Of what charges? (Luke 16:1-2).

Abstract

This essay explores one of Jesus' parables, arguably his most complex: that of the dishonest steward. The emphasis here is on the charges against the steward. The facts that only Luke includes this parable and that he uses a verb found only here to express the steward's supposed wrongdoing raise pivotal questions. What motivates those who have brought the charges? What choices for defending and protecting himself does the steward consider? Does the owner's call for accountability preserve his reputation of honor? Complex relationships existed between owners, stewards, and tenants in Roman-occupied agrarian settings. The probability that the steward is irresponsible or derelict in his duties rather than guilty of immoral or criminal actions significantly affects how other elements of this parable are understood.

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The steward in Luke 16:1-8a is criticized by most interpreters as dishonest, shameful, unjust, unrighteous, wicked. Others see him more positively as clever, honorable, prudent, shrewd. Assessments traditionally rest upon the steward's actions in vv 5-7 and the owner's reaction in v 8. But too little attention has been given to the nature of the "charges" in vv 1-2:

   Then Jesus said to his disciples, "There was a rich man who had a manager,
   and charges were brought to him (dieblethe) that this man was squandering
   his property (diaskorpizon ta hyparchonta autou). So he summoned him and
   said to him, `What is this that I hear about you? Give me an accounting of
   your management (ton logon tes oikonomias sou), because you cannot be my
   manager any longer.'"

This parable is unique to the Gospels; only Luke includes it. It is a very complex parable that has been called "a puzzle for interpreters throughout the centuries" (Moxnes 1988: 139). Did someone start a rumor? Might someone want to discredit or frame the steward? Is his behavior criminal? How honorable are the owner's actions?

"Squandering" resources is the charge. "Accounting" for his behavior is the action the landowner demands. To understand the steward's response requires knowledge of the behaviors expected of tenants, stewards and owners.

The Setting

The setting for this parable of Luke has been characterized as agrarian, pre-industrial and socialized, consisting of the governing and peasant classes without a middle class as we think of one. Within the peasant class were groups including the peasants themselves, artisans, unclean (or degraded), and expendable (Lenski: 39; cf. Rohrbaugh 1978: 33-34). Inequality was common within and between groups since membership included small landowners, stewards, day laborers, slaves, and others that Luke mentions.

Peasants constituted 90-95% of the population in contrast to the elite leaders (1-2%) who governed the land with the help of "retainers" (5%), whose roles were military, governing, administrative, judicial, and priestly (Lenski: 214-48). They included soldiers, educators, bureaucrats, and even special interest groups such as Pharisees and scribes. Retainers lacked independent power and so did not constitute a middle class. Easily replaceable, retainers could readily "fall back into the peasantry" (Saldarini: 41).

Another way to think of retainers is as patrons who assisted peasants such as Luke's landowner. Patrons helped owners (clients) acquire the means of production (e.g., tools, seeds, slaves) and occasionally functioned as brokers when owners/clients needed help dealing with governmental taxes and regulations. Examples of broker services include the need to challenge land taxes or to clarify a procedural step (e.g., "an accounting" [Luke 16:2]) expected when hiring or firing a steward.

The territorial governor leased lands to farmers-general (conductores), who in turn leased smaller plots of an estate to tenants. The conductores (cf. Luke's rich man) were responsible for seeing that all arable lands were cultivated and that all rents (including the land tax) were collected and given to the territorial governor. If the lands were not cultivated sufficiently and tax revenues fell short, "the land reverted to the owner" and a new conductor was most likely appointed (Rostovtzeff: 368, 389). Conductores needed to plan carefully their contracts with tenants, since Roman law "pronounced categorically that contractual farm-tenants were free to leave at the completion of their tenure, normally five years" (Finley: 69, with reference to Code 4.65.11).

The Roman census played a large role as a disincentive in this system. The farm-tenant lived off the produce so could not manipulate the system. Those in authority above the tenant had to weigh carefully how much land to cultivate fully, poorly, or not at all. In a census year a piece of uncultivated land was not taxed until the following census. A poorly cultivated parcel was taxed on the basis of its productivity. As a result of this Roman system, the conductor or territorial governor "was far more at liberty to leave land fallow or turn it over to pasture in the year of the census than the little peasant-farmer who lived off it" (Corbier: 227). Although it was a logical and rational system by some measures, Roman lands were subject to much "exploitative and predatory" mismanagement (Herzog: 253).

