Numbers don't lie: a priesthood in irreversible decline.

In Going My Way, Bing Crosby is Father O'Malley to parishioners and friends, and to three generations of movie viewers. In the United States, believers and nonbelievers alike use "Father" to identify a Catholic priest. If Bing were addressed as Reverend O'Malley, well socialized Catholic would twinge at the unfamiliar sound. Calling a Catholic priest father and calling other Christian ministers reverend or pastor is a taken-for-granted distinction in many Western countries. Similarly, most of the world knows Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II. As head and high priest of Roman Catholicism, he is familiarly called il papa, the pope, that is, simply, the father.

Thus, whether referring to parish priest or supreme pontiff, the same title signifying hegemonic control, patriarchal respect, and filial affection is used worldwide, and has been for centuries. It is time for Catholics and society-at-large to say goodby to father. Not, I insist, good-by to the sacerdotal sacramental ministry but to what "father" has come to symbolize: male celibate exclusivity.

The demographic facts leave little room for doubt. The imbalance in supply and demand for priests in the Catholic church can only grow more pronounced in die decades ahead. Ordinations to the diocesan priesthood fell by half during the decades following Vatican 11, dropping from about 1,000 per year in the late 1960s to approximately 500 per year throughout the 1980s. From 1990 to 1993, the annual number of ordinations averaged 603, a 20 percent increase over the previous decade. This rise could be interpreted as the beginning of an upward trend, but that is unlikely because seminary statistics point in the opposite direction.

The number of Catholic seminarians in U. S. theologates (the final years of study before ordination) has steadily decreased, and the bottom of the descent is not yet in sight. Enrollments in theologates dropped 59 percent in less than three decades, from 8,325 in 1966 to 3,416 in 1993. Between 1990 and 1993 alone, the size of this group fell by more than 5 percent. The trend in the number of ordinations cannot go up as long as seminary enrollments continue so relentlessly downward. Thus, the recent increases in ordinations are only minor fluctuations in the downward trend.

Poor retention after ordination deepens the severe losses inflicted by plummeting ordinations. Chronic defection of young priests from the active ministry has likewise persisted since the end of the council. From 1968-74, the retention problem reached catastrophic proportions: The number of newly ordained priests needed to fill vacancies created by resignations averaged 73 percent annually, peaking at 95 percent in the early 70s. Later in that decade and throughout the 1980s, that dropped to 38 percent. Hence, although the retention problem has been cut almost in half, it continues to be severe. Nowadays four out of ten newly ordained priests are needed just to take over the ministries abandoned by those who resign; the other six ordinands cannot begin to fill the vacancies created by the retirements and deaths of older priests.

In the last years of the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, the Catholic priesthood will undergo a second mass exodus. This time, however, priests will be leaving because of natural attrition. Retirement and preretirement death are the inevitable result of the rapid aging of the priestly work force. Between 1966 and 2005, the median age of priests will have increased eight years. As the large cohorts ordained during the 1950s and 1960s reach the end of their careers, natural attrition rates will begin to soar and the already limited supply of active priests will precipitously dwindle.

Another component of the clergy shortage is the increased demand for priestly services produced by continuing growth in church membership. Catholic church membership will burgeon from roughly 45 million in 1965 to 74 million in 2005. High fertility rates of Catholic families and the steady immigration of Asian and Hispanic Catholics account for most of the growth. To a great degree, these demographic forces are impervious to social engineering, so membership growth cannot be slowed down even if anyone wanted to do it.

The stark facts are that, while the diocesan priesthood population will have declined by 40 percent between 1966 and 2005, the lay population is increasing by 65 percent. The laityto-priest ratio, a fairly accurate measure of supply and demand, will double between 1975 and 2005 from 1,100 to 2,200 Catholics per active priest. Furthermore, this is a conservative estimate because it does not account for the growing Hispanic-American population, which is increasing five times faster than the general population. At the same time, recruitment and retention will remain chronic problems and the number of retirements and deaths will soar.

Here are the numbers to watch during this decade and the next. Barring change in the celibacy requirement, the total number of ordinations nationwide to the diocesan priesthood is likely to bottom out at a point between 500 and 600 per year. Net incardinations (the excess of immigrations of priests over out-migrations) will probably hover around 100 per year. Resignations would fluctuate between 125 and 150 per year. Natural attrition during this period would average about 800 losses annually, approximately 500 from retirement and 300 from preretirement deaths. Thus, entrances to the diocesan priesthood would add up roughly to about 650 and exits to approximately 950 per year, for a net loss to the active clergy population of 300 diocesan priests annually.

