Observations from Iraq: the 3d Div Arty in OIF.

"Greta ... Greta ... Greta".

With those three words, Major Bill Howard, Fire Support Officer (FSO) for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Aviation Brigade, gave the green light for the 3d Division Artillery (Div Arty) howitzers to destroy the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) observation posts (OPs) along the Kuwait-Iraq border in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Less than 60 seconds later, the night sky lit up with brilliant flashes of light as 54 howitzers from the three direct support (DS) battalions of the Div Arty fired the first rounds of the war for the Marne Division. As projectiles hurtled toward their targets, the motors of the rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) ignited, leaving telltale streaks across the moonless sky.

While the world watched, the Redlegs of the 3d Div Arty and AH-64 Apache pilots of the aviation brigade performed their jobs with deadly precision. Apache helicopters patiently hovered in air battle positions, observing the effects of the artillery barrage, waiting to hear "Rounds Complete" so they could move forward and complete the destruction of the OPs.

OIF was a watershed event for the 3d Infantry Division. Never in the history of warfare has a division moved so far, so fast: 720 kilometers in 21 days.

The Div Arty headquarters occupied Baghdad International Airport and looked back on our accomplishments with a sense of pride. Among our firsts--first use of the M109A6 Paladin in combat, first use of the M7 Bradley fire support team (BFIST) vehicle in combat, first employment of the divisional multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion in combat, first use of advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) in combat, first use of sense and destroy armor (SADARM) in combat, and first use of the M795 improved high-explosive (HE) projectile in combat.

The missions were equally impressive: 610 DS missions fired for a total of 13,923 155-mm rounds sent down-range and 90 counterfire plus 26 reinforcing missions for a total of 794 MLRS rockets and six Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) missiles fired in support of V Corps shaping operations.

This article outlines our observations in OIF with an eye toward continuing to improve our systems and ensuring the Field Artillery maintains its stature as the King of Battle.

Terrain and Enemy. To understand the battlefield environment, one must understand the terrain and enemy we fought. Our zone of operation stretched for more than 700 kilometers, beginning with the flat, relatively featureless desert terrain along the Kuwait-Iraq border in southwestern Kuwait to the urban sprawl of Baghdad. Along the way, we encountered the compartmented terrain of the Euphrates River Valley that restricted movement to roads and highways due to the numerous canals and ditches.

We faced three distinct types of Iraqi forces: the Regular Army, Republican Guard Forces and Saddam Fedayeen. The Regular Army fought hard and put up a respectable fight. The Republican Guard, considered the regime's center of gravity, was not as aggressive as their irregular counterparts but was better trained--as evidenced by their ability to mass multiple artillery units against a single target.

The unexpected strength was the irregular Fedayeen and Baa'th Party militia. These groups were very aggressive, well armed and fanatical in their consistent attacks against superior firepower. They presented a threat to coalition forces from all sides, anywhere, anytime. There was no sanctuary or safe haven from potential attack.

M109A6 Paladin. The combat performance of the M109A6 Paladin was magnificent. It is an extremely capable system that consistently put rounds down-range in less than two minutes after mission receipt, even while on the march. Firing batteries regularly fired from superhighways, narrow secondary roads and open desert to deliver their munitions with devastating accuracy. The system held up extremely well to the rigors of battle as shown by our fighting strength's never dropping below 51 of 54 systems.

However, the system needs a few improvements. First, we had problems with the M93 chronograph and W92 and W93 power data cables. The M93 is fragile and often not mission-capable. Long lead times for repairing or replacing M93s make this problem worse.

Additionally, there is no clearly defined troubleshooting guide that explains the interoperability of the M93, automatic fire control system (AFCS) and AFATDS. Many times a firing battery lost all muzzle-velocity variations (MVV) data on a howitzer when the M93 sent an erroneous reading to the AFATDS in the platoon operations center (POC). In combat, most units simply used shooting strength as a baseline for the guns and turned the M93 off.