In the rural countryside of the first and second centuries A.D. under Roman rule, those who tilled the soil and harvested the crops were tenant farmers assisted by slaves, day laborers, or freedmen (manumitted slaves). Freedmen (liberti) were unqualified to hold property by themselves since ownership of the land they cultivated remained with the patron who had granted manumission. Liberti were no longer slaves, yet were not landowners either. They were not allowed to leave one patron for another, even when injustice or cruelty occurred (Eisenstadt & Roniger: 54-55; Andreau: 179). Landowners manipulated the process of manumission and the use of the "peculium" (personal savings accounts for slaves to purchase their own small parcels) so as "to create a climate of fear among their slaves" (Horsley: 47).

A patron-client relationship between owners and liberti existed both before and after manumission in the form of reciprocity (e.g., the libertus speaking well of his patron) and "dyadic" contracts. These were implicit contracts between unequal persons. Whereas reciprocity was central to a patron-client contractual understanding, a "dyadic" contract involved a benefit not to be repaid, such as physical protection from harm (Saldarini: 57-58; cf. Malina: 112).

No higher virtue existed in Roman-occupied agrarian areas than that of honor. Those in subservient positions within the peasant class were duty bound to conduct themselves in ways that did not embarrass or shame someone in a position of authority. A landowner was expected to speak well of anyone in the retainer class, a steward or tenant of a landowner, and a wife of a husband. The fact that tenants are said to bring charges against Luke's steward (vv 1-2) suggests that they either did not consider his position to carry authority, or else that the tenants chose such action as a last resort.

Subsisting

Within an agrarian society there was a very narrow margin between what could be harvested and what was needed for food, seed, and animal fodder. Percentages mattered less than the total quantity left over for a tenant's consumption. In a subsistence-based economy with its annual ups and downs, a strong sense of interdependence between owners and tenants arose, since what really mattered was whether basic needs were met (Moxnes 1988: 81; Grimshaw: 39). While the small tenant subsisted in average or good years, when production lagged and tenants were unable to repay loans (for seed or equipment), greater indebtedness occurred. Small tenants had to incur higher mortgages. Large conductores could foreclose on mortgages, reducing tenants to the status of sharecroppers (Matt 18:23-35) with unreasonable repayment schedules, to employment as day laborers, or even to imprisonment (Malina & Rohrbaugh: 333).

Luke depicts a peasant-dominated society characterized by a zero-sum economic system and limited quantities. Tenants, slaves, and even small landowners remain on the same social level in such a society. Anyone who gets ahead is thought to have done so at the expense of everyone else (Foster: 310-15; Oakman 1996: 132; 1991: 155). The work of the many supports a small ruling elite.

An example is the small landowning peasant who secures a loan from a large landowner in order to plant his small parcel. As debts mount, the large landowner forecloses on the peasant's mortgage, reducing the peasant to the status of tenant sharecropper on what previously was his own land (Malina & Rohrbaugh: 333). To be sure, the reverse also occurred. That is, some peasants prospered so as to acquire more land, thereby enhancing their position in contrast to their previous associations with both tenants and smaller landowning peasants (Gottwald: 4).

Landowners functioned both as patrons and as brokers. Owners provided tenant farmers with arable land to rent and necessary resources (tools, seed). Taxes collected from the sale of crops produced by tenants were transferred by owners acting as brokers to territorial governors. Even the steward in Luke 16 functions as broker when mediating his master's or tenants' interests to one another (Moxnes 1991: 253-54). Reciprocity was expected by tenant farmers in the form of expressions of loyalty and honor to owners; the more public, the better. What mattered most was the opportunity and the ability to "manipulate the available person" (Malina: 112) in terms of treating him as honorably as one's social position allowed.