The bottom line, therefore, shows about 21,000 active diocesan priests in 2005, or 40 percent fewer than the 35,000 registered in 1966. This priestly cadre, diminished not only in size but in youthful vigor, will be burdened with overwork, trying to meet the sacramental and other religious demands of more than 74 million U.S. Catholics.

So far, I am arguing that demographic forces are like a loaded tanker in the open sea. Once momentum is gained, it takes a long time for a heavy ship to slow down and turn around. So even if a successful program to improve recruitment and retention of priests is found, it would take several decades to decelerate the downward trend and turn it around.

Several decades, however, is a relatively short time for an organization like the Catholic church, which measures its age in centuries rather than decades. Thus, many church leaders, are content to take a wait-and-see attitude. In the meantime, some dioceses are improving their recruitment techniques and launching prayer campaigns to increase vocations to the priesthood. Others are urging deeper spiritual programs for priests and seminarians and calling for renewed support and encouragement from the laity to foster retention of young priests who are at risk of leaving the active ministry.

This approach assumes that the challenge facing the Catholic church is to change the environment, not adapt to it. If the environment no longer yields enough committed male celibates to staff its growing parishes, then the church must mount an effort to make the environment more supportive of male celibate exclusivity.

Will this strategy work? Not as long as the church itself and society-at-large spend their best efforts in exactly the opposite direction. The current demographic trends in the priesthood are propelled by a deep-seated dissatisfaction with mandatory celibacy. Study after study over the last three decades has concluded that poor recruitment and retention of priests is caused, in great measure, by problems with mandatory celibacy.

For example, every survey on record reports that the majority of priests are in favor of allowing the ordination of married men. Furthermore, the same polls show that one out of every three or four young priests saying that he would like to get married if the policy were to allow it. Research by Potvin, Fee, Hemrick, Hoge, and their colleagues demonstrates that many young men are not entering the seminary because of the celibacy requirement. Further, most seminarians do not persevere to ordination for the same reason. Likewise, Schoenherr, Greeley, Perez Vilarino, and Verdieck and colleagues show that many young priests resign soon after ordination mainly because of the desire to marry. The celibacy requirement is keeping young men who want to from entering the priesthood and driving out many of those who do get ordained.

My review of these and other investigations concludes that low levels of ordination and moderate levels of resignations will continue for the foreseeable future because of: (1) the large proportion of psychologically underdeveloped and still developing priests among the U.S. clergy; (2) the pervasive influence of the wider culture's sexual norms; (3) the growing uneasiness about claims to the spiritually superior value of celibacy over marriage within Catholic theological and priestly circles; (4) the large minority of priests who would prefer to be married; and (5) the unavoidable challenge facing every young heterosexual and homosexual priest to make the crisis of intimacy and mutuality a passage for growth rather than regression. The problem is not just celibacy; it is the powerful matrix of social forces that are propelling the number of those willing to be and remain priests in its downward trajectory. The full weight of history and social change is turning against male celibate exclusivity in the Catholic priesthood.

Society as a whole, and the Catholic church along with it, is experiencing an axial epoch. As the trends come to bear on the church, they are producing a unique balance of countervailing pressures for change. In this era of societal transformation, the Catholic church is trying to adapt its structures to incorporate a better balance between dogmatism and pluralism, between centrism and localism, between male domination and female equality, between personalism and transpersonalism; between clericism and laicism, and between sacramental and biblical means of salvation.

Whether all the players recognize it or not, celibacy has taken the lead role in the drama currently playing in the Catholic church. Why is this so? I see three main explanations: first, organizational change results when a charismatic coalition successfully resolves conflict over the status quo. Second, the material support for mandatory celibacy is waning in most Catholic dioceses. Third, ideological support for mandatory celibacy becomes more critical as material support for it wanes. So the theology of celibacy and marriage becomes a contested ideological terrain where conservative and progressive coalitions fight it out. Let me try to clarify these three areas.

