Of Individual and International Identities: Notions of Nationalism and Nationhood.

"Globalization" is what everyone seems to be talking about as one millennium yields to the next. What does this elusive, variously defined concept represent in the context of an organization whose formal membership comprises 188 States and whose effective constituency transcends six billion human beings? The Chronicle hopes to offer ideas and perspectives in this regard over the coming year and, to initiate the debate, brings to its pages the thoughts of Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo in Norway, who is the author, among other works, of "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives". He graciously contributed, at our invitation, his views on "Globalization and the Politics of Identity".

In a certain, important sense, the present world is more tightly integrated than at any earlier point in history. In the age of the jet plane, satellite dish, global capitalism, ubiquitous markets and global mass media, various commentators have claimed that the world is rapidly becoming a single place. Although this slightly exaggerated description has an important point to make, perhaps an even more striking aspect of the post-cold-war world is the emergence, seemingly everywhere, of identity politics, whose explicit aim is the restoration of rooted tradition, religious fervour and/or commitment to ethnic or national identities.

It is doubtless true that globalization is a pervasive tendency influencing the lives of people everywhere- from the Amazon rainforest to Japanese cities. The concept has recently become a fashionable one and, as a result, its meaning is becoming fuzzy. I would propose, therefore, a view of globalization as all the sociocultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant. It has important economic, political and cultural dimensions, as well as equally important ethical implications. Truly, global processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities, creating new opportunities and new forms of vulnerability. Risks are globally shared in the age of the nuclear bomb and potential ecological disasters. On the same note, the economic conditions, in particular in localities, frequently (some would say always) depend on events taking place elsewhere in the global system.

Patterns of consumption also seem to merge in certain respects; people nearly everywhere desire similar goods, from cellular phones to ready-made garments. Naturally, a precondition for this to happen is the more or less successful implementation of certain institutional dimensions of modernity, notably that of a monetary economy-if not necessarily wage-work and literacy. The ever-increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or immaterial, seems to create a set of common cultural denominators which threaten to eradicate local distinctions. Investment capital, military power and world literature are similarly being disembedded from the constraints of space; they no longer belong to a particular locality. With the development of the jet plane, the satellite dish and more recently the Internet, distance no longer seems a limiting factor for the flow of influence, investments and cultural meaning. Globalization is, in other words, not merely another word for the growing transnational economy.

It is true that globalization is Largely driven by technology and economic interests, but it must be kept in mind that it encompasses a wide range of processes that are not in themselves technological or economic. Take the human rights discourse, for example. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the ideas and values associated with human rights have spread from educated elites worldwide (and not just, as some wrongly believe, in the West) to villagers and farmers in remote areas. The rapid dissemination of human rights ideas is probably one of the most spectacular successes of globalization.

This new political scene, difficult to fit into the old left-right divide, is interpreted in very different ways by the many academics and journalists who have studied it. This is partly because identity politics comes in many flavours: some are separatist nationalist movements; some represent historically oppressed minorities which demand equal rights; some are dominant groups trying to prevent minorities from gaining access to national resources; some are religious; some are ethnic; and some are regional.

At the same time, we have in recent years witnessed the growth in very many societies in all continents of political movements seeking to strengthen the collective sense of uniqueness, often targeting globalization processes, which are seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-determination. In sum, politics in the 1990s has to a great extent meant identity politics.

Many writers see identity politics in general as an anti-modern counter-reaction to the individualism and freedom embodied by globalization, while others see it as the defence of the weak against foreign dominance or even as a concealed strategy of modernization.

Some emphasize the psychological dimension of identity politics, seeing it as nostalgic attempts to retain dignity and a sense of rootedness in an era of rapid change; others focus on competition for scarce resources between groups. And some see identity politics as a strategy of exclusion and an ideology of hatred, while others see it as the true-born child of socialism, as an expression of the collective strivings of the underdog.