The tenants responsible for the charges are a) the two males mentioned in vv 5-7, b) the two entire groups who produce wheat and olive oil, or c) additional tenants of the rich man's lands who provide support services (e.g., meals, maintenance, the transportation of goods). They rent small parcels of land that they farm by leasing equipment or purchasing seed through loans from conductores. The tenants become indebted to the rich man in Luke's parable, who thereby functions both as patron to the tenants and as broker for those services to which the tenants do not have direct access (Moxnes 1991: 254). Precisely how tenants acquired the basic materials they needed to prepare the soil, plant, cultivate, harvest, and then transport their produce to village or city markets, it is very difficult to say from the existing literary and documentary sources (Finley: 189). While Klausner (181) asserts that tenant farmers were given seed, implements, and oxen by landowners in return for which the tenants received 25-50% of the produce, nothing in Matthew 21:33-42 (to which he refers) suggests a percentage to be received for one's labor.

The steward seems to have authority over the producers of oil and wheat (vv 5-7), at least insofar as altering the contracted amounts. What is less clear is whether the tenants till the soil themselves, oversee slaves or day laborers who provide the labor, or expect the steward to function as foreman. Both tenant and steward are indebted to the owner, but in different ways (Thebert: 156, 172). The steward may have previously been a slave on these very parcels, but who on account of loyalty or organizational skills was promoted to the position of steward (Stambaugh & Balch: 68). Another possibility is that the steward is a political appointee, perhaps even a former slave who has performed military service in the Roman army (Carrie: 110). Whether he acquires his position through the territorial governor or through favoritism by a conductor or by one or more tenants, we cannot tell.

Jealousy, retribution and greed are all motives that drive the tenants to allege charges against the steward. Suspicion arises against a person insensitive to the society's values, especially if in a position with any authority who engages in thoughtless boasting or spending. Tenants are in the best position to be jealous or suspicious of a steward whom they did not hire, whose meager authority derives from a conductor whom the tenants resent, or whose handling of contracts or supervision of slaves is unfair, incompetent, or worse. Given the steward's decision to reduce the debts as reported in vv 5-7, is it not appropriate for the steward first to approach those tenants who are most likely to observe the steward's questionable practices directly or who are in a position to benefit the most by seeing him discredited? Answers lie in a closer look at the charges levied against the steward.

"Squandering" (diaskorpizon)

We need to assess the evidence of the wrongdoing with which the steward is charged. What is the content of the charges? What is the leading motive?

The word for "charge" (diaballo) is "hapax legomenon" (found exclusively here) in the Second Testament. The verb diaballo can mean to "make a complaint about a person to a third party, bring charges, inform either justly or falsely" (Danker, Arndt, Gingrich: 226). Others assert that diaballo does not necessarily imply hostile intent since it is "without implied malice or falsehood" (Liddell & Scott: 390) and that "there is here no necessary thought of calumniation," that is, of slander (Foerster: 71). Landry and May (291-92) report that Via (1974: 124) and Scott (178-79) suggest the possibility that diaballo means "unjustly accuse" so that the steward, whose reputation is thereby sullied, has little choice but to "get even" with the owner. Beavis (48) argues that the steward is really a servant wrongfully dismissed and that Luke repeats the common pattern that "in other servant parables the relations between masters and servants are often hostile."

Taken alone, diaballo does not mean that the steward is guilty of any crime. We have seen why the tenants may be spreading rumors about the steward. We need to explore another possibility: namely, that the owner himself is not acting honorably. What is the nature of the charge that the owner announces?

The steward is squandering the owner's resources, say several translations, not resources that belong to tenants. "Squander" is one meaning for diaskorpizon. But "squander" has two quite different dictionary meanings: (1) "to cause to disperse: scatter"; or (2) "to spend extravagantly or foolishly: dissipate." There is no direct evidence in the parable for this second meaning, where the charge is misappropriating funds for selfish or immoral activities (Landry & May: 298). Many interpreters point to the suspicion on the part of tenants or merchants (who transport goods to market towns) that too little is left after the steward has appropriated the master's portion of the harvest and included his own cut as well (Herzog: 244, 251).

In the agrarian context of this parable, diaskorpizon is just as likely to mean to "scatter seed" (cf. Matt 25:24-26) or "may simply refer to the scattered nature of the grains swelling on the ears distributed across the field" (Michel: 422 n 21). The verb can describe both the process itself (i.e., cutting the grain, separating the chaff, and gathering the good grain into barns) as well as a wasteful manner of executing these tasks.