In addition, we experienced many generator failures and leaking elevation cylinders while firing M203 propellants or high-angle missions.

Our final concern is that the Paladin was easily outranged by Iraqi cannon systems. Throughout the conflict, we were outranged consistently by the G-5 and GHN-45 155-mm weapon systems. As a result, we had to position well forward in the maneuver formations during movements and position very close to the forward line of troops (FLOT) when stationary to ensure we could mass all firing units. This created force protection concerns (addressed later in this article).

Future systems need to address this range disparity and achieve a conventional munitions range of 40 kilometers with extended-range munitions out to 50 kilometers.

M7 BFIST. The M7 BFIST performed brilliantly. For the first time, the artillery community has a vehicle that allows FISTs to keep up with their maneuver counterparts and remain in the fight. Every crew praised BFIST's speed, survivability and capability as a communications platform. It gave the company FSO the ability to remain well forward in maneuver formations without compromising his safety.

As a result, BFIST teams initiated 407 of the 657 DS fire missions. All BFISTs employed the 25-mm gun and M240C machine gun in a defensive role, and in every case, the crew credited its Table VIII proficiency for its survivability. The average Marne Division BFIST fired 300 rounds of 25-mm and 900 rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition.

We learned several ways to enhance BFIST significantly. It does not have a mounted laser designation capability. The only way for a BFIST team to designate a target is to dismount and set up the ground/vehicular laser locator designator (G/VLLD). The G/VLLD took too much time to set up, making the crew vulnerable to enemy fire, and took up half the internal crew space when stowed. It's not practical to use the G/VLLD during offensive operations, and its age, size and reliability make it obsolete. None of the 30 BFIST teams in the 3d Division used their G/ VLLDs in combat.

The optics package on the BFIST requires the crewman to switch between two separate modes: direct fire and FIST modes. Company fire supporters need one fire control sight instead of having to change sights between the two modes, which hampers target acquisitions.

A single sight would allow the BFIST crew's laser zero to be accurate for both indirect and direct targets. Targets would not be lost during the time it takes to switch sights.

BFIST sights are effective out to the max range of the Bradley tube-launched optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) weapon system (3.7 kilometers). This hinders the ability to call-for-fires because, by the time a target is identified and acquired, the company is already in direct fire range and maneuvering to destroy the enemy.

In contrast, the long-range scout sight (LRSS) can acquire targets beyond 10 kilometers with great clarity. Mounting LRSS to the BFIST would significantly upgrade the vehicle's ability to acquire targets before maneuver forces close into enemy direct fire range.

Finally, the mission equipment package (MEP) digital components need updating. Specifically, the handheld terminal unit (HTU) and forward observer software (FOS) link to the lightweight computer unit (LCU) require continuous troubleshooting for most crews. The placement of the HTU over the M240C access door is an issue.

During combat operations, the crews needed to remove the HTUs daily to clean and service the M240s. This led to damaged connections and the inoperability of many HTUs across the Div Arty. Additionally, the HTU needs a power cable for the system rather than having to rely on internal battery power.

The digital communications link through the LCU is another source of friction. Because our units have fielded AFATDs, there are few LCUs available as floats when systems go down.

AFATDS. This is another new system that passed its first combat use with flying colors. It is a very stable and reliable fire control platform that allowed us to provide timely, accurate and lethal fires in support of ground maneuver forces. Units effectively used it tactically and technically to deliver Field Artillery fires, manage fire support coordination measures (FSCM) and provide a common operating picture (COP) down to the platoon level. The ability to view unit icons with range fans displayed for specific firing units combined with adequate digital maps simplified the conduct of tactical fire direction.

From the Div Arty perspective, AFATDS' best feature was the Div Arty fire control element's (FCE's) ability to tactically direct fire missions on the move inside an M1113 rigid-wall shelter (RWS) high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Similarly, DS battalion fire direction centers (FDCs) executed missions on the move in their M577A2/3 tracks.

