Officers' Perceptual Shorthand.

What Messages Are Offenders Sending to Law Enforcement Officers?

On an extremely dark night, a uniformed patrol officer observed a minor traffic offense--only one headlight functioning on a vehicle. The officer initiated a traffic stop on an unlit portion of the rural roadway. The vehicle, a late model four-door sedan, pulled to the right and stopped. As the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed a bumper sticker supporting the local youth soccer league. When the officer reached the driver's door, he was shot once in the chest. As he fell to the ground, the car sped away. Unknown to the officer, the driver had stolen the vehicle earlier that evening and used it during a robbery. The driver later reported that he thought the officer was going to arrest him for those crimes. Fortunately, the officer had on a bullet-resistant vest and survived the deadly attack on his life.

How many other officers have sustained serious or fatal wounds during similar circumstances? What caused these officers to become victims while performing such everyday duties as stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic violation? Because the officer in the opening scenario survived the attack, he could objectively and constructively review his actions during this "routine" traffic stop and offer his experience to other officers in the hope of preventing a similar occurrence from happening to them. [1]

EXAMINING A TRAFFIC STOP

The first reflection that this officer offered involved his making several very quick and potentially life-threatening assumptions about the vehicle and the driver. He began with a set of observations: the driver was not speeding, driving erratically, or acting suspiciously prior to the traffic stop; the vehicle, which needed a headlight replaced but had no other apparent damage, displayed a sticker supporting a local soccer league on the rear bumper. The officer had a child who played in that league, too. From these observations, the officer made several judgments: the driver was a local resident, probably a parent of a child involved in soccer activities, and they would more than likely have a friendly conversation. From these judgments, the officer's actions followed: he neglected to notify the dispatcher and report the location of the stop; he approached the vehicle without having made a computer search of the license plates; and he advanced psychologically, emotionally, and tactically unguarded. After a ll, this was only a "routine" traffic stop. What caused this officer to make these dangerous assumptions?

ANALYZING OFFICERS' PERCEPTUAL SHORTHAND 

Over the past several years, FBI researchers have investigated cases where law enforcement officers were seriously assaulted. [2] Specifically, the researchers examined the actions and observable behaviors of these officers and their offenders immediately before the assaults occurred. They accomplished this by interviewing both the officers and their assaulters and found that the offenders paid very close attention to the officers' behaviors prior to assaulting them. The assailants often used a "perceptual shorthand" [3] in processing the officers' observed behaviors and actions.

Similarly, the research indicated that officers need to examine their own use of perceptual shorthand, that is, what behaviors they observe on the part of individuals and what meaning or attributes that they give to these behaviors. In fact, the way officers process this material may result in their subsequent actions. In short, their lives may depend on their use of perceptual shorthand. For example, the research suggested that 64 percent of the 52 officers interviewed did not realize that the attack was about to occur. [4] Interestingly, 62 percent of the 42 offenders interviewed in this study stated that they believed that the assault blindsided the officers, finding them "surprised, unprepared, and indecisive." [5]

The Deadly Mix

Not surprising, the research found that the way officers process and perceive the totality of the circumstances of an incident results in their actions. As illustrated in the opening scenario, the officer's perception that he was dealing with a nonthreatening "soccer parent" resulted in his being caught off guard. The research revealed additional situations that officers processed in their perceptual shorthand.

* It was just a minor offense, that is, littering or drinking in public.

* It was just a minor traffic stop, that is, a tail light that needed replacing.

* It was just a call to the "same family" with the "same drunk husband."

* It was just another transport of someone else's prisoner that they assumed their fellow officer had searched thoroughly.

In several cases, the officers related that they thought to themselves, "He's just a kid (or just a woman); there's no real threat here." "I've arrested this drunk before; he's no real threat." From these assumptions, the officers concluded that the incidents posed no threat to their lives. Tragically, such encounters often resulted in officers sustaining serious or even fatal injuries.

The Killing Zone

From 1989 through 1998, 682 local, state, and federal law enforcement officers in the United States lost their lives due to criminal action. [6] Of those 682, nearly 75 percent (509) received fatal wounds while within 10 feet of their assailants. [7] What perceptions--or inaccurate perceptions--on the part of the officers drew them into this 10-foot "killing zone?" In some cases, it is true, officers had little, if any, choice as to their movement into the killing zone. However, have other situations occurred where officers perhaps misread the signs that the offenders sent? Is it possible that officers, after making one observation and judging the situation as posing no threat, failed to process other signals that the offenders sent? For example, an officer stops a young man because of a traffic infraction. He looks about 16 years old, 5'8" in height, approximately 110 pounds, and has on shorts and a tank top. He does not appear to be armed and obeys the officer's commands. His physical appearance and compli ant attitude combined with a commonly occurring traffic violation suggest to the officer a low level of threat. Yet, statistics for the years 1989 through 1998 reveal the enforcement of traffic laws as a category in which one of the highest number (93 of 682) of officer deaths occurred. [8] Of these 93 deaths, 78 took place within the 10-foot killing zone. [9]