The "property" or "possessions" (hyparchonta) may therefore refer to the seeds themselves or may include much more than seeds (e.g., tools, records, transports to market, food and shelter for the workers). These and other necessities for operating a business constitute possessions for which absentee owners need not only dependable but resourceful stewards (cf. Matt 25:24-26). Lack of attention to using an owner's resources responsibly is most certainly a serious matter.

The charge could, however, be of a criminal nature. To what illegitimate use might the steward be directing some of his owner's hyparchonta? Perhaps the steward has a secret deal to benefit one tenant at the expense of the other tenants. Perhaps the steward has an illegal arrangement with another steward to falsify how many goods a parcel is really producing. Perhaps our steward is hoarding hyparchonta in a secret place to be used later to purchase his own parcel so as to elevate his own status to that of landowner. Perhaps all of these and other suspicions arise because the steward is conspicuously consuming in ways inappropriate to his social standing.

The most negative rendering is that the steward is justly charged with intentionally dissipating the owner's resources. He is trying to beat the "system" we have described earlier by consciously and willfully using what belongs to others to benefit himself. Intentionally wasting, hiding or selling his owner's hyparchonta is both immoral and criminal.

On the other hand, taking diaballo and diaskorpizon together, the most charitable interpretation is that the steward is unjustly accused of scattering the owner's seed carelessly. Under this scenario the steward is inefficient, incompetent or derelict in his duties, but not immoral or criminal. He is not trying to cheat the owner deliberately.

If what the owner has been told is that the steward is scattering or disbursing the seeds recklessly, one can conclude that the steward is guilty not of a crime but of inefficiency, incompetence, or inattention to duty (Herzog: 244; Stein: 109). He may be innocent of a criminal charge but guilty of not using his owner's hyparchonta responsibly. Irresponsible stewardship justifies being fired by the owner.

The owner's reactions both before (v 2) and following (v 8) actions by or about his steward do not suggest that the steward is guilty of a crime. To call the steward "dishonest" or "unjust" (adikias) in v 8 seems too harsh a reading of vv 5-7 or of the "charges" in vv 1-2 (Fitzmyer 1964: 31-33; Landry & May: 289, 297, 304). In v 8 (cf. 12:42) Luke does, after all, say that the steward has acted "cleverly" or "shrewdly" (phronimos). What is "unrighteous" may not be the steward so much as the conditions within which he is expected to carry out his duties (Bailey: 106). The steward's behavior can be understood as typical for his age and time (Stein: 109; Ellis: 199). Indeed, his behavior is consistent with any age when a subordinate is given certain responsibilities without commensurate resources or authority.

The only evidence to support the charge by anonymous persons (tenants) that the steward is "squandering" the owner's hyparchonta lies in the inability or unwillingness of the steward to defend himself when challenged by the owner. The owner presents no evidence. The tenants do as the steward suggests. In his soliloquy the steward seems to be shamed yet is focused upon what strategy to pursue. Will his actions bring shame or honor to his owner?

Let us see whether the owner's demand to "give me an accounting of your management" absolves the steward or supports a negative rendering of diaballo and diaskorpizon.

"Accounting" (ton logon)

When we today read words such as "accounts" or "management," we think of individual or corporate responsibility or accountability that leads to a formal procedure such as an audit. Documentation, paper trails, credits and debits, assets and liabilities occur in any "accounting" of the costs to produce goods. Extension agents called "farm management advisers" provide specialized services for analyzing, planning, managing, and evaluating farm operations.

While it would be interesting to speculate why our steward reduces the bill of the tenant producing olive oil by 50% but by only 20% for the wheat, to engage in a complete analysis of first-century agrarian economics is not a purpose of this study. (Readers are referred instead in the Works Cited to Landry & May, to Kloppenborg, or to Moxnes.)

Nevertheless, the steward's interactions with the tenants raise certain questions relevant to our inquiry. Why do the tenants not question the disproportionate reductions?

Is not the wheat tenant, whose debt is reduced less, jealous of the other tenant? Has the steward previously shown favoritism to those growing olive trees as compared with wheat? Does inconsistent treatment provoke some tenants either to start rumors about this steward or to go directly to the owner with their complaints? In the process of complaining about how their bills were figured, the tenants likely grumble about other methods the steward has used, such as scattering seed recklessly or wastefully, or of hoarding hyparchonta.