* First, social change results when structural tension creates conflict over the status quo and a charismatic coalition resolves the conflict, moving an organization in the direction of its progressive values. Today. conflict in the church swirls around the hegemonic priesthood because it defines the status quo: Only ordained male celibates are given the expertise and authority to control the sacramental means of salvation, which are the core of Catholic ministry. What is the most likely resolution of the conflict buffeting the church?

Of the traits that make up the current form of Catholic ministry, two flow from the essence, or deep structure of religion, namely, hierarchic and sacramental hegemony. They will always be part of Catholic ministry. Others stem from historical and cultural circumstances, or the surface structures of religion, namely, male and celibate exclusivity.

While hierarchic control over the means of salvation will remain intact in the Catholic church, it will continue to be transformed by greater participation of the laity. In fact, this modification is well under way as a result of the lay movement, the liturgical movement, and reforms inaugurated by Vatican 11. As the second millennium ends, sharing hierarchic control by priest and lay minister is possible because social trends affecting the Catholic church have struck a new balance between laity and clergy.

Despite lay participation, however, sacrificial worship requires a properly designated sacrificer. Thus, in keeping with the unique rights and responsibilities flowing from ordination, priests will still be called to preside over sacramental celebrations, principally the eucharistic sacrifice of the Mass. But even the rites that require a priest are no longer rigidly controlled by them. Lay people now help plan the liturgy, actively participate by reciting prayers, singing hymns, reading the Scripture passages, serving at the altar, even preaching homilies, and distributing Communion. Furthermore, all of these activities are open to both men and women. These practices, unheard of a few decades ago, have become routine in Catholic parishes. Moreover, they will persist because they fit the needs of an educated, pluralistic community moving away from its Eurocentric origins.

Following the rule of lex orandi, lex credendi (the order of worship determines the order of the believing community), if the ordained priesthood shares hierarchic control of worship with the priesthood of all believers, other transformations follow. Genuine participation in creating and controlling the order of worship demands greater participation in hierarchic coordination and control of the structure of the believing community. Decision-making power over the central hierophanic actions of worship will spill over into decision-making power in other hierarchical activities of the church. Note, however, that hierarchic power will continue, even though it has been adjusted in order to include participation of the laity.

* Second, the time for celibate exclusivity, however, has run out. Many of the economic and political conditions supporting mandatory celibacy are less salient now than in the past. In prior centuries, inheritance and landholding traditions in Catholic countries used to provide latent support for priestly celibacy. These customs directed that the first son inherit the family property encouraging the second or third to enter the priesthood. Denied family property, which went to the eldest son, ambitious younger sons could satisfy their desire for power and wealth by acquiring a church benefice. Talented younger sons could satisfy their desire for higher education in the priesthood. Even homosexual sons could satisfy their desire for dignity and respect in the same way.

With the shift from agricultural to an industrial economy, most of the structural supports for mandatory celibacy crumbled in Europe. Further, they never held sway in countries like the United States that began with the Industrial Revolution and so never had a feudal tradition. Generally, the need for large families is gone and the widespread availability of effective birth control techniques makes the choice of small families possible. Additionally, the avenues of upward mobility for men are wider, the chances for power and wealth are greater, and the opportunities for creative talent are more plentiful now than in the past.

While structural supports in favor of mandatory celibacy are waning, structural pressures against it are growing. Obviously, society-at-large prefers marriage as the norm and supports the preference by being suspicious of those who choose not to enter wedlock. This is one of the most pervasive structural constraints working against celibate exclusivity. It affects all walks of life, including Catholic ministry.

In the final analysis, the most telling structural pressure against celibate exclusivity is the decline in the church's most critical economic resource, the priestly work force. The church, like any other modern bureaucracy, is organized around its technical core. Based on the theoretical and empirical arguments presented, it is obvious that the Catholic church cannot continue her far-flung operations without an ample supply of priests. It is just as obvious from the data that losses in the supply of celibate priests are approaching the crisis point. The only choice is to staunch the hemorrhaging supply or cut back key operations. The choice can be dramatized by asking whether the Catholic tradition of eucharistic worship should be sacrificed on the altar of mandatory celibacy. Conflict over which is the better strategy, keeping mandatory celibacy or keeping the Eucharist, is moving toward an intense ideological struggle.

* Third, as the material basis for mandatory celibacy declines, male exclusivity becomes an open political debate in the church. Ideological arguments are taking over as the major weapons in the battle. Whose ideology wins is the outcome of a sophisticated political contest. Most theories of social change emphasize the necessity of an open battle to win the hearts and minds of both elites and subordinates so they will support either the status quo or the proposed change.