Neither of these interpretations and judgements tells the whole story, both because the concrete movements in question differ and the phenomenon of identity politics is too complex for a simple explanation to suffice. What is clear, however, is that the centripetal or unifying forces of globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the same coin, two complementary tendencies which must be fully understood for anyone wishing to make sense of the global scene at the turn of the millennium.

For a variety of reasons, globalization creates the conditions for localization, that is, various kinds of attempts at creating bounded entities--countries (nationalism or separatism), faith systems (religious revitalization), cultures (linguistic or cultural movements) or interest groups (ethnicity). For this reason, a more apt term, coined by sociologist Roland Robertson, might be "glocalization". I shall now present some features that the "glocal" identity movements of the turn of the millennium seem to have in common.

First, identity politics always entails competition over scarce resources. Successful mobilization on the basis of collective identities presupposes a widespread belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines. "Resources" should be interpreted in the widest sense possible and could, in principle, be taken to mean economic wealth or political power, recognition or symbolic power, although what is usually primarily at stake are either economic or political resources.

Secondly, modernization and globalization actualize differences and trigger conflict. When formerly discrete groups are integrated into shared economic and political systems, inequalities are made visible, since direct comparison between the groups becomes possible. In a certain sense, ethnicity can be described as the process of making cultural differences comparable and, to that extent, it is a modem phenomenon boosted by the intensified contact entailed by globalization. You do not envy your neighbour if you are unaware of his existence.

Thirdly, similarity overrules equality ideologically. Ethnic nationalism, politicized religion and indigenous movements all depict the in-group as homogeneous, as people "of the same kind". Internal differences are glossed over and, for this reason, it can often be argued that identity politics serves the interests of the privileged segments of the group, even if the group as a whole is underprivileged, since it conceals internal class differences.

Fourthly, images of past suffering and injustice are invoked. Even spokesmen for clearly privileged groups, such as anti-immigrant politicians in Western Europe, may argue along these lines.

Fifthly, the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experiences. This is perhaps the most important ideological feature of identity politics in general. Using myths, cultural symbols and kinship terminology in addressing their supporters, promoters of identity politics try to downplay the difference between personal experiences and group history. In this way, it becomes perfectly sensible for a Serb to talk about the legendary battle of Kosovo in the first person ("We lost in 1389"), and the logic of revenge is extended to include metaphorical kin, in many cases millions of people. The intimate experiences associated with locality and family are thereby projected onto a national screen.

Sixthly, first-comers are contrasted with invaders. Although this ideological feature is by no means universal in identity politics, it tends to be invoked whenever possible and, in the process, historical facts are frequently stretched.

Finally, the actual social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrast. The "truly national leader" concentrates the attention of his people on one enemy at a time, a concept propagated, for example, by Hitler in Nazi Germany. Since cross-cutting ties reduce the chances of violent conflict, the collective identity must be based on relatively narrow, unambiguous criteria, such as place, religion, mother-tongue and kinship. Again, internal differences are under-communicated in the act of delineating boundaries towards the frequently demonized other.

Identity politics is often dismissed as an anachronistic survival from a time when kinship ("blood relations"), religion or local belonging formed the basis of politics. Against this view, it has been argued many times, always correctly, that although identity politics tends to be dressed in traditional garb, beneath the surface, it is a product of modernity. The strong emotions associated with a tradition, a culture or a religion can never be mobilized unless people feel that it is under siege. To put it metaphorically: A fish knows nothing of water as long as it is surrounded by it, but the moment it is pulled out into the air, it develops an intense interest in the water and nostalgia for it. Indeed, it could be said that the fish discovers the water only the moment it is removed from it.

Viewed in this way, the collective emotions identity politics depends on reveal themselves to be deeply modern emotions associated with the sense of loss experienced in situations of rapid change. Ethnic nationalism, minority movements and politicized religion offer a larger share of the cake, as well as a positive sense of self and, like it or not, these movements will remain influential in most parts of the world [INCOMPLETE]