Luke's expression, ton logon tes oikonomias sou, has been variously translated as "an accounting of your management" (NRSV, NIV), "the account of your stewardship" (RSV, KJV), and "produce your accounts" (REB). Luke describes subsequent actions as verbal. Why does the steward ask tenants how much they owe? Is he testing their veracity? Is he asking for information that he himself does not possess? How can a steward have no records of his own to show either the tenants or the owner?

In this parable Luke suggests only one specific duty for the steward: namely, producing some form of documentation (ton logon). There is no mention of slaves to be supervised, shares of goods to be collected, the calculation or collection of any taxes or rent, the need to check initial contracts, or any indication of authority to alter contracts. From the interactions in vv 5-7 the landowner can logically expect documentation to include (a) whatever contracts were initially established between the owner and his tenants and (b) approved changes to those contracts under certain conditions previously specified by the owner. Documentation could also exist for dates of planting and harvesting, dates and amounts of field and household supplies purchased, hours for laborers, and the like.

What is the owner's motivation for his demand to the steward? The owner has heard the charges against the steward brought forth by unnamed persons (probably tenants). The steward's defensive response to the owner's confrontation is one possible evidence of guilt. But the owner is unusually patient; he seems confused, surprised or embarrassed by the charges. Perhaps the owner is privately hoping that by asking for an "accounting" or by other actions the steward decides to take on his own, the steward will either be exonerated or proven guilty beyond all doubt. Of even greater concern to the owner is the public perception that this steward is shaming him and the owner's realization that preserving an honorable reputation requires dismissing his steward.

The steward's lack of authority becomes obvious in vv 5-7. Why does he ask the tenants how much they owe? He asks for one of two reasons. The steward may be trying to trap the tenants into revealing by their behavior that they are guilty of the same charges (vv 1-2) used by the owner to confront the steward. "By accepting the reductions in their contracts, the very debtors who had accused the steward of `scattering' the master's resources revealed how willing they were to do the very thing they had accused the steward of doing" (Herzog: 256). There is no evidence in v 8, however, that the owner's response exonerates the tenants.

The steward may be asking the tenants what they owe for a different reason: the steward has no written record. The owner thinks that the steward should know. What information could possibly be more germane to an "accounting" than documenting who has incurred what liabilities?

Ignorance is no excuse. Incompetence can be charged. Supervising slaves and keeping a record of the contracts made between owner and tenant were the most obvious duties expected of the steward. Although given extra time to produce an "accounting" for the owner, the steward comes up empty-handed.

The Steward's Options

Let us examine whether the steward's possible reactions are consistent with our findings as to the source and nature of the "charges." One option is suggested by the steward's soliloquy, which calls to mind the prodigal son's soliloquy one chapter earlier.

Luke 15:17-19

   I will say to him, "Father,
   I have sinned against
   heaven and before you;
   I am no longer worthy to
   be called your son; treat
   me like one of your hired
   hands.

Luke 16:3-4

   `I am not strong enough
   to dig, and I am ashamed
   to beg. I have decided what
   to do so that, when I am
   dismissed as manager,
   people may welcome me
   into their homes.'

Both sound like victims who have plans what to do. The prodigal son admits to himself that he has "sinned" and is "no longer worthy." On the other hand, in his soliloquy the steward acknowledges no wrongdoing.

If the steward is guilty of either immoral or criminal actions, his soliloquy is the most logical place for Luke to have him express remorse. Why does the steward voice even the possibility of receiving hospitality? The steward's self-pity in his soliloquy suggests lack of control over his situation or a passive-aggressive personality. Perhaps there have been prior occasions when the steward has felt unjustly accused by an owner and when the steward has not given highest priority to preserving an owner's honor.

The first option the steward therefore rejects is a passive action of accepting a demotion to dig in the soil or to beg. If he was appointed a steward not because of exceptional prior service as a slave but because of recent military service to Rome, he probably never before had to beg or dig. Begging was classified as the lowest status along with thievery and prostitution. Having to dig was as demeaning as begging; either one is shameful. The steward rightly fears a degrading demotion; he cannot sink any lower.