AFATDS received digital updates from units on the move, and the fire direction officer (FDO) directed which firing unit to send the mission to. At the lowest level, POCs executed fire missions on the move using the AFATDS to manage the AFCS database and to verify the technical commands sent to the Paladin.

We did have some issues with regard to AFATDS hardware. The AFATDS box is too big. A simpler, more robust laptop computer would be better and more user-friendly. This would allow the rapid replacement of components with commercial peripherals (keyboards, mice and memory devices).

Our biggest maintenance problem was the reliability of the mouse and keyboard as well as hard drive failures. Any mouse or keyboard failure required we evacuate it to Kuwait, with no hope of getting it back.

The system also is too susceptible to any fluctuation in voltage, and power generation issues continue to plague it. The simple process of the AFATDS box's switching to internal battery power caused an operational facility (OPFAC) reconfiguration, resulting in the loss of firing capability for at least 20 minutes.

The challenges with size and power generation would be greatly simplified by repackaging the system in a laptop computer. Team AFATDS reports that units fielding AFATDS for the first time will receive laptops starting in the spring of 2004 and that units already fielded AFATDS will start receiving laptop replacements for their AFATDS boxes in FY05.

The AFATDS software improved dramatically with Version 6.3.1, which includes not only technical fire direction capabilities, but also the effects management tool (EMT). The biggest software improvement was the communications package. FM radio range was the only limiting factor. Occasionally, systems had modem failures, but communications among local area network (LAN), variable message format (VMF) and tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE) protocols were extremely reliable as compared to the previous versions of AFATDS software.

Version 6.3.1 simplified geometry workspaces and is a vast improvement. The division tactical command post (DTAC) fire support element (FSE) as well as maneuver brigade FSEs were able to build, verify, update and disseminate geometries much faster with 6.3.1. The division main (DMAIN) and DTAC FSEs received battlefield geometries from subordinate task force FSEs, V Corps, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) continuously during pre-war rehearsals and throughout the entire war. We effectively managed hundreds of no-fire areas (NFAs) and restricted fire areas (RFAs), constantly changing zones of responsibilities (ZORs), and a plethora of Army airspace command and control ([A.sup.][C.sup.2]) measures using AFATDS.

The late introduction of the EMT limited its use by battalions due to operator training levels; however, the system is a promising addition to the AFATDS suite. The the mapping tool, view fire missions and target lists, as well as view enemy counterfire vectors were great additions to the situational awareness down to the battalion level.

The drawback to EMT is its reliance on the AFATDS box that it is attached to. It cannot display friendly maneuver icons or interface directly with the global command and control system-Army (GCCS-A) for enemy icon feeds. Additionally, FSEs could not view the current air tasking orders (ATOs) on EMT--which needs to be a future software upgrade.

Some software changes to the adjust fire and emergency mission procedures would maximize the system's technical fire direction capability. While in the adjust fire mission, AFATDS won't display the adjusted grid on the "Weapons Status" window for the FDC to verify before it is sent to the gun. Paladin units cannot change the shell-fuze combination between the adjustment and firefor-effect phase of the mission, and they can't select the POC or gun to adjust. These capabilities also could be improvements for future software.

During emergency missions, the system won't send a mission to a gun that's in a moving status. As a procedure, the section chief did not send a howitzer update before moving. Therefore, AFATDS considers the Paladin in a "Ready Status." This resulted in the AFATDS computing the gun out-of-range, but allowed the AFCS to accept the mission, which in reality was in range.

Finally, some degree of flexibility is required for the guidances in AFATDS. The system generates a fire order based on guidances or defaults to the joint munitions effectiveness manuals (JMEMs) without guidances. The FDO needs the latitude to choose whatever fire order is appropriate for the tactical situation instantly rather than have to change guidances/rely on JMEMs in a computer program that does not have situational awareness and understanding.

Munitions. We employed a wide range of munitions. Most notable was the first combat use of the M895 SADARM round. We fired 108 rounds and recorded 48 vehicle kills.

