger", it is possible to infer that security danger is the preparedness (intentions and opportunities) of one of the policy subjects to inflict damage on the vital interests of another policy subject with a view to solving the contradictions formed between them and to gaining unilateral advantages.

As our primary focus is on politico-military aspects, it is deemed expedient to consider the correlation of the concepts of "military danger" and of "military threat." The disclosure of the meaningful aspect and of the correlation of these concepts can be fruitful using the category of "politico-military relations," which correspond to the relations between policy subjects (both inside the state, and in the international arena), which pertain to the formation, development and use (in real and proposed terms) of military force. (17)

Speaking about specific "military danger," the notion adds up to the type of inter-state or domestic relations, which contemplate the existence of objective opportunities for inflicting damage on states by armed violence means, with its subject, i.e., the aggressor, being absent in the explicit form. "Threat" is the specific instance of the evolvement of military danger characterized not only by the aggravation of military danger, but also by the particularly targeted nature attained by it (threat emanates from the specific source and is targeted to the specific object), whereas, "danger" can be general and oftentimes non-targeted, emanating from multiple sources and affecting multiple objects. Intrinsically, both "military danger," and "military threat" are the specific manifestations of the substantial politico-military relations between states and their coalitions. They indicate the degree of the escalation of politico-military tensions, except that "military threat" is conceived as the higher degree of escalated tension compared to "military danger": it directly stems from military threat, being its resultant outcome, i.e., subject to intensified military threat. "Military threat" is characterized by the confrontational politico-military relations between states and by their ambition to solve fully-formed contradictions by military force application, whereas "military danger" differs by the significantly relaxed tensions and by the politico-military relation compromise between states.

The major signs of "military danger" are as follows:

* Occurrence of the economic, political, religious-and-ethnic, ideological and other contradictions in relations between policy subjects, which could be solved by using military force;

* Availability of opportunities (resource base) with the entities of politico-military relations for keeping the field;

* Admission by military policy subjects of the capability for using force as means toward political aims.

The same features are characteristic of "military threat," but as the higher degree of escalated politico-military tensions, the latter has its own specific distinctions:

* Readiness (capability plus intention) of policy subjects to apply military force for the resolution of incurred contradictions;

* Explicit evidence of the aims, subject and object of armed violence (i.e., personified military danger).

Consequently, "military threat" implies the preparedness of one of the policy subjects to inflict damage on the vital interests of another policy subject by using armed violence forces and means for settling contradictions between them and for gaining unilateral advantages.

As the analysis of the concepts of "threat" and "danger" has clearly revealed their relatedness, one can speak about their complementariness. In the event of the unfavorable contingency, even minor danger in the national security domain can telescope into direct and overt threat to the vital interests of the state. Thus, there is every reason to state that there is the system of threats, rather than isolated threats and dangers, which embodies the totality of all threats and dangers. That said, each fundamental danger can be viewed as potential threat in that it can become, subject to certain conditions, a tangible threat and is capable of inflicting this or that real damage on the interests of the state, society and the individual.

Viewed as a system, the totality of threats and dangers raises the justified question: is the given system limited to identified threats and dangers only, or are there other threats and dangers capable of inflicting damage on security interests? Along with our conventional terms of "threat" and "danger," use can also be made of such notions as "challenge" and "risk," which are widely bandied about in the domain of the U.S. national security strategy. American official documents treat the national security strategy as the art and science of committing national might, under any circumstances, to attain the required level and the type of control over the hostile party by way of threats, brutal force, indirect pressure, diplomacy and other available means, which provide the protection of interests and secure the attainment of national security goals. In so doing, U.S. experts regard "threat" as the opportunity for a country, a group of states or things to pose a menace; "challenge" is viewed as the ability to counteract, whereas "risk" is defined as the capacity to oppose the achievement of security goals. (18)

Assuming as the primary notion among the following destabilizing factors--risk, challenge, danger or threat--we are inclined to choose "risk," Challenge, danger and threat express various levels of risk concerning the infliction of specific damage on the security interests of the state, society and the individual, i.e., they act as secondary factors. In the Russian language, the term "risk" is used in its two principal meanings: first, as potential danger, failure; second, as acting at random in the hope of successful outcome. (19) Note the coincidence of the lexical meanings of "threat" and "risk": their full identity is indubitable (both "threat" and "risk" are treated as "imminent danger"). Thus, the totality of factors, posing challenge, danger or threat to the security of the state, can be viewed as risk factors. In this connection, challenges involves the least risk in terms of potential damage to the national interests and the security of the Russian Federation, with average risk pertaining to dangers, and with considerable risk emanating from threats to security interests. On that ground, it is evidently nonsensical to refer to "risk" in the context of a certain initial stage in the tension escalation process, as risk represents the degree (the scope) of the infliction of damage to certain interests, which emanates from various destructive factors (challenge, danger, threat).