A second option is to pursue whatever legal procedures are available. "Due process" was unavailable to persons holding subservient positions or to those labeled as debtors in Roman-occupied rural areas (Fitzmyer 1997: 175). Luke objects to the Pharisees (members of the "retainer" class) who function as patrons assisting peasants with legal matters while ignoring those who are the poorest (Saldarini: 176). He calls the Pharisees "lovers of money" (16:14) because of their access to the rich and powerful. Why should they patronize a lowly steward?

Landowners avoided publicity as a sign of weakness, of loss of control over household members and stewards (Kloppenborg: 489). In his soliloquy the steward sounds resigned to whatever forms of justice existed in rural areas during this period of Roman occupation, when warlords enslaved tens of thousands of Judeans and Galileans, and stewards were plentiful (Horsley: 58). The steward's quick action to befriend his master's debtors affords him a better hearing than having to make his case in court.

The steward's motive for summoning two tenants "one by one" may be to reduce the number of hostile witnesses if the case should be taken to court. The steward sees to it that the debts are therefore altered in the tenants' own handwriting rather than in his own (Via 1967: 158). If the steward is illiterate, in court he will claim that he forgot what the original contracts specified or that he suggested the very changes in contracts that the two tenants are claiming.

An overemphasis upon literacy can skew one's understanding of who the debtors are and in what setting this parable occurs. By doubting that either peasants or tenant-farmers could be literate, Herzog (249) argues that (a) the setting is a market town rather than a rural village and that (b) the debtors in vv 5-7 are literate merchants using grammata as IOUs "which would be easier to falsify than tenant leases." Our argument does not require the steward to be literate, as Herzog's does.

A third option is for the steward to reduce the bills equally or by substantially more than he does. Such an action certainly guarantees the steward's twin goals of being welcomed into the tenants' homes and causing the tenants to revere the master for his generosity. In his soliloquy the steward sounds confident that the tenants will repay the favors he contemplates giving them first.

Achieving his second goal is more problematic. Without a systematic "accounting" of what each tenant owes his master, how the steward decides to discount the bills can backfire on him. If he discounts all bills equally or by more than he does in vv 5-7, demotion or imprisonment are distinct possibilities. While the tenants will revere the master for his generosity and extol his honor, the master will probably punish his steward to a greater extent than firing him.

A fourth option is the action our steward does in fact take, which is not to admit any wrongdoing, to use whatever financial leverage he has, and to outwit the very tenants who have slandered him. The steward faces a tricky balancing act. He cannot stand the idea of being shamed to dig or beg for the rest of his life. He fears presenting his case in court. Reducing the tenants' debts too much or incompetently will prompt the owner's wrath. The steward's clever actions result in the owner's appearing to be a generous, honorable master. We are not even told by Luke whether this outcome necessitates the steward's firing.

Honor in first century Galilee was at least as important as wealth, whether public recognition was ascribed by means of inheritance or acquired by virtuous deeds (Landry & May: 298; Horsley: 30; Moxnes 1996: 20; Bailey: 86; Malina & Neyrey: 28; Kloppenborg: 493). Since the steward's actions in vv 5-7 quickly become public knowledge, the tenants assume that the master has requested his steward to announce these charitable acts. The end justifies the means. The owner has no choice but to commend his steward for preserving and accentuating his reputation as an honorable owner. To be commended (v 8) rather than fired is a remarkable outcome.

The Owner

The owner is portrayed as hearing anonymous charges against his steward. Who brought these charges? Do they originate from the unknown persons whom the steward deliberately "summons" in vv 5-7, i.e., the tenants themselves? After all, it is human nature to blame one's superior if disgruntled with one's work or compensation.

A persistent question remains about these options when one considers the owner's actions. Except for questioning why the owner does not fire the steward on the spot, why do most interpreters of this parable accept the owner's actions uncritically?

One possibility is that the owner does not consider the charges to be serious enough (Plummer: 382). Do they come by way of disgruntled tenants who were not shown as much favor as other tenants? Are these the first serious complaints that the owner has heard? Does the owner's question ("What is this I hear about you?") suggest that the owner has not suspected any wrongdoing and is at a loss how to verify the charges or is embarrassed to be so out of touch? The more parcels of land this owner is leasing to tenants and the more other stewards are involved, the more embarrassing it is for him to charge his steward with squandering resources. The owner should know whether his steward is buying many more tools or much more seed than the tenants need.