DS battalions developed the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of firing two to four rounds against single or multiple stationary targets. SADARM was so effective that maneuver commanders asked to use it to destroy stationary vehicles rather than using massed artillery.

The drawback to these munitions is its two-kilometer danger close range and susceptibility to temperature inversions and restrictions during windy conditions.

Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) was the munition of choice for killing tanks and personnel in the open. We destroyed many enemy artillery units with six M26 MLRS rockets.

The only drawback to DPICM is the dud rate. The duds produced by these weapons became a major concern in post-combat stability and support operations (SASO) as they littered the battlefield and created a hazard to the local populace.

We need to develop a bomblet for cannons and MLRS that self-destructs or re-engineer the round to significantly reduce the dud rate.

Finally, we relearned how effective our HE projectile is. When the division entered the Baghdad area, HE consumption doubled because of the concern with dud-producing munitions. The M795 improved HE is a great projectile that increases the range to 22.5 kilometers (as compared to 17.5 from the M 107 projectile) and provided increased flexibility in positioning and moving howitzers.

Multiple-Launch Rocket System. Operation Iraqi Freedom marked the combat debut of an MLRS battalion organic to the heavy Div Arty. This organization was an unqualified success as it allowed the division to control the counterfire fight without relying on an FA brigade; it also enhanced flexibility in providing additional fires to the maneuver brigades and immediately available general support (GS) fires. The system was very reliable and held up well as we always had at least 16 of 18 launches in the fight.

A major shortcoming of the system is the range of the M26 conventional rocket. The Iraqis had four cannon systems and two rocket systems that outranged MLRS. We need to increase the range for conventional rockets out to 50 kilometers.

Our average MLRS target was fired at a range of 27 kilometers; we had 20 counterfire acquisitions we did not fire because they were out of range. A longer-range rocket would enable the launchers to engage enemy artillery and units before friendly forces move into the enemy artillery's range and allow us to engage targets almost to the maximum range of the Q-37 radar.

Some may argue the ATACMS missile offsets the range limitations of the conventional rocket; however, we did not have ATACMS release authority, and the [A.sup.2][C.sup.2] clearance process was slow and cumbersome.

Another drawback with MLRS is that DPICM is its only munition. Incorporating different types of munitions would significantly increase the capability of MLRS on the battlefield. For example, a global positioning system (GPS)guided rocket with HE, similar to the current unitary missile, may reduce the danger close restriction to the 600-meter range of cannon munitions and could be devastating against point targets.

Another recommendation is to create a smoke rocket with white phosphorous (WP) soaked felt wedges similar to the 155-mm M825 smoke round. With 12 rockets in a launcher, one launcher could create a smoke screen for river crossings or breaching operations in a fraction of the time it would take tube artillery.

We had great success using MLRS in the close fight. This has been debated for years, and our combat training centers (CTCs) teach different approaches to this contentious subject.

Our experience showed that MLRS is potentially the maneuver commander's "silver bullet." Our TTP was to first assess the situation and decide if rockets were an option. We consulted the MLRS risk estimate tables in FM 309.60, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for MLRS Operations and decided how far friendly troops needed to be away from the target, based on the range and probability of incapacitation (PI) we were willing to accept.

In at least one case, one troop of the division cavalry squadron was decisively engaged and in danger of being overrun. Although the range-to-target was 25 kilometers, the risks were calculated and deemed acceptable, and the squadron commander called the mission within 1,200 meters of his location. The effects were devastating on the enemy, and the cavalry troop broke contact and repositioned in good order.

In a second example, the 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery fired a four-target MLRS prep of 24 rockets just before the 2d Brigade Combat Team's (BCT's) famed "heavy metal" run into the heart of the Baghdad Palace District on 7 April. The rocket preparation obliterated enemy defensive positions around a key intersection. The FSO described the MLRS damage: "There's nothing left but burning trucks and body parts."