Having reviewed the interplay of the concepts of "challenge," "danger" and "threat," let us deal with the analysis of their interrelationships in the systemic sequence by giving it the conventional categorizing as the scale of escalation of politico-military tensions (Table 2).

Politico-military challenge constitutes the initial phase of the escalation of tensions and manifests itself in the intent of one of the parties in the politico-military relations to counteract another party in the implementation of national security interests.

The next phase--military danger--includes hypothetical probability for damage to be inflicted on national interests on the part of the abstract enemy. In the event of the availability with the specific policy subject (the aggressor) of real intentions and sufficient military-economic capabilities for inflicting damage on the specific object of aggression, politico-military tensions reach their extreme military threat phase, followed by the realization of the given threat (i.e., armed struggle), or by the measures for the reduction of tensions (negotiations, reaching compromise agreements, relaxation of tensions).

Each phase of politico-military tensions has specifically distinctive intrinsic features. The individual characteristics of the phenomena under review are congruent, which is indicative of the transparency of their boundaries. The correlation between danger and threat has certain inherent regularities, which are subject to the operation of the dialectical law of the transition of quantity changes to quality changes. These regularities find their expression in the danger status acquiring the signs of immediate threat under the definite quantitative changes (formation of overt intentions and creation of objective opportunities for damage to be inflicted on the enemy), in its turn, threat telescopes into the danger status under the corresponding build-up of changes (risk level drop, reduction of tensions, attainment of compromise, etc.).

At first glance, in the detailed scrutiny of the correlation of threat and danger, the paradoxical inference arises: if threat signifies the highest level of danger; it follows that danger must grow in the event of abated threat.

Let us examine, whether, in reality, abated threat entails increased danger. As is evident, in the event of abated threat, the threat itself does not disappear altogether, but transforms into its potential configuration substantially conforming to the danger status. Thus, the transformation of threats into the status of dangers increases the number of the latter, which is confirmed by the analysis of the objective events taking place in the world in recent years. The end of the politico-military East-West confrontation, the implemented international SNF reduction agreements and other assertive post-cold-war shifts, which have set in worldwide, have categorically reduced the immediate threat of the global ABC war, but at the same time, there has been a dramatic growth of the array of dangers (regional instability rise, escalation of local wars and of low intensity military conflicts, proliferation of hazardous military technologies, etc.).

As is known, the deduction concerning the abatement of direct aggression threat against Russia, with the continued growth of military danger, has been embodied in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: "In modern conditions, the threat of direct military aggression, in traditional forms, against the Russian Federation and its allies was reduced ... "At the same time, the potential external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation continue to exist, whilst increasing in isolated directions." (20)

A similar conclusion is contained in the U.S. President's State of the Union Address U.S. National Security Strategy, which points out that "the principal challenge, which was in existence in the last 50 years,--the threat of Communist expansion--was removed. The set of dangers, faced by us today, is wide and diversified." (21) The German analyst M. Sturmer qualified the given situation laconically, when he said: "the threat is abating--the danger is growing." (22)

Thus, the correlation of threats and dangers is that of dependence, with dangers growing in the event of threat level abatement. It is obvious that there can be no absolute security, if viewed as the status devoid of any threats and dangers whatsoever, because it is simply unreal to isolate completely the state, society and its individuals from the negative impact of the external and internal destructive factors and to guarantee their conflict-free existence side by side. At the same time, it is mandatory and practicable to make their security level approximate to the status guaranteeing their non-violent development, excluding the infliction of unacceptable damage.

In this connection, it appears that the repertoire of the politico-military measures, which minimize the potential threats to Russia's military security, must give prominence to the build-up of the Armed Forces and other Federal power structures capable of effective and guaranteed suppression of the entire spectrum of the military dangers and threats, both external and internal.

NOTES:

1. V.L. Manilov, "Ugrozy natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossii," Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 1996, pp. 7-17; A.F. Klimenko, "Metodika otsenki voennykh ugroz i mery po ikh neitralizatsii," Voennaia mysl', No. 5, 1993, pp. 26-34; N.P. Klokotov, M.M. Kasenkov, "Voennaya bezopasnost Rossii: deklaratsii i realii," Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 1993, pp. 20-21; V.P. Sinetskii, "O ponyatiinom apparate obshehei teorii bezopastosti," Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 1994, pp. 55-60.

2. S.B. Ivanov, "Mirnoye bremya: interviu zhurnalu ltogi," ltogi, No. 15 (461), 2005.

3. S.I. Ozhegov, Slovar russkogo yazyka, Russkii Yazyk Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 823.

4. V.I. Dahl, Tolkovyi slovar, Vol. 4, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1955, p. 470.

5. V.V. Lopatin, L.Ye. Lopatina, Maty tolkovyi slovar russkogo yazyka, Russkii Yazyk Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 622.

6. Slovar sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo yazyka, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 271.

7. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar pravovykh znanii, Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 480.