Another possibility not heretofore considered is that the owner is bluffing. Might he be setting a trap? The owner suspects this steward of "squandering" his resources but lacks proof that he has done so. The owner has grown to dislike his steward and therefore fabricates an excuse for elevating another person to the position. Or he genuinely respects his steward and gives the steward a chance to regain his trust and that of his tenants. By bluffing, the owner hopes that the steward's resulting actions will reveal clearly whether he has been honest and forthright all along. It is highly unusual, given the customs of rural first century Galilee and the power wielded by landowners, for the owner to exhibit such restraint. Is the owner buying more time for his trap to close?

If indifference or incompetence is to be charged, let it be to the owner as much as to the steward. Why commend a steward for reducing bills inconsistently for one tenant over against another? What precedent will be set for other tenants of this property as `well as for owners of other lands? Tenants of one parcel talk with tenants of other parcels; stewards talk about their respective owners; owners speak with other owners about prices, land taxes, and profit margins. This owner is setting precedents potentially dangerous to the way that small agrarian economies operate. He seems no more competent than his steward; indeed, the owner's behavior might even be called "foolish" (Donahue: 168).

Conclusion

Of what charges is the steward guilty? To call the steward dishonest, shameful, unjust, unrighteous, or wicked is too harsh. He probably (a) exceeded his authority, (b) squandered the owner's hyparchonta incompetently, inefficiently, or with dereliction to duty, (c) previously showed favoritism to some tenants at the expense of others, (d) poorly supervised slaves, and (e) mismanaged contracts between the owner and tenants. To these and similar misdeeds the charges (vv 1-2) apply. Considering the nature of patron-client relationships in Galilee and the need to preserve his honorable reputation, the owner is certainly within his rights to fire the steward for any reason he chooses.

Irresponsibly stewarding the owner's hyparchonta and mismanaging contractual understandings with tenants are both reasons enough to be fired. We have given three reasons why the charges were less serious than immoral or criminal acts:

First, the steward's actions seem typical for the times and for the agrarian setting. We cannot tell whether he is literate. Both in his soliloquy and in his reactions to the owner, the steward respects authority. Even though his actions in vv 5-7 are "shrewd," he preserves the owner's reputation, privately accepts the consequences (v 3), and counts on genuine friendships he has previously made (v 4).

In the second place, Luke gives no hint that the charges are credible. Those charging the steward are unnamed in v 1. The tenants are passive recipients of the steward's initiatives (vv 5-7) and motivated by jealousy, retribution or greed. They realize that the steward has outwitted them. What do they have to lose by hypocritically accepting the owner's largesse from the very steward these tenants have unjustly framed?

And finally, the owner gives him extra time. The owner does not follow through in v 8 to ask for the "accounting of your management" that he initially requires (v 2). Instead, the owner "commends" his steward for acting "shrewdly" (phronimos--v 8). The owner's honor has been upheld.

The steward insures his own future, reduces tenants' debts, and enhances the owner's honor. At the end of Luke's parable the steward therefore appears to be at least as prudent or wise, indeed as honest and honorable, as the owner himself.

Works Cited

Andreau, Jean. 1993. The Freedman. Pp. 175-98 in THE ROMANS, edited by Andrea Giardina. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Bailey, Kenneth E. 1976. POET AND PEASANT. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Beavis, Mary Ann. 1992. Ancient Slavery as an Interpretive Context for the New Testament Servant Parables, with Special Reference to the Unjust Steward (Luke 16:1-8). JOURNAL OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE 111/1: 37-54.

Carrie, Jean-Michel. 1993. The Soldier. Pp. 100-37 in THE ROMANS, edited by Andrea Giardina. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Corbier, M. 1991. City, Territory, and Taxation. Pp. 211-39 in CITY AND COUNTRY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, edited by John Rich & Andrew Wallace-Hadrill. London, UK: Routledge.

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John G. Lygre, Ph.D. (Princeton Theological Seminary), is Senior Stewardship Officer and Assistant Professor of Religion at St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057-1098 (e-mail: lygre@stolaf. edu). He is currently analyzing other Second Testament texts about relationships between owners, tenants, and stewards.