The classic arguments about the political power of ideology are nicely summarized and applied by Rhys Williams and Jay Demerath ("Religion and Political Process in an American City," American Sociological Review, 56 [1991]). They note that all political issues go through a life cycle. First, the issue area must evolve; that is, it must be named and defined. What category the issue is put in is a political issue. The namers, definers, and categorizers become the owners of the issue.

For example, the pope encourages bishops to avoid public discussion of mandatory celibacy, thus keeping the issue area from evolving by being named and defined as a problem worthy of attention. The married priesthood may be defined as either a hierarchic/bureaucratic or as a hierophanic/pastoral issue. When it is discussed, therefore, the pope and his agents define the problem as a hierarchic/bureaucratic issue. They couch it in arcane theological language, calling celibacy a most precious jewel," and authoritatively announce that the theological issues are closed and not in need of further study.

The conservative coalition maneuvers to downplay the practical pastoral implications of maintaining a celibate priesthood (for example, the bitter debate between bureaucrats and pastors in the 1971 Synod of Bishops, which was repeated on a smaller scale at the 1990 synod). The papal alliance practically ignores the pastoral issue by calling for administrative bureaucratic solutions which reproduce the status quo. They argue that the priest shortage is temporary: Better recruitment techniques, better support groups, better in-service training, better discipline and asceticism, etc., will solve the crisis. Bishops at the local level, however, define the priest shortage as a pastoral problem involving access to the sacraments, especially Mass. They give priority to immediate pastoral solutions. For example, Archbishop Rembert Weakland, Bishop Kenneth Untener, and others take a public stand against bureaucratic solutions supporting the status quo. They go on record that the wait-and-see strategy is not working: Not even the present generation of practicing Catholics should be deprived of the Mass because of the scarcity of celibate priests. If a celibate priest is unavailable to celebrate Mass, they propose the immediate and simple pastoral solution of ordaining qualified married men to the priesthood

In an ideological battle such as this, Williams and Demerath point out, definitions imply solutions. That is, defining a problem determines who has the authority or responsibility for addressing, deciding, and acting on the issue. Thus, to be granted the right to reduce the complexity of an issue to its essence is a hotly debated political process. If celibacy is really a pastoral issue, then it must be addressed immediately in those terms, for definitions imply solutions. If conservatives can keep attention off the pastoral implications of the celibacy problem, and define the issue in other terms, then the status quo of the hegemonic priesthood remains intact.

But the key point should not be lost. It is not celibacy that is at issue, but celibate exclusivity. Limiting the priesthood exclusively to celibates has become an anachronism. Celibacy as such has always been and will always continue to be a viable, respected path to transpersonal holiness for those who are called. A call to priesthood, however, can no longer be equated with a call to celibacy.

Differentiating the two has positive consequences for both the priesthood and authentic religion. For when an interior, personal, religious calling becomes mandatory as an entrance requirement for a position of power, the dilemma of mixed motivation clouds the picture.

Catholic priests of the future will continue to exercise sacerdotal and sacramental power. But many Catholics no longer need or want celibate exclusivity in the priesthood. To be authentically religious, Catholic ministry must open itself to the charismatic transformative power of marriage as well as celibacy. Most Catholics will have little trouble saying hello to married fathers in the priesthood. But once this is achieved, the issue will then become one of saying farewell to father-rule in general, and to welcoming gender equality in the priesthood and the church.

Male exclusivity is a long way from getting on the official reform agenda of the Roman Catholic church because the church has spent little effort developing a theology of gender equality. What passes for a Catholic theology of human sexuality is based on what many consider to be inaccurate or outdated philosophy, anthropology, biology, and history. Moreover, Catholic scholars who suggest new tenets that veer even moderately from Rome's traditional views on sexual morality and the related issue of gender equality have been harassed and marginalized.

Still, while the issue of mandatory celibacy now fills the reform spotlight, the more basic issue of male exclusivity strikes deeper at the root-malaise that threatens authentic religion in the Catholic church. Dropping celibate exclusivity is the necessary chink in the patriarchal wall surrounding Catholic male dominance. It is the crack that will eventually cause another section of the barrier against gender equality to crumble.