8. O bezopasnosti: Sbornik zakonodatelnykh i normativnykh dokumentov, Bukvitsa Publishers, Moscow, 1998, p. 38.

9. V.S. Pirumov, "Nekotorye aspekty metodologii issledovaniya problem natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossii v sovremennykh usloviyakh," Geopolitika i bezopasnost, No. 1, 1993, p. 12.

10. Kontseptsiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossii, Obozrevatel Publishers, Moscow, 1995, p. 81.

11. V.V. Lopatin, L.Ye. Lopatina, op. cit.

12. Slovar sinonimov russkogo yazyka, Nauka Publishers, Leningrad, 1975, p. 547.

13. S.I. Ozhegov. op. cit., p. 823.

14. Ibid., p. 451.

15. V.L. Manilov, op. cit., p. 17.

16. V.A. Zolotarev, Voennaya bezopasnost Otechestva (istoriko-pravovoye iisledovaniye), Kanon-press-Kuchkovo pole Publishers, Moscow, 1998, p. 41.

17. A.P. Dmitriyev, Metodicheskiye osnovy obshchei teorii bezopasnosti. Obshchaya bezopasnost: Uchebnoye posobiye, VAGSh Publishers, Moscow, 1994, p. 19.

18. L. Collins, Grand Strategy, Principles and Practice, Maryland, Annapolis, 1973, p. 14.

19. S.I. Ozhegov, op. cit., p. 678.

20. "Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Sobraniye zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 17, 24 April 2000, Art. 1852.

21. "Strategii natsionalnoi bezopasnosti SShA. Doklad Presidenta SShA," NG-Scenarios: Supplement to Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 May 1996.

22. M. Sturmer, Die Deutschen in Europa, Europa Arehiv, 1989, F. 24.

Col. of Just. V.F. GATSKO

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences

Mikhail Fyodorovich GATSKO was born on 21 June 1961. He graduated from Rizhskoye Higher Politico-Military School (1982), Politico-Military Academy (1991), Peter the Great Military Academy Post-Graduate Course (1997), Law Institute (2001).

He served in various positions in the Legal Department and in the educative apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R. and of the Russian Federation. From June 1997, he is Legal Assistant Chief, 4th Central Research Institute, RF Defense Ministry. Full Member, the Academy of Security, Defense, Law and Order Issues; Professor, the Academy of Military Sciences. He is the author of 30 scientific publications.

Table 1 Differences Between "Threat" and "Danger"

                                  Preparedness
                Components        for Inflicting
Concept  Intentions  Opportunity  Damage

THREAT   There Is    There Is     Real (obvious)
         No          There Is     Hypothetical (possible)
DANGER   There Is    No
         No          No           Ostensible

Table 2 Scale of Escalation of Politico-Military Tensions

                   PHASES OF ESCALATION OF POLITICO-MILITARY TENSIONS
                   POLITICO-MILITARY
Characteristics    CHALLENGE               MILITARY DANGER

Contents           Intent to countervail   Probability of infliction of
                   the fulfillment of      hypothetical damage on
                   national security       national security interests
                   interests in politico-  by using armed violence
                   military sphere
Character          Abstract, hypothetical, non-targeted (absence of the
                   specific object and subject of presumable armed
                   violence)
Stages of Risk     Inception of the cause  Saturation, probability of
                   of potential damage     damage infliction (direct or
                   to national interests   indirect)
Association of     Rivalry of subjects of  Opposition of potential
subjects of        politico-military       (abstract) adversaries
politico-          relations
military
relations
Evolvement of      Inception of            Compromise resolution of
contradictions     contradictions          existing contradictions
between subjects                           mainly by non-military
of politico-                               methods
military
relations
Enemy              Abstract (potential)
Own armed forces   Day-to-day activity mode, preparation for countering
                   military challenges, potential and real military
                   dangers
Politico-military  Quiet                   Compromise
situation

                   PHASES OF ESCALATION OF POLITICO-M IUTARY TENSIONS
Characteristics    MILITARY TIIREAT          ARMED STRUGGLE

Contents           Preparedness (intent      Realized threat of using
                   and capability) for       armed violence for
                   infliction of damage on   attainment of political,
                   the vital interests and   military and other goals
                   security of the state
                   by using armed violence
Character          Specific, personified, targeted and directional
                   (availability of the specific express goals,
                   subject and object of real armed violence)
Stages of Risk     High probability          Causation of direct and
                   (preparedness) for        conspicuous damage to
                   infliction of damage on   vital interests
                   vital interests by
                   military means
Association of     Confrontation of          Immediate armed clash with
subjects of        personified (specific)    real enemy
politico-          adversaries
military
relations
Evolvement of      Preparedness of one       Resolution of
contradictions     military policy subjects  contradictions by armed
between subjects   for overt use of armed    violence methods
of politico-       forces to resolve
military           contradictions
relations
Enemy              Specific (real)
Own armed forces   Implementation of         Armed defense of national
                   measures adequate to      interests
                   military threat
Politico-military  Confrontational (threat   Crisis (armed conflict)
situation          situation)