We recognize that MLRS fires are not suitable for every situation. However, appropriate planning can mitigate the dangers involved and make it an acceptable risk for the maneuver commander if the situation warrants.

Force Protection. A major concern throughout the operation was the level of force protection available to FA units across the battlefield. The nonlinear nature of this battlefield offered no sanctuary or safe haven. Everyone was subject to attack, no matter where he was on the battlefield.

The organic M2 machine guns and MK-19 grenade launchers provided cannon batteries adequate security; however, tactical operations centers (TOCs) and trains elements were very vulnerable. With too few maneuver elements to secure everything, units provided their own route reconnaissance and security, patrolling, and checkpoint operations. Our modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) do not provide enough crew-served weapons for these elements to secure themselves.

During the Army prepositioned stocks (APS) draw, we fortunately were issued M1025HMMWVs in lieu of M998HMMWVs. As part of the M1025 draw, we drew accompanying pintle mounts and stanchions to mount crew-served weapons on the vehicles, increasing our security. On several occasions, we used these vehicles to clear positions still occupied by enemy dismounts.

When two members of the Baa'th Party militia attempted a "drive-by-shooting" of the Div Arty TOC, their privately owned vehicle (POV) and AK-47 were no match for the M2 machine gun on the M1025 that stopped the attack before the POV got into the perimeter.

The days of maneuver units providing security for the artillery are over. We must ensure our units are equipped to defend themselves and trained to that standard.

The biggest force protection concern is that FA commanders at all levels, platoon leaders and senior NCOs in both cannon and rocket units don't have adequate vehicles to perform their combat tasks. They are on the battlefield, fully integrated into maneuver formations in soft-skinned HMMWVs that don't protect them from small-arms fire. They need vehicles that provide the same protection as the maneuver leaders' vehicles moving with them in formations.

Command and Control on the Move. Command and control ([C.sup.2]) on the move requires the battle staff to monitor and track operations while moving and leverage information systems to ensure enough control to accomplish the task and purpose of the mission. Furthermore, [C.sup.2] on the move implies that command posts (Caps) can transition rapidly from a static configuration to a shorthalt configuration or to an on-the-move configuration.

Current MTOEs, however, do not include such a platform for artillery units. Combat operations during OIF demonstrated, once again, that the five-ton expando van (M932A2) at the Div Arty level and M577A3 at the battalion level do not provide the speed with which to keep pace with maneuver forces, the physical environment from which to effectively employ [C.sup.2] terminals or an adequate degree of protection for the crew.

At the Div Arty level, the expando van is an excellent static CP but is hopelessly obsolete in supporting the requirements of today's rapidly changing battlefield that demands [C.sup.2] on the move. The cross-country capability of this vehicle is severely limited, it affords no protection from enemy fires (direct or indirect), and it cannot support even basic communications while moving.

Furthermore, the primary Army tactical command and control system (ATCCS) for artillery (AFATDS) must be shut down during movement because the expando will not accommodate a powered and manned workstation while moving. This significant shortfall degraded the FCE's ability to control GS fires throughout the division battlespace.

At the battalion-level, the M577A3 provides a better [C.sup.2] on-the-move platform because the battle staff can monitor the battle from within the crew compartment, and it affords the crew a small degree of armor protection. The M577A3, however, cannot keep pace with the current fleet of M1A1 tanks and M2/M3 Bradleys. Its armor design is obsolete and inadequate, and the basic ergonomics of the system for the crew is 30 years outdated.

Furthermore, the M113 family of vehicles requires the main support battalion (MSB) to maintain a large inventory of repair parts, an inventory that could be reduced by having a common Bradley family of vehicle chassis for Caps.

A combat-proven vehicle with none of these shortcomings, one that excelled at the division level during OIF, is the [C.sup.2] vehicle ([C.sup.2]V). The commanding general used one in his assault command post (ACP), while the DTAC employed two. From this modem [C.sup.2] platform, the crew not only could exercise [C.sup.2] on the move, but also keep pace with maneuver forces in a vehicle that afforded satisfactory armor protection.