Of the remaining 431 officers slain within the killing zone, the circumstances varied. They included such activities as responding to disturbance calls, investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, attempting other arrests, and dealing with individuals with mental illness. [10]

The weapons used to kill these 509 officers included handguns (396), rifles (39), shotguns (18), knives or other cutting instruments (12), bombs (11), personal weapons--hands, fists, or feet--(6), and other weapons, such as vehicles, clubs, and blunt objects (27). [11]

With these chilling statistics in mind, law enforcement agencies must teach their officers that no singular profile of an offender exists. Although statistics detail such demographic variables as average age, height, and weight, an average never kills or assaults an officer. Rather, one discreet, distinct data point, that is, one particular person, assaults or kills an officer. And, this person may appear "threatening," "nonthreatening," "suspicious," "trusting," "old, "or "young." Agencies must train their officers to process observed appearances and behaviors but not to draw conclusions that result in their dropping their guard.

AVOIDING THE PERCEPTUAL SHORTHAND TRAP

By interviewing officers who have survived assaults, examining incidents where officers were killed in the line of duty, and interviewing individuals who have killed or assaulted law enforcement officers, FBI researchers developed recommendations for avoiding the perceptual shorthand trap. These recommendations fall into two basic categories--safety-related training issues and the officer's mental mind-set.

Safety-Related Training Issues

Law enforcement safety-related training throughout the United States differs from department to department, from training academy to training academy, and from individual officer to individual officer. Research demonstrates the need to review, analyze, and alter safety-related training on a continual basis. [12] Safety training is a dual responsibility of the agency and the individual officer. Many of the officers interviewed stated that they survived because they took training seriously and practiced on their own time and, in some cases, at their own expense.

Safety-related training should include such issues as searching procedures, handcuffing techniques, traffic stop guidelines, and use of deadly force policies. For example, experienced officers know that they should search all prisoners thoroughly before placing them in police vehicles. Officers also understand that properly used handcuffs serve to protect both the officer and the individual the officer takes into custody. In addition, they realize that a "routine" traffic stop does not exist. Every officer making a traffic stop should consider the proper selection of the stop location with a view toward both the safety of the violator and the officer. Officers always should notify the police dispatcher of the location and nature of all vehicle stops. Finally, officers throughout the United States have reported that the use of deadly force was the most difficult decision that they ever had to make in their law enforcement careers. Officers should review their departments' use of deadly force policy constantly and prepare themselves to act quickly in potentially lethal situations. Along with addressing specific safety issues, officers also must focus on the relationship between these procedures and their own mental mind-set to survive an attack. [13]

Officer's Mental Mind-set

Officers must understand that individuals' perceptions of reality come about through a combination of biological, psychological, and environmental factors. Officers also must realize that such elements as experience, expectations, and training affect the way they perceive reality. From these perceptions of reality, individuals act. Within a law enforcement setting, these actions determine whether an officer lives or dies. What can officers do to ensure their safety and the safety of the communities they serve?

First, officers' perceptions of incidents and their instantaneous analysis of those perceptions determine their state of readiness to employ the necessary safety tactics to successfully defend themselves against life-threatening attacks. Through experience and informal training, officers have learned to expect minor physical resistance when making arrests. However, officers must ask themselves, at what point does a seemingly small wrestling match with an offender become a fight for survival? All too often, officers have received severe injuries before they realized that they were fighting for their lives.

When a physical confrontation or struggle begins, officers must remember that they cannot predict offenders' thoughts or to what lengths offenders will go to escape. Instead, officers must realize that faulty beliefs contribute to their forming inaccurate perceptions. For example, the researchers found that some of the officers' faulty beliefs exhibited themselves in such statements as, "This was just another routine wrestling match." "This person wasn't a threat, he just committed a larceny." "I couldn't shoot him because he didn't have a gun." This last officer then explained how the offender took his service weapon and shot him. [14]

Safety Versus Mind-set

Three FBI research examples illustrate how officers misread the circumstances of the incidents. In other words, their perceptions of reality did not match those of their assailants.

Just a Minor Traffic Violation

FBI researchers discovered that officers often initiated traffic stops for a perceived minor traffic violation, only to learn that the offenders had very different perceptions. For example, an officer initiated a traffic stop for traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. The three occupants of the vehicle perceived that the officer stopped them for an armed robbery that they had just committed. The officer's ensuing actions reflected his perception of a minor traffic violation. However, the offenders reacted as if fleeing from a major crime scene. In reality, the incident ended tragically with an officer killed over what he thought was a minor traffic violation.