Additionally, the division assistant fire support coordinator (AFSCOORD) worked out of a [C.sup.2]V in the DTAC and could use his AFATDS terminal while moving or stationary without having to power AFATDS down and reconfigure it. The division FSCOORD (Div Arty commander) did not have this capability because the Div Arty TOC was configured in five-ton expando vans.

The [C.sup.2]V platform increased [C.sup.2] on the move, but it is just one example of such vehicles. Regardless of the chassis, the figure outlines the baseline requirements for a vehicle that can provide battle staffs [C.sup.2] on the move.

Conclusion. The Redlegs of the 3d Div Arty distinguished themselves repeatedly over the course of 21 days of sustained combat during OIF and won the admiration of maneuver commanders throughout the division. Colonel Dan Allyn, the commander of the 3d BCT, is fond of saying, "Prep with steel, lead with lead, count the dead." He began every 3d BCT engagement with preparatory fires and repeatedly used his artillery to shape the battlefield before entering the enemy's direct fire range.

Lieutenant Colonel Terry Ferrell, commander of the division's cavalry squadron, would not move his squadron unless they were under Q-37 radar and MLRS coverage. According to him, "Indirect fire was the killing system of choice within the squadron. Fires allowed the troops to destroy the enemy without actually getting into a knife fight."

Lieutenant Colonel Ferrell goes on to say, "MLRS in the close fight works. On several occasions the only system capable of assisting the squadron with the destruction of attacking forces in adverse weather conditions were the rockets. They saved many a trooper's life with their pinpoint accuracy in severe conditions."

Despite the belief by some that the Field Artillery branch has "walked away from the close fight," maneuver commanders in the 3d Infantry Division will argue otherwise--13,923 155-mm rounds and 794 MLRS rockets fired in OIF back them up.

The soldiers of the 3d Div Arty performed their mission with a sense of excellence and professionalism, traveling farther and in a shorter amount of time than any campaign in history. We took the fight to the enemy, whether close or deep, and proved, once again, the Field Artillery is the King of Battle.

* Have the mobility and speed to match the Bradley family of vehicles.

* Include armor protection that defeats up to 50 caliber class weapons.

* Have crew workstations that can use the systems on the move.

* Allow for mounting the following:

- Five FM radio nets (with telescoping long-range antenna systems)

- One HF radio net

- Two SCTACSAT nets

- EPLRS or [FBCBsup.2] terminal

- Full range of ATCCS systems (depending on the role of unit, AFATDS, ADOCS, ASAS-L, etc.)

Legend:

ADOCS = Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

AFATDS = Advanced FA Tactical Data System

ASAS-L = Ali-Source Analysis System-Light

ATCCS = Army Tactical Command and Control System

EPLRS = Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 

[FBCB.sup.2] = Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

SCTACSAT = Secure Tactical Satellite

Colonel Thomas G. Torrance commands the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Fort Stewart, Georgia, currently deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He commanded 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery, also part of the 3d Infantry Division, and C Battery, 2d Battalion, 92d Field Artillery, part of the 42d Field Artillery Brigade, Germany. His past assignments include service as the Chief of Staff for Task Force Eagle and Multinational Division North in Bosnia during Stabilization Force (SFOR) 9; Brigade Fire Support Trainer and Deputy Senior Fire Support Trainer at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; and S3 of the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he was the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. Nicolle is the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD) for the 3d Infantry Division, and until recently, the Division Artillery S3, deployed for OIF. Previous assignments include serving as FSO for 3d Brigade and S3 for 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery, both in the 3d Infantry Division; Small Group Instructor at the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and an Observer Controller for the Mechanized Task Force Trainers and Fire Support Trainers at the NTC. He commanded B Battery, 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), part of the 1st Armored Division in Germany. He holds an MA in History from Louisiana State University.