Just a Subject I Know

Another incident examined by he researchers combined the faulty perception of the officer and his subsequent actions, which resulted in his injury. This incident included such safety-related issues as waiting for backup, handcuffing, and pursuing offenders on foot. An officer observed a vehicle that matched the description of one involved in a street robbery. As the officer notified the dispatcher, a second patrol officer radioed that he was in the area. The officer stopped the vehicle and had the driver get out and place his hands on the trunk. At that time, the offender knocked the officer to the ground, removed the officer's firearm, and ran from the scene. During the ensuing foot pursuit, the offender shot the officer with his own service weapon.

The officer thought that the offender was not dangerous based on his numerous previous contacts with him, that the backup officer would arrive within seconds, and that he could handcuff the offender by himself because the offender presented no threat to him. In contrast, the offender perceived that the officer was arresting him for a felony offense and realized that the officer was neither physically nor mentally prepared to restrain him. The offender successfully defeated he officer by executing an escape/ disarming technique that he had perfected while in prison.

In reality, the backup unit did not arrive on the scene. Moreover, without formulating a plan, the officer nonetheless pursued the offender on foot and was shot with his own service weapon.

Just a Female Offender

A final incident combined the safety-related issues of searching and handcuffing. An officer arrested a female for a minor assault charge and placed her, handcuffed with her hands in front of her body, in the rear of his patrol vehicle. As the officer waited for the arrival of a transport vehicle, the woman removed a small-caliber handgun from inside her shirt and shot the officer in the head, killing him instantly. When the transport vehicle arrived, they found the officer slumped over the wheel, and the offender still seated in the back of the patrol car.

This incident suggested that the officer may not have viewed the female as a threat to his safety. According to the offender, the officer did not search her prior to placing her in the patrol vehicle. The female perceived that she would spend a good portion of her life in jail and feared this possibility. She resolved to shoot the officer in order to escape.

The reality of this incident showed that the officer placed the woman in the rear of the patrol car with a gun in her possession. He lost his life, and she did not escape.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement officers face many challenges in the daily performance of their duties. Sometimes their activities involve seemingly innocuous situations. However, even the most everyday law enforcement tasks can turn deadly if officers make judgments based on incorrect or incomplete observations. These assumptions, in turn, can cause officers to act inappropriately. What they perceive as no threat to their lives can, in fact, become lethal.

During their training and subsequent years on the job, officers must remain vigilant in employing proven safety techniques and in staying alert to the dangers of making assumptions about the individuals they encounter. Officers must not become complacent when faced with everyday law enforcement duties. They must realize that they must treat each encounter as if their lives depended on their perceptions of reality because, as research has shown, they do.

Endnotes

(1.) For a detailed discussion of traffic stops, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997), 35-37.

(2.) Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E, Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997).

(3.) For additional information on offenders' use of perceptual shorthand, see Anthony J. Pinizzotto and Edward F. Davis, "Offenders' Perceptual Shorthand: what Messages Are Law Enforcement Officers Sending to Offenders?" FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, June 1999, 1-4.

(4.) Supra note 2, 17.

(5.) Unpublished data from the research for In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers.

(6.) Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1998 (Washington, DC, 2000), 25-26.

(7.) Information relative to the distance between victim officers and their assailants appears in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program's Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1998 publication only as it pertains to officers slain with firearms. The authors obtained the data presented in this section from special compilations prepared by FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program staff members.

(8.) Supra note 5, 36.

(9.) Supra note 6.

(10.) Supra note 6.

(11.) Supra note 6.

(12.) Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1992); and Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire. A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997).

(13.) For additional information on safety- related issues, see Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study

of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1992); and Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997).

(14.) Supra note 2.

Behavioral Descriptors of Officers Killed and Assaulted

In an attempt to better understand both the circumstances in which officers are killed and assaulted, as well as the officers themselves, FBI researchers examined some behavioral descriptors used by peers, supervisors, offenders, and, in some cases, the researchers to characterize these officers. They discovered that most victim officers appeared--

* friendly, "laid-back," and "easy going;"

* well-liked by community and department;

* hardworking;

* to look for "good" in others;

* to use less force than other officers felt they would use in similar circumstances;

* to perceive themselves as more public relations- and service-oriented than law enforcement-directed;

* to not follow all the rules, especially in making arrests, confronting prisoners, enforcing traffic laws, and waiting for backup (when available); and

* to feel that they could "read" others and situations and would drop their guard as a result.

Source: Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F Davis, and Charles E. Miller, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire: A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers (Washington, DC, 1